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Abstract: This article examines the interactions between Kang Youwei and Inukai Tsuyoshi around the time of Kang's first sojourn in Japan (1898–98). By presenting a translation of an unexamined poetic work by Kang Youwei, "Mutangji," it highlights an attempt to foster cooperative Sino-Japanese ties based on Confucian values. It thus reveals a philosophical basis for Inukai Tsuyoshi's involvement with China, and raises the question of whether a more idealist, rather than purely strategic, Sino-Japanese alliance held potential for success in the prewar period.

"I am Japan's Kang Youwei, You are China's Inukai Tsuyoshi": A Case of Idealism in Sino-Japanese Relations at the Turn of the Twentieth Century

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Introduction

This essay examines the intellectual relationship between Japanese parliamentarian Inukai Tsuyoshi 犬養毅 (1855–1932) and Chinese philosopher and political reformer Kang Youwei 康有為 (1858–1927). It focuses on the exchanges between these two men during Kang's first visit to Japan from October 1898 to March 1899, and considers the potentials of their vision of a shared Sino-Japanese Confucian civilization. The emphasis is on these ideas and their contexts; and even though their vision did not leave a lasting legacy, as politicians of considerable influence in their day, their ideas could have exercised great sway over the public. Granted, in the twentieth century, a great deal of harm has been done in the name of pan-Asian solidarity; the example of the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere springs immediately to mind. But, it is also important to resist the tendency to reduce all historical versions of Asian regionalism to justifications for imperialism.[1] On the contrary, I believe it is timely to reflect on this largely overlooked case of idealism (in the political sense) in the Sino-Japanese relationship—both for the unfulfilled potentials of its articulation of a shared identity for China and Japan, and the light the case sheds on the political limits of cooperation between their two countries in the decades prior to the Asia Pacific War (1937–45).

As a framing device, I will present a translation of a relatively unknown poetic work, "Mutangji" (木堂記, Record of the wood cottage) that Kang composed during this sojourn. The title of the work is a reference to Inukai's *nom de plume* Bokudō (Ch: *mutang*). It is one of the only records of their communications during this period, which were mainly conducted through letters or "brush talk."[2] In either case, the linguistic medium would have been written classical

[1] Indeed, Sven Saaler has argued that there is a tendency among historians to treat pan-Asianism as "much discredited" idea "as a result of of its prewar history." Sven Saaler, "Pan-Asianism in Modern Japanese History: Overcoming the Nation, Creating a Region, Forging an Empire," in Sven Saaler and Victor J. Koschmann eds., *Pan-Asianism in Modern Japanese History: Colonialism, Regionalism, and Borders* (London: Routledge, 2007), p.2.

[2] Kang's autobiographical work, *Kang Nanhai ziding nianpu* (康南海自訂年譜) ends with his arrival in Japan in 1898. The continuation of this work compiled after his death by his daughter Kang Wenpei (康文佩) *Kang Nanhai xiansheng nianpu xubian* (康南海先生年譜續編,) devotes only half a page to the remainder of Kang's first visit to Japan. Neither work provides more than a cursory list of people and places. Kang Youwei, *Kang Nanhai ziding nianpu* (Chronological autobiography of Kang Nanhai) (Taibei: Wenhai Chuban, 1972), p. 77; Kang Wenpei 康文佩, *Kang Nanhai xiansheng nianpu xubian* 康南海先生年譜續編 (Continuation of Mr. Kang Nanhai's chronological biography) (Taibei: Wenhai Chuban, 1972), p. 1.

Chinese.[3] It placed the two men on relatively equal footing, since neither understood the other's spoken language. Inukai could not have been unaware of the differences in their positions, and in political power between China and Japan.[4] But, it seems that he chose to treat Kang as his equal, and even identified with him. "Mutangji" contains the remarkable lines: "Inukai Tsuyoshi spoke to Kang Youwei: 'You are China's Inukai Tsuyoshi, I am Japan's Kang Youwei.'" Even if not faithful to their actual dialogue, the work suggests a feature in Inukai's overall approach to China—avoiding the language of Japanese patronage and leadership, while affirming a shared identity—that contributed to his political mission to stabilize Sino-Japanese relations. And, considering Inukai's words and deeds over the remainder of his career, this intellectual affinity with Kang Youwei was not a momentary element in his politics, even if political realities eventually led him to establish political alliances with Chinese leaders of different ideological orientations.

On a different level, these exchanges allow a reinterpretation of Inukai's historical legacy, and proposes a philosophical connection between his approach to Japan's democracy and relationship with China. To date, the international and domestic dimensions of his political career have not been adequately analyzed in an integrated framework. By connecting these dimensions, this article offers a portrait of Inukai as a more idealist politician than has been previously acknowledged. I take as my point of departure a 1968 article by Tetsuo Najita in *The American Historical Review*, which despite its age is still the most important analysis of Inukai's historical significance in the English language. In this article, Najita distilled from Inukai's political career the wider dilemma between idealism and pragmatism in Japan's prewar democracy. Najita makes the case that Inukai's approach to party politics was highly pragmatic, but justified by traditional ethical concepts from the Confucian tradition. This was because Inukai believed that the political parties could only flourish in Japan if they "satisfied the ethical expectations of the public." He thereby sought to construct a "righteous politics" (善政) from *jin* (仁, Ch. *ren*), the virtue of benevolence, believing that this ideal of unselfish dedication to society would make party politics compatible with Japanese tradition.[5] Such a position showed his discontent with arguments made by contemporaries like Hara Kei 原敬 (1856–1921) and Ōishi Masami 大石正己 (1855–1935) that "politics was power and that the satisfaction of

[3] Brush talk need not be in classical Chinese, as Christopher T. Keaveney points out, though it seems that it was in this case. Tang Zhijun (湯治鈞) cites a record of the brush talk between the two men in his 1997 monograph *Kang Youwei zhuan*, though I have not been able to locate it. Christopher T. Keaveney, *Beyond Brushtalk: Sino-Japanese Literary Exchange in the Interwar Period* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2009), p. 3; Tang Zhijun 湯治鈞, *Kang Youwei zhuan* 康有為傳 (The biography of Kang Youwei) (Taibei, Taiwan: Taibei Shangwu Yinshu Guan, 1997), p. 317.

[4] Kang was a political refugee, while Inukai was by this point already a former cabinet minister. Japan had also renegotiated its treaties with the Western powers to achieve political equality; the Qing, however, remained under similar treaties to the West and now also Japan as well.

[5] Tetsuo Najita, "Inukai Tsuyoshi: Some Dilemmas in Party Development in Pre-World War II Japan," *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 74 No. 2 (Dec. 1968): pp. 492–94. The political parties of Meiji Japan were without precedent, and had to be justified based on a preexisting "universe of ethical assumptions: sincerity between men, unselfish dedication to serve all of society, a spiritual consensus based on personal loyalties."

private economic and political interests was a *sine qua non* in party politics." Inukai's was therefore an idealistic project, and one that ultimately failed because he found it impossible to balance Confucian ethical ideals with the pragmatic, deal-making nature of party politics.[6]

The existing scholarship has refrained from extending such an idealist argument to Inukai's involvement with Asianist causes. Instead, Inukai biographers Huang Zijin 黄自進 and Tokitō Hideto 時任英人 have tied Inukai's thinking on Japan's "China problem" to the pursuit of national interest and little else. They argue that Inukai sought to cultivate ties with Chinese reformers and revolutionaries at the end of the 1890s in order to strengthen Japan's position in a military rivalry with the Qing dynasty. In other words, he was pursuing a foreign policy in line with the goals of the Matsukata-Ōkuma 松方・大隈 and Ōkuma-Itagaki 大隈・板垣 cabinets (9/1896–1/1898, 6/1898–11/1898). With Japan's intervention during the Boxer Rebellion (1899–1901) the potential for such rivalry receded, and Inukai's goals then shifted to promoting Japan's economic penetration of China—to help Japan overcome its status as a late-developer vis-a-vis the Western Powers. For that purpose, so the line of argument goes, Inukai sought above all a stable, pro-Japan political regime in China in order to make Sino-Japanese cooperation possible.[7] The historical consensus is that Inukai did not care about the ultimate form of China's new government—whether republic or constitutional monarchy—so long as these pragmatic goals were met.[8]

However, works that deal with Inukai and Sun Yatsen 孫文 (1866–1925) emphasize the friendship shared by the two men, which seems at odds with the political pragmatism by which Inukai was supposedly driven. After all, with the failure of Sun's Second Revolution, Sun should have lost his strategic usefulness for Inukai. But the two men would remain in contact. At the end of his life, Inukai would declare his friendship for (the late) Sun with pride; during his highly publicized final visit to China in 1929, he released a statement to newspapers claiming to be "one of Sun Yatsen's oldest friends in Japan."[9] Similarly, Sun's thoughts turned to Inukai and other Japanese patrons when he was on his death bed in 1925.[10] This bond between the two men, however, has not been used to establish idealist inclinations in Inukai's pan-Asianist interventions; rather, it has been explained as a personal, chivalrous bond—i.e. a friendship outside the realm of political calculus.[11]

Nevertheless, the preeminence of Inukai's relationship with Sun Yatsen in the historiography, has overshadowed his relationship with Sun's early rival, Kang Youwei. There are

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[6] Ibid., pp. 502–3.

[7] Tokitō Hideto 時任英人, "Inukai Tsuyoshi to Chūgoku" 犬養毅と中国 (Inukai Tsuyoshi and China), *Seiji keizai shigaku* 政治経済史学 Vol. 1 (1984): p. 22; Huang Zijin 黄自進, "Inukai Tsuyoshi to Chūgoku: Hoku-Shin jihen o chūshin ni" 犬養毅と中国：北清事変を中心に (Inukai Tsuyoshi and China: On the north Qing incident), *Keiō gijuku daigaku daigakuin hōgaku kenkyūka ronbunshū* 慶應義塾大學大學院法學研究科論文集, Vol. 26 (1987): p. 56.

[8] Tokitō Hideto "Inukai Tsuyoshi to Chūgoku", pp. 17, 20–21.

[9] *Asahi shinbun* 朝日新聞, May 24, 1929, morning ed., p2; *Shibao* 時報, May 24, 1929.

[10] Marius Jansen, *The Japanese and Sun Yat-sen* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1954), p. 199.

[11] Tokitō Hideto, *Inukai Tsuyoshi: Sono miryoku to jisshō* 犬養毅：その魅力と実像 (Inukai Tsuyoshi: His appeal and real image), (Okayama: Sanyō Shinbun Sha, 2002) pp. 166–67.

many reasons for this. With regard to Inukai, his relationship with Sun gained in political currency with the latter's canonization as "father of the Chinese nation" in the late-1920s. As a result, Inukai's later statements regarding the Sino-Japanese relationship made ample reference to Sun, but not Kang. This tendency was on display during his 1929 visit to China, and in that sense, Inukai was involved in rewriting his own history to align with the political imperatives of the moment. Nevertheless, there is value in reviving an awareness of Inukai's earlier support for Kang because it reminds us that Inukai's support for Chinese reformers was also motivated by shared ideals. Kang and Inukai made repeated reference to Confucian concepts as both the foundation of a modern Chinese political system and a shared East Asian civilization. Despite Inukai's pragmatic support for Sun Yatsen, Kang Youwei was to him a kindred scholar who offered a politically compatible and culturally relevant vision of Sino-Japanese cooperation.

"Mutangji": Inukai Meets Kang

"Mutangji" is a short poetic tribute to Inukai written by Kang. It has not been analyzed to any significant extent, and was not even known to Chinese-language scholarship until its discovery and publication in 1981. The source of that "discovery" was Japan, when Kansai University professor Sakade Yoshinobu 坂出祥伸 mailed a selection of letters and calligraphic manuscripts to Jiang Guilin 蔣貴麟, who was editing the collected works of Kang Youwei.[12] Japanese scholars had long been aware of the manuscript—a photograph of it, showing Kang's beautiful *zhaoti* (趙體) brushwork, was included in Washio Yoshinao's 1939 biography of Inukai Tsuyoshi *Inukai Bokudō den* (犬養木堂伝).[13] Nevertheless, Japanese works, including Sakade's, have not provided a transcription, nor any detailed analysis of the work's content.[14]

What follows is a provisional translation of the text, a retelling of its context, and an exploration of its historical signficance and potentials. The translation is only partial. The text represents the two scholars through the trope of counterpart trees, and I have omitted several passages that catalog the trees at Inukai's study and Kang's school that engage in elaborate word play relating to trees. While these may be of literary interest, I have not found them to carry political significance. I leave to those more skillful than myself the task of further translation and explication.

[12] Jiang Guilin 蔣貴麟, "Riren suocang Kang Nanhai xiansheng yimo" 日人所藏康南海先生遺墨 (Calligraphy left behind by Mr. Kang Nanhai held by Japanese), *Dalu zazhi* 大陸雜誌 62:1 (1981): pp. 36–40.

[13] It is unclear where this manuscript currently is, though presumably, it was in Inukai's possession until his death. Washio Yoshinao 鷲尾義直, *Inukai Bokudō den* 犬養木堂傳 (The story of Inukai Bokudō) (Tokyo: Tōyō Keizai Shinpō Sha 東洋経済新報社, 1939).

[14] Sakade Yoshinobu 坂出祥伸, *Kō Yūi: Yūtopia no kaika* 康有為—ユートピアの開花 (Kang Youwei: Blossoming of utopia), (Tokyo: Shūei Sha 集英社, 1985), p. 277.

Mutangji (Record of the Wood Cottage, 1899)

In China, there is a scholar Kang Youwei, who built a grand lecture hall in Guangzhou that he called the Thatched Cottage of the Myriad Woods [萬木草堂]. . . . In Japan [日本] there is a benevolent scholar, called Inukai Tsuyoshi who built an elegant study in Edo and gave it the name Wood Cottage [木堂]. . . . Kang Youwei used a tree to prop up a decaying China [支那], and he sought to reform and renovate it. A new structure was only just built, but a cyclone felled the tree, the structure collapsed, and Kang was cast adrift to the shore of the East Sea [東海]. Inukai Tsuyoshi of the East Sea used a tree to support a renovated Japan, with its beautiful multilayered structure. It had only just begun functioning when it met with a cyclone. The tree tilted, but stood strong on the East Sea. The two trees met in the East Sea; embraced each other with branches intertwining; gazing up to the heavens, down to earth, and over the realm; leading East Asia [東亞] in a new direction; serving as bridge, as boat, filling Bohai [渤海] and connecting it. Inukai Tsuyoshi spoke to Kang Youwei: "You are China's Inukai Tsuyoshi, I am Japan's Kang Youwei." Kang Youwei said: "I see that tree, with short trunk and shallow roots, with weak branches and withered leaves, devastated by the gale, and snapped suddenly by the storm. . . . But your tree in Japan [搏桑], so verdant, grasping the clouds and supporting the sky . . . It truly is a bridge that spans the East Sea, a great structure that holds up the world! So, how can this dead tree compare to yours? If it were to receive sustenance of rain and dew,[15] a share of spring's bounty, this dead tree could return to vitality, and accompany the tree of Japan, to be rafter and pillar, to be peg and base, one as warp, one as weft.[16] May it be of assistance in promoting the great structure of East Asia [東海大陸]!"

[15] Rain and dew (雨露) here can refer to goodwill and aid.

[16] A play on 經緯天地, which means to rule over the world.

木堂記
支那有一士，康有為廣廈，築講堂於粵，號之曰萬木草堂。森森萬木，松柏豫章，杞梓楩楠，椅桐及桑，樫據檀梅，李桃長楊。日本有元夫，曰犬養毅子遠，築高齋於江戶，號之曰木堂。松柏豫章，杞梓楩楠，椅桐及桑，沉檀木香，桂椒芬芬。皆將 修柯以拂雲，普蔭暍於大地。康有為既以一木支柱廢毀之支那，欲改革而新之，堂構甫繕，颶起木折，堂構傾毀，漂流于東海之濱。東海犬養毅以一木拄維新之日本，而層重美麗之堂構，堂構甫營，颶起木欹，猶仡立東海上。兩木遇于東海，為合抱木，為連理木，相與俛仰二儀，顧盼大地，指揮東亞， 為橋為梁，為舟為方，填塞渤海而溝通之。犬養毅告康有為曰：「子支那之犬養毅也，僕日本之康有為也。」康有為曰：「吾自視其木，幹短根淺，枝弱葉凋，摧殘于疾風，峻折于暴雨，利斧銛斤，冷之殪之，鋤之伐之，拽之拔之，萌芽將披，又踐絕之，荄核垂萎，黃葉翳迷，荒僵支離，生氣慘淒，已為枯木之枝哉！」吾子擢秀搏桑，拏雲撐天，吞霞吐煙，旭日浴沒，出入其中，深根蔓延，蟠結于三島，條枝修長，蔭達乎大瀛，鵬翼若垂雲巢其上，鶯鳩燕雀翱翔其下，蟻附蜂又萬億千，其癭瘤霜皮十圍容修蛇末條千尺，容人之攀也。其氣象之鉅遠，匠石顧之，撟舌瞪目，駭聳惶惶而莫可量也。此真橫東海之梁，營中天之巨構者哉，而何枯木之比乎？倘承雨露之餘潤，分天地之盎春，枯木復生氣，則隨搏桑之木枝，為桷為楹，為楔為據，一經之， 一緯之，或余促東海大陸之巨構，其亦有助也耶！木堂之中，一花一石，一池一壑，蕭然以意遠，穆然而風清，出入日月，吞吐山河。康有為既登堂，蔭其嘉木，于孔子生二千四百五十年之春記之，並書之。[17]

The grandiose and dramatic imagery of "Mutangji" reflects Kang's perspective on his first visit to Japan and the events that preceded it. The work was written during this visit, and is dated "spring" (春) of the 2450th year of Confucius. This corresponds to the three months starting from February 10 of 1899, the start of the lunar year. Kang Youwei left Japan on March 22.[18] Therefore, the manuscript was likely written sometime in late February or early March. This was a tumultuous time for Kang and his political movement, which is suggested at the end of the work by reference to a frail, devastated tree dependent on Inukai's support.

In addition to word play relating to trees, the text also includes some terms that convey a range of interpretations. The word which I have translated as "structure" (堂構), can be understood literally as the building of a house, but has been metaphorically linked to governing a country ever since the ancient *Book of Documents* (尚書).[19] In that sense, the construction metaphor can be extended to describe political programs initiated by Kang, which he likens both to Japan's Meiji political order, and an imagined and emergent East Asian political structure. Regarding the geographical concepts that Kang used, Japan is variously described as *dong hai* (東海), *bosang* (搏桑), and *riben* (日本).[20] His conception of East Asia is expressed as "East

[17] Kang Youwei, "Mutangji" (1899) quoted in Jiang, "Riren suocang Kang Nanhai xiansheng yimo," p. 36.
[18] Sakade, *Kō Yūi*, p. 243, Tokitō, *Inukai Tsuyoshi: Sono miryoku to jisshō*, pp. 130–31.
[19] *Hanyu da cidian* 漢語大詞典 (Great dictionary of the Chinese language), s.v. 堂構 def. 1.
[20] There are historical uses of 東海 to refer to Japan, or at least include it geographically. For instance, see Zou Tao 鄒弢, "Hai wai yin" 海外吟 (Foreign song) in *Sanjie lüzhui tan* 三借廬贅譚 Vol. 5 (1885), p. 24). In this text, Kang suggests Japan with 東海 but also specifies the country with the terms 搏桑 and 日本.

Sea and continent" (東海大陸), suggesting Japan and China, but does not mention Korea as a separate entity. Interestingly, the text claims Bohai, the body of water between China and Korea, as the conduit that connects East Asia. These linguistic choices suggest an attempt to blur political boundaries, but also indicate an emphasis on China and Japan to the neglect of Korea. While the exchanges suggested by this text therefore speak expansively of a unified Asia, the substance of the region seems to be nothing more than China and Japan; the political problem of Korea, which was falling under Japanese suzerainty, does not appear.

"In Japan there is a benevolent scholar, called Inukai Tsuyoshi . . ."

This opening section introduces the men as scholars in the Confucian tradition with reference to their respective halls of learning. In contrast to other "liberals" of his age like Yoshino Sakuzō 吉野作造 (1878–1933), Inukai largely abjured Western political theory in favor of Sino-Japanese intellectual traditions.[21] His early education in his home domain of Niwase (later to be part of Okayama Prefecture) took place under the tutelage of a relative and Confucian scholar named Inukai Shōsō 犬飼松窓 (1816–93).[22] Throughout his career, Inukai was famous for his mastery of Confucian concepts and argumentation—the reading public witnessed these skills in debates over Edo-period shogunal adviser Ogyû Sorai 荻生徂徠 (1666–1728) in the pages of *Nipponjin* (日本人) in 1896, and once again in the *Osaka mainichi shinbun* (大阪毎日新聞) in 1915.[23] In that sense, Inukai's approach to politics, both domestic and international, derived from a conservative, culturalist world of assumptions. By the time that Kang arrived in Tokyo, Inukai was residing at a house in Tokyo, at Ushigome Babashita (牛込馬場下), a location near Waseda University.[24] It is not clear if he ever called this residence his *bokudō* (wood cottage), nor is it clear when he adopted this pen name.

Kang Youwei also conducted his political activism through traditionalist idioms, but achieved renown as a Confucian scholar and teacher to a far greater extent than Inukai. From 1891 to 1898, Kang taught at a school in Guangzhou called the Wanmu Caotang (萬木草堂), which I have translated literally above. He justified institutional reform on the basis of Chinese history and the tradition of Confucian values. In his work *Kongzi gaizhi kao* (孔子改制考, study of Confucius as a reformer, pub. 1897), he expounded on his thesis that reform was inherent to

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[21] Yoshino Sakuzō was most famous by his advocacy for "people-centered democracy" (民本主義, *minponshugi*), and according to Jungsun Han, his liberalism largely drew from his studies of Western learning and Christianity. Joel Joos, "The Liberal Asianism of Inukai Tsuyoshi (1855–1932): Japanese Relations with the Mainland between Opportunism, Pragmatism and Idealism," *Kōchi joshi daikgaku kiyō: Bungakubu hen* 高知女子大学紀要:文学部編 Vol. 60 (2011): p. 31; Jung-Sun Han, *An Imperial Path to Modernity: Yoshino Sakuzō and a New Liberal Order in East Asia, 1905–1937*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 2012), p. 41.

[22] Joseph L. Sutton, *A Political Biography of Inukai Tsuyoshi*, Phd. Dissertation (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1954), pp. 5–7.

[23] His affirmation of Sorai is somewhat out of keeping with the Inukai family tradition, which claimed an intellectual lineage to the school of Yamazaki Ansai 山崎闇斎. Tokitō, *Inukai Tsuyoshi: Sono miryoku to jisshō*, pp. 187–98.

[24] Washio, *Inukai Bokudō den*, p. 726.

Confucianism—arguing that Confucius himself developed his ideas to reform institutions and establish laws in his time.[25] He moreover articulated a progressive view of human development in his *Lunyu zhu* (論語注, Annotation of the *Analects*, pub. 1902) that included a vision of evolution through "three ages": from the Age of Disorder, to the Age of Order, to the Age of Peace. Humanity likewise progresses from tribes, to nations, and ultimately to the "Grand Commonality" (大同, Ch. *datong*). Accordingly, institutions and methods of rule should follow the age.[26] To Kang, the Qing state was out of step with a world evolving into the age of order. In early 1898, he submitted to the Guangxu emperor 光緒帝 of the Qing Dynasty a memorial for institutional reform that cited the nearby example of Japan as a highly applicable model.[27] Prior to his first visit to Japan, Kang already sought answers to China's political problems from its often aggressive neighbor. It would not be long for him and his eager colleagues to implement these lessons.

"**A cyclone felled the tree, the structure collapsed . . ."**

In the summer of 1898, the Guangxu emperor appointed a number of reformers, including Kang and his disciple Liang Qichao 梁啟超 (1873–1929), as his advisors and began issuing decrees to reorganize China as a constitutional monarchy along the lines of Meiji Japan. Retrospectively, this movement was has been known as the Hundred Days Reform (戊戌變法), based on the approximate length of its viability. Japanese leaders were following these events with great interest and many clearly wished for their success. Itō Hirobumi 伊藤博文 was in the midst of a trip to Korea and China, and even met with the Guangxu emperor on the movement's one hundred and second day.[28] Moreover, according to the writings of Ōkuma Shigenobu's secretary Aoyanagi Atsutsune 青柳篤恒 (1877–1951), Ōkuma and Shinagawa Yajirō 品川弥治郎 (1843–1900) supported a plan to bring the Guangxu emperor to Kyūshū to meet the Meiji emperor. The plan was supported by Kang Youwei, but in the end came to nothing.[29] On September 21, the day after Itō's audience with the Guangxu emperor, the empress dowager Cixi 慈禧太后 launched a palace coup that brought the reform movement to a bloody close. The dowager empress placed the Guangxu Emperor under house arrest and had six reformers tried and executed on Sept. 28. Kang Youwei was in transit to Shanghai when the coup took place,

[25] William Theodore De Bary and Richard John Lufrano, eds., *Sources of Chinese Tradition: From 1600 Through the Twentieth Century*, 2nd ed. Vol. 2 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), p. 266.
[26] Ibid., pp. 266–68.
[27] Jonathan D. Spence, *The Gate of Heavenly Peace: The Chinese and Their Revolution* (New York: Viking Penguin, 1981), p. 47.
[28] Nagai Kazumi 永井算巳, "Shinmatsu ni okeru zai-Nichi Kō-Ryō ha no seiji dōsei (1): Kō Yūi Ryō Keichō no Nihon bōmei to sono go no dōsei" 清末における在日康梁派の政治動静(1)—康有為梁啓超の日本亡命とその後の動静 (Late-Qing political activities of the Kang-Liang faction in Japan [part 1]: The exile of Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao to Japan and aftermath), *Jinbun kagaku ronshū: Shinshū daigaku jinbun gakubu* 人文科学論集—信州大学人文学部 No. 1 (Dec. 1966): p. 4.
[29] Ibid., pp. 2–3.

and with British help fled to Hong Kong on a P&O steamer. Kang's reform program had met a cyclone of political repression.

"**Kang was cast adrift to the shore of the East Sea . . ."**

After Kang's flight to Hong Kong, Inukai Tsuyoshi played a role in bringing him to Japan. Even before the Hundred Days, Inukai had heard of Kang through his main informants on Chinese affairs, Miyazaki Tōten 宮崎滔天 (1871–1922) and Hirayama Shû 平山周 (1870–1940). The two men traveled to China in early 1898 to reestablish contact with Chinese revolutionaries affiliated with Sun Yat-sen, and during this visit they also came to know of Kang Youwei.[30] The Tō-A Kai (東亜会, East Asia society), which Inukai helped establish in spring 1897, was sympathetic to Kang's reform movement, and in spring 1898 they accepted Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao as members.[31] This decision was likely facilitated by one of Kang Youwei's former students at the Wanmu Caotang academy, Xu Qin 徐勤 (1873–1945).[32] Xu had arrived in Yokohama in fall 1897 to serve as principal of a Chinese school.[33] That school was named Zhongxi Xuexiao (中西學校, School of east and west) when it was planned by Sun Yatsen and his ally Chen Shaobai 陳少白 (1869–1934), but Xu changed its name to Datong Xuexiao (大同學校, School of grand commonality) in honor of Kang Youwei's philosophy.[34]

During Kang's flight from Qing authorities, these Japanese connections came into play. On Oct. 2, the president of the Tō-A Kai, Andō Shunmei 安東俊明 wrote a letter to prime minister Ōkuma Shigenobu and urged him to take action: "Kang and Liang are both members of the Tō-A Kai, and based on the principle of friendship [朋友の義] we can not stand by while they are wrongly executed."[35] Inukai had Miyazaki Tōten meet with Kang in Hong Kong, and then arranged to bring him to Japan. When Kang arrived in Tokyo on Oct. 25, he initially stayed at a *ryokan* called Mihashi (三橋), and Inukai's protégé Kashiwabara Buntarō 柏原文太郎

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[30] Tokitō, *Inukai Tsuyoshi: Sono miryoku to jisshō*, p. 128.

[31] Douglas Reynolds, *China, 1898–1912: The Xinzheng Revolutioni and Japan* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993), p. 106.

[32] Xu also worked as a journalist for Liang Qichao's *Shiwubao* 時務報 newspaper. "Zappō: Daidō gakkō" 雑報：大同学校 (Miscellaneous reports: Datong Xuexiao,) *Tōyō sensō dan*: *Shō kokumin* 東洋戦相談—少国民(10th Anniversary Supplement, 1898): p. 148. Urs Matthias Zachmann, "The Foundation Manifesto of the Tōa Dōbunkai (East Asian Common Culture Society), 1898," in *Pan-Asianism: A Documentary History: Vol. 1 1850–1920*, edited by Sven Saaler and Christopher W. A. Szpilman (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2011), pp. 115–16.

[33] Yokohama Yamate Chūkagakkō hyakunen kōshi henshū iinkai 横浜山手中華学校百年校史編集委員会, "Bainian xiaoshi" 百年校史 (Hundred-year school history), in Yokohama Yamate Chūka Gakkō hyakunen kōshi henshū iinkai ed., *Yokohama Yamate Chūka Gakkō hyakunen kōshi* 横浜山手中華学校百年校史, (Yokohama: Yokohama Yamate Chūka Gakuen, 2005), p. 45.

[34] Chen Shaobai 陳少白, *Xingzhonghui geming shiyao* 興中會革命史要 (Main historical points of the Xingzhonghui's revolution), (Nanjing: Jianguo yuekanshe, 1935), p. 44; Ye Mingcheng 葉明成, "Chūgoku daidō gakkō-shi" 中国大同学校史 (History of the Chinese Datong Xuexiao), in Yokohama Yamate Chūkagakkō hyakunen kōshi henshū iinkai ed., *Yokohama Yamate Chūkagakkō hyakunen kōshi* (Yokohama: Yokohama Yamate Chūka Gakuen, 2005), p. 625; Sugawara Kōsuke 菅原幸助, *Nihon no kakyō* 日本の華僑 (The overseas Chinese in Japan), 1st ed. (Tokyo: Asahi shinbunsha, 1991), p. 39.

[35] Nagai, "Shinmatsu ni okeru zai-Nichi Kō-Ryō ha no seiji dōsei (1)," p. 2.

(1869–1936) was put in charge of his day-to-day needs and safety.[36] Four days later, Kang moved to a house in Ichigaya owned by Ōuchi Chōzō 大内暢三, who was secretary to Konoe Atsumaro 近衛篤麿 (1863–1904). Konoe was a leading pan-Asian voice and president of the House of Peers; after the merger of the Tō-A Kai and the Dōbunkai (同文会) in November 1898, he would preside over the newly formed Tōa dōbunkai (東亞同文会, East Asia common culture society).[37] Financial aid for Kang and his entourage was provided by Konoe, as well as Inukai, Itō Hirobumi, and Ōkuma Shigenobu. Ministry of Foreign Affairs records indicate that Kang stayed in Ichigaya for about three months, moving to Ushigome Tsurumaki-chō (牛込鶴巻町) in the vicinity of Waseda around the start of 1899. The name they gave this house was Mingyige (明夷閣, Hall of "brightness hidden"), and it was situated in the same Tokyo district where Inukai had sheltered Sun Yatsen during the years 1897–98.[38] In this way, Kang had arrived at the nexus of Asianist thought and activism in Japan, gaining protection and financial support much as Sun Yatsen had.

"The two trees met in the East Sea, embraced each other . . ."

The day after Kang arrived in Tokyo, Sun Yatsen requested a meeting with him through Miyazaki Tōten, but Kang refused the request. Inukai had been pushing for cooperation between the two expatriated Chinese leaders, and that evening invited Kang, Liang, Sun Yatsen, and Chen Shaobai to his home. Kang begged off, claiming inconvenient timing, and thus only his disciple Liang went to the meeting. The meeting did not go well.[39] Further attempts to bring Kang and Sun to an accord also ended in failure. As recalled by Kashiwabara Buntarō, Kang said of Sun that "he is not a bad person, but he is too unlearned; he wouldn't understand anything you said to him." And Sun said of Kang, "that corrupt Confucian is no good." Kashiwabara also attributed the failure of cooperation to differences among their supporters: "at that time, many of Sun's supporters in Yokohama were like ruffians. Kang's suporters had the appearance of scholars and gentry. The two groups' personalities did not mesh."[40] Kashiwabara was perhaps unkind to Sun's faction; the main divide at this point was based in socio-economic class, which animated a struggle for control of Chinese organizations in their communities.[41]

While it seems that the terminological bifurcation of reform (改革) from revolution (革命) came about through Kang's writings in spring 1902, the 1898–99 conjuncture may have been

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[36] Sakade, *Kō Yūi*, pp. 242–43; *Asahi shinbun*, Oct. 26, 1898, morning edition, p. 1.

[37] Saitō Taiji 齊藤泰治, "Ōkuma Shigenobu to Tōkyō de no Kō Yūi" 大隈重信と東京での康有爲 (Ōkuma Shigenobu and Kang Youwei in Tokyo), *Kyōyō shogaku kenkyū* 教養諸学研究, No. 126 (2009): pp. 59–60; Nagai "Shin matsu ni okeru zai-Nichi Kō-Ryō ha no seiji dōsei (1)," p. 1.

[38] Saitō, "Ōkuma Shigenobu to Tōkyō de no Kō Yūi," pp. 66–67; Kang, *Kang Nanhai ziding nianpu*, p.77; Mayumi Itoh, *The Origins of Contemporary Sino-Japanese Relations: Zhou Enlai and Japan* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), p. 120.

[39] Huang, "Inukai Tsuyoshi to Chūgoku: Kita shin jihen o chūshin ni," p. 49.

[40] Washio, *Inukai Bokudō den*, p. 737.

[41] Eric Han, *Rise of a Japanese Chinatown: Yokohama, 1894–1972* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2014), p.69.

the beginning of the break between the two movements.[42] In years past, the reformers and revolutionaries had not always held mutual antipathy; some of Kang Youwei's disciples expressed support for Sun's revolutionary faction before the Guangzhou uprising of 1895. Moreover, supporters of Sun Yatsen and Chen Shaobai had accepted Xu Qin as principal of the Datong Xuexiao, and invited other students from the Wanmu Caotang as teachers. However, Kang Youwei's view of the revolutionaries had shifted markedly during his time serving the Guangxu Emperor. As historian Huang Zijin argues, it is likely that Kang felt he could no longer associate with a "national traitor" like Sun because he believed his mission was to restore the Guangxu emperor to power and serve the dynasty.[43]

In that regard, Kang clearly sought more than personal protection from his Japanese patrons. Through the end of October, Kang met with many Japanese leaders and offered his opinion to Japanese newspaper reporters.[44] While engaging in such public relations, he was requesting military intervention from Prime Minister Ōkuma to rescue the Guangxu emperor.[45] He turned to Inukai to convey these requests as well; an undated letter he composed to Inukai around this time suggests his motives and style of persuasion.[46] In this letter, Kang calls upon Inukai to use his influence to secure Japanese intervention. He begins the letter on an idealistic note, with an appeal to the historical and cultural affinity between the two countries. He writes: "our two countries have the same teachings and the same texts [同教同文] . . . and we share the Chinese classics [経義] . . . Japan and China are like brothers, like lips and teeth [兄弟唇歯], and our feelings are intimate." He continues that because of a shared cultural heritage, Japan and China are incapable of debating political affairs from the point of view of Western law. This is why, as he sees it, China's leaders have in recent years "looked East" to Japan's example. He ends with a shift toward realism, suggesting the menacing consequences for Japan of a Qing collapse:

> If you stand by and silently watch the sovereign die miserably, and if the usurper regime then falls, powerholders will do as they please. There will be invasions from outside, and rebellions on the inside, leading to China's destruction. And with this tall tower tilting, your neighboring country may be pushed to the brink of peril as well. You must consider providing us support.[47]

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[42] Jeffrey Wasserstrom and Yidi Wu, "You Say You Want a Revolution: Revolutionary and Reformist Scripts in China, 1894–2014," in Keith Michael Baker and Dan Edelstein eds., *Scripting Revolution: A Historical Approach to the Comparative Study of Revolutions*, (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2015), pp. 239–40.
[43] Huang, "Inukai Tsuyoshi to Chūgoku: Kita shin jihen o chūshin ni," p. 49.
[44] Saitō, "Ōkuma Shigenobu to Tōkyō de no Kō Yūi," p. 63.
[45] Huang, "Inukai Tsuyoshi to Chūgoku: Kita shin jihen o chūshin ni," p. 49.
[46] This letter was almost certainly written prior to Nov. 8, while Ōkuma and Inukai still held cabinet positions. Nagai "Shin matsu ni okeru zai-Nichi Kō-Ryō ha no seiji dōsei (1)," p. 3.
[47] Tei Seikō 鄭正浩, "Inukai Tsuyoshi ate Sunbun, Kō Yūi ra shokan ni tsuite" 犬養毅あて孫文・康有為ら書簡について(Letters from Sun Yatsen and Kang Youwei to Inukai Tsuyoshi), *Ajia bunka* アジア文化 No. 7 (1982): p. 55.

Discussions in the Japanese government did not seem promising for Kang's request. The dominant opinion, including that of navy and army leaders, held that Japanese intervention was premature. Even Konoe Atsumaro did not think that restoring the Guangxu emperor to power would be as easy to accomplish as Kang thought.[48]

"The tree tilted, but stood strong on the East Sea . . ."

Ōkuma's cabinet fell on November 8, 1898, and with it the hope for direct action by the government of Japan. The new cabinet of Yamagata Aritomo 山県有朋 (1838–1922) reversed Japan's stance toward the reformers; because it sought stronger ties with the Qing Dynasty, the government of Japan could no longer openly support anti-Qing radicals.[49] This situation made Kang more reliant on informal Japanese support, particularly Inukai's. But, it is also clear that he was a divisive figure among these activists and politicians.

Even with both Ōkuma and Inukai out of the cabinet, Kang and his reformers seem to have taken the change in government policy in stride. As reported by Miyazaki Tōten to the *Hōchi shinbun* (報知新聞) on Nov. 18,

> They feel the careful protection of the Japanese government, but are also tired of the inconveniences. They spend their days reading the papers, and when they think of home, they shed tears over the heartbreak of the things that happened. The change in cabinet has brought a disappointing turn in their circumstances . . . though they were relieved to hear the news that the emperor is alive and well. Three or four days ago, their boredom became unbearable, and they wanted to go out for a walk; they strolled Ueno Park and greatly enjoyed the zoo. With endless smiles they went around and around . . .[50]

But, Kang apparently also alienated many Japanese supporters with his suspiciousness, inflexibility, and arrogant treatment of Sun Yatsen. This was particularly true of the younger pan-Asian activists who looked up to Sun as an elder brother.[51] Japan's senior statesmen were also divided. Konoe remained supportive, and offered words of encouragement in a Nov. 12 conversation that included his famous declaration of an Asian "Monroe Doctrine." At the same time, however, Konoe brushed aside any consideration of direct Japanese intervention on behalf of the Guangxu emperor.[52] Kang may indeed have been blind to the dangers of asking for foreign interference in China's reform, but was also desperate to return the emperor to power under a constitutional monarchy. On Nov. 18, Kang met a sharply critical Katsu Kaishū 勝海舟

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[48] Nagai, "Shinmatsu ni okeru zai-Nichi Kō-Ryō ha no seiji dōsei (1)," p. 3.
[49] Huang, "Inukai Tsuyoshi to Chūgoku: Kita shin jihen o chūshin ni," pp. 48, 56.
[50] Saitō, "Ōkuma Shigenobu to Tōkyō de no Kō Yūi," p. 65.
[51] Saitō, "Ōkuma Shigenobu to Tōkyō de no Kō Yūi," p. 68; Fukuda Keiko 福田恵子, "Son Ƀun no jinbunzō to Nihonjin nettowâku no kentō: Kō Yūi to hikaku shite" 孫文の人物像と日本人ネットワークの検討—康有為と比較して(Investigating Sun Yatsen's personal image and Japanese network: A comparison with Kang Youwei), *Kokusai kaihatsugaku kenkyū* 国際開発学研究, Vol. 5, No. 2 (2006): p. 52.
[52] Paula Harrell, *Asia for the Asians: China in the Lives of Five Meiji Japanese* (Portland ME: MerwinAsia, 2012), pp. 47–48.

(1823–99), a statesman and former shogunal official who helped administer Japan's navy. Kang presented a manuscript on events in Beijing that summer to the seventy-five-year-old Katsu—as he would present "Mutangji" to Inukai a few months later. In spite of this "gift," the seventy-five-year-old Katsu disparaged Kang's political reform movement as hasty, and declared that it was highly inappropriate for China to request aid from Japan.[53] An *Asahi shinbun* (朝日新聞) reporter happened to be present, and recorded what Katsu had to say after the forty-year-old Kang took his leave:

> Kang is called a scholar, but from what I have seen he is too trusting of men [御人善]; someone like him who comes from the Confucius-Mencius school would have a hard time renovating a great state. It would be better for him to become a teacher in the Yokohama area, and then think of the most appropriate next step.[54]

The Yamagata cabinet wanted Kang and Liang out of the country; it treated very seriously the admonitions from Li Hongzhang (李鴻章, 1823–1901) against harboring political refugees, and held concerns that they could not provide adequate security for Kang, Liang, and their allies. Yamagata wanted to deport Kang, while Konoe Atsumaro and Itō Hirobumi wished for Kang to be allowed to travel to another country of his own accord.[55] This policy was no secret to these men. Liang Qichao had received a personal warning from Foreign Ministry Secretary Narahara Chinsei 樽原陳政 (1862–1900) on December 20 that the government considered them diplomatic liabilities; Narahara even advised them to leave for either the Americas or Britain on the 28th of that month. With this treatment by the Japanese establishment, Kang expressed misgivings about remaining in Japan to his handler, Kashiwabara. He told him that if his presence were so inconvenient, he would be happy to travel to England. This troubled Kashiwabara, who reported the situation to Inukai. Inukai too thought such an outcome would be "nonsense," and decided to negotiate with the government to allow Kang to remain and to provide funds for his support.[56]

"That tree, with short trunk and shallow roots, with weak branches and withered leaves . . ."

Kang moreover still faced fears of arrest or death at the hands of Qing agents. The mass media did not help matters by both revealing Kang's activities and whereabouts, and publicizing rumors of assassination orders. Upon his arrival in Japan, the *Asahi* published an article including the name of his *ryokan* and its address—i.e. Kōjimachi-ku, Hirakawa-machi, 4-chōme (麹町区平河町四丁目). The article rather unhelpfully added that he and his compatriots were

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[53] Saitō, "Ōkuma Shigenobu to Tōkyō de no Kō Yūi," pp. 64–65.
[54] *Asahi shinbun*, Nov. 21, 1898, morning edition, p. 2.
[55] Tokitō, *Inukai Tsuyoshi: Sono miryoku to jisshō*, p. 129; Harrell, *Asia for the Asians*, p. 48.
[56] The precise timing of these discussions with Inukai and Kashiwabara is unclear, because the documents that refer to them are recollections composed decades later. This sequence of events is the most plausible one. Washio, *Inukai Bokudō den*, p. 727.

tired from their journey and "were not accepting visitors."[57] On December 11, however, the same newspaper ominously disseminated a rumor from Beijing that the empress dowager herself had instructed the Zongli Yamen (總理衙門) to issue an order to the Qing ambassador in Japan to either apprehend or kill Kang Youwei—as the situation demanded.[58] Nine days later, the *Asahi* further specified that the Qing court had also ordered the death of Sun Yatsen, though Kang was apparently a greater priority: Kang's head was worth 50,000 *taels* of silver, while the bearer of Sun's head would only receive 20,000 *taels*.[59] About a month later, on January 27, 1899 the newspaper reported that an assassin by the name of Chin (陳?) was already in the country.[60] It is likely that these were but rumors, since neither Kang nor Sun came to serious harm while in Japan.

"A bridge that spans the East Sea, a great structure that holds up the world . . ."

These threats from the Qing did not prevent Kang from pursuing his political mission during these months; nevertheless, he and his supporters faced increasing conflict with revolutionaries aligned with Sun Yatsen and Chen Shaobai. It was during these months that Kang met with Tang Caichang 唐才常 (1867–1900) and conspired to raise a military uprising in 1900.[61] Also, in collaboration with the brothers Feng Jingru 馮鏡如 and Zishan 馮紫栅 in Yokohama, Liang Qichao began publishing a political journal titled *Qingyi bao* (清議報) on December 23, 1898. But, because Kang was increasingly isolated from Japanese support, he relied more heavily on aid from Inukai. These were the unsettled circumstances under which "Mutangji" was written, and the final plaintive lines holding out hope for aid from Inukai reflect Kang's embattled situation.

The most visible rift between Kang and Sun's factions emerged from a battle for control over the Datong Xuexiao in early 1899, which required Inukai's intervention to resolve. Nominally, Inukai sought cooperation between the two factions, but his resolution of the crisis affirmed Kang's movement, both substantively and ideologically. According to Japanese police observers, at the start of January 1899 the existing slate of trustees of the school largely supported Kang Youwei; but this group of Chinese elites was concerned that an impending election for the next term might hand control of the school to the revolutionaries, so they sought to limit voting eligibility to business owners or those employed by foreign firms. This decision was violently contested at a meeting on January 17, after which the leaders cancelled the election and left it in the hands of the Zhonghua Huiguan (中華會館), a governing body in the Yokohama Chinese community. That body announced a slate of school trustees on January 20, and all were from Kang's faction. This led to another round of obstruction and protest by Sun Yatsen's

[57] *Asahi shinbun*, October 26, 1898, morning edition, p. 1.
[58] *Asahi shinbun*, December 11, 1898, morning edition, p. 1.
[59] *Asahi shinbun*, December 20, 1898, morning edition, p. 7.
[60] The surname of the supposed assassin is only specified in *katakana*. *Asahi shinbun*, January 27, 1899, morning edition, p. 7.
[61] Nagai, "Shinmatsu ni okeru zai-Nichi Kō-Ryō ha no seiji dōsei (1)," p. 3.

supporters, activities which were given tacit approval by the Qing dynasty's consulate in Yokohama.[62]

Hoping to resolve these conflicts prior to the start of the new term, the trustees of the school asked Inukai to serve as honorary principal of the school. Inukai accepted the position with pleasure, and funneled some money to support the operation of the school. He then used this opportunity to voice his vision of a joint Sino-Japanese Confucian civilization. On March 18, he and Ōkuma attended the opening ceremony, along with Miyazaki Tōten, Hirayama Shū, and Kashiwabara Buntarō. These Japanese dignitaries greeted the assembled students outside the school gate, then led the assemblage in venerating a statue of Confucius by bowing three times.[63] Inukai then delivered a speech inside the school's main hall that expressed his views on Confucianism, education, and civilizational progress. He declared that he was in deep agreement with this effort to educate Chinese children in Japan; education was necessary to help reform the Qing empire in step with the times and thus lead it toward "civilization [文明]." He also affirmed his commitment to the principles of Confucianism by stating that: "I respect the teachings of Confucius; the word benevolence [仁] has since ancient times been the basis for cultivating yourself and your clan, ruling the kingdom and pacifying the realm [修身亦家，治国平天下]." In conclusion, he promised that he would "take the methods of world civilization and apply them to the teachings of Confucius."[64] While Inukai would not give up his effort to cultivate ties with both the reformers and revolutionaries, the way that he understood China's progress and reform mirrored Kang Youwei's stance. Moreover, his elevation of the virtue of benevolence illustrates the way that Inukai's thinking on domestic politics cohered with his views on Asian alliance.

However, Inukai could not ignore the political pressure to expel Kang from Japan, and Kang's days in Japan were numbered by then. In the end, Foreign Minister Aoki Shûzō 青木周蔵 (1844–1914) sent Itō Hirobumi to pay a personal visit to Inukai on February 27, 1899 to resolve this diplomatic problem. Inukai accepted a plan to send Kang out of the country, with a travel stipend of seven thousand yen and a translator; at the same time, the Japanese government would permit Liang Qichao to remain in the country to carry out his educational plans. The money would be handed to Kang in the form of a gift from his Japanese comrades, presumably to soften the blow of this decision.[65] But, the deal that Itō and Inukai had crafted was quite generous to the expatriates, and not likely to satisfy the Qing court; after all, Kang had been thinking of traveling to England even before his arrival in Japan. Inukai nevertheless condemned Kang's expulsion as a "cowardly and barbarous act" by the Yamagata cabinet. Kang boarded a

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[62] Gaimushō 外務省, *Shinkokujin ni kansuru hōkoku* 清国人に関する報告 (Reports on Qing nationals), No. 32 (Jan. 18, 1899); Gaimushō 外務省, Shinkokujin ni kansuru hōkoku 清国人に関する報告, No. 40 (Jan. 24, 1899).
[63] "Datong xuexiao kaixiao ji" 大同學校開校記 (Record of the opening of the Datong Xuexiao), *Qingyi bao* 清議報, No. 10 (1899): p. 591.
[64] Gaimushō 外務省, *Shinkokujin ni kansuru hōkoku* 清国人に関する報告, No. 109 (March 19, 1899).
[65] Nagai, "Shinmatsu ni okeru zai-Nichi Kō-Ryō ha no seiji dōsei (1)," p. 4.

steamer in Yokohama on the morning of March 22, 1899 bound for Vancouver where he would found his Society to Protect the Emperor (保皇會) that summer.[66]

Aftermath

The political destinies of Sun Yatsen and Kang Youwei diverged greatly over the succeeding decade. One factor in this divergence was their organizational abilities in Japan. Sun Yatsen was able to win the trust of ardent, idealistic men like Miyazaki Tōten, and through him, was able to extend his network of support among Japanese. This extension occurred even in the face of Sun's repeated setbacks and failed uprisings. Kang Youwei, on the other hand, earned the esteem of Japan's political leaders, particularly Inukai and Ōkuma. But the younger Japanese activists permanently lost their respect for Kang after the "Singapore Incident" of 1900, when Kang suspected that Miyazaki and Sun had come to kill him and therefore refused to meet them. This was a last-ditch effort led by Miyazaki to broker some sort of cooperation between the two factions, and left him feeling deeply insulted.[67]

Inukai, however, continued to support both men and their movements, which led to some awkward encounters. At a July 17, 1908 meeting of the Chinese reformist group Zheng Wen She (政聞社), he was asked to clarify why he supported reform but had also called on students to launch an immediate revolution. Inukai responded that, "whether China calls for revolution or reform, the most important thing is for the right people to take responsiblity and carry it out."[68] In the moment, Inukai made a case for expedience and refused to choose sides between the Chinese groups; but, the evidence suggests that across his career it was the reformers, in particular Kang's intellectual project, that appealed to him. Inukai believed that a revitalized Confucianism could serve as a cultural link between China and Japan, and an authentic basis for modernization in East Asia. In spite of the retrospective historical emphasis on Inukai's friendship with Sun Yatsen, for the first decade of the twentieth century Inukai apparently believed that Kang Youwei was the most likely leader of a modern China.[69] In August of 1911, he declared that he did not believe that a successful revolution led by Sun Yatsen and Huang Xing 黃興 (1874–1916) was imminent.[70] This assessment derived from his rather static view of Chinese society as both individualistic and conservative. He also had an optimistic assessment of the Qing dynasty's own reforms that created province-level elected assemblies and modernized army units. Inukai's two visits to China during the previous decade, in 1903 and 1907–8, gave him a view of these reforms in person. And he noted that the local assemblies were dominated by gentry who were sympathetic to the Society to Protect the Emperor.[71] Ultimately,

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[66] Tokitō, *Inukai Tsuyoshi: Sono miryoku to jisshō*, p. 131.
[67] Fukuda, "Sonbun no jinbunzō," pp. 51–55; Jansen, *The Japanese and Sun Yat-sen*, pp. 87–88.
[68] Tokitō, "Inukai Tsuyoshi to Chūgoku," p. 17.
[69] Fukuda, "Sonbun no jinbunzō," p. 54; Tokitō, *Inukai Tsuyoshi: Sono miryoku to jisshō*, p. 139.
[70] Tokitō, "Inukai Tsuyoshi to Chūgoku," p. 18.
[71] Chin Bibi 沈薇薇, "Chūgoku no shotaimen: Inukai Tsuyoshi no dai ikkai, dai nikai Chūgoku yūreki ni tsuite" 中国との初対面—犬養毅の第一回、第二回中国遊歴について (First encounter with China: Regarding Inukai

Inukai believed that reform of the Qing dynasty as a constitutional monarchy was most appropriate for China's political reality and national character.[72]

The Xinhai Revolution (辛亥革命) then took Inukai completely by surprise when it broke out on October 11, 1911. But, even with the revolution Inukai did not abandon Kang Youwei, whom he considered more politically influential than even Yuan Shikai 袁世凱 (1859–1916), leader of the Beiyang Army (北洋軍).[73] When he set out for China in December to witness the revolution first hand, Inukai first called on Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao in Kobe. After more than ten years in Hong Kong, Singapore, Penang, India, and Europe, they had returned to Japan on June 7, 1911.[74] Once again, Inukai urged Kang and Liang Qichao to join forces with Sun and the revolutionaries—and this time they assented. Inukai arrived in Shanghai on Dec. 19, nearly a week before Sun Yatsen's return from the United States; according to an *Asahi* newspaper report of December 27, 1911, Inukai distributed ten thousand copies of "Kang Youwei's opinion on republican government [共和政治]" after his arrival. It is likely that this was Kang's *Jiuwanglun* (救亡論, On saving the nation) of November 1911, which extolled the virtues of constitutional monarchy and warned against the immediate adoption of republican government.[75] Inukai's proposal, however, met with a frosty response from the revolutionaries; Inukai had clearly misjudged attitudes in China toward the reform movement, support for which dipped sharply after its failure to win the creation of a national assembly in 1910.[76] It has been argued that Inukai's primary motivation was a political calculation that an alliance between reformist and revolutionary factions could prevail against Yuan Shikai, who was perceived as anti-Japanese.[77] However, there is also significant evidence that Inukai preferred a political regime based on existing political ideals and institutions.

Inukai moreover remained interested in Kang's philosophical writings and maintained friendly relations. After the ferment and disappointment of the Xinhai Revolution, Inukai took a trip with Kang and Liang to Nikkō, Hakone, Kyoto, and Hiroshima in fall 1912.[78] It was at Yugawara Onsen in Hakone that Kang showed Inukai a draft of his *Datong shu* (大同書, Book of grand commonality). As Kang attested in a 1919 telegram, at that time Inukai lauded the draft with the words "in the thousands of years of East Asia's history, there has not been a book like this [自有東亞數千年以來, 未曾有此書也]." Evidently hearing of Inukai's praise, Xu Qin wrote to Kashiwabara in 1924 to ask both Inukai and Kashiwabara to compose forewords for the

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Tsuyoshi's first and second travels in China), *Higashi Ajia bunka kōshō kenkyū* 東アジア文化交渉研究, No. 5 (2/2012): pp. 163, 170.

[72] Tokitō, *Inukai Tsuyoshi: Sono miryoku to jisshō*, pp. 139–45.

[73] Tokitō, *Inukai Tsuyoshi: Sono miryoku to jisshō*, p. 139.

[74] Sakade, *Kō Yūi*, pp. 245–46.

[75] Huang Zijin 黃自進, "Inukai Tsuyoshi to Chūgoku: Shingai kakumei o chūshin ni" 犬養毅：辛亥革命を中心に (Inukai Tsuyoshi and the Xinhai revolution), *Keiō gijuku daigaku daigakuin hōgaku kenkyūka ronbunshū* 慶應義塾大學大學院法學研究科論文集, No. 25 (1986): p. 67; Tokitō, "Inukai Tsuyoshi to Chūgoku," pp. 18–19; Kang Wenpei, *Kang Nanhai xiansheng nianpu xubian*, p.89.

[76] Tokitō, *Inukai Tsuyoshi: Sono miryoku to jisshō*, pp. 146–48.

[77] Huang, "Inukai Tsuyoshi to Chūgoku: Shingai kakumei o chūshin ni," pp. 65–68.

[78] Kang Wenpei, *Kang Nanhai xiansheng nianpu xubian*, p. 92.

first complete publication of *Datong shu*. Xu proclaimed that Inukai is a "great man of East Asia and also an intimate friend of Kang Youwei [東亞偉人又康南海先生至交]" whose evaluation of the book would "increase its fame ten-fold [聲價十倍]." Inukai apparently agreed, and a few years later wrote a short foreword in his calligraphic brushwork.[79] This foreword declares how impressed he was of the work's novel extension of the "Liyun" (禮運), a section of the *Book of Rites* (禮記), and the "meticulousness of its research and profundity of its knowledge [研鑽之精造詣之深]."[80]

Inukai had another major public venue to air his thoughts on Confucianism and Sino-Japanese relations. As mentioned in the introduction, in May 1929 Inukai made his final visit to China to attend a memorial service for the late-Sun Yatsen. By this time, both Sun Yatsen and Kang Youwei had passed away—Sun Yatsen in 1925 in Beijing, and Kang Youwei at his home in Qingdao in 1927. Even so, Inukai still seemed to be seeking a reconciliation of the competing political programs offered by the two men. This visit and its immediate circumstances deserve a fuller historical analysis, but here I will touch on how Inukai used the visit to legitimize the Nationalist (國民黨, AKA GMD) regime under Jiang Jieshi 蔣介石 (1887–1975), while also arguing for the continuing relevance of Confucianism as a touchstone of cultural identity in East Asia. When he arrived in Shanghai on May 23, Inukai issued a statement that gave full support to the party that Sun Yatsen founded, and which can be read as a rebuke to the policies of the current Japanese prime minister Tanaka Giichi 田中義一 (1864–1929):

> Seeing the current height of GMD influence, we [Inukai Tsuyoshi and Tōyama Mitsuru] can not repress the feelings of respect for our friends who have carried out late-President Sun's dying wishes and worked their utmost for China's development. . . . In being able to participate in this great ceremony, I am overwhelmed with delight that many Sino-Japanese anxieties have been resolved and that the friendly relations between the two countries has deepened by a degree.[81]

When he met with Jiang on June 4, Inukai was asked about his motivations for his support of late-President Sun over the years. He replied that he "sympathized with Sun, because they both faced the same circumstances"—highlighting the role of personal affect, and perhaps also realism regarding the shared threat of Western imperialism. But he did not mention any

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[79] The foreword is undated, but because it refers to the end of Kang's life, it can be deduced that it was written between Kang's death in 1927 and Inukai's death in 1932.

[80] Interestingly, this foreword was not included in the 1935 edition of *Datong shu*, and was only discovered and publication in 1985. Historian Takeuchi Hiroyuki speculates that the foreword's curtness, and the ambiguousness of its praise may have led Xu Qin to decide against publishing it. It is also possible that by 1935, emphasizing Kang's association with eminent Japanese would bring not fame but political criticism. Finally, Inukai's foreword contains some chronological errors regarding when he first saw the work, and when it was written. Takeuchi Hiroyuki 竹内弘行, "Inukai Tsuyoshi no 'Daidō sho jobun' o megutte" 犬養毅の「大同書序文」をめぐって (On Inukai Tsuyoshi's "Forward to the *Datongshu*"), *Atarashii kangaku kanbun kyôiku* 新しい漢学漢文教育, Vol. 5 (2000): pp. 41–49.

[81] *Asahi shinbun*, May 24, 1929, morning edition. p2.

ideological justifications.[82] And then, toward the end of his sojourn, he released a statement affirming the GMD regime as the permanent, authentic government of China. He offered cautious advice to his own political party, the Seiyūkai (政友會) under Tanaka Giichi, to accommodate itself to the rising tide of Chinese nationalism.[83]

These statements were consistent with his longstanding pragmatic approach toward China. But, he could not repress his idealistic motivations in other venues. On June 13th, in the middle of his China trip, Inukai visited Qufu (曲阜), the birthplace of Confucius, where he met the 77th descendant of the sage. There he was invited to give an impromptu speech at a local teacher's academy, and these brief remarks offered a strikingly Confucian justification for Sun Yatsen's *sanmin zhuyi* (三民主義, three people's principles). He argued that among the three, the principle of *minsheng* (民生, people's livelihood) is an expression of none other than the utopian ideal of grand commonality (大同). The era of grand commonality was a time when men achieved perfect knowledge, morality, and physical strength, and that this was the end point of human progress described in the "Liyun."[84] While affirming the legacy of the late Sun Yatsen, he could not avoid justifying this support in the same Confucian terms that Kang had used in *Lunyu zhu* and *Datong shu*.[85]

Across his career, Inukai advocated pragmatic cooperation between China and Japan, but justified it with reference to the civilizational ties between the two countries. He struck a middle ground between romantic/idealist versions of Asianism popular during the late-Meiji period, and its appropriation as a "realistic option" by the Japanese state following the First World War.[86] This was akin to his effort to reconcile party politics and existing ethical ideals in Japan. His efforts to resolve Sino-Japanese crises through a similar reconciliation of international politics with Sino-Japanese cultural ties, were not, in retrospect, particularly successful. When he became prime minister in December 1931, his personal connections with Chinese leaders offered hope for a peaceful resolution to the Manchurian crisis. His attempt at secret negotiations with the GMD, however, ended in failure when the details were leaked to the Japanese army.[87] Two months after the Kwantung Army engineered the puppet state of Manchukuo, on the evening of May 15 1932, radicalized naval officers and army cadets stormed the prime minister's mansion and shot Inukai dead. Worse, these officers represented a swath of the Japanese public that had turned against the deal-making that was endemic both to party politics and the conciliatory

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[82] Tokitō Hideto 時任英人, "Bannen no Inukai Tsuyoshi ni kansuru ichikōsatsu (2): Hakurinsō, Son Bun ikyūshiki, Seiyūkai sōsai" 晩年の犬養毅に関する一考察（２）—白林荘、孫文移柩式、政友会総裁 (Thoughts on Inukai Tsuyoshi's later years (2): Hakurinsō, Sun Yatsen's coffin-transfer ceremony, and becoming president of the Seiyūkai), *Kurashiki geijutsu kagaku daigaku kiyō* 倉敷芸術科学大学紀要, No. 21 (2016): p. 123.

[83] Ibid., pp. 125–26.

[84] Kondō Tatsuji 近藤達児, *Son Bun ireisai no ki* 孫文移霊祭の記 (Record of the transfer ritual of Sun Yatsen's spirit) (Tokyo: self published, 1929), pp. 109–10.

[85] De Bary and Lufrano, eds., *Sources of Chinese Tradition*, Vol. 2, pp. 267–68.

[86] Saaler, "Pan-Asianism in Modern Japanese History," pp3–7.

[87] Kobayashi Michihiko 小林道彦, *Seitō naikaku no hōkai to Manshū jihen* 政党内閣の崩壊と満州事変—１９１８～１９３２ (The collapse of party cabinets and the Manchurian Incident: 1918–1932) (Tokyo: Minerva shobō, 2010), pp. 236–38.

approach to China's GMD. Inukai's attempt to legitimize both of these aspects of domestic and international politics had ended in failure.

Conclusion: "May it be of assistance in promoting the great structure of East Asia!"

Previous studies have emphasized the political pragmatism that marked Inukai's involvement in Japan's China policy. But, they deemphasize or overlook the conceptual vocabulary that Inukai brought to bear on the Sino-Japanese relationship, as well as his exchanges with Kang Youwei. Kang and Inukai saw much of themselves in the other; in terms of politics, they were both staunch advocates of constitutional monarchy, and in terms of society and culture, they sought to revise the Confucian intellectual tradition, not overturn it. Kang and Inukai employed this tradition to link their two countries. As such, they avoided racializing their conception of East Asia, defining it instead as civilizational and cultural. Consider, in contrast, Konoe Atsumaro's invocation of a conflict between the "yellow" and "white" races to justify pan-Asian alliance in a 1898 article in the journal *Taiyô* (太陽).[88]

Inukai was but one of a generation in Japan whose Confucian education shaped their approach to political practice and social reform. Many of his contemporaries developed the intellectual tradition into an ideology supportive of colonialism and even fascism.[89] However, Inukai's ideas stood apart from these more statist and imperialist interpretations. To provide one example from the field of education, the writers who were tasked with producing modern Japan's first ethics textbooks emphasized Confucianism's virtues, five social relationships, and the pedagogical style of exemplary biography.[90] And yet, the use of Confucianism by these authors was highly selective; their goal of fostering state-centered national subjectivity led them to prioritize the virtues of filiality and loyalty, the latter of which was often combined with patriotism. They excluded discussion of the virtues of benevolence and righteousness (義, *Ch.* yi, J. *gi*).[91] However, as the foregoing discussion illustrates, Inukai's understanding of Confucianism's value hinged on benevolence, which he saw as the ethical precept from which all others followed.

The way Inukai construed Japan's relationship with China was also markedly different. Writers and thinkers associated with a Confucian society known as the Shibunkai (斯分会, est. 1918) recognized the Chinese origins of this philosophy, but tried to reverse the polarity of the

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[88] Konoe Atsumaro, and Urs Matthias Zachmann, trans., "A Same-Race Alliance and on the Necessity of Studying the Chinese Question," in Saaler and Szpilman, eds., *Pan-Asianism*, p. 89; Saaler, Sven, "Pan-Asianism in Meiji and Taishō Japan—A Preliminary Framework," *Philipp Franz von Siebold Stiftung Deutshces Institut für Japanstudien Working Paper 02/4* (Tokyo: Deutsches Institut für Japanstudien, 2002); Harrell, *Asia for the Asians*, pp. 44–45.

[89] Kiri Paramore, *Japanese Confucianism: A Cultural History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), pp.156–59.

[90] As Yamashita writes, "Confucianism was central to the thinking of those who oversaw the design and compilation of the first textbooks." Samuel Hideo Yamashita, "Confucianism and the Japanese State 1904–1945," in Tu Wei-ming, ed., *Confucian Traditions in East Asian Modernity: Moral Education and Economic Culture in Japan and the Four Mini-Dragons,* pp 132–54 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996), pp. 143, 153.

[91] Ibid., pp. 153–54.

Sinocentrism in the tradition to assert Japan's superiority.[92] One of the founders of this group was Hattori Unokichi 服部宇之吉 (1867–1939), a professor of philosophy who taught at Beijing University, the University of Tokyo, and Harvard University. According to historian Paula Harrell, Hattori made the case that instead of China, "it was in present-day Japan that Confucius' original teachings were achieving new operative value, providing the underpinning to economic success and political strength."[93] Furthermore, Hattori reconstructed Confucianism to elevate Japan above China, promoting the notion that Japan's "imperial way" was superior to the "king's way" of China and Manchuria.[94] Another member of the group was philosopher Inoue Tetsujirō 井上哲次郎 (1855–1944), who argued that the *sanmin zhuyi* ideology used by the Chinese Nationalists showed that China had strayed from the teachings of the sage, again demonstrating the need for Japanese leadership over Confucian civilization.[95]

In contrast, Inukai's Confucian rhetoric did not denigrate China nor place Japan in a position of superiority. This provisional analysis suggests that, on the contrary, he deployed it for the purpose of fostering cooperation between the two countries. He consistently opposed China's division and Japan's military expansion, and rather than condemning Sun's *sanmin zhuyi*, he found Confucian justification for it. But, there were implicit costs to this idealist focus on a Sino-Japanese Confucian civilization—for one, it did not address the concrete political problem of Korea. There was nothing inherently anti-imperialist in Inukai's version of Asianism; he in fact seemed quite willing to accept the realist expansion of Japan's power, and then the *fait accompli* of Japan's dominion over Korea.[96] Again, this is suggested in "Mutangji," where its geographic symbolism deemphasized Korea's independent existence. This lacuna implies that the Asianism expoused by Kang and Inukai was intrinsically limited; it was conservative rather than revolutionary with regard to the diplomatic status quo, and attuned specifically to the cultural needs of China and Japan.

As illustrated by "Mutangji," Inukai identified personally with Kang. And throughout Inukai's career Kang's thought and political activism appealed to him as an Asia-centric, conservative, and cultural basis for mutual cooperation. This intellectual relationship illuminates an important dimension of Inukai's political practice. He valued Sino-Japanese alliance as a strategic *end*, but the idealist appeal to Confucian traditionalism was a valuable aspect of his chosen *means*. To stabilize political ties between China and Japan, he promoted a culturally resonant form of East Asian partnership. This can be likened to his domestic political efforts,

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[92] Granted, this is not a twentieth-century innovation, but derived from precedents in Edo-period Japanese Confucianism. Warren W. Smith, *Confucianism in Modern Japan: A Study in Conservatism in Japanese Intellectual History* (Tokyo: Hokuseido Press, 1954), p. 104.

[93] Harrell, *Asia for the Asians*, pp. 107–21.

[94] Nakajima Takahiro, "Critical Comparability in the Age of 'Classical Turn'," in Maeda Koichi and UTCP, *Utopia: Here and There* (Tokyo: The University of Tokyo Center for Philosophy, 2008), pp. 84–86.

[95] Nakajima Takahiro, "The Restoration of Confucianism in China and Japan: A New Source of Morality and Religion," in *Facing the 21st Century. Nanzan Institute for Religion & Culture,* edited by Lam Wing-keung and Cheng Ching-yuen (Nagoya: Nanzan Institute for Religions and Culture, 2009)*,* pp. 44–48.

[96] Inukai, writing in a 1896 article in the journal *Nipponjin* (日本人), did not problematize Japan's attempt to colonize Korea; on the contrary, he wrote that Japanese colonization and mercantile penetration would help spread modern civilization there. Tokitō, "Inukai Tsuyoshi to Chūgoku," pp. 11–12.

where he sought to mobilize existing ideals of ethical leadership to legitimize party politics.[97] In that regard, it may be true that, as Najita argues, Inukai's historical significance is "evident less in his political successes than in his failures."[98] On the one hand, his failure to sustain a peaceful, cooperative relationship between Japan and China can be understood as a failure to strike the right political deals to balance actors and material interests. But on the other hand, this failure was perhaps made unavoidable by a wider problem—the inability of his ideals to reshape public attitudes to allow rapprochement to succeed. This predicament is not limited to an episode in the past, but bears more than passing similarity to the highly emotional Sino-Japanese controversies of today. Conflict between the two countries then, as now, was rooted in geopolitical and nationalist logics, but at the same time exacerbated by a general inability to trust, much less identify, with the other.

[97] Najita, "Inukai Tsuyoshi: Some Dilemmas in Party Development," p. 508.
[98] Najita, "Inukai Tsuyoshi: Some Dilemmas in Party Development," p. 494.