It is always amazing to see how the Sankei Shimbun interprets things in its UNIQUE way. The August 16 editorial of the Sankei Shimbun titled “高句麗論争－みんな歴史に真剣なのだGoguryo Controversy – Everybody is serious about history” says, “…Behind the Goguryo controversy was China’s expansionism, sense of grandeur, or nationalism which was bred with confidence earned through economic developments. Meanwhile, the Koreans have had nostalgia for the Goguryo kingdom whose glorious past has become a source of national pride.” Up to this, it pretends to strike a balance, but here comes a big jump. The article concludes, “There are voices in Japan calling for writing Japanese history considering opinions in Korea and China, the very two countries that are battling over history for their own national purpose. What a nonsense! It is only natural to record history in the perspective of the country. If there is one thing that recent Korea-China history disputes teach us, it is that Japan needs ‘Japanese history by Japanese.’” SASUGA, Sankei.
最近の日本の対外政策の特徴は、いうまでもなく、その安全保障政策の面での積極性である。軍事的アクティビズムともいわれるこうした傾向は、その具体的な活動が日米同盟の枠内、あるいは国連決議の前提下で行われていることを勘案しても、非常に特徴的であるといえる。
ところで、このような日本の政策は、以前ならば、日中間に何らかの軋轢をもたらす可能性があるものである。しかしながら、最近の日中関係は、小泉首相の靖国参拝もあり確かに大いに良好というわけではないが、かといって、緊張しているわけでもない。対中・対日感情の悪化が際立つが、なお小泉さんは中国訪問の意向を全く示していない。政策決定グループのみを見れば、中国の対日政策は、むしろ好転してきているように見える。
一体それはなぜか。
この興味深い問いに、山本先生は次のように説明する(山本吉宣｢グローバルシステムの中の日中｣、毛里和子編『日中関係をどう構築するか』岩波書店、2004年、p141-175)。一言で、それはアメリカの存在のためである。そこでは、単に日中二国間関係だけでなく、日米中の三角関係が大きな説明要因となっている。すなわち、現在の三角関係は、日米・米中は良好な関係にあり、日中関係もそれほど悪くはない、三角形を書いてみると三つの辺が全部＋になる状況である。こうした状況を生み出したのは、皮肉にも911テロの発生と北朝鮮の核問題の浮上である。すなわち、反テロに関しての米中協力、また北朝鮮の核問題に対する中国の政策によって、米中関係はブッシュ政権初期の険悪さを払拭し、きわめて良好なものとなっている。そして日米関係も、日本のアメリカの反テロ戦争に対する協力(テロ特措法)、イラク戦争支持、復興協力(イラク特措法)によってきわめて良好なものとなっている。そうすると、バランス理論(三角関係が安定するのは、三つの辺がすべて＋のときか、一つが＋で他の二つが－のときに限る)により、日中関係は必然的に＋となる。いわば、あまり日中双方が関係改善に努力しなくとも日中関係は安定したものとなる。つまり、現在の日中関係の安定は、自動的に形成されたもの－｢デフォールトの安定(stability by default)｣－である。
面白い。何より、日中経済関係の進展、すなわち両国の経済的相互依存の進展により日中政治関係が安定したという、実証不可能で陳腐な議論よりは格段に斬新。
It was at the Boao Forum last November where the term “peaceful rise(和平崛起)” was first clearly enunciated, which was originally invented at the Central Party School(中央党校) in respose to what China calls the “China threat theory(中国威胁论)”. Apart from some concerns from outside that the new formulation is unclear or even contradictory in terms of the treatment of the Taiwan issue, it seems that many people within China have been annoyed at the new term.
First, some within China, not least the Foreign Ministry officials, pointed out that the use of the term “rise” may give an impression that China is aiming at a China-led “power transition” in the region and possibly the emergence of a new power center in Asia. In addition, the use of “rise” is not an accurate characterization of China’s current socio-economic evlolution and thus it is too early to talk about rising. Second, a small, but vocal group of people, mainly around the military, opposed China’s commitment to a rise that is “peaceful.” They argued that committing to a peaceful rise could undermine China’s right to use force against a recalcitrant Taiwan. A Chinese foreign policy specialist said at a Todai symposium that the PLA, who had showed its discontent with “peaceful rise” theory from the beginning, recently began to use its own term “scientific development(科学的发展)” instead of the former, thereby distancing itself from the policy line of the Communist Party.
In a sense, China’s internal debate is encouraging. It provides further evidence of increasing openness in foreign policy thinking and in official policy formulation. Chinese leaders are actively seeking input and guidance from analysts with extensive training, expertise and experience in regional and international affairs. In this one instance, debates among officials, analysts, and scholars shaped official foreign policy guidelines like peaceful rise.(see this article)
However, the internal discord over “peaceful rise” reveals that China has yet to reach a consensus on the direction in which it is moving and to create a state image at which it is aiming, even in the policy-making group. Now that the rise of China, regardless of China’s self-perception, is regarded as an accomplished fact, it is not surprising that neighboring countries are seeing China’s march with suspicion that the country’s economic strength will one day encourage it to assert its power more aggressively. In this sense, I think that behind an emotional backlash in Japan against recent radical, incomprehensible behaviors of some Chinese, and a “history war” in Korea against what Koreans conceive as China’s scheme to distort history for its national unity, lies a fundamental misgivings about where China is heading.
The DongA Ilbo, on Wednesday, published an article featuring an interesting virtual debate over historical assessment of ex-president Park Chung-hee. The panel is comprised of Park himself, Cho Gab-je (the editor of the Monthly Chosun and author of Park’s biography – “내 무덤에 침을 뱉어라Spit on My Grave”) and Prof Jin Joong-gwon(the author of a book parodying the above biography – “네 무덤에 침을 뱉으마Yes, I will Spit on Your Grave”).
I translated some dialogues in the article here that I thought were of interest.
Park: What do you guys want to call me in one word?
Cho: A modern revolutionary.
Jin: Just one of the Third World dictators(who is unnecessarily over-rated).
Park: What do you think my biggest achievement was?
Cho: The realization of strong and rich Korea.
Jin: Nothing. What appears to be YOUR achievement is, in fact, something that was bound to be realized WITHOUT YOU.
Park: So then, what do you think my biggest fault was?
Cho: An inevitable, partial abuse of power(and more fatally, the failure to foster your political protégé).
Jin: Military culture that you created and spread (and is constantly being reproduced even in the present).
Park: If I were to run for the president in 2007, what do you think the chances are?
Cho: No chance. To be more exact, you MUST be lost. You are the person needed in the 60s and 70s. You could not have stayed there by the 80s, if you had not died in 1979. The fortune of South Korea is your timely death and the misfortune of North Korea is long life of Kim Il-sung.
Jin: You are not going to run for it because it is SO DEMOCRATIC. Maybe you will try another coup de-tat.
Despite the two debaters’ completely different assessments of what Park had done and left, it is interesting to note that they basically share the view that Park’s era has already gone and this era does not need a leader like him. After all, behind all the discourse on Park, positive or negative, is the assumption that HE CANNOT BE BACK ALIVE.
｢端的に言って、小泉政権の東アジア政策って一体なんでしたというと、なかなか答えにくい部分がある。それは小泉内閣の中で東アジア政策がはっきり定義されないまま現在に至っているからである。それはなぜか。まず一つは、小泉政権ができたときの日本の外交体制そのものに深刻な問題が発生していたことが挙げられる。つまり、小泉政権が東アジア政策を進めるにあたっての当初の初期条件がそもそもよくなかったわけである。さらに小泉さんは、二つの点でその初期条件をさらにめちゃくちゃにすることを最初にやってしまったわけである。それはいうまでもなく総裁選で靖国参拝を公約したこと、それから、外務大臣に田中真紀子さんを任命したことである。内政的な含意は別として、前者が外交の面でなかなか厄介な問題を作ったことは否定できない。また田中真紀子さんの大臣任命は、ただでさえスキャンダル等でおかしくなっていた外務省の状況をさらにめちゃくちゃにし、そのため2001年のほとんどを通じて外務省のエネルギーは、外務大臣と外務官僚との大権力闘争に費やされる。その結果、とくに東アジア外交においてはなかなかフォーカスが定まらない状況になったのである。。。。
一方、同年9月には例のテロ事件が発生し、いかに外務省が内部的に大バトルを繰り返していようと、これに対して何とかしなければならない事態が起きたから、その後日本外交のエネルギーのほとんどは、テロへの対応で終わることになったわけである。その際、実際の政策決定の中枢というのは、やむを得ずというか、仕方なくというか、あるいは当然にというか、官邸の方に移っていくわけであり、その後の政策決定の基本は、官房長官を中心として行われる形になる。アジアとの関連で言うと、当初911以後の段階でこれを機に、少し体制を立て直そうとする動きがあったのも事実である。小泉さんが日帰りで中国、それから韓国を訪問して協力を訴えたのがそれである。しかし全体的には、韓国・中国に関しては、あまり外交的なイニシアチブをとらず、その代わり出てきた問題の一つが北朝鮮との関係を何とかしよう、ということだったわけである。対北朝鮮外交は、戦後日本外交の流れでいうと所謂｢戦後処理外交｣の伝統を継ぐものであり、当時外務省の状況のため政策推進の主体が官邸に集中されたこともあり、わりとやりやすかったのではないかと思う。とにかく、全体的にみると、日中関係の政治関係がやや停滞し、日韓関係もそんなに華々しくはない中で、日朝交渉が一つの焦点になり、それから東南アジア関係がまた一つの焦点となる、ということが現在の日本の東アジア外交の特徴になっているといえなくもない。
ただ、小泉首相が自ら動いている日朝交渉に反して、他の領域は、政策決定のモダリティでいえば、官僚主導というか、とくに総理大臣の意思があってなんとかは、余りない。中国政策についてみると、これはとくに官邸の意思というのは、一つの点を除けば、それほど明確ではない。一つの点とは何かというと、先方から来てください、といわれるまでは私は行きませんよ、ということで、これだけははっきりしている。それに対して役所の意思は、これはどうしようもない、小泉さんを変えるわけにもいかないから、そうすると、この小泉さんの呼ばれるまでは行かないよということを前提にしたうえで対中関係をどうしたらいい、というのが今の外務省の頭を悩ましているところだと思われる。その面で言うと、できる限り、現在の、政治は冷たいけれども経済は熱い、といわれている状況を利用して経済はどんどんやってくださいよ、というのが日本の対中外交になっている、ということである。ただ一つだけ、対中外交で日本の政策が今までとはやや異なる面を示したのは、日本の台湾に対する態度であって、これは昨年から続いていった三月の台湾の総統選挙にかけての陳さんのいくつかの政策について、12月に日本の政府が、直接にというか、陳さんにむけて日本側のメッセジーとしてできるだけ慎重に物事を行ってくださいよ、というようなものを伝えたのである。これは従来の日本の台湾政府への対応からすると、結構積極的だというか、台湾に対してこういうことをしないようにとか、慎重にとかは、今まで言ったことがない。それに比べると今回そのような態度をとったというのは、一つの特徴であり注目してもいいのではないかと思う。｣
(田中明彦、7月30日東文研シンポ基調発言)
It was on the way to my grandfather’s in the north of Seoul. I was waiting for a train at Kangnam station. Waiting for over 20 minutes, however, there was no sign of train’s coming. What’s going on? Gee, I forgot that subway workers went on a strike calling for a personnel expansion for the smooth running of newly-introduced five-days working system.
While waiting, I noticed a guy, apparently in his early 20s, who was trying to explain vigorously to his girlfriend how UNFAIR the strike was and how MEAN subway workers were. I could hear what he was saying because he, probably deliberately, was talking in rather loud voice, and sometimes even asking for agreement to people around him. His logic was pretty simple: subway workers are working under relatively better working condition and get paid much better than common office workers in the same age group. So they do not have the right to whine about their workng condition and wage level, not to mention go on a strike that makes trouble to innnocent citizens.
What amazed me was that he knew the exact amount of money that a new recruit and middle-level executive at the Subway Cooperation receive annually. Naruhodo, he must have seen an article in the morning paper on the wage level of subway workers that the authorities propagated to win over citizens to their side. A 20s, who swallows whole propaganda of the authorities without any doubt, withdraws all sympathy he may have held with the workers and shamelessly expresses the anger in public, was a real shock to me. Come on, it is not only you that is waiting in the heat!
Anyway, this small episode reinforced my belief that the so-called 20-30 solidarity, the very reason that the Roh government came into being, has either already disappeared, or been greatly exaggerated from the outset.
I, for one in the 20s, do not want to place myself into the category of the so-called 386 generation, or their protégé. Of course, this is not to say that I AM conservative and THEY ARE liberal. It is just to say that the experience of the 20s including me is quite different from that of the 30s. If it is the frustration of Kwangju in May 1980 and the excitement of Seoul in June 1987 that constituted sort of ‘pristine’ experiences, and they determined the 386’s ideological orientation, obviously we the 20s do not share the same ideology, because WE WERE NOT THERE.
Don’t get me wrong. I have no desire to agree with any attempt of the conservative media and the opposition party to estrange the 20s and 30s. What I am trying to say is that we need a more sophisticated lens to look into generation geography of the Korean society and a broader perspective to observe each generation's ideology and as the base
"세계관이 대립하고 있다거나 세대간 충돌이 너무 심해서 사회통합의 문제가 심각해졌다는 세간의 인식은 기우에 불과하다. 그런 우려들은 종종 ‘사회통합’이라는 누구도 부정하지 못하는 명제를 동원해서 자신의 의견을 정당화하려는 의식적/무의식적 의도를 갖고 있다. 지난 몇 년간의 위기는 한국인들의 가치관에 이질성을 줄이고 동질성을 늘리는 효과를 초래했다. ‘가치관의 정화작용’이 일어난 것이다." (송호근『한국, 무슨일이 일어나고 있나 – 세대, 그 갈등과 조화의 미학』삼성경제연구소, 2003년, p201)
(The fears that conflicts in value system or generational collision has aggravated the problem of social integration are groundless. Behind those concerns is a conscious or unconcious intention to justify their own views by using the ‘social integration’ logic, a proposition that can hardly be denied in the Korean society. Rather, continuing crises in the past couple of years have been closing the gap in the value system of the Koreans: what we have seen is a “purification of value system.”)
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Prof Song Ho-geun, a well-known sociologist at SNU, is making a bold yet well-founded claim that the recent talks about “generation battle” in Korea are seriously exaggerated. He pursues the track of changes in the view of world and value system of the Korean since the financial crisis in 1997, and draws a very different picture of “Habits of the Heart” of the contemporary Koreans.
In the aftermath of the financial crisis in 1997, each generation has gone through a profound change in its value system. But Prof Song claims that the extent and direction of the change are far from what has been portrayed by the media and academia so far. The extent to which rapid social changes triggered by the crisis have had an impact on the already existing divergence in value system between generations is negligibly insignificant. More importantly, value transformation each generation experienced in the past few years has been moving in the SAME direction – most notably, the acceptance of market-oriented value and structural reform.
But he doesn’t stop there. A more interesting hypothesis is emerging where the “generation war” theory was gone: chances of generational conflict have gotten EVEN lower than ever. That is, the financial crisis shook the basic order of the society to its core and in the process of recovering from the crisis, old institutions and practices had rapidly collapsed and been replaced by new ones such as market mechanisms and more ‘rational’ institutions. Every generation, although unwillingly, had to adjust themselves to new institutions and practices, to survive. So what now appears to be a serious generational conflict is, in fact, the difference in the speed with which each generation is adapting to those changes.
The Economist (July 10th, "From pacifism to populism") says,
"Far from being hijacked by a right-wing cabal, Japan's conduct of foreign policy is arguably growing more democratic. And the recent widening of the SDF's role reflects an interaction between Koizumi’s keen political instincts and broad popular attitudes. Those attitudes suggest that Japan is not so much flexing its muscles as it is stretching them after a long convalescence, to see whether they work and what they can usefully do."
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Taking this logic, we don't need to see Japan's new experiment – a series of security measures including sending troops to Iraq - as another example of its "following-America diplomacy(対米追随外交)”. That is, although Japan has indeed done much of what America wanted in Afghanistan and Iraq, it has HARDLY been bullied into it. Rather, as noted in the article, it is a "natural" consequence of the Japanese public's changing perceptions and Koizumi's popular touch.
Then, what will come after Koizumi? Probably the best guide to foreign policy in post Koizumi Japan lies in those popular attitudes that he has so skillfully tapped. In this sense, it should be noted that Japanese voters do seem to have given a warning to Koizumi, whose abrupt pledge at the G8 meeting to include Japanese troops in a new multinational force in Iraq, along with his rush over pensions policy, clearly affected the LDP’s embarrassing showing in the upper-house election on July 11. Of course, it is not clear whether the outcome implies a temporary discontent with Koizumi’s arrogant remarks and actions, or more fundametally, some sort of inertia in security perceptions of the Japanese public, but I do not think that the Japanese have TOTALLY lost their pacifist inhibitions.
And what will become of “Kantei Gaiko(官邸外交)” when Koizumi leaves office? Over the past three years Koizumi has honed his populist approach by strengthening the role of his own office and the cabinet in making policy, which allows him to seize changes as they come along. However, it is necessary to note that the Koizumi-style diplomacy has been made possible in a particualr situation where the traditional “Kasumigaseki Gaiko(霞ヶ関外交)” has not functioned at all since a series of scandals paralyzed normal policy-making process in the Foreign Ministry beginning 2001(the year Mr Koizumi got the office). Given some recent criticisms against the Kantei Gaiko that it lacks a comprehensive, longterm policy – for instance, the absence of East Asian policy of the Koizumi cabinet, chances are the Gaimusho would restore its clout over policy-making process in one or another form.