
Abstract: This article analyzes the role of the Japan-China Cultural Exchange Association (日中文化交流协会) and its director-general Nakajima Kenzō (中島健蔵) in facilitating cultural exchange within Sino-Japanese "People’s Diplomacy" in the period from 1956 to 1972. Cultural exchange was highly politically charged, and aimed at promoting favourable views of China among the Japanese intelligentsia. The article looks at how Nakajima cultivated a non-political image by distancing himself from party politics within Japan, in order to attract a wide variety of Japanese cultural figures to take part in cultural exchange with China. A staunch ally of Beijing, he mobilized Japanese cultural figures to become active in the movement to change Japan’s China policy and promote China’s position in the wider progressive movement. It is an analysis in three parts: of the trajectory leading to the founding of the association in 1956; of Nakajima’s efforts to combine pro-China activism with promoting cultural exchange under the Kishi government (1957-1960); and of the cultural exchange and its political significance in the 1960s and early 1970s.
Cultural Relations within Sino-Japanese “People’s Diplomacy”:
Nakajima Kenzō and the Japan-China Cultural Exchange Association

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Introduction

The advent of the Cold War led to Japan establishing official relations with the Republic of China (ROC) government in Taiwan in 1952, and not with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). This was largely due to US pressure, and an unpopular choice among large swaths of Japanese leftists and mainstream progressives. Nevertheless, not until 1972 would diplomatic normalization between Japan and the PRC be realized. In the 1950s the Chinese faced the same situation with many countries, and as a result Chinese Premier and Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai (周恩来) developed his so-called “People’s Diplomacy” (人民外交) or “People-to-People Diplomacy” (民间外交); a policy aimed at enhancing the PRC’s informal ties in countries with which they did not have official relations, ties that would ideally become so strong they would lead to the long term goal of formal diplomatic relations. An important result of People’s Diplomacy towards Japan was that from the early 1950s “nongovernmental” negotiations on trade were held between the PRC and Japanese trade groups, with tacit approval from the Japanese government. Another important informal channel for the Chinese leadership in Japan consisted of progressive civic groups sympathetic to the PRC. Already before 1952 activist groups had sprung up in Japan that favoured stronger ties and diplomatic normalization with the PRC, most notably the Japan-China Friendship Association (JCFA, 日中友好协会). The JCFA had strong ties to both the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) and the Japan Communist Party (JCP), political parties that had a natural affinity with the newly founded PRC. From the mid-1950s onwards cultural exchange between the two countries became another popular avenue for interaction; for Beijing a useful avenue to promote its image among people from varied sections of Japanese society.

The focus of this article will be on Nakajima Kenzō (1903-1979 中島健蔵), one of the most important “backchannels” of the Chinese in Japan, and the Japan-China Cultural Exchange Association (JCCEA, 日中文化交流协会) of which he was the director-general, in the period prior to 1972. From 1956 onwards Nakajima was the key person responsible for
cultural relations within Sino-Japanese People’s Diplomacy. We will look at the way he tried to maintain a non-partisan image in Japan, and how he attempted to broaden the appeal of Sino-Japanese cultural exchange among a segment of the intelligentsia that was not affiliated to the leftist political parties. Nakajima was a staunch and loyal advocate of the PRC in Japan, and we will look at how he used his position to mobilize cultural figures in opposing Japan’s China policy and strengthen China’s influence among the wider Japanese progressive movement.

The article will be divided in three parts: First, we will look at the background of People’s Diplomacy in the 1950s and Nakajima Kenzō; trace the trajectory that led to the founding of the JCCEA in 1956; and determine the difference between the JCCEA and the JCFA. Second, we will look at the first exchanges; and how Nakajima mobilized cultural figures against the government of Kishi Nobusuke (岸信介, in office: 1957-1960), while continuing to facilitate channels for cultural exchange. Third, we will analyze the activities of the JCCEA in the 1960s and early 1970s, looking at how Nakajima combined Sino-Japanese cultural exchange with promoting China’s interests among the progressive movement in Japan. The story of Nakajima and the JCCEA will be reconstructed using Nakajima’s writings; memoirs of Chinese Japan hands; Japanese and Chinese newspapers of the time; and an interview with Satō Junko (佐藤純子), a close associate of Nakajima’s who worked for the JCCEA for 53 years from 1957 to 2010.

**Nakajima Kenzō and the founding of the JCCEA**

*Background*

Already by the early 1960s the PRC’s use of cultural diplomacy had drawn significant attention in scholarly circles, with Herbert Passin producing a monograph on the subject in 1963 with an especially detailed analysis of Chinese cultural diplomacy towards Japan.1 While the use of cultural exchange to promote a country’s policies and positions was nothing novel, Passin argues that the use of such exchanges by the PRC was unique in that they had “a much clearer conception of their goals and a greater sense of urgency about them.”2 In the decades following, Chinese People’s Diplomacy towards Japan would be analysed by a great variety of

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2 Ibid., 9.
scholars, such as Chae-jin Lee, Wolf Mendl, Kurt Radtke, Quansheng Zhao, and Yinan He, among others. A central aim of People’s Diplomacy was to win over new supporters, among the “people” as opposed to their governments, in countries with which PRC had no diplomatic relations, who could then exert pressure on their governments to enact policies more favourable to China. In the case of Japan, this strategy was especially effective with opposition parties and the business community; many in the latter group favoured improved Sino-Japanese ties not for ideological reasons but because of a desire to trade with China, and from the 1950s many trade groups would pressure the Japanese government with this in mind. Intellectuals were another group of specific interest to the PRC as a target for its People’s Diplomacy, and cultural exchange was a channel for interaction with this group. Japanese progressive intellectuals were particularly receptive to this approach because of lingering guilt over the war, general sympathy for the new PRC, and dissatisfaction with US influence on Japanese foreign policy. Important for understanding the manner in which the JCCEA approached cultural exchange between Japan and China, is the fact that these sentiments were common not just among those with outspoken leftist sympathies but among moderate intellectuals as well. This article attempts to explain the activities of the JCCEA as dedicated to promoting China’s interests among this particular segment of Japanese society, via cultural exchange. According to Wolf Mendl, since it was US pressure that had prevented Sino-Japanese diplomatic normalization in the early 1950s, progressive intellectuals often came to see a more independent and pro-PRC foreign policy as “a symbol of the drive for national independence,” and hence they were sympathetic to the idea of improving Sino-Japanese relations. An example of one such intellectual was Nakajima Kenzō.

7 Yinan He, The Search for Reconciliation: Sino-Japanese and German-Polish Relations since World War II (Cambridge University Press, 2009).
8 Chae-jin Lee, Japan faces China, 72.
9 Herbert Passin, China’s Cultural Diplomacy, 11; Quansheng Zhao, Japanese Policymaking: The Politics Behind Politics, 83.
10 Herbert Passin, China’s Cultural Diplomacy, 14.
11 Ibid., 43; Chae-jin Lee, Japan faces China, 72.
12 Yinan He, The Search for Reconciliation, 124; Herbert Passin, China’s Cultural Diplomacy, 12.
13 Wolf Mendl, Issues in Japan’s China policy, 14.
Nakajima Kenzō

By the mid-1950s Nakajima Kenzō was a relatively apolitical literary critic, originally a scholar of French literature. The trigger for Nakajima’s engagement and resolve to work for Sino-Japanese reconciliation can be found in his wartime experience. Like many Japanese intellectuals too old to fight in the war, he had been ordered to do propaganda related work and for that reason was stationed in Singapore during the Japanese occupation. There he had learned of the indiscriminate mass killings of the local Chinese population and was especially moved by the mothers approaching him on the street because he was Japanese, asking whether he had seen their sons. This made him resolve to work for Sino-Japanese reconciliation in the future and he would describe his wartime experience in detail in a book published in 1957.14 Already during the war years Nakajima was convinced of the need to face up to the war atrocities committed by the Japanese and that “without widening the scope of memory and letting it enter our minds, the morass that Japan and China’s relations are in cannot be truly understood.”15 Feeling frustrated with the failure of his anti-fascist stance before the war, after the war he resolved to divide this life “between the study room and the street, and to make the democratization movement my new aim.”16 He sought to cultivate an image that he described as of “no party, no faction” (無党無派) and he took care to remain aloof from party politics, despite entreaties to join the JSP.17 After the war he made a living as a freelance journalist and literary critic, while also teaching part-time at Tokyo University. Perhaps his most important activity around this time was his involvement with TBS Radio, a radio station known for its social criticism and independent political debate, where he hosted two radio programmes in the mid-1950s. Other people involved with these shows were journalists of the Asahi Shimbun, Mainichi Shimbun, and notably the famous columnist and former Beijing correspondent Takagi Takeo (高木健夫) of the Yomiuri Shimbun.18 This meant Nakajima had a wide network among journalists with the three main daily newspapers in Japan, something that would prove very useful during his later activist career. In addition to these contacts, Nakajima

16 Ibid., 21, 22.
17 Ibid., 64.
18 Ibid., 72.
was also well acquainted with many progressives who would play an important role in Japanese politics in the 1950s and 1960s.

**The Sunday Club**

Nakajima was connected to a network of moderate intellectuals via the *Sunday Club* (日曜クラブ); a broad progressive organization founded in 1952 that attracted many mainstream intellectuals and still exists today. Founded to facilitate the gathering of those interested in politics to hold lectures and exchange views without affiliation to any political party, it was more a networking club than an activist group. However, many members would play central roles in progressive nongovernmental associations in the decades to come. Many of these associations were focussed on democratization, repentance for the war, and the improvement of Sino-Japanese relations. The *Sunday Club* was the result of a coming together of three intellectuals in the autumn of 1952; politician Kazami Akira (風見章), peace activist Saionji Kinkazu (西園寺公一), and Nakajima Kenzō. Soon joined by politicians Kitamura Tokutarō (北村徳太郎) and business leader Sugahara Tsūsai (菅原通濟), the five founded the club on December 20, 1952. While Kitamura as a politician would become an advocate for the improvement of Japan’s relations with the USSR and Eastern Europe, Saionji and Nakajima would focus on China, with Kazami active on both fronts. Other early *Sunday Club* members who would play a central role in People’s Diplomacy with the PRC were former Prime Minister Katayama Tetsu (片山哲 In office: 1947-1948) and author Shirato Norio (白土吾夫), both of whom would become leading figures in the JCCEA. Katayama Tetsu and Kazami Akira were very active in the progressive movement from the mid-1950s onwards; forming the *National Federation for the Defense of the Constitution* (NFDC, 憲法擁護国民連合) in January 1954, in opposition to possible rearmament and to safeguard the country’s new pacifist identity as enshrined in the constitution; and the *National Congress for the Restoration of Japan-China and Japan-USSR Diplomatic Relations* (日中日ソ国交回復国民会議), in October of the same year. During the 1950s numerous Japanese associations focussed on

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20 Suda Teiichi 須田禎一, *Kazami Akira to sono jidai 風見章とその時代* (Kazami Akira and his era) (Tokyo: Misuzu Shobō みすず書房, 1965 ), 182.

21 Ibid., 184.
contact with the PRC would appear, but Chae-jin Lee has identified two of these as of particular importance in the regular conduct of People’s Diplomacy; the JCFA and the JCCEA.  

A closer look at the former association is needed to understand the purpose of the latter.

The Japan-China Friendship Association

The Japan-China Friendship Association (JCFA), founded on October 1, 1950, was the most prominent Japanese association advocating improved relations between Japan and the PRC. The association aspired to be an overarching group with subdivisions all over Japan, and with members from various sectors of society. Four areas of public life were identified that the group would focus on: public opinion, cultural exchange, trade, and foreign policy. According to Franziska Seraphim, of the 78 official founding members, one third were intellectuals and China specialists; one third came from the business community (and half of these from Overseas Chinese businesses); while the rest consisted of JSP politicians, union representatives, and social movement activists. The core of the movement consisted of intellectual figures with long-standing ties to China prior to 1945 like Uchiyama Kanzō (内山完造), who had run a bookshop in Shanghai for decades and served as first JCFA president from 1950 to 1953; and Itō Takeo (伊藤武雄), who for many years had worked for the famous research section of the South Manchurian Railway Company. But the most prominent figurehead of the association during the 1950s and 1960s was Matsumoto Jiichirō (松本治一郎), who served as its first chairman from May 1953 until his death in November 1966. Matsumoto was a well-known JSP politician, businessman, peace activist, and most of all an activist for the rights of the Burakumin (outcast) class. He had a strong interest in China, where he had spent a few years in his youth, and had great sympathy for the newly founded PRC, where he had already attracted attention in the early 1950s because of his activism.

While JSP members like Matsumoto and his faction were heavily involved in the JCFA,

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22 Chae-jin Lee, Japan faces China, 73.
25 Ibid., 112.
26 Ibid., 111-113.
Seraphim points out that there were also strong ties with the JCP, which in the first half of the 1950s was still under heavy Chinese influence. Unsurprisingly, the association was criticized because of its supposed communist sympathies. This criticism had already started before the association was officially established, with the Mainichi Shimbun publishing an article on July 17, 1950 that described a meeting of the group and accused them of forming a spy network aligned with the USSR-controlled Cominform. While obviously an exaggeration, its reputation as a leftist activist group was established from the start. Unconditional in its support for the PRC, “political representation and mobilization were its primary functions in Japan,” with the goal of overturning the government’s China policy. Additionally the JCFA, together with the JCCEA, provided a channel for a great variety of personal exchanges with China.

Until 1966 the JCFA leadership posts were dominated by JCP and JSP members, who were heavily involved in the power struggles in these parties, on behalf of pro-China factions. Especially after the Sino-Soviet split in the early 1960s China wrestled for control of these two parties with the USSR, via their respective factions. In the JSP Matsumoto Jiichirō and his faction were heavily involved in this. But already in the mid-1950s the dominance of the JCP and JSP meant that the JCFA was seen as a heavily partisan association, potentially limiting its appeal among more mainstream progressives. In Beijing this led to the idea of creating a new Japanese association focussed on cultural exchange with China, mirroring the creation of a Chinese association devoted to cultural exchange in 1954.

The Chinese People’s Association for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries

In China, to streamline the nongovernmental exchange of People’s Diplomacy, the Central International Activities Leading Committee (CIALC, 中央国际活动指导委员会) was formed within the International Department of the Communist Party Central Committee in April

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29 “Nihon kakumei ni odoru supai mou” 日本革命に踊るスパイ網 (The spy network creating Japan’s revolution), Mainichi Shimbun, July 17, 1950.
31 Chae-jin Lee, Japan faces China, 77.
32 Ibid., 77, 78.
33 Ibid., 77.
1953. The idea then arose to create an association under the CIALC focused solely on cultural exchange. In July 1953 the CIALC put Chu Tunan (楚图南) in charge of setting up this association, of which he was to become the director, and the Chinese People’s Association for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries (CPACRFC, 中国人民对外文化协会) was inaugurated on May 3, 1954. As for cultural exchange with Japan, the idea arose for an organization within Japan that would gather together a wide range of Japanese cultural groups and individuals sympathetic to China, thereby serving as the counterpart of the CPACRFC. The natural candidate for this would have been the JCFA; as mentioned earlier, the JCFA was interested in taking a leading role in cultural exchange with China. However, Satō Junko describes that while “the JCFA… was considered the counterpart [of the CPACRFC] for one or two years, it was an extremely political organization… so it was considered very inflexible [by the Chinese].” From 1955 there was a steady improvement in Sino-Japanese relations which created the need for further streamlining the corresponding increase in cultural exchanges.

Exchange during the Hatoyama/Ishibashi years

During the mid-1950s in Japan the governments of Hatoyama Ichirō (鳩山一郎 In office: December 1954-December 1956) and Ishibashi Tanzan (石橋湛山 In office: December 1956-January 1957) ushered in a period of increased interaction between China and Japan, with even diplomatic normalization now a possibility. Mutual visits became much easier and attempts to increase cultural exchange would start from 1955. In this year a large Japanese delegation of the Science Council of Japan (日本学術会議), consisting of academics and cultural figures headed by scientist Kaya Seiji (茅誠司) visited China in May, and a similar delegation from China of the Chinese Academy of Sciences (中国科学院) headed by author Guo Moruo (郭

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37 Ma Xingfu 麻星甫, Chu Tunan nianpu 楚图南年谱 (Chu Tunan Chronicle) (Beijing: Qunyan Chubanshe 群言出版社, 2008), 64.
38 It would be renamed the Chinese People’s Association for Cultural Relations and Friendship with Foreign Countries (中国人民对外文化友好协会) in 1966, before acquiring its current name the Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries (CPAFFC, 中国人民对外友好协会) in 1969. See: http://www.cpaffc.org.cn/introduction/agrintr.html Accessed January 19, 2016.
39 Interview by author, Tokyo, June 13, 2015.
40 Kurt W. Radtke, China’s Relations with Japan, 1945-83, 107.
沫若) visited Japan in December. These two delegations were intended as the start of an intensive interaction between academics and cultural figures from both sides, and especially the visit of Guo Moruo’s delegation to Japan was seen as very significant both culturally and politically. However, on the Japanese side the coordination depended on the pro-PRC groups, and according to Satō Junko the Japanese delegation to China “was considered of limited use by the Chinese. I think China was not satisfied; if the various [Japanese nongovernmental] associations had been neatly aligned with the thinking of the Chinese government, there would have been no reason for the existence of the Japan-China Cultural Exchange Association.”

Then in November 1955 a delegation of Katayama and Kazami’s NFDC visited China; a high profile visit because it was headed by Katayama Tetsu and this was the first time a former Japanese Prime Minister visited the PRC. The hosts convinced Katayama of the need for a new organization devoted to cultural exchange and to that end the Agreement on Japanese-Chinese Cultural Exchange was signed between the NFDC and the CPACRFC on November 27. On the Chinese side the agreement was signed by a large group of prominent cultural figures like author Lao She (老舍) and dancer Dai Ailian (戴爱莲). While it was agreed Katayama would serve as figurehead, the actual running of the organization would be done by someone from the Japanese cultural world. One important cultural figure in the NFDC delegation was Senda Koreya (千田是也), a famous stage director and activist and an old friend of Zhou Enlai’s confidant and prominent Japan hand Liao Chengzhi (廖承志). According to Satō:

Senda Koreya was a key person in the founding of the JCCEA. Senda had befriended Liao Chengzhi in the 1930s in Germany. They were involved in union activities together and had grown close through their shared activism. Senda had fled to Germany escaping the Japanese authorities… and when in Germany were both active in the Asian Division of the German Communist Party.

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41 Furukawa Mantarō, Nitchū sengo kankei shi, 123.
42 Ibid.
43 Interview by author, Tokyo, June 13, 2015.
45 Wu Xuewen 吴学文 and Wang Junyan 王俊彦, Liao Chengzhi yu Riben 廖承志与日本 (Liao Chengzhi and Japan) (Beijing: Zhonggongdangshi chubanshe 中共党史出版社, 2007), 221.
46 Interview by author, Tokyo, June 13, 2015. Actually what Satō refers to here is the Japanese division (日本人部) of the German Communist Party (KPD) founded by Kunizaki Teidō (国崎定洞) in 1929. Both Liao and Senda were in Germany in the late 1920s/early 1930s and active together in several groups of East Asian communists aligned with the KPD. For a fascinating overview of this network see: Katō Tetsurō 加藤哲郎, Waima-ru ki Berurin no Nihonjin ワイマール期ベルリンの日本人 (Japanese in Weimar period Berlin) (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten 岩波書店, 2008), 155-211, 265-287.
When Senda visited China, Liao was delighted and he and Senda spoke in detail about the need for increased cultural exchange and Senda’s potential role therein. Satō:

Liao wondered if Senda could not lead the effort. But the fact was that Senda was busy with theatre at that time, and moreover what was needed was someone with a broader scope. It was because of this that Senda realized Nakajima Kenzō was the ideal candidate. When he arrived back in Japan he approached Nakajima. Nakajima later said it was Senda who recruited him.47

The main point here is that Nakajima was an ideal candidate because of his “broader scope;” compared to other leftists he had a wide network, among intellectuals and journalists, and his distance from the JSP and JCP could help attract people that the leftist parties could not.

The founding of the JCCEA

In Japan preparation got underway with a meeting organized by Kazami Akira, and according to Nakajima:

Those who were involved with the creation of the new organization… took great pains to avoid partisan politics and aimed for the participation of as wide a variety of people as possible. The JCFA and the NFDC were seen by conservatives as leftist organizations, and it was agreed by all that these groups should not be involved in a leadership role and remain in the background. Therefore they decided to invite Katayama and myself.48

Nakajima adds that another reason to preserve a neutral profile for the association was due to “the need to get the cooperation of different newspapers like the Asahi Shimbun, Mainichi Shimbun, and Yomiuri Shimbun, as well as those representing different sectors, including the conservative political parties.”49 The association was founded on March 28, 1956 in Marunouchi, Tokyo, with about 80 people present.50 Katayama was to serve as chairman, Nakajima as director-general.51 Katayama would serve as chairman until 1960, after which

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47 Interview by author, Tokyo, June 13, 2015.
48 Nakajima Kenzō, Kōei no shisō, 84.
49 Ibid., 87.
50 Ibid.
51 “Kaichō ni Katayama Tetsu-shi Nitchū bunka kōryū kyōkai hossoku” 会長に片山哲氏：日中文化交流協会発足 (Chairman will be Katayama Tetsu: The Japan China Cultural Exchange Association founded), Asahi Shimbun, March 24, 1956.
Nakajima was solely in charge of the association. Nakajima made great efforts to get his journalist contacts to cover the founding, and to have a very broad range of cultural figures attend. Further contributing to the nonpartisan image were the mainstream politicians that attended from the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), all old friends of Nakajima.\textsuperscript{52} This is what had to set apart the JCCEA from the JCFA, according to Mayumi Itoh the former association had to be a “less ideologically charged group” than the latter; dedicated to promoting “nonpolitical exchanges between China and Japan,” while staying clear of any official affiliation with Japan’s leftist parties.\textsuperscript{53} This is only partially true however; even though Nakajima took great care to maintain the image of an independent intellectual, he in fact believed culture could not be separated from politics,\textsuperscript{54} and we will see he was unapologetic in his activism on behalf of the PRC.

The first years of the JCCEA: 1956-1960

The first exchanges

Cultural exchange was to be interpreted broadly and would also include sports exchanges, and in light of later history, namely the “Ping-Pong Diplomacy” of the 1970s, it seems fitting that the first Chinese delegation travelling to Japan facilitated by the JCCEA consisted of a group of Chinese table-tennis players who were to compete against their Japanese counterparts in March and April, 1956.\textsuperscript{55} Visits to Japan by high profile cultural delegations from China were soon to follow, with Mei Lanfang (梅兰芳) leading a Peking Opera delegation in May/June\textsuperscript{56} and Cao Yu (曹禺) with a group of playwrights in August.\textsuperscript{57} Then in September a delegation of 21 Japanese cultural figures, led by musicologist Tanabe Hisao (田邉尚雄),\textsuperscript{58} and in November a delegation of 11 Japanese writers visited China.\textsuperscript{59} Naturally most

\textsuperscript{52} Nakajima Kenzō, \textit{Kōei no shisō}, 88, 89.
\textsuperscript{54} Nakajima Kenzō, \textit{Kōei no shisō}, 75.
\textsuperscript{55} “Chūkyō takkyū senshu-ra tōchaku” (Communist China table tennis team arrives), \textit{Asahi Shimbun}, March 30, 1956.
\textsuperscript{56} “Bai Ranhō-shi-ra Haneda ni tsuku” (Mei Langfang party arrives at Haneda), \textit{Asahi Shimbun}, May 27, 1956.
\textsuperscript{57} “Rainichi suru gekisakka Sō Gū” (Playwright Cao Yu comes to Japan), \textit{Asahi Shimbun}, August 5, 1956.
\textsuperscript{58} Nakajima Kenzō, \textit{Kōei no shisō}, 105.
\textsuperscript{59} \textit{Nitchū bunka kōryū} No. 716 (March 23, 2006), 4.
participants in the exchanges only spoke either Japanese or Chinese, but generally the Chinese side would supply an interpreter from among their Japan hands. On most of Nakajima’s visits to China he would be assisted by interpreter Zhou Bin (周斌), who recalls that Nakajima, among the many Japanese he interpreted for, was the person he “was closest to, the one who has impressed me the most, and who I felt a deep admiration for.”

Especially the Mei Langfang delegation garnered a lot of attention in Japan because of his fame. Due to the high profile nature of the visit, as well as the need for this to be a smooth beginning of the cultural exchange, the Chinese were very concerned about security, and for that reason it was decided to add Sun Pinghua (孙平化), one of the Japan hands close to Liao Chengzhi, to the delegation. Fluent in Japanese, Sun had been an intelligence agent in the Sino-Japanese war. And indeed, as the delegation arrived they were handed pamphlets by Taiwanese Guomindang (国民党) agents urging them to defect, and these were collected quickly by Sun Pinghua. At performances at various places in Japan there were small groups of rightwingers who took issue with the delegation, and Sun Pinghua describes how it took deft coordination between him, pro-PRC overseas Chinese and Japanese sympathizers, and the police to let everything go smoothly. Harassment from Japan’s notorious right-wing groups (右翼団体) was to become a frequent occurrence for the next decades, for Chinese delegations and Nakajima personally. According to Satō Junko, Nakajima “would often receive threatening letters… and there was frequent harassment on the streets from anti-communist right-wing groups, such as the Great Japan Patriotic Party (大日本愛国党) led by Akao Bin (赤尾敏).”

Not only there to keep order, Sun Pinghua was also charged with discussing the future of the JCCEA with Nakajima, as a trusted envoy of Liao Chengzhi. Although Sun makes no mention of this aspect of the visit, Nakajima describes their one-on-one meeting in his memoirs, and that Sun once again stressed the point that the Chinese hoped the JCCEA would “gather

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60 Zhou Bin 周斌, Wo wei Zhongguo lingdaoren dang fanyi 我为中国领导人当翻译 (简体字版) (I was interpreter for the Chinese leadership (Simplified Chinese version)) (Hong Kong: Danshan wenhua chubanshe 大山文化出版社, 2013), 254.
64 Interview by author, Tokyo, June 13, 2015.
together as wide a variety of Japanese people from different fields as possible, as long as they were not anti-China.”\(^{65}\)

**The establishment of the Kishi government**

The initiative for the founding of the JCCEA was taken at a time of optimism for improved relations between the two countries, but with the establishment of the government of Kishi Nobusuke in February 1957 these hopes soon faded, with Kishi seemingly devoted to the US alliance and loyal to the ROC government in Taiwan. The Kishi years, from 1957 to 1960, would see great polarization between progressives and conservatives, and an increased involvement of the PRC with Japanese opposition parties like the JSP and JCP, “as an institutional device to penetrate into Japan’s political processes and to influence the Japanese government’s China policy.”\(^{66}\) Zhou Enlai encouraged the formation of a broad anti-Kishi united front of all Japanese forces sympathetic to China.\(^{67}\) As Christopher Braddick has noted, the JCP and JSP would actually lose votes after becoming active in this united front,\(^{68}\) which makes Nakajima’s independent stance even more advisable in hindsight.

Nakajima Kenzō, would focus on mobilizing his network of cultural figures in this effort, while keeping a distance from the JSP/JCP efforts. For this purpose he would take on a more active role advocating a change in China policy in the Japanese media, something he resolved to do after observing the increasing split in society between progressives and conservatives, saying he “tried to maintain a neutral stance as much as possible, but as the polarization became more pronounced, this position gradually became impossible.”\(^{69}\) Judging from his personal description, this decision was his own and not made in consultation with China, a country he had yet to visit.

In reaction to Kishi’s Taiwan stance, a group of 14 progressive activists, among whom were Kazami Akira, Nakajima Kenzō, Katayama Tetsu, and scholar/peace activist Nanbara Shigeru (南原繁), took the initiative to form the broad *National Congress for the Restoration of Japan-China Diplomatic Relations* (日中国交回復国民会議) in July 1957; an effort to bring together all the progressive nongovernmental groups in opposing the Kishi government’s

\(^{65}\) Nakajima Kenzō, *Kōei no shisō*, 101.
\(^{67}\) Ibid.
\(^{69}\) Nakajima Kenzō, *Kōei no shisō*, 117.
China policy.\footnote{Suda Teiichi, Kazami Akira to sono jidai, 95.} As reported on the front page of the Yomiuri Shimbun, the first meeting on July 27, 1957 attracted over 400 people from all walks of life, calling for Sino-Japanese rapprochement.\footnote{“Yakuin 14shi wo senshūtsu: Nitchū kokkō kaifuku kokuminkaigi kessei sōkai” 役員14氏を選出：日中 国交回復国民会議結成総会 (Choosing 14 directors: National Congress for the Restoration of Japan-China Diplomatic Relations founding meeting), Yomiuri Shimbun, July 28, 1957.} The Chinese leadership would take a lot of interest in this organization over the next few years, encouraging them to form a united front with the leftist parties, and they invited a \textit{National Congress} delegation to visit China for the October 1 celebrations of that year. Kazami Akira and Katayama Tetsu led the delegation, but notably Nakajima’s activities in the \textit{National Congress} were limited and he would not join them. His priority at the time was to maintain and expand the channels for cultural exchange, and he would visit China for the first time separately in November, in his capacity of director-general of the JCCEA. He met representatives from many national associations in the cultural and sports fields, such as the \textit{China Writers and Artists League}, the \textit{All China Sports Association}, the \textit{Beijing Broadcasting Association}, and the \textit{China Science Council}, to make plans for concrete future exchanges.\footnote{Nakajima Kenzō, Kōei no shisō, 143.} In Japan Nakajima had met extensively with the Japanese counterparts of these associations and therefore plans could be squared quickly, with a final meeting between Nakajima and Chu Tunan of the CPACRFC to go over and finalize all suggested exchanges. This was to become the standard procedure for his visits to China in the many years to come.\footnote{Ibid., 143, 144.}

\textit{The Nagasaki Flag Incident}

The increasing tensions in Sino-Japanese relations came to a head with the Nagasaki Flag Incident on May 2, 1958, when a right-wing youth tore down the PRC flag at a trade fair promoting Sino-Japanese trade in Nagasaki.\footnote{Chae-jin Lee, Japan faces China, 37, 38.} This was followed by the breaking off of all trade relations by the Chinese leadership. The JCCEA was at that time hosting a Chinese theatre group of 58 people, who had to return early.\footnote{Nitchū bunka kōryū No. 716 (March 23, 2006), 8.} In the second half of 1958 and in 1959 the number of visits between the two countries dropped sharply, but Caroline Rose describes how the Chinese government was reluctant to “allow its links with Japan to lapse completely- even if the links were to be used only as a channel through which to reiterate the Chinese government view on Kishi,” while at the same time for the Japanese government these links were important
too, “since they provided an opportunity to communicate indirectly with China’s leading politicians.” Cultural exchange was one such channel. From the start there were indications that the Chinese kept open the possibility for cultural exchange to continue despite the downturn, and some two weeks after the incident the CPACRFC released a statement, saying that Sino-Japanese cultural exchange was to continue, and that the Chinese people’s issue was with the Kishi government and not the Japanese people. Still, no Chinese delegations would visit Japan while Kishi was in power. From the Japanese side the exchanges planned for the rest of the year did go ahead: with a group of Japanese calligraphers visiting China in May; buyō dancer Hanayagi Tokubei (花柳徳兵衛) with a large delegation of 46 people in June; and a Japanese delegation visiting China for painter Ogata Kōrin (尾形光琳)’s memorial exhibition in September. Among others, the Chinese cancelled a planned delegation of writers to Japan.

In reaction to the Nagasaki Flag Incident, Nakajima and leaders of six other pro-PRC associations, including the JCFA and the National Congress, released a statement together on May 14; calling for continued trade and cultural exchange between Japan and China, as well as for diplomatic normalization. The statement was reported in both the Japanese and the Chinese press. As for the JCCEA, Katayama and Nakajima drafted a long statement aimed at the Chinese leadership, signalling their desire to keep the channel for cultural exchange open. They made clear they understood the gravity of the situation:

As for the worsening of relations between Japan and China, it is clear the [Japanese] people should not just follow the government but take equal responsibility... Knowing of China’s true intentions, we believe that the key to improving this unfortunate situation is a voluntary repentance by the Japanese people.

78 Nitchū bunka kōryū No. 716 (March 23, 2006), 8.
79 “Nitchū bunka kōryū no Kiki” 日中文化交流の危機 (Crisis in Japan-China cultural exchange), Asahi Shimbun, August 4, 1958.
80 “7-Shi ga seimei: Nitchū bōeki mondai” 7氏が声明 : 日中貿易問題 (7 people release a statement on the issue of Japan-China trade), Yomiuri Shimbun, May 14, 1958.
81 “Huyu huifu Rizhong bangjiao” 呼吁恢复日中邦交 (Call for resuming Japan-China relations), Renmin Ribao, May 14, 1958.
82 Nakajima Kenzō, Köei no shisō, 163.
The statement was dated June 14, and signed by Katayama, Nakajima and Hayashi Hirotaka (林弘高). It was passed on to the Chinese by the Hanayagi delegation that visited China in June, and not published in the media. On June 25 the People’s Daily published a long editorial entitled; “It is impossible for China-Japan cultural exchange not to be influenced,” and while Nakajima is not entirely sure whether it was in direct response to their statement, this seems highly likely.83 The editorial states that continued cultural exchange is the will of the people in both countries, and that many in Japan have asked the question whether cultural exchange will be affected. It then explains the dilemma:

If the current situation was to have no influence on cultural exchange, Kishi would see this as a sign of weakness of China, and this foolish arrogance will become [his] China policy. But if cultural exchange is influenced by it they will shift the responsibility for this onto China, and among the Japanese people dissatisfaction with China will grow.84

China’s harsh reaction to the Nagasaki Flag Incident did in fact have a negative effect on the Japanese public’s opinion of China in the summer of 1958, as it was largely seen as an attempt to influence the elections that took place in late May.85 These elections were won by Kishi and would herald two more years of civil strife. For Nakajima, one important collaborative action at the time was the drafting together with Kazami Akira and the JCFA activists Hosokawa Karoku (細川嘉六, a former JCP parliamentarian) and Itō Takeo of the Repentance (反省) statement, released on July 20.86 The statement appears to be aimed at a Japanese more than at a Chinese audience, and was a call to action, stating for example that “when we unite with [people from] all fields with this as a basis for our efforts and activism, we will for the first time achieve a breakthrough in relations between Japan and China.”87 Perhaps as a sign of how polarized and anti-PRC the discourse in Japan had become, all major newspapers ignored the Repentance statement.88 The Chinese did not however, and in early August they sent an invitation to its authors to visit China for the coming October 1 celebrations

83 Ibid., 164.
84 “Zhongri wenhua wanglai buneng bushou jingxiang”中日文化关系往来不能不受景象 (It is impossible for China-Japan cultural exchange not to be influenced), Renmin Ribao, June 25, 1958.
85 Christopher Braddick, Japan and the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1950-1964, 177.
86 Suda Teiichi, Kazami Akira to sono jidai, 196, 197.
87 Nakajima Kenzō, Köei no shisō, 172.
88 Ibid., 175.
in 1958.\textsuperscript{89} Again Nakajima would not join them, and while over the next two years he would take an increasingly activist role, he would do so largely independent of the JCFA and JSP/JCP efforts.

\textit{Nakajima’s mobilization of cultural figures}

Already by late 1958 a united front, supported by China, had begun to emerge of the JSP and JCP, the JCFA, the radical union Sōhyō (総評), and the \textit{National Congress}; opposed to Kishi’s China policy and the proposed extension of the Japan-US Security treaty.\textsuperscript{90} This alliance between Beijing and large swaths of the Japanese left placed the issue of Sino-Japanese relations at the centre of the progressive struggle that culminated in the large anti-Security Treaty demonstrations of 1960. According to Christopher Braddick, the alignment of the PRC (and USSR) with this popular movement helped them “to temporarily reach out beyond their natural support base.”\textsuperscript{91} This is crucial for understanding the role of Nakajima Kenzū; though thoroughly aligned with the aims of the leftist united front, his focus was on mobilizing a particular segment of the intelligentsia not already involved with pro-China activism.

In autumn 1958 Nakajima began to mobilize opposition to Kishi’s China policy among his network. He set out to gather most of the cultural figures that had visited China in the years before and used his good contacts among journalists to avoid the media treatment that had befallen the \textit{Repentance} statement. Nakajima organized the widely publicised\textsuperscript{92} \textit{Roundtable Conference on Japan-China Cultural Relations} (日中文化関係懇談会) on October 16 with around 30 representatives from all walks of cultural life: literature, fine arts, theatre, religion, the academic world, dance and journalism. The gathering urged them to lecture and publish wherever possible on this topic, to appeal to as large an audience as possible, in order to bring

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\textsuperscript{89} Suda Teiichi, \textit{Kazami Akira to sono jidai}, 200.
\end{flushright}
into being a popular movement demanding a change in the country’s China policy. They also explicitly tied the legitimacy of their views to the fact that they, due to their direct contact with the country and its people, could speak about contemporary China based on experience.

On Nakajima’s initiative, in January 1959 a meeting was held with the leaders of 11 different nongovernmental groups, the Roundtable Conference of the Heads of the Japan-China Relations Groups (日中関係団体首脳懇談会), calling for continued exchange, moves toward diplomatic normalization and criticizing government policy on Taiwan and the US. Then the second Roundtable Conference on Japan-China Cultural Relations was held on February 22, 1959, with about 100 people present, this larger number a result of the call to action the previous October. At the time of the next “Roundtable,” held on April 4, the ranks had swelled to more than 470 people, and a series of questions to be put to Prime Minister Kishi was prepared. Then in May and June 1959, Nakajima visited China for the second time. Like last time he had meetings with various cultural figures, and this time he also had a meeting with Foreign Minister Chen Yi (陈毅), with whom he had a wide ranging discussion on various topics, beyond just cultural exchange. Again, the purpose of Nakajima’s visit to China was the organization of concrete exchanges, and a Joint Communiqué on cultural exchange was signed between the JCCEA and their counterparts of the CPACRFC. This was the first of seven such annual statements until the Cultural Revolution put a stop to all cultural exchange. The statement was reported in full in the People’s Daily, and on the same page a long article explained in detail Nakajima’s vision of the current state of the Sino-Japanese relationship, in which he framed the struggle of the Japanese against Kishi as one where the people of Japan and China stood united.

93 “Nitchū no naka o waruku suruna bunka hito ga kokumin undō okosu,” Yomiuri Shimbun, October 17, 1958.
94 “Bunka geinōjin wa kyōryoku shite iru: Nitchū bunka kōryū o mezashite” 文化芸能人は協力している: 日中文化交流をめざして (With the help of cultural and entertainment figures: aim for Japan-China cultural exchange), Asahi Shimbun, October 23, 1958.
95 “Nitchū kōryū no sokushin o yōsei 11 dantai ga seimei” 日中交流の促進を要請11団体が声明 (Request for the promotion of Japan-China exchange: 11 groups make a statement), Yomiuri Shimbun, January 28, 1959.
96 A fact that the media seem to have missed is that the “Roundtable Conference on Japan-China Cultural Relations” held in October 1958 was actually a preparatory meeting for the inaugural “Roundtable Conference on Japan-China Cultural Relations” that was held in February 1959. Therefore the February “Roundtable” was technically the first, but referred to here as the second. See: Nitchū bunka kōryū No. 716 (March 23, 2006), 8.
98 Nakajima Kenzō, Kōei no shisō, 195, 196.
99 “Yao gaishan Rizhong guanxi bixu fandui An zhengfu: Zhongdao Jianzang zai wo duiwaiwenxie jiangyanhui shang shuo” 要改善日中关系必须反对岸政府：中岛建臧在对外文协讲演会上说 (For the
While Nakajima carefully maintained his stance of non-alignment to any Japanese political party, there is no doubt these cultural exchanges were highly politically charged. During the Kishi years, Japanese delegations to China organized by the JCCEA would often heed Nakajima’s call to speak about their (positive) experiences when back in Japan. One such JCCEA delegation was a delegation of writers headed by Noma Hiroshi (野間宏) in May 1960, noted by Herbert Passin for their glowing reports about China,\(^{100}\) that published a photo book of their experiences.\(^{101}\) Baba Kimihiko, in his study of the changing image of China in Japan, suggests that the positive views of this delegation were especially valid because they “observed the actual situation out of intellectual interest only, and political factionalism was limited” among the delegates.\(^{102}\)

**The anti-Security Treaty movement of 1960**

The year 1960 saw immense demonstrations against the Security Treaty, and the Chinese government was very explicit in their support for the movement; holding supportive rallies, inviting Japanese activists to China, and even calling for the overthrow of the Kishi government.\(^{103}\) Nakajima Kenzō would continue to focus on the mobilization of cultural figures, independent from the broader leftist united front. The latter group had set up the *National Congress for Opposing Security Treaty Revision* (安保条約改定阻止国民会議), with Sōhyō getting the JSP and JCP to cooperate with some difficulty.\(^{104}\) In January 1960 Nakajima would set up the much smaller *Security Treaty Criticism Association* (安保批判の会) for a mobilization of intellectuals opposed to the treaty, as well as an effort to unite student groups and other progressive associations in this cause.\(^{105}\) For the next few months, Nakajima, with friends like Senda Koreya, would gather as many cultural figures as possible, holding

\(^{100}\) Herbert Passin, *China’s Cultural Diplomacy*, 13.


\(^{103}\) Herbert Passin, *China’s Cultural Diplomacy*, 13.


meetings and releasing statements criticizing the government, spreading the message with help from their journalist contacts.\textsuperscript{106} The \textit{Security Treaty Criticism Association} organized a meeting with the \textit{Roundtable Conference on Japan-China Cultural Relations} on April 4, which led to posing a series of questions to the government.\textsuperscript{107} These two associations largely consisted of the same people, with Nakajima in charge of both. At the height of the anti-Security Treaty demonstrations in the early summer of 1960, Nakajima and many in his circle joined forces with the larger \textit{National Congress for Opposing Security Treaty Revision} for a large demonstration on June 4 in front of the Diet with more than 20,000 people, many from the academic and cultural fields.\textsuperscript{108} Nakajima organized another demonstration of 7000 people, especially from the cultural scene, a few days later on June 14.\textsuperscript{109} Sino-Japanese cultural exchange had been thoroughly politicized during the Kishi years and in the 1960s the JCCEA would become highly involved with the struggle for influence within the Japanese left.

\textbf{Cultural exchange in the 1960s and 1970s}

\textit{The establishment of the Ikeda government}

The years under the government of Ikeda Hayato (池田勇人 In office: July 1960-November 1964) would prove to be a more stable period for the JCCEA and Sino-Japanese relations in general. There were some major breakthroughs for People’s Diplomacy like the establishment of trade liaison offices and the exchange of journalists, both in 1964. These successes were mainly a result of the cooperation between Beijing and what Chae-jin Lee calls their “indirect allies” in the LDP; the pro-PRC faction of Ishibashi Tanzan, Matsumura Kenzō (松村謙三), and others.\textsuperscript{110} As for their “direct allies;” the JSP and JCP would be consumed by factional infighting throughout the 1960s, with China focussed on promoting their factions in

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\textsuperscript{107}“Mizutani, Fujiyama ryōsōra ni kenkai tadasu ‘anpo hihan no kai’” 水谷、藤山両相らに見解ただす‘安保批判の会’ (Explaining their opinion to the two ministers Mizutani and Fujiyama: ‘Security Treaty Criticism Association’), \textit{Yomiuri Shim bun}, April 4, 1960 (evening edition).


\textsuperscript{109}“Bunkajin-ra 7000 nin ga atsumaru: minshushugi mamoru tsudoi” 文化人ら人が集まる：民主主義守るつどい (7000 cultural figures gather: to protect democracy), \textit{Yomiuri Shim bun}, June 14, 1960 (evening edition).

\textsuperscript{110}Chae-jin Lee, \textit{Japan faces China}, 45.
these parties (over those of the USSR) and in the broader Japanese progressive movement.\textsuperscript{111} The JCFA was very involved involved in the factional struggles, especially via Matsumoto Jiichirō and his faction in the JSP. But in the broader movement the JCCEA was invested in this struggle as well; a good example of this is its involvement in the Japan Council against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs (原水協). From August 1960 Chinese delegations would visit Japan again, starting with a delegation that attended the Council’s 6\textsuperscript{th} World Conference against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs, headed by Liu Ningyi (劉宁一).\textsuperscript{112} Mirroring the struggle inside the leftist parties, for the next few years these conferences would see ferocious infighting with heavy Chinese involvement, as both Lee and Braddick describe in detail.\textsuperscript{113} Nakajima Kenzō became increasingly involved with these efforts, especially the conferences in 1962 and 1963, speaking out in favour of China and against “revisionists” in Japan.\textsuperscript{114,115} The Chinese delegations to the conferences would often figure important cultural figures who were hosted by the JCCEA, so pro-China activism within the Japanese progressive movement was seamlessly integrated with Sino-Japanese cultural exchange. For example in 1962, author Ba Jin (巴金) would lead the delegation and he and other members received a welcome reception organized by the JCCEA, hosted by Nakajima and Senda Koreya.\textsuperscript{116} This was the beginning of a long friendship between Nakajima and Ba Jin. Zhou Bin recalls that Ba Jin had one of the closest connections to Nakajima among the many Chinese cultural figures who met him.\textsuperscript{117} Ba Jin would visit Japan again when leading a delegation of writers in November 1963.\textsuperscript{118}

\textsuperscript{111} Ibid., 66.
\textsuperscript{112} Kurt W. Radtke, China’s Relations with Japan, 133.
\textsuperscript{113} Chae-jin Lee, Japan faces China, 65, 66; Christopher Braddick, Japan and the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1950-1964, 182, 189.
\textsuperscript{114} “Ôare no gensuikin taikai konran no mama heimaku” 王荒れ原水禁大会混乱のまま閉幕 (Unruly anti-nuclear conference ends in chaos), Yomiuri Shimbun, August 7, 1962.
\textsuperscript{115} “Chūso ronsō mochikomu gensuikin no kokusai kaigi” 中共論争持ち込原水禁の国際会議 (Sino-Soviet dispute present at international anti-nuclear conference), Yomiuri Shimbun, August 7, 1963.
\textsuperscript{117} Zhou Bin, Wo wei Zhongguo lingdaoren dang fanyi, 261.
\textsuperscript{118} Nitchū bunka kōryū No. 716 (March 23, 2006), 18.
Increased cultural exchange

Generally the improved atmosphere under the Ikeda government would lead to a flurry of cultural exchange activity. Nakajima would visit China yearly until 1966, meeting with leaders like Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai and Chen Yi, as well as with numerous cultures figures, and signing a Joint Communiqué on cultural exchange with the CPACRFC every time. From the early 1960s the Chinese leadership was keen to expand on and establish new connections with people from different sectors of Japanese society. In autumn 1961 a CPACRFC delegation visited Japan for the first time, headed by Chu Tunan. The delegation, consisting of 9 people, was hosted jointly by the JCFA and the JCCEA and included Sun Pinghua.119 Sun Pinghua explains that among the Chinese this was seen as an important new start since “many of the backchannels that had been shut after the Nagasaki Flag incident were gradually reopened,” and the Chinese leadership had selected movie director Cui Wei (崔嵬), painter Chang Shana (常沙娜), and engineer Zhang Youxuan (张有萱), among others, to re-establish a connection with Japanese counterparts in their fields.120 The JCCEA was focussed on introducing many people from the Japanese cultural scene to Chu Tunan and he was able to meet with a large selection of Japanese from the literature, film, theatre, and so on. Among them were old friends like Senda Koreya and Hanayagi Tokubei, and prominent figures like Nanbara Shigeru.121 Still, the Chinese visitors would not remain aloof from politics and the National Congress for the Restoration of Japan-China Diplomatic Relations organized a manifestation welcoming Chu Tunan that was attended by some 3000 people in Hibiya, Tokyo. Here Chu as well as speakers from the pro-PRC factions of the JCP and JSP called on people in the US as in Japan “to stop opposing Sino-Japanese friendship,” and on the Ikeda government to support China’s claim to a seat at the UN.122

Exchange among literary figures is a good example of an area in which the JCCEA was active; after the Noma Hiroshi delegation of 1960, more writers’ delegations would follow in

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119 “Chūgoku bunka daihyō Nihon e” 中国文化代表日本へ (Chinese cultural representatives come to Japan), Yomiuri Shimbun, November 20, 1961.
120 Son Heika 孫平化 [Sun Pinghua], Chāgōku to Nihon no hashi wo kaketa otoko 中国と日本の橋を架けた男 (The man who built a bridge between China and Japan) (Tokyo: Nihon keizai shimbunsha 日本経済新聞社, 1998), 104.
122 “Dōngjīng géjié sānqiānrèn jìhuì yàqiú huìfǔ bāngjiāo” 东京各界三千人集会要求恢复邦交 (3000 people from different fields demand resumption of relations in Tokyo), Renmin Ribao, November 26, 1961.
both June and November 1961, and in June 1963, with participants like Kamei Katsuichirō (亀井勝一郎), Shirato Norio, Ariyoshi Sawako (有吉佐和子), among others. The writers were able to meet with Chinese literary figures and sometimes with leaders like Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, and Chen Yi.\(^\text{123}\) Laying the groundwork for further literary exchange, Nakajima visited China in September and October 1962 with Ariyoshi Sawako, where they met with Chu Tunan, Liao Chengzhi, and others,\(^\text{124}\) as well as with Mao Dun (茅盾) and Lao She; discussing literature and future writers’ exchanges.\(^\text{125}\) They then had a meeting with Foreign Minister Chen Yi.\(^\text{126}\) One result of this was that in March 1965 the JCCEA would host a delegation of Chinese writers to Japan, a delegation led by Lao She who had an extensive meeting with Tanizaki Jun’ichirō (谷崎潤一郎), who was a JCCEA member, shortly before the latter’s death.\(^\text{127}\) Similar exchange initiatives were facilitated by the JCCEA in other fields, such as cinema, theatre, sports, and so on.\(^\text{128}\) As had been the case with the Noma Hiroshi delegation, the Japanese participants would often gain a favourable opinion of China and Nakajima encouraged them their experience with others in Japan. For example Kamei Katsuichirō would write a book about his two journeys to China.\(^\text{129}\)

**Criticism and obstruction from the right**

Although the atmosphere for Sino-Japanese exchange improved a lot during the Ikeda era, the influence of the conservatives around Kishi remained strong even after 1960, with allies like Kaya Okinori (賀屋興宣) forming the pro-Taiwan faction in the LDP.\(^\text{130}\) Kaya was unsparing in his criticism of people-to-people exchange between the PRC and Japan, accusing the Chinese visitors of meddling in the Japan-US relationship and encouraging subversive groups, as well as of hypocrisy in the case of their involvement in the anti-nuclear movement,
since the PRC too was a nuclear power from 1964.\textsuperscript{131} The pro-Taiwan faction would obstruct the JCCEA whenever they could, for example when Kaya was Minister of Justice (1963-1964). In the 1950s and 1960s a travel permit was needed for travel to the PRC from the Ministry of Justice, and according to Satō Junko; “when a member of the pro-Taiwan faction was Minister of Justice, we often would not get the permit. I remember we had to write objection letters all the time.”\textsuperscript{132}

\textit{The end of the Ikeda era}

By the end of the Ikeda era in 1964, Nakajima had become one of the most trusted allies of the Chinese in Japan, while frequently appearing in the Chinese media as one of the “Japanese friends.” In 1964 many Japanese sympathizers visited China for the October 1 celebrations, and Nakajima arrived a few days earlier with a JCCEA delegation of 8 people.\textsuperscript{133} A large reception was held for all the Japanese guests that had come for the celebrations, hosted by Chen Yi and Guo Moruo. In many ways their sheer number, more than 500, was a testimony to the success of more than 10 years of People’s Diplomacy. There were politicians from the JCP, JSP, and LDP, as well as old friends like deceased JSP leader Asanuma Inejirō’s widow Asanuma Kyōko (浅沼幸子). Showing the central position of both the JCFA and the JCCEA within Sino-Japanese People’s Diplomacy was that their respective leaders, Matsumoto Jiichirō and Nakajima Kenzō, after having a private meeting with Chen Yi, were two of the three speakers at the reception with the third being Liao Chengzhi.\textsuperscript{134} On October 8, both Matsumoto and Nakajima met separately with Zhou Enlai and Liao Chengzhi.\textsuperscript{135} In some ways this was the end of an era as the government of Satō Eisaku (佐藤栄作) In office: 1964-1972) was established in November 1964, and politically there would be another period of coolness between the two countries as Satō, a younger brother of Kishi Nobusuke, was again more inclined towards open support for the ROC government. After the death of Matsumoto Jiichirō

\textsuperscript{131} Kaya Okinori 賀屋興宣, \textit{Sensen, sengo hachijūnen 戦前戦後八十年}(Eighty years, prewar and postwar) (Tokyo: Rōman 浪漫, 1975), 308.
\textsuperscript{132} Interview by author, Tokyo, June 13, 2015.
\textsuperscript{133} “Rizhong wenhua jiaoliu xiehui daibiaotuan dao Jing” 日中文化交流协会代表团到京 (Japan-China Cultural Exchange Association delegation arrives in Beijing), \textit{Renmin Ribao}, September 29, 1964.
\textsuperscript{134} “Zhongri youxie juxing jiuhui huanying Riben pengyou” 中日友协举行酒会欢迎日本朋友 (China-Japan Friendship Association holds a welcome party for Japanese friends), \textit{Renmin Ribao}, October 3, 1964.
\textsuperscript{135} “Zhou zongli jiejian yipi Riben keren” 周总理接见一批日本客人 (Premier Zhou meets group of Japanese friends), \textit{Renmin Ribao}, October 9, 1964.
in November 1966, and the split of the JCFA into JSP and JCP branches one month earlier,\textsuperscript{136} Nakajima was the most important among the long-term leaders of the pro-PRC associations still standing. The split in the JCFA reflected the fact from 1965 the pro-Chinese faction had come to control the JSP, while in the JCP it was the reverse.\textsuperscript{137} Incidentally this also led to the break of a lot of progressive intellectuals, who were exactly the kind of people attracted to Nakajima activism, with the JCP.\textsuperscript{138} With infighting in Japan’s progressive movement ever more intense, Nakajima’s central status as a pro-PRC advocate meant that he became a target of criticism from factions of the left, mainly the JCP.

\textit{Criticism from the left}

In the 1960s both Chinese visitors to Japan and the Japanese pro-PRC groups would routinely castigate “revisionists” and “anti-Chinese elements” within the leftist movement in Japan, which was veiled criticism of those sympathetic to the USSR. Unsurprisingly this created resentment among those criticized. Antagonism between China (and its Japanese supporters) and the JCP exploded in February and March 1967, with the \textit{Zenrin Student Dormitory Incident} (善隣学生会館事件); a violent confrontation between radical Chinese students and JCP proxies.\textsuperscript{139} The JCCEA and the other pro-PRC groups used this as an opportunity to rally their entire network, from LDP members to cultural figures, against the JCP.\textsuperscript{140} Nakajima and 34 other intellectual figures released a statement in support of the students and denouncing the JCP.\textsuperscript{141} Subsequently on March 15 the communist newspaper \textit{Akahata} published an editorial critically analyzing Nakajima’s role in the Japanese progressive movement.\textsuperscript{142} In a way the criticism testifies to the success of Nakajima’s efforts to be a pro-PRC advocate while maintaining the image of an independent intellectual. Blasting Nakajima for using the incident for his own political ends without regard to the facts, the editorial further accuses him of using his position of “progressive cultural figure,” as well as the Chinese visitors he invited to Japan, to “split Japan’s democratization movement,” and sell out the

\textsuperscript{136} Nihon Chūgoku yūkō kyōkai zenkoku honbu-hen, \textit{Nitchū yūkō undoshi}, 137-143.
\textsuperscript{137} Christopher Braddick, \textit{Japan and the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1950-1964}, 211, 212.
\textsuperscript{138} Ibid., 267.
\textsuperscript{139} Chae-jin Lee, \textit{Japan faces China}, 80, 81.
\textsuperscript{140} Ibid., 81.
\textsuperscript{141} “Bunkakai 35shi no seimei” 文化界 35 氏の声明 (Statement from 35 cultural figures), \textit{Chūgoku kenkyu geppō} 中国研究月報 229 (1967), 15, 16.
\textsuperscript{142} “Nakajima Kenzō no tenraku ni tsuite” 中島健蔵の転落について (On the fall of Nakajima Kenzō), \textit{Akahata}, March 15, 1967.
movement to foreigners; thereby using it to further China’s ends. Another editorial in the same paper focussed on the statement of the 35 cultural figures; criticizing them for siding with the Chinese students, it warned against the danger of Chinese dominance in the progressive movement and the damage done by criticizing all with a different view as “revisionists” and “anti-Chinese elements.”

Exchange during the Cultural Revolution

As far as cultural exchange was concerned, during the first two years under Satō the situation would never deteriorate the way it did under Kishi. Exchanges continued unabated, as did Nakajima’s visits, on which he met Mao and Zhou in 1964, 1965, and 1966. Throughout the first half of the 1960s, the JCCEA became more involved with sports exchanges, and from 1966 the plan was to increase these exchanges even more. In July of that year Nakajima visited China and signed another Joint Communiqué with Chu Tunan, and met with the leadership. Unsurprisingly, the Cultural Revolution put a halt to all these plans. During the next few years, although the amount of exchange was reduced to almost zero, the JCCEA worked hard to keep some kind of channel open, with Shirato Norio visiting with small delegations in May and December 1967 and September 1968. But with most cultural figures as well as Liao Chengzhi and his Japan hands largely purged or worse, there was no one left to exchange with. One of the few Japan hands who still active was interpreter Zhou Bin, and he recalls how Nakajima did make a brief visit in what was probably 1968, and how saddened Nakajima was by the fact he knew no one anymore. He returned to Japan sooner than planned, and urged Zhou Bin to pass on his regards to his many friends if Zhou ever saw them again, saying: “if you see them or their families, make sure to tell them Nakajima from Japan has not forgotten them.”

143 “Sanjūgonin no ‘seimei’ ni hanron suru” (Refutation of the ‘statement’ of the thirty-five), Akahata, March 15, 1967.


146 Nichū bunka kōyū No. 716 (March 23, 2006), 26, 27.

147 Zhou Bin, Wo wei Zhongguo lingdaoren dang fanyi, 261.
The 1970s

Nakajima was invited to China again in autumn 1970, at the first sign of things returning to normal and China opening up again to the outside world. Together with LDP politician Matsumura Kenzō, Nakajima had become perhaps the longest serving and most loyal Japanese friend of China. This was reflected in the fact that he witnessed the October 1 parade of that year with Mao and Zhou in the leadership stands for the full 8 hours, a rare honour. In the two years before Sino-Japanese diplomatic normalization in 1972, there are two examples that serve to illustrate the important role that the channels maintained by the JCCEA had come to play in the interaction between the two countries. First, the so-called “Ping-Pong Diplomacy” that set in motion the thaw in US-China relations that culminated with Nixon’s visit in February 1972 began when the American and Chinese table tennis teams met at the World Championship in Nagoya in 1971. As Mayumi Itoh describes in detail, the controversial decision by the Japan Table Tennis Association (JTTA) to invite the PRC team was preceded by heavy lobbying from the JCCEA, and after the decision was made, the visit was realized through cooperation between the JTTA and JCCEA. Second, after Tanaka Kakuei (田中角栄 In office: July 1972-December 1974) became Prime Minister in Japan in July 1972, Sino-Japanese diplomatic normalization became increasingly likely; however the first steps were hard to take because of the lack of official contact. Here the visit of the large Shanghai Ballet Troupe, organized by the JCCEA in the same month, was to play an important role. Zhou Enlai and Liao Chengzhi decided to let Sun Pinghua accompany the group as deputy head and when in Japan, while keeping a low profile, open negotiations with the Japanese and extend the official invitation for Tanaka to visit Beijing. This would have been impossible to do without a cover like this, due to opposition from the pro-Taiwan faction in the LDP, as well as the potential loss of face in case the talks did not go well. In Japan Sun Pinghua (together with fellow Japan hands Xiao Xiangqian (肖向前) and Tang Jiaxuan (唐家璇), the future Foreign Minister) met with Tanaka, as well as with Foreign Minister Ōhira Masayoshi (大平正芳). Through the 1950s and 1960s, Shirato Norio had become Nakajima’s right hand in managing the JCCEA, and throughout the years he had led a large number of delegations himself. Often by Nakajima’s side in Beijing, he had cultivated strong ties with the Chinese

148 Ibid., 256.
150 Son Heika [Sun Pinghua], Chūgoku to Nihon no hashi wo kaketa otoko, 136-144.
leadership. In the 1970s, he gradually took on the leadership role in the JCCEA, although officially he only became the director-general after Nakajima’s death.\(^{151}\) In the years after 1972, Nakajima’s health gradually declined, and he would pass away on February 21, 1979, a few months after Deng Xiaoping’s visit to Japan that formalized the Peace Treaty between Japan and China. Liao Chengzhi, who accompanied Deng on this visit, would make a final visit to Nakajima’s house, on October 24, 1978.\(^{152}\)

**Conclusion**

The aim of Chinese People’s Diplomacy towards Japan was to create a more favourable environment in Japan for the idea of improving Sino-Japanese relations, and eventually to achieve diplomatic normalization. Cultural exchange between China and Japan was highly politically charged; its goal was to bring about a more favourable view of China among Japanese cultural figures by increasing positive interactions with their Chinese counterparts. Ideally they would then be willing to support the China in the arena of public opinion. Additionally, in the absence of official diplomatic relations, such people-to-people contact could serve as an alternative channel of communication. It was the Chinese leadership that first suggested creating the JCCEA, which shows the importance they attached to creating channels through which they could interact with a wide variety of Japanese. This wide variety would have to include intellectuals who potentially had favourable views of the PRC but were not attracted to the leftist groups in Japan that China had a natural affinity with. The focus on this particular segment of the intelligentsia is what set the JCCEA apart from Japan’s main pro-China association, the JCFA, which had close ties to the JSP and JCP. Nakajima Kenzō came to lead the JCCEA especially because of his carefully cultivated “no party, no faction” stance of keeping a distance from political parties. Despite this stance Nakajima rejected the idea that cultural exchange was independent from politics and he encouraged Japanese cultural figures,

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\(^{152}\) “Nagaiki i ne tōbyō-chū no Nakajima Kenzō-san Ryō-san ga jitaku ni mimau” 長生きいいね: 閑病中の中島健蔵さん廖さんが自宅に見舞う(A good long life: Nakajima Kenzō visited at his sickbed at home by Liao), Yomiuri Shimbun, October 25, 1978.
especially those who had visited China, to join him in advocating a change in the country’s China policy. This was the case especially during the Kishi years of 1957-1960, when he focussed on mobilizing people from the cultural world in the wider progressive struggle. During this period he took care to work independently from the larger PRC-supported united front of the leftist parties and groups, organizing the Security Treaty Criticism Association and the Roundtable Conference on Japan-China Cultural Relations. With the breakdown of the leftist united front in the early 1960s that lead to increased rivalry between pro-China and pro-USSR camps, he continued to promote a pro-China viewpoint in the Japanese progressive movement. By now hardly above factionalism anymore, he was criticized by others in the progressive movement for his partisanship.

In addition to the aim of changing Japanese views of China, the additional political importance of these painstakingly crafted cultural channels can be seen when we look at examples like the immense success of “Ping-Pong Diplomacy” in the 1970s, and the way the Chinese could use cultural delegations to send envoys that could then stay under the radar, like Sun Pinghua in 1972.

Lastly, though he was unapologetic in his pro-China activism, it would be unfair to dismiss Nakajima as a mere puppet when clearly the JCCEA articulated the feelings of so many in the Japanese intelligentsia like Tanizaki Jun’ichirō, Nanbara Shigeru, Senda Koreya, and others. Moreover, Nakajima and the JCCEA were able to bring about meetings between Japanese cultural figures like this and towering Chinese figures like Lao She and Ba Jin, thereby making a valuable contribution to Sino-Japanese friendship.