Much ado about Samsung

The DongA Ilbo(March 4) said that approximately 1,000 graduate students flocked to a hall at Harvard University, where Samsung Electronics president Hwang Chang-gyu gave a special lecture, to learn the secret of his company's success in the semiconductors business. And the Harvard MBA program also selected Samsung's success story regarding semiconductors as the case study subject of "managerial strategy," a required class at the school.

Also in Japan, Samsung's success story had already made the frontpage of most major newspapers. I remember reading an editorial about Samsung in NIKKEI suggesting that every Japanese consumer electoronic maker, notably Sony, take a lesson from the company's remarkable success, while citing the statistics that only Toyota can compete with Samsung in terms of annual net income.

Of course, Korea is no exception about touting the company. People are saying that Samsung's success made a significant contribution to improving national image as well as the brand image itself. The appointment of Hong Suk-hyun, the president of the JoongAng Ilbo,

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論文提出日の翌朝

　論文を提出する前に、かなりドタバタしている私に、ある先輩の一言。「出すまではしんどいけど、一旦出したら、世界が少し違って見えるよ」。

　翌朝の今、見える世界はもちろん変わっていない。ただ、昨日で、一応何かの「区切り」がつけられたのは、そしてそうした気分がするのは、確かである。

　論文の質の問題はさておき、自ら何かを構想し、資料を集め話を構築し、それで何かの結論を出すという作業は、確かに大変な作業であるが、それだけ、なかなかの充実感を与える。この充実感ゆえに、人々は研究者の道に引かれるのではなかろうか。

　新たな出発点を模索している。そのためには、やはり原点に立ち戻って考えるのが、何よりの近道であろう。「政治学」って一体なんだ、そしていかなる「政治学」を追求していくか。

　昨日の朝とは、やはり「何か」が変わっている。

朝の断想

辞任したパウェル前米国務長官がこういう言葉を残したという。
「何事も思っているほどは悪くない。朝になれば状況はよくなっている」

当然、眠っている間に、いつの間にか状況が好転するということではないだろう。朝、気分よく目覚めると、少し世界が違って見える。前夜にはもう駄目だと思えたことにも、立ち向かう力がわく、ということだろう。

修論を書きながら、自分と立ち向かうことの厳しさを痛感する。一文章、一文章にあまりにも鮮明に表れる自分の限界に、ときには吐き気さえ感じる。「どうせ、つまんないものになるだろうな」との敗北感が襲ってくる。そして、絶望感でパソコンの電源を消す。眠る。もうこれ以上はできないと思いつつ。

朝、少し勇気を出してパソコンを開く。不思議なことに、前夜それほど情けなく見えた自分の文章が「そんなには」悪くない。一体何を言っているか分らなかった段落に、「それなりの」筋が通っている。もちろん、眠っている間に文章が自分で変わったり、誰かが直してくれたわけではないだろう。やはり、朝日を見るまでは待ってみるべきものである。

歴史問題と日中「知的」関係の非対称性

溝口雄三は、日本と中国との間で歴史問題に関する見解の差がなかなか縮まらない理由として、双方に横たわる問題認識の根本的相違を指摘する。

まず日本では、（批判的知識人と保守的知識人のどちらの目からも）この問題は、安保問題、憲法問題、天皇制問題など、国家としてのあり方を決める重要な問題に直結した、いわば日本の将来の方向を決める問題として中核的な位相を占めている。それに対し、中国の知識人にとって、歴史認識とそれに伴う謝罪の問題は、基本的に日本国内の政治問題であって、例えば中国の農村問題や人口過剰の問題のような、中国自身の問題であると同時にグローバルな課題でもある「重大な」案件に比してその位相がはるかに低い。

かくして歴史問題の持つ知的位相が本質的に異なる状況の下では、仮に日本人と中国人の歴史研究者の間で歴史認識問題が共同討議され、会議が成功したとしても、それは実は、双方が文脈の存在には無自覚に、ただ問題だけを共同討議した場合のことになる。

さらに溝口は、こうした知的文脈の相違の源流を、思想文化面における日中間の非対称的関係に求めている。

端的に言って、日本の学界・思想界に絶えず存在してきた、知的な意味での中国関心に見合うような日本関心が、中国には基本的に存在していなかったということである。もちろん、ここでいう日本関心とは、興味の次元における「日本語」や「日本文化」などへの関心とはその意味を異にする。例えば、戦後、日本で竹内好が日本論のための中国関心を言説化した、あのような中国関心に見合うような、中国問題、世界問題を考えるうえでの日本関心、つまり思想資源としての日本関心が、少なくとも現代の中国の知識界には、ごく少数の例外を除いては存在しないのである。

題目から非常に「衝撃的」なこの本は、しかし深く吟味すべきところをたくさん持っている。一読を勧める。

書く力＝読む力

「書くことがよくできないのは、読む力がないからだ。読む力というのは、何でも読み込んじゃう力ではなく、書くことを前提にして戦略的に読む力のことだ。また逆に、アウトプットを意識すると、より上質な読書ができる。このように、書く力と読む力はリンクしている」と、最近まさに何でも書きまくっている斉藤孝は言う。

ナルホド。何でこんなに書くのが遅いんだろう、いろいろ考えてみた。やはり日本語だから、外国語で書いているわけだから当然じゃないの、と思ってみたが、そんな言い訳ははっきり言って、韓国人には通じない。とすると、もともと自分に文章力というものがないからか。これにも、どうもうなづけない。いままで、自分が作文力に欠けていると思ったことはない。

やはり、きちんと読んでないから、そして非効率的な読み方をしているから書くのが遅いんだ、というのがいまのところの結論である。まあ、質よりは量で勝負する世界になりつつあるからな、学界も。「良く」読んで、「早く」書かないと。

ちなみに彼は、どんな本でも約2割が理解できて、3箇所くらい引用できる部分が見つかれば、その本は完全に自分の物になったに等しいと断定する。ホントかも。

Everybody is serious about history – from Sankei

It is always amazing to see how the Sankei Shimbun interprets things in its UNIQUE way. The August 16 editorial of the Sankei Shimbun titled “高句麗論争－みんな歴史に真剣なのだGoguryo Controversy – Everybody is serious about history” says, “…Behind the Goguryo controversy was China’s expansionism, sense of grandeur, or nationalism which was bred with confidence earned through economic developments. Meanwhile, the Koreans have had nostalgia for the Goguryo kingdom whose glorious past has become a source of national pride.” Up to this, it pretends to strike a balance, but here comes a big jump. The article concludes, “There are voices in Japan calling for writing Japanese history considering opinions in Korea and China, the very two countries that are battling over history for their own national purpose. What a nonsense! It is only natural to record history in the perspective of the country. If there is one thing that recent Korea-China history disputes teach us, it is that Japan needs ‘Japanese history by Japanese.’” SASUGA, Sankei.

日中関係の現状と｢デフォールトの安定(stability by default)｣

最近の日本の対外政策の特徴は、いうまでもなく、その安全保障政策の面での積極性である。軍事的アクティビズムともいわれるこうした傾向は、その具体的な活動が日米同盟の枠内、あるいは国連決議の前提下で行われていることを勘案しても、非常に特徴的であるといえる。
ところで、このような日本の政策は、以前ならば、日中間に何らかの軋轢をもたらす可能性があるものである。しかしながら、最近の日中関係は、小泉首相の靖国参拝もあり確かに大いに良好というわけではないが、かといって、緊張しているわけでもない。対中・対日感情の悪化が際立つが、なお小泉さんは中国訪問の意向を全く示していない。政策決定グループのみを見れば、中国の対日政策は、むしろ好転してきているように見える。
一体それはなぜか。

"Peaceful Rise" and internal debate

It was at the Boao Forum last November where the term “peaceful rise(和平崛起)” was first clearly enunciated, which was originally invented at the Central Party School(中央党校) in respose to what China calls the “China threat theory(中国威胁论)”. Apart from some concerns from outside that the new formulation is unclear or even contradictory in terms of the treatment of the Taiwan issue, it seems that many people within China have been annoyed at the new term.

First, some within China, not least the Foreign Ministry officials, pointed out that the use of the term “rise” may give an impression that China is aiming at a China-led “power transition” in the region and possibly the emergence of a new power center in Asia. In addition, the use of “rise” is not an accurate characterization of China’s current socio-economic evlolution and thus it is too early to talk about rising. Second, a small, but vocal group of people, mainly around the military, opposed China’s commitment to a rise that is “peaceful.” They argued that committing to a peaceful rise could undermine China’s right to use force against a recalcitrant Taiwan. A Chinese foreign policy specialist said at a Todai symposium that the PLA, who had showed its discontent with “peaceful rise” theory from the beginning, recently began to use its own term “scientific development(科学的发展)” instead of the former, thereby distancing itself from the policy line of the Communist Party.

Where is the right place of Park Chung-hee in modern Korean history?

The DongA Ilbo, on Wednesday, published an article featuring an interesting virtual debate over historical assessment of ex-president Park Chung-hee. The panel is comprised of Park himself, Cho Gab-je (the editor of the Monthly Chosun and author of Park’s biography – “내 무덤에 침을 뱉어라Spit on My Grave”) and Prof Jin Joong-gwon(the author of a book parodying the above biography – “네 무덤에 침을 뱉으마Yes, I will Spit on Your Grave”).

I translated some dialogues in the article here that I thought were of interest.

Park: What do you guys want to call me in one word?
Cho: A modern revolutionary.
Jin: Just one of the Third World dictators(who is unnecessarily over-rated).

Park: What do you think my biggest achievement was?
Cho: The realization of strong and rich Korea.
Jin: Nothing. What appears to be YOUR achievement is, in fact, something that was bound to be realized WITHOUT YOU.

Park: So then, what do you think my biggest fault was?
Cho: An inevitable, partial abuse of power(and more fatally, the failure to foster your political protégé).
Jin: Military culture that you created and spread (and is constantly being reproduced even in the present).

Park: If I were to run for the president in 2007, what do you think the chances are?
Cho: No chance. To be more exact, you MUST be lost. You are the person needed in the 60s and 70s. You could not have stayed there by the 80s, if you had not died in 1979. The fortune of South Korea is your timely death and the misfortune of North Korea is long life of Kim Il-sung.
Jin: You are not going to run for it because it is SO DEMOCRATIC. Maybe you will try another coup de-tat.

Despite the two debaters’ completely different assessments of what Park had done and left, it is interesting to note that they basically share the view that Park’s era has already gone and this era does not need a leader like him. After all, behind all the discourse on Park, positive or negative, is the assumption that HE CANNOT BE BACK ALIVE.

日本の東アジア外交の現状－その政策不在の淵源

｢端的に言って、小泉政権の東アジア政策って一体なんでしたというと、なかなか答えにくい部分がある。それは小泉内閣の中で東アジア政策がはっきり定義されないまま現在に至っているからである。それはなぜか。まず一つは、小泉政権ができたときの日本の外交体制そのものに深刻な問題が発生していたことが挙げられる。つまり、小泉政権が東アジア政策を進めるにあたっての当初の初期条件がそもそもよくなかったわけである。さらに小泉さんは、二つの点でその初期条件をさらにめちゃくちゃにすることを最初にやってしまったわけである。それはいうまでもなく総裁選で靖国参拝を公約したこと、それから、外務大臣に田中真紀子さんを任命したことである。内政的な含意は別として、前者が外交の面でなかなか厄介な問題を作ったことは否定できない。また田中真紀子さんの大臣任命は、ただでさえスキャンダル等でおかしくなっていた外務省の状況をさらにめちゃくちゃにし、そのため2001年のほとんどを通じて外務省のエネルギーは、外務大臣と外務官僚との大権力闘争に費やされる。その結果、とくに東アジア外交においてはなかなかフォーカスが定まらない状況になったのである。。。。

The 20s, are they really progressive?

It was on the way to my grandfather’s in the north of Seoul. I was waiting for a train at Kangnam station. Waiting for over 20 minutes, however, there was no sign of train’s coming. What’s going on? Gee, I forgot that subway workers went on a strike calling for a personnel expansion for the smooth running of newly-introduced five-days working system.

While waiting, I noticed a guy, apparently in his early 20s, who was trying to explain vigorously to his girlfriend how UNFAIR the strike was and how MEAN subway workers were. I could hear what he was saying because he, probably deliberately, was talking in rather loud voice, and sometimes even asking for agreement to people around him. His logic was pretty simple: subway workers are working under relatively better working condition and get paid much better than common office workers in the same age group. So they do not have the right to whine about their workng condition and wage level, not to mention go on a strike that makes trouble to innnocent citizens.

What amazed me was that he knew the exact amount of money that a new recruit and middle-level executive at the Subway Cooperation receive annually. Naruhodo, he must have seen an article in the morning paper on the wage level of subway workers that the authorities propagated to win over citizens to their side. A 20s, who swallows whole propaganda of the authorities without any doubt, withdraws all sympathy he may have held with the workers and shamelessly expresses the anger in public, was a real shock to me. Come on, it is not only you that is waiting in the heat!

Generation War? No, there is no such a thing in Korea!

"세계관이 대립하고 있다거나 세대간 충돌이 너무 심해서 사회통합의 문제가 심각해졌다는 세간의 인식은 기우에 불과하다. 그런 우려들은 종종 ‘사회통합’이라는 누구도 부정하지 못하는 명제를 동원해서 자신의 의견을 정당화하려는 의식적/무의식적 의도를 갖고 있다. 지난 몇 년간의 위기는 한국인들의 가치관에 이질성을 줄이고 동질성을 늘리는 효과를 초래했다. ‘가치관의 정화작용’이 일어난 것이다." (송호근『한국, 무슨일이 일어나고 있나 – 세대, 그 갈등과 조화의 미학』삼성경제연구소, 2003년, p201)
(The fears that conflicts in value system or generational collision has aggravated the problem of social integration are groundless. Behind those concerns is a conscious or unconcious intention to justify their own views by using the ‘social integration’ logic, a proposition that can hardly be denied in the Korean society. Rather, continuing crises in the past couple of years have been closing the gap in the value system of the Koreans: what we have seen is a “purification of value system.”)

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Prof Song Ho-geun, a well-known sociologist at SNU, is making a bold yet well-founded claim that the recent talks about “generation battle” in Korea are seriously exaggerated. He pursues the track of changes in the view of world and value system of the Korean since the financial crisis in 1997, and draws a very different picture of “Habits of the Heart” of the contemporary Koreans.

“Populist foreign policy” and post-Koizumi

The Economist (July 10th, "From pacifism to populism") says,
"Far from being hijacked by a right-wing cabal, Japan's conduct of foreign policy is arguably growing more democratic. And the recent widening of the SDF's role reflects an interaction between Koizumi’s keen political instincts and broad popular attitudes. Those attitudes suggest that Japan is not so much flexing its muscles as it is stretching them after a long convalescence, to see whether they work and what they can usefully do."
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Taking this logic, we don't need to see Japan's new experiment – a series of security measures including sending troops to Iraq - as another example of its "following-America diplomacy(対米追随外交)”. That is, although Japan has indeed done much of what America wanted in Afghanistan and Iraq, it has HARDLY been bullied into it. Rather, as noted in the article, it is a "natural" consequence of the Japanese public's changing perceptions and Koizumi's popular touch.

Then, what will come after Koizumi? Probably the best guide to foreign policy in post Koizumi Japan lies in those popular attitudes that he has so skillfully tapped. In this sense, it should be noted that Japanese voters do seem to have given a warning to Koizumi, whose abrupt pledge at the G8 meeting to include Japanese troops in a new multinational force in Iraq, along with his rush over pensions policy, clearly affected the LDP’s embarrassing showing in the upper-house election on July 11. Of course, it is not clear whether the outcome implies a temporary discontent with Koizumi’s arrogant remarks and actions, or more fundametally, some sort of inertia in security perceptions of the Japanese public, but I do not think that the Japanese have TOTALLY lost their pacifist inhibitions.

And what will become of “Kantei Gaiko(官邸外交)” when Koizumi leaves office? Over the past three years Koizumi has honed his populist approach by strengthening the role of his own office and the cabinet in making policy, which allows him to seize changes as they come along. However, it is necessary to note that the Koizumi-style diplomacy has been made possible in a particualr situation where the traditional “Kasumigaseki Gaiko(霞ヶ関外交)” has not functioned at all since a series of scandals paralyzed normal policy-making process in the Foreign Ministry beginning 2001(the year Mr Koizumi got the office). Given some recent criticisms against the Kantei Gaiko that it lacks a comprehensive, longterm policy – for instance, the absence of East Asian policy of the Koizumi cabinet, chances are the Gaimusho would restore its clout over policy-making process in one or another form.

Any good idea on surviving Japan's summer?

I just got back from Seoul. For all the stuff I had to finish within this month, I was there for one reason: to avoid the heat.

This is the fourth summer I’ve had in Japan, including the one in Kyoto. Well, it might be the time you are getting used to it. But never, never for me. I still find it extremely difficult to deal with this humid and scorching summer. Yesterday back in Tokyo after one week's stay in Seoul, I concluded that there is something with Japan's summer. No sunshine, humidity and 30 something degree is a great but horrible combination of Japan's summer.