
**Abstract:** In this essay, Professor Iwai discusses the use of trade and travel restrictions placed on Chinese maritime merchants by the early Qing court. It involves trade contacts among China, Japan, Korea, and various states in Southeast Asia. The institution of a system of regional maritime customs was one result of this changing policy. It provides as well a whole new look at the institution of the shinpai (licenses issued by the Tokugawa shogunate for trade at the port of Nagasaki) seen now from the perspective of the Chinese. He also takes a close look at specific cases (Li Taoshi, Li Wei) to illustrate the points being made.
International Society after “The Transformation from Civilized to Barbarian”\(^1\)

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“Oppose the Qing, Revive the Ming” and the Demise of Hope

Can Barbarians Become Civilized?

On July 9, 1674 (Enpō 延寶 2/6/6), Hayashi Shunsai 林春斎 (Jo 恕, 1618-80, heir of Hayashi Razan 林羅山, 1583-1657) appeared before shogunal officials and read out in Japanese translation two manifestos that were circulating in China calling on people to rise up and oppose the Manchus and restore the Ming dynasty. At the end of May of that same year, the first piece of news about an uprising had been brought to Japan by a merchant vessel sailing from Fuzhou, and Shunsai had read this report aloud as well. A merchant ship from Guangzhou that entered port that very same day in Nagasaki brought news that: “Of the fifteen provinces of the great Qing dynasty, seven—Yunnan, Guizhou, Sichuan, Huguang [Hunan and Hubei], Shaanxi, Guangxi, and Fujian—had all risen in support of the great Ming.” (Ka’i hentai 2 shang)

Hayashi Shunsai was afraid that the reports about China that were being delivered to the shogunate from Nagasaki would become scattered and disappear as the Qing dynasty’s control of China was in a state of turbulence, and he went back through past documents and set out to compile them. His final remarks for the introduction he composed for this work read: “This resembles the transformation from barbaric to civilized; that is, even if they are from a different place, isn’t this a happy event?” He gave this collection of reports on China acquired from Nagasaki the odd title Ka’i hentai 華夷変態 (The transformation from civilized to barbarian) because he as editor hoped that the situation of “civilized becoming barbarian” caused by the “barbarians (tatsuryō 韃虜) gaining predominance over the Central Plain” following the collapse of the Ming dynasty would be reversed and he would see the realization of “barbarians transformed into civilized people.”

Wu Sangui 呉三桂 (1612-78), who had earlier been enfeoffed as the “Prince who pacifies the West” (pingxi wang 平西王) by the Qing court, was protecting Zhu Suntai 孫太子, and taking the title “Great general who will revive the Ming and punish the barbarians” he raised an army in Yunnan and launched the Rebellion of the Three Feudatories in 1673 (Kangxi 12). “Zhu Suntai” was the third imperial prince of the Chongzhen emperor (r. 1627-44) whose fate was linked with that of the Ming dynastic

\(^1\) This essay appeared as “‘Ka’i hentai’ go no kokusai shakai” 「華夷変態」後の国際社会, in Nihon no taigai kankei, vol. 6: Kinsei teki sekai no sei juku 日本の対外関係、6 : 近世的世界の成熟 (Japan’s foreign relations, vol. 6: The maturation of the early modern world), ed. Aranoo Yasunori 荒野泰典, Ishii Masatoshi 石井正敏, and Murai Shōsuke 村井章介 (Tokyo: Yoshikawa kōbunkan, 2010), pp. 44-68.
house, but it was all a sham. Wu Sangui had surrendered at the Shanhai Pass 山海關, and he had been the driving force behind allowing the Manchu forces through the Great Wall into China. He then reversed course to oppose the Qing dynasty and raised an army set on “resisting the Qing and reviving the Ming,” and he was able to justify this through his support of Zhu Santaizi. Joining with the army of Geng Jingzhong 耿精忠 (d. 1682), the “Prince who pacifies the South” (jingnan wang 靖南王), in Fujian, he rose up reportedly “with as many as ten thousand men who grow their hair, wear a cap on their heads, and they have changed to following the Ming system of attire.” (Ka’i hentai 2 shang) Ceasing to shave the hair off of the front half of one’s head as part of tying one’s hair in a queue and wearing one’s hair over this area would have been an expression of disobedience to Manchu rule. The cap referred to was the wangjin 網巾, an ordinary hat used to tie up one’s growing hair. The ceremonial dress worn by officials in accordance with their rank was a revival of the traditional style adopted by the Ming rather than that used by the Manchus.

Wu Sangui later raised the banner of “revive the Ming,” and he established a Zhou 周 state and enthroned an emperor. This was to become a primary factor hampering solidarity between the forces of the Zheng 鄭 family seeking revival of the Ming and the Three Feudatories. (Liu Fengyun 1994) In Japan, though, the Rebellion of the Three Feudatories was seen principally as a struggle between the Ming and the Qing—namely, between civilized and barbarian—for control over the realm, and concern concentrated around this issue. Following Wu Sangui’s manifesto, Zheng Jing 鄭經 (1642-81), eldest son of Zheng Chenggong 鄭成功 (Koxinga, 1624-62), had his own written appeal delivered all the way to Edo via Nagasaki. With the change in dynasties from Ming to Qing in 1644, the influence of the Zheng family from their base on Taiwan and along the Fujian coastline continued in resistance the Manchus, and they issued a call for a response by raising an army on the mainland.

In response to a request for military assistance sent by Zheng Zhilong 鄭芝龍 (1604-61, father of Zheng Chenggong) when the Ming dynasty collapsed in 1644, the regime of Tokugawa Iemitsu 誠川家光 (r. 1623-51) both indicated a stances of refusal and made preparations to dispatch troops. (Ishihara Michihiro 1945) There apparently was support at the time to get the shogunate to become involved in the uprising in China. Thirty years later at the time of the Rebellion of the Three Feudatories, however, while investing hope in a Ming revival, they took a bystanders’ stance. At the same time, the Ryukyus and Korea, which were located as “bulwarks” for China by virtue of investiture and tribute relations, were not going to calmly remain outside.

“Revive the Ming,” Ryukyu and Korea

Geng Jingzhong, the “Prince who pacifies the South,” raised an army in Fujian, sent a vessel to Naha in the Ryukyus, and planned to insure the supply of sulphur. A messenger carrying a reply from the royal Ryukyu court was dispatched to Fuzhou. It remains unclear what sort of negotiations transpired between Geng Jingzhong and the Ryukyu court, but it appears as though on the Ryukyu side they were prepared to offer assistance to Geng’s army. By the time the messenger arrived in Fuzhou in 1676, though, the Price who pacifies the South had already surrendered.
Amid the information relayed from the Ryukyus to Edo, we find the following: “In the spring of Enpō 5 [1677], a Ryukyu man who had crossed the sea and become a Tatar traveled to a Qing city issued an apology for the messenger captured the previous year.” Learning of the defeat of Geng Jingzhong, the Ryukyuan messenger’s party shaved their heads, changed their attire to that of the Manchus, burned their reply to Geng from the Ryukyu king, and hid out in Lianjiang County, but they were captured as suspicious. Interrogated at the pacification commission in Fuzhou, they made various excuses, although evidence was discovered against them. Ultimately, to secure their release, the Ryukyuan messenger delivered a huge sum of money—on the order of thirty kanme 貫目 [1 kanme equals 8.72 pounds] of silver—to Qing officials, and they were freed; eventually they returned to Naha in 1677. On board the same ship was a party of eighteen under tribute emissary Wu Meide 吳美德 who had traveled to Beijing, and on their return voyage were kept under house arrest in Suzhou for five years. (Ka’i hentai 6 shang) The armies of Zheng Jing which held control over the southern half of Fujian were under attack from the Qing army and that very year retreated to Taiwan. Having their route to link up with the Zheng forces then stationed along the southeast coast of China cut off, Wu Sangui’s troops found it difficult to gain success in their effort to again reverse the civilized-barbarian balance.

In response to the demands of the Ming at the time of the rise of the Manchus (then known as the Later Jin dynasty), the Chosŏn dynasty in Seoul sent troops to the Liaodong border, and after their entire army was destroyed, found themselves at the mercy of the contending Ming and Qing sides. They suffered military invasion on two occasions during the reign of Hong Taiji (Emperor Taizong 太宗, r. 1626-43). As a consequence of the first invasion in 1627 (chŏngmo horan 丁卯胡亂), the Later Jin assumed a fictive older brother role to the Chosŏn’s younger brother, and the two peoples did not violate the border between them. A decision was reached on punishments for anyone crossing the frontier.

The second invasion of 1637 (pyŏngja horan 丙子胡亂) discarded this relationship and resulted in the decisive action of compelling a ruler-ruled tie with the Qing emperor in the former role and the Korean king in the latter. The point of departure for this was when representatives of the Manchus, Mongols, and Han each carried out the solicitation ceremony in which Hong Taiji was installed as emperor. Korea, too, was sought for support, but because Korea had received investiture from the Ming and because it looked down on the Jurchen peoples as “barbarians,” the king could not approve of a subordinate role vis-à-vis the barbarian emperor. Hong Taiji acceded to the throne in 1637 and changed the name of the dynasty form Later Jin to Great Qing. In order to compel Korea which did not join in the solicitation line-up to submit, an imperially led armed force crossed the frozen Yalu River. King Injo 仁祖 (r. 1623-49) who was holed up at the Namhan-san 南漢山 Fortress saw that resistance was futile, and reached a peace on the conditions that he broke relations with the Ming, took responsibility to respond to the demand to send troops, and did not repair his fortress’s ramparts. An investiture-tribute bond between the Qing and the Chosŏn not only concluded a fictive sovereign-subject bond, but was actually close to that of control over a vassal state. (Liu Jiaju 1986)
Given this experience, anti-Manchu hostility was deep-rooted in Korea. With the death of King Hyojong 孝宗 (r. 1649-59), however, plans for an armed counteroffensive against the Qing (a northern expedition) were abandoned. As hopes for a Ming revival grew slimmer, the stance of “serving the great” (sadae 事大) which prioritized stability in relations with the Manchus gained influence. Amid this trend when news came of Wu Sangui’s uprising, there was a complete turn around and a movement aimed at a northern expedition was revived. The opposition between the Northern faction of officials which laid emphasis on “serving the great” and the Southern faction which leaned toward an anti-Qing stance prevented unity of public opinion, and as a result concrete war plans and diplomatic strategies were not decided upon. After Wu Sangui died in 1678 (Kangxi 17), his grandson Wu Shifan 吳世璠 (1666-81) succeeded him and soon fell into obscurity in Kunming; and quickly any idea of a northern expedition lost all influence. (Han Ubon 2008; Yi Sŏngmu 2006)

Thus, the Rebellion of the Three Feudatories represented the greatest crisis for the Qing after establishing its dynasty, and this trend influenced international relations within East Asia. Two years after the end of the rebellion with the suicide of Wu Shifan, in 1683 the Zheng family in Taiwan submitted to the Qing. The anti-Qing, pro-Ming forces which combined military and financial might with the three feudatories and the Zhengs were overcome, and the possibility of reversing the “transformation from civilized to barbarian” virtually disappeared. The reports conveyed by Chinese who sailed to Nagasaki continued as before to be compiled under the heading of Ka’i hentai, but then suddenly from 1717 it was given a new heading true to name and reality of Kikō shōsetsu 崎港商説 (Merchant reports from the port of Nagasaki). Expectations for a reversal of civilized-to-barbarian transformation were given expression as a realization of the frustrated civilized-vs.-barbarian perspective and its imaginary world in Chikamatsu Monzaemon’s 近松門左衛門 Kokusenya kassen 國姓爺合戰 (The battles of Koxinga) of 1715.

Removal of Maritime Restrictions and Movement toward International Trade

Change of Commercial Policy

Shortly after overcoming the crisis, Qing finances were thoroughly depleted. As for the extraordinarily destitute state of the Qing at this time, a Korean tribute delegation reported as follows. In the first lunar month of Kangxi 22 (1683), the emperor hosted a “peace banquet” in Beijing, and the Korean party along with various princes, grand ministers, a Mongol envoy, and the commanders-general of the eight banners, among others, all attended. The Court of Imperial Entertainments (Guanglusi 光祿寺) which was charged with providing food and drink was unable to make the necessary arrangements, and the assorted princes perforce brought their own. The eight banners which had been bursting with loyalty to proper etiquette were compelled to pay for their provisions when in attendance on the spring and autumn hunts. “Thus, they say that men’s minds have gradually drifted away, and complaints have undergone a sharp increase. One senses that much has been squandered.” (Chosón wangji sillok, Sukchong reign, fascicle 15; Kangxi 23/3/14) For an imperial prince to provide his own food and drink when attending an invited banquet hosted by the emperor was an exceedingly unusual event. Not only attending banquets but the influence of this fiscal poverty
extended even to the ceremonies at the hunt which were enacted to preserve the alliance with the nomadic Mongol bannermen. In the administrative offices of the outer provinces as well, much of their local expenses for military procurement was eliminated and reverted to the central government; in addition, it even became a normal state of affairs to find government salaries confiscated. (Abe Takeo 1971)

The Qing court somehow pacified all the disturbances amid this poverty and adopted an audacious and open commercial policy. Among Western countries at this time, international rivalries over commodities had produced an inclination toward a mercantilist policy. The Qing abandoned its policy of maritime restrictions which had tied its hands due to military objectives and effected a sudden turnabout in the direct of open maritime commerce. (Chen Shangsheng 1993) Undeniably, this was one aspect of a fiscal retrenchment policy. However, Manchuria which had suddenly risen from the era of Nurhachi (1559-1626) as a commercial and military unit grounded in regulated border trade known as hushi 互市 was about to revert to its original nature. The policy which had grown out of the maritime restrictions expanded its range, and from the 1570s the Ming government was oriented toward opening up this regulated trade. (Iwai Shigeki 2004; Iwai Shigeki 2009) Having gone through a period of countercurrents toward maritime restrictions, the Qing reinstated this route.

Maritime restriction in the early Qing had a negative influence on domestic maritime transport linking China’s coastal ports and even the fishing industry along the coast. This was one of the causes for the lengthening of the decline in commodity prices and land values as well as the depression accompanying the insufficient quantity of silver as currency. (Kishimoto Mio 1997) By changing policies and abrogating the restrictions on maritime activity, it was anticipated that the flow of goods by means of maritime transport linking coastal ports would be stimulated, and commodity markets be revitalized. The revitalization of trade among domestic port cities and the opening up of international trade expanded with redoubled efficiency.

Establishment of Maritime Customs

Manchus were sent as supervisors to the newly established maritime customs offices. An office of accounts was places in the imperial household department, and after they conquered China, medicinal use ginseng was brought into cross-border trade to raise revenues, and it was tied to merchants known as “imperial household department traders” (neiwufu shangren 内務府商人). (Qi Meiqin 1998) Trade in cross-border commodities was the cornerstone for Nurhaci’s expansion of his influence; while he was contesting the Ming militarily, he sent caravans to Zhangjiakou and assumed a consistent stance that emphasized commerce. There was no lack of Manchus knowledgeable in commercial affairs and calculations. Not only the customs overseers, but many Manchu officials affiliated with the eight banners were also appointed governors and governors-general of various provinces along the coast. The court expected them to plan for coastal defense preparations as well as the expansion of revenues.

The customs administration regulated affairs without distinguishing domestic coastal trade and international trade. Customs houses were set up at the passes—Zhangjiakou, Shanhaiguan, and the like—situated at strategic sites along the inland waterways, the gate to Beijing, and along the Mongolia-Manchuria trade route. There they collected commercial customs revenues known as changguanshui 常關税. The
newly installed Jiang Customs (Jiangsu), Zhe Customs (Zhejiang), Min Customs (Fujian), and Ao Customs (Guangdong) were the facilities for collecting commercial customs revenues assessed on shipping along inland waterways and commercial products as well as on international trading vessels (including Chinese ships) and on their freight. Customs assessment was carried out not only at specific port cities. Maritime customs offices were set up in each of the individual provinces along the southeast coast. These provincial maritime customs offices had branches installed in each of the ports under their jurisdiction. For example, a branch of the Ao Customs office was set up at Macao, and not only Portuguese vessels but Chinese ships that came and went at Macao also paid customs fees. (Matsuura Akira 2002; Okamoto Takashi 1999)

Maritime customs revenues were comprised of a levy on ships assessed based on their size and a levy on freight assessed on the basis of what they were carrying. Because the revenue reports largely indicated only overall amounts—not distinguishing classifications of vessels, routes taken, or ultimate destinations—it is impossible to give statistical values, but the relative weight in the overall amount of revenues collected between commercial customs revenues and maritime customs revenues can be seen in the exports and imports of domestic trading vessels along the Chinese coastline and Chinese merchants ships (“junks”), and the exports and imports of foreign vessels. The chart below lists the “base amount” (zheng’e 正額) of revenues collected at the four maritime customs offices in the first half of the eighteenth century. The term zheng’e referred to the base amount of the total collected, the least amount of money projected for collection—and thus differing from the actual amount collected overall. When the revenues collected proved satisfactory, a yingyu 盈餘 (surplus) assessment outside the zheng’e was collected to add to the quota, and the lowest projected amount of it would be set. (Qi Meiqin 2004; Chen Guodong 1982; Peng Yuxin 1956)

| Qing Customs Revenues (unit: tael) |
|-------------------------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|
| Base                          | Percentage of total | Surplus (1799) | Percentage of total |
| Jiang Customs                 | 21,480            | 1.1%           | 42,000          | 1.8%          |
| Zhe Customs                   | 32,158            | 1.6%           | 39,000          | 1.6%          |
| Min Customs                   | 66,549            | 3.3%           | 113,000         | 4.7%          |
| Ao Customs                    | 56,531            | 2.8%           | 866,500         | 35.8%         |
| Totals                        | 176,718           | 8.8%           | 1,049,500       | 44.0%         |

Source: Qi Meiqin 2004. Total amounts include only commercial and maritime customs under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Revenue.

Looking at the surplus amounts for 1799, the figure for Ao Customs (Guangdong) stands out among the four customs offices. This was due to the fact that Western vessels at the time were directed to trade at Guangzhou and to the fact that Guangzhou was considered relatively more important in outbound trade for Chinese vessels. The south—meaning Fujian and especially Zhangzhou (Xiamen)—were areas which sent out numerous emigrants overseas and many trading ships, while Zhangzhou was strengthening its ties to Guangzhou. There was a brokerage firm operating in Guangzhou
known as “Fuchaohang” 福潮行 aimed at ships with people from southern Fujian. If a brokerage firm concerned with overseas trade was also known as **yanghang** 洋行, it might also serve as an agent in paying fees to the customs office and provide warehousing services. Although Chaozhou was included in Guangdong Province, because it neighbored Zhangzhou and its dialect was close to that of southern Fujian, they were lumped together. In addition, many men of southern Fujian origins were to be found among the merchants of the thirteen hangs of Guangzhou who provided services such as contracting for the payments of fees for Western vessels and trading companies. (Zhang Wenqin 2009; Tan Yuanheng 2009; Liang Jiabin 1999)

China’s maritime trade in the eighteenth century extended it ties to the Southeast Asian region with Guangzhou as a hub port. The route for trading here linked coastal sites along the Indian Ocean, around the Cape of Good Hope to European ports via the Malacca Straits and the Sunda Strait. A Pacific course linking up with Acapulco in Mexico and the Philippines reached to Xiamen, Guangzhou, and Macao by means of a branch route from Manila heading to the northwest.

**Concentrating in Guangdong**

At the same time, Chinese trade at Nagasaki throughout this century was gradually diminishing. This forms the background to the fact that revenues from Zhejiang and Jiangsu Customs were becoming sluggish. The important windows for trade with Japan were now ports in the Jiangnan region: Zhapu, Ningbo, Zhoushan, and Shanghai, among others.

Ever since the widening of the trade route between the Kyushu region and ports in Fujian and Zhejiang in the 1540s, silver production in Japan had declined while copper gained in relative importance and began to drive Sino-Japanese trade. Silver was the currency of trade, and there was a huge need for it in China for minting coinage. The basis for this trade went through the disruptions at the time of the Ming-Qing transition and the era of maritime restrictions from the mid-1650s, but it did not change. To make up for the decline in silver and copper in the eighteenth century, high-grade marine products known as **tawaramono** 俵物 and **konbu** 昆布 (dried seaweed) were exported, and more silver came flowing into East Asia via the Pacific route from Manila, while the relative importance of trade with Japan for China seems to have declined. Chinese trading vessels coming to Manila in the first half of the seventeenth century numbered thirty to forty annually. (Morga 1966) Chinese ships were attracted by the ability to secure silver coinage as compensation for commercial products.

When the Qing abandoned its maritime restrictions and switched to an active trade policy in 1684, trade with Japan remained a prominent sight for investment. That Chinese ships in excess of one hundred per year sailed to Nagasaki to engage in trade speaks eloquently to this fact. In 1689 a policy to segregate the Chinese in the Tōjinkan 唐人館 (Chinese compound) was adopted, and in 1702 they concentrated their goods on Chinese vessels and built a new guardian deity for protection; such developments strengthened the restrictions in trade. Further intensification of the controls on the amounts of trade in 1715 with the “New Rules on Maritime Freight and Regulated Trade” and the issuance of licenses (shinpai 信牌) to trade at Nagasaki, the path to a policy to bring Sino-Japanese trade under control became fixed.
Through the eighteenth century, China underwent an expansion in trade, and the concentration in Guangzhou which gained a position as the hub port rose accordingly. Movement of the center of gravity for trade came together with a decline of the importance for the Qing government of problems with Japan in foreign relations. By problems with Japan meant how to cope with Japan as a threat or as a strategic base for a threat. In responding to such a Japan problem we can see the basis of foreign policy of the Qing dynasty in the eighteenth century. The problem was, then, how this was perceived with respect to trends in international society and what sort of policy such perceptions led to.

**The Shinpai Problem and Qing Commercial and Diplomatic Policy**

**New Rules on Maritime Freight and Regulated Trade**

From the eighth lunar month of 1714 (Kangxi 53, Shōtoku 4), Chinese merchants sailing to Nagasaki were required not to return home but to remain on hand, and then finally on the fifth day of the third lunar month of the following year they were summoned to convene at the office of the Nagasaki Administrator. There they had read out to them the “New Rules on Maritime Freight and Regulated Trade” (also known as the new Shōtoku regulations). When the Chinese merchants returned to the Tōjinkan where they were staying, the Chinese interpreters showed them the Chinese-language documents and explained it to them further. Thereafter, merchants and others wishing to come to Nagasaki to do business were compelled to write out a certificate which, in essence, meant they would comply with these new regulations. (Tsūkō ichiran, fascicle 164, “Ikoku tsūshō sōkatsubu” 異國通商總括部 [Overall section on foreign commerce] 27, “Shōhō” 賞法 [Commerce], “Shōtoku gokaisei” 正德御改正 [New Shōtoku regulations]) Each vessel that called at port was issued a document entitled “Shinpai Nagasaki tsūshō shōhyō” 信牌長崎通商照票 (License, verifiable ticket for engaging in commerce at Nagasaki) which clearly laid out the year that they would be allowed to return to port and the upper limit on the amount of trade they were permitted. Thus commenced the issue of licenses which exacerbated the problems between China and Japan over a two-year period. (Yano Jin’ichi 1925; Saeki Tomi 1971 [1958 original]; Ōba Osamu 1974; Ōba Osamu 1980 [2012]; Ōba Osamu 2001; Arano Yasunori 1988; Matsuura Akira 1988; Iwai Shigeki 2007)

When Chinese merchants bearing shinpai issued by the Japanese from the summer of 1715 forward set sail form home, discordant views emerged between the Zhejiang provincial administration commissioner (buzhengshi 布政使), the surveillance commissioner (anchashi 按察使), and the provincial governor, among others, and the customs administration which oversaw trade over whether or not they should accept the trading policy of Japan, clearly an effort to use the issuance of licenses as a way to reduce the number of Chinese trading vessel to a level of thirty per year. The superintendents of customs (both Manchus) for Zhejiang and Jiangsu accepted the shinpai system so as to maintain customs revenues, and they tried to send merchants to Nagasaki. Merchants in the Fujian (Xiamen and Taiwan) and Guangdong (Guangzhou) regions traveled to Nagasaki with their licenses from the summer of that year, and there is no evidence that the customs administrations in Fujian and Guangdong ever saw the shinpai system as problematic. The Zhejiang provincial administration commissioner and surveillance
commissioner (both Han Chinese), though, did see the matter of recognizing the Japanese shinpai as one injurious to “national rites” or “national ceremonials.” Furthermore, there were cases in which merchants who by chance did not come to Nagasaki in the latter half of 1714 and hence did not receive shinpai were excluded from trade falsely accused other merchants who did receive licenses of treason for “submitting to Japan.” And, there were lawsuits brought which were aimed at obstructing merchants who received shinpai from monopolizing trade with Japan. The shinpai system thus led to considerable strife among merchants in Zhejiang and Jiangsu.

Three documents originating with a merchant by the name of Li Taoshi 李韜士 are recorded in the Ka’i hentai: one is a report written in Chinese by Li himself; the second, entitled “Kantonsen no Tōjindomo shinkō” 廣東船之唐人共申口 (Oral testimony of Chinese from a Guangdong vessel) (dated Kangxi 56/2/23; Shōtoku 6), translation compiled from collected reports; and the third was entitled “Kanton sentō Ri Tōshi monogatari no oboe” 廣東船頭李韜士物語之覺 (Notes on the story of Li Taoshi, shipmaster on a Guangdong vessel), submitted to the Nagasaki Administrator by a number of Chinese interpreters. (Ka’i hentai, fascicle 35) On the basis of these three documents, let us examine the case of merchant Li Taoshi and the problems surrounding the shinpai.

Confusion Surrounding the Shinpai

Li Taoshi received a shinpai on April 14, 1715 and was then about to return to Guangdong. He ran into a southern wind, and on May 8 entered port at Ningbo where he stayed to convalesce. He then found himself while sojourning in Ningbo enveloped in a case of slanderous charges brought against him by merchants who had been unable to secure shinpai and thus had been excluded from trade with Japan. Having received a report from the district magistrate, the Zhejiang governor saw through the slander in the indictment claiming that merchants “had submitted to a foreign land and were using a foreign country’s era name.” He advised the merchants: “As for the matter of the era name, there are many such era names used in foreign lands, and because it was a license issued there, the fact that it would bear that country’s era name was not baseless”; and he found there to be no problem with it. The merchants, nonetheless, brought a lawsuit before the Jiangsu customs administration so as to raise a huge fuss. As a result, the accused shipmaster was summoned to Suzhou and subjected to an inquiry.

Fearful that misfortune would befall him personally, Li fled from Ningbo in the winter and returned to Guangdong. He readied a vessel waiting for an opportunity to engage in trade, set sail from Guangzhou on January 26 of the following year, and entered port “in the sea outside Ningbo” (probably either Zhoushan or Putuo). The merchants who had been indicted on the basis of information from Zhejiang and Jiangsu were being held under house arrest in Nanjing with no decision as yet having been reached. The customs house in Ningbo seized forty-three shinpai, and the governor-general of Zhejiang and Jiangsu as well as the provincial governors made it clear to merchants through the customs office that Chinese merchants who would have gone to do business in Japan without one—namely, just like before the shinpai system had gone into effect—should be allowed to trade at Nagasaki without restrictions.

Li Taoshi sailed on February 29 and went directly to Nagasaki. According to the Shinpaikata kiroku 信牌方記録 (Records of the office of trading licenses), by the end of
June, following Li Taoshi seventeen Ningbo and Nanjing vessels entered port at Nagasaki. (Ōba Osamu 1968) All of these ships were following the instructions of the governor-general and governors and had come to port without licenses. This action was effectively diplomatic negotiations by merchants pressuring the Japanese to revoke the shinpai system.

This effort at collaboration between the authorities in Zhejiang and Jiangsu and the merchants, though, failed. Half a month after entering port at Nagasaki, Li Taoshi himself on April 1 sought to unload his cargo, but was denied permission to do so. He was finally ordered sent home on June 9, and he left on June 12. Seeking the realization of Chinese demands, he had persevered for about two months. The Japanese did not send Li’s ship away immediately by virtue of his not having a shinpai. Clearly they wanted to avoid cutting off trade relations with the Jiangsu-Zhejiang region, the site from which there was a great demand for products, such as raw cotton. The government officials in Edo, however, would not compromise. From March until the end of June, a total of seventeen vessels from Jiangsu and Zhejiang which had entered port without licenses were ordered to return home with their cargoes intact within four to twenty days.

Among the licenses issued in 1715, there were forty-two given to Nanjing and Ningbo vessels. To make up for the severing of trade by these ships, an arrangement was worked out whereby ten new shinpai were distributed “among the Chinese resident” in Nagasaki, “selecting men of good character with no [Chinese] port name affixed,” in order to overcome the seizure of licenses by the Zhejiang authorities. (Shinpaikata kiroku) Negotiations over the strict trading rights not based on diplomatic methods occurred repeatedly.

Seeing Japan assume such a strident posture, in August of that year Zhejiang Governor Xu-yuan-meng 徐元夢 (1655-1741), a Manchu, sent a memorial to the Kangxi Emperor (r. 1661-1722), accompanied by an actual shinpai and the text of the “New Rules on Maritime Freight and Regulated Trade,” requesting instructions. He was thus relying on the court for a resolution of this problem. (Iwai Shigeki 2007)

Merchants and Silent Diplomacy

Having no other recourse the Zhejiang provincial authorities sent a document to Japan requesting revocation of the system of trading licenses and proposed diplomatic negotiations. The Ministry of Revenue agreed. The Kangxi Emperor, however, rejected the proposal to try to open diplomatic negotiations with Japan over this issue; the acceptance by Chinese merchants of licenses issued by the Chinese interpreters in Japan was merely an act of commercial certification, and it was completely wrong to see this as disruptive of “national rites.” He concluded that this was not something that should have even been reported to the court. (Matsuura Akira 2002) Later, the issue was turned over for another round of deliberations at a court conference of the nine chief ministers. It would appear that there was resistance on this occasion as well. A decision was put off until the following year, but ultimately the Qing government went along with the position staked out by the Kangxi Emperor, and it issued a determination that accepted a strengthening of the trade regulations based upon the shinpai system and the “New Rules on Maritime Freight and Regulated Trade.” This decision was sent to the Zhejiang and Jiangsu authorities in May 1717 (Kangxi 56) in the form of an official dispatch from the Ministry of Revenue.
The details of this case reveal the rigors of harmony between government offices and trading merchants in China at the time. The “official informing” by the Zhejiang governor which the Japanese received contains content worthy of note. In his memorial, the Zhejiang governor proposed and the Ministry of Revenue accepted as follows: “The merchants are to trade in compliance with the Japanese protocol as far as the number of vessel fixed by the Japanese (Woren 倭人) and the stipulated amount of cargo are concerned.” He had the merchants confer as follows:

Only those in possession of trading licenses may cross the sea frequently, and the cargo of those not in possession of a license will fall in arrears. Because they are people who pay taxes on behalf of the court, they should be treated benevolently. Be certain to order the superintendent of customs at Ningbo and have him assemble the merchants. They should be flexible among themselves with the Japanese licenses or ready their ships collectively, perhaps with an alternating sequence. (“Zhun haishang ling Wo piaozhao, Kangxi wushuliu nian siyue” 准海商領倭票照、康熙五六年四月 [Grating maritime merchants Japanese licenses, fourth lunar month of Kangxi 56], in Shinpaikata kiroku)

This was not an announcement to the Japanese that the Qing accepted trading regulations based on the “New Rules on Maritime Freight and Regulated Trade,” but it indicated that it was based upon a document prepared for Chinese merchants. By having this document transported to Nagasaki, the Japanese learned of the final decision reached by the Chinese side.

As concerns the matter of “regulated trade” (hushi) and perhaps the confusion surrounding it, the officials and courts of both countries did not resolve this by means of diplomatic negotiations; rather, one side communicated to its merchants and the other side announced acceptance through its merchants. Hidden from sight, the bureaucrats and administrators who should have shouldered responsibility for royal authority and national sovereignty transmitted reports and notices of intent via commercial routes. With respect to the introduction of the shinpai system, the Japanese side—in particular, Arai Hakuseki 新井白石 (1657-1725)—as well as the Chinese side cautiously carried out a program of silent diplomacy by daring to engage in artificiality and sophism to avoid spreading into the realms of “national rites” or “national ceremonial” and negotiating without state-to-state diplomacy. (Iwai Shigeki 2007)

Although merchants who had not been able to receive trading licenses might have been excluded from trade at Nagasaki, the Chinese proved flexible when it came to the shinpai, shared in the financing of export shipping, and used a rotation system for the licenses as a plan for resolving this problem. Private merchants contributed to state finances via customs revenues. We see here the expression of a rational idea through which commercial activity should have been maintained. Private merchants accepted the supervised trade inherent in hushi and, while conferring with state power, aimed at gaining profits for themselves. By coming up with such a system, the officialdom expressed a rational idea based on mutual benefit which in turn should have extended into positive action. Deliberation in which the maintenance of peaceful trade was based on mutual benefit for officials and merchants was a premise of this. China in the eighteenth century brought such a system into existence.
Maritime Restrictions in the South Seas and Their Context

Primary Factors behind Maritime Restrictions

After announcing an ultimate resolution of the shinpai issue, in September 1717 (Kangxi 56) merchant Li Yixian’s 李亦贤 “oral testimony” touched on the fact that on May 25 the court had erected in various provinces roadside prohibitions boards announcing “maritime restrictions in the South Seas.” Li Yixian began with a memorial from Governor Zhang Boxing 張伯行 (1652-1725) in Nanjing which claimed that the rise in domestic rice prices was a consequence of rice being shipped overseas by merchants, and he declared that an imperial message had been handed down by the Kangxi Emperor personally at the time of a palace visit by Fujian-Zhejiang Governor-General Man-bo 滿保 (1673-1725) to the effect that they “should invoke restrictions on vessels sailing overseas to engage in commerce.”

Yanagisawa Akira argues that the maritime restrictions on the South Seas of 1717 “were aimed at strengthening the system of maintaining order throughout the empire just as the government was plunging into full-fledged war with the Zhungars—in a word, it was a kind of preventive measure to eliminate all anxiety about the future.” (Yanagisawa Akira 1999) Given the fact that that very year there was a complete change in policy to that point and that thorough enforcement of maritime restrictions proved to be quite difficult, the fact that an order was issued on restrictions in the South Seas cannot be understood by leaving the influence of the issue of the Zhungars out of consideration.

Issues of concern to us, however, go beyond this. With the expansion in overseas trade in East Asia from the middle of the sixteenth century, there was heightened activity by commercial-military blocs born of the boom in frontier economies that straddled the southeast coastline of China and overseas Chinese societies. The largest such bloc was the Zheng family, and the Qing dynasty had realized a “Manchurian peace” by overthrowing the Zhengs. (Iwai Shigeki 1996) The Qing was naturally on a high level of vigilance that similar anti-Qing blocs might form again. Needless to say, the maritime restrictions in the South Seas area were proposed with the intention of preventing just such an eventuality. The need to invoke once again maritime restrictions due to a worry that such a state of affairs might materialize in the South Seas was thus recognized. Over the course of the years until the abrogation of these restrictions in 1727 (Yongzheng 5), and even after the restrictions were lifted, there was an active debate among the governors-general and governors of the coastal provinces and the Yongzheng Emperor (r. 1723-35) over questions of how to reduce the number of Chinese resident overseas or, by contrast, not allow them to return home, and how to sever their links to the Chinese homeland. From these instances, we can see that China was directly facing the fact that the central task of diplomatic and commercial policy with respect to the maritime world was protecting the empire’s security, and on this basis it would simultaneously protect profits from overseas trade and insure a balance of interests as it enhanced its financial and economic priorities.

Loopholes in Maritime Restrictions

On March 20, 1718 (Kangxi 57), about eight months after promulgation of the maritime restrictions, the Ministry of War in deference to instructions from the Kangxi Emperor approved the stance articulated by Guangdong-Guangxi Governor-General
Yang Lin 杨琳 (d. 1724); Yang had memorialized seeking confirmation that “foreign vessels in Macao going to trade in the South Seas and Chinese vessels inland going to trade in An Nam” were not covered by the restrictions. (Qing Shengzu shilu 清聖祖實錄, fascicle 277, Kangxi 57/2/wuxu) For all intents and purposes, this measure eviscerated the efficacy of the maritime restrictions for the Guangdong region in particular. In April 1726 (Yongzheng 4), Fujian Governor Mao Wenquan 毛文詮 argued as follows: “The land of An Nam was originally not connected [to the ban]. Hence, travel to and from [the South Seas] from Guangdong has never been severed.” In other words, Chinese vessels setting sail from Guangdong and putatively headed toward An Nam had, in fact, been able to travel anywhere. Because the South Seas travel restrictions had now effectively ceased to have any efficacy, Governor Mao sought a relaxing of the ban as far as Fujian Province was concerned. Trade was the lifeblood of Fujianese, he claimed, and financial affairs gained them profits. (Guo Chengkang 1997)

What prompted the Yongzheng Emperor to decide to rescind the maritime restrictions was a report by Li Wei 李衛 (1687-1738), governor of Zhejiang and an official of energetic spirit whom the emperor trusted. In March 1727, Li wrote the Yongzheng Emperor a memorial which revealed the true state of smuggling and secret trade going on despite the prohibition on travel to the South Seas. According to his report, ever since recognizing as an exception to the ban travel from Guangdong to An Nam in the year after the maritime restrictions went into place, the following situation developed:

If they set sail with papers claiming they were going to engage in trade in An Nam, there is no difficulty in stopping them [with naval forces] at Nan’ao or Haitan Island. If we inspect the cargo on their vessels after returning to port and there is produce from the western ocean or the South Seas region, they will gloss over it claiming it was all repurchased from An Nam or they acquired it after they were overcome by high winds at sea and drifted ashore at islands in the western ocean or South Seas. An Nam, however, is a small country and is not rich in produce to sell. In an official document from Guangdong from before, it was noted: “Only four or five ships sail to that country to engage in trade each year.” There is no reason to believe that [An Nam] would be able to purchase goods from numerous trading vessels from all provinces. Siam shares a border with An Nam, but it falls within the restricted zone. If merchant vessels travel overseas just once, the ocean spreads out endlessly; they have the freedom to head in any direction: east, west, south, and north. There is no way to track them, and there is thus no guarantee they will not sail in another direction [from their putative objective]. (Li Wei, “Wei zouwen chuyang shangchuan qing youshi” 為奏聞出洋商船情由事 [Report to the throne on matters concerning merchant vessels sailing at sea], Yongzheng 5/2/17, in Gongzhongdang Yongzhengchao zouzhe, vol. 7)

What eviscerated the efficacy of the maritime ban in the South Seas was the activity of shrewd Chinese merchant ships. It was impossible for the political wave of the maritime ban to stop them. Responding to requests from Fujian and Zhejiang, the Yongzheng Emperor had the Ministry of War discuss the matter, and ultimately he decided to lift the restrictions.

Southeast Asian Markets and China

The Kangxi Emperor’s worry that Chinese rice would be carried overseas and supplied to Chinese communities and pirates’ lairs overseas was initially a
misunderstanding. In the summer of 1722, the following entry in the Qing Shengzu shilu can be found in which Kangxi describes tribute envoys from Siam:

Another imperial edict reads as follows: “A man from Siam says that the rice in his land is extremely plentiful and its price quite low. Roughly 0.2 or 0.3 taels of silver can purchase one dan 石 [100 liters] of rice. My orders were: ‘If you have much rice, transport 300,000 dan of it for distribution to Fujian, Guangdong, Ningbo, and like sites, and there it can be sold.’ If men from Siam are able to transport [their rice], they will make a tidy profit in such places. Because there is an official preferment with respect to this 300,000 dan of rice, there will be no customs fees levied on it.” (fascicle 297, Kangxi 61/6/renxu 壬戌)

Each of three large vessels was actually loaded with 100,000 dan of rice to sail from Siam to China. The Chinese shipowner of Siam vessel number 18 which entered port at Nagasaki in 1725 (Yongzheng 3, Kyōhō 9) reported that as a consequence three ships laden with 100,000 dan of rice were sent from Siam; one of them arrived in Guangdong, one was shipwrecked at the port of Zhoushan, and the whereabouts of the third heading toward Fujian were unknown. (Shimabarabon Tōjin fūsetugaki)

In September 1727, after the ban of travel to the South Seas had been lifted, Kong Yuxun 孔毓珣 (d. 1730), governor-general of Guangdong and Guangxi, sounded out the possibility of trade in rice with shipowners of Siam vessels who transported rice and sappan wood to China. He received a positive reply. When Kong made a palace visit in Beijing, he personally received from the Yongzheng Emperor instructions to the effect that it would be acceptable to earn a profit for vessels trading in rice by acquiring rice from Siam. (Memorial of Kong Yuxun, Yongzheng 5/8/19, in Yongzhengchao Hanwen zouzhe huibi an, vol. 10) In fact, these Siam vessels that sailed to Guangdong heard the news that merchant ships from Fujian were bringing rice from overseas, and just as they were in the midst of trying to sell their rice in Fujian, they sailed on to Guangdong. The Guangdong authorities at the time expressed the following inclinations. By virtue of the instructions that the importation of Siamese rice was desirable for Guangdong and would be exempt from duties and Chinese merchants who purchased it would not be restrained in terms of purchasing price, in future we should continue to encourage the arrival of vessels from Siam laden with rice. The Yongzheng Emperor wrote his approval in vermilion on the memorial with the character hao 好 (fine). (Memorial of Akdun, Yongzheng 5/9/13, Gongzhongdang Yongzhengchao zouzhe, vol. 8) Although we know that in the mid-Qing years the importation of rice from Thailand and Viet Nam to areas of south China expanded considerably, it should probably also be noted that this expansion of the rice trade became regularized from around the era of the “maritime restrictions in the South Seas.” (Sarasin Viraphol 1977; Li Jinming 1990; Tang Kaijian and Tian Yu 2007; Tanaka Harunobu 2009)

Despite these “maritime restrictions,” the bond between the South Seas region and Chinese markets grew ever stronger. The decision of the Kangxi Emperor in 1717 was based on a misunderstanding that rice and ships from China proper were being supplied by Chinese communities and gangs of pirates forming overseas. In fact, the key was preparations for war against the Zhungars in the remote western regions. Yet, we cannot neglect the following point. Overseas Chinese communities in the South Seas region and Luzon continued to grow together with the expansion of commerce. Control in these areas was forcefully maintained by such Western powers as Portugal, Spain, and Holland using powerful weaponry and large-scale ocean-going vessels. At the same time, the
Qing authorities lacked the means to compel or induce Chinese abroad. The issue of coastal defense was an important policy task throughout the era of the “South Seas maritime restrictions.” Heightening fears vis-à-vis the South Seas were closely tied to upheavals in the world of East Asian seas in this period.

Coastal Defenses and Reports on Overseas Chinese

Chinese without Queues

In October 1727 (Yongzheng 5) the Fujian-Zhejiang governor-general and the governors of Fujian and Guangdong jointly signed a memorial sent to the Yongzheng Emperor in response to an imperial edict from him. The edict instructed them to investigate the arrangement aimed at realizing the repatriation of Chinese overseas on the basis of an official dispatch from the Ministry of War, and to send in a file concerning overseas affairs during the Kangxi reign to be used as reference for devising a counter-plan. In the memorial the officials reported on the situation in Batavia and Manila which they acquired from rumors. In the midst of this report they noted that Chinese in the Batavia region had cut their queues and were settling there and in Manila there was no need to cut their queues. This was the evidence that set the Qing authorities’ nerves on edge that there was anti-Qing activity brewing overseas.

The governor-general and governors proposed sending to Batavia and Manila either capable people posing as trading merchants or selecting from among the experienced traders for this task, and then have them investigate “what sorts of activities were going on in those lands, how settled Chinese actually were there, what they were doing there, and what were the goals driving Chinese to settle there.” In response the Yongzheng Emperor indicated a cautious approach. (Fujian-Zhejiang Governor-General Gao Qizhuo 高其倬 [1676-1738], Guangdong Governor Yang Wenqian 楊文乾 [d. 1728], and Fujian Governor Chang Lai 常賚, “Wei fu zoushi” 為覆奏事, Yongzheng 5/9/9, Gongzhongdang Yongzhengchao zouzhe, vol. 8) Unlike the case of Nagasaki, there was the danger that sending spies into areas under Dutch and Spanish control might draw them into diplomatic complications. Despite the revocation of the “South Seas maritime ban,” a feeling of vigilance was high in such areas where the Western countries had interests.

It was reported that in the Batavia region “rice was extremely inexpensive, and it was easy for craftsmen to make a profit on it. Thus, they have settled with their queues cut and laying in store, and if they marry and have offspring there appears to be no sentiment toward returning to their native place.” Given such an economically advantageous environment, settlement continued, and “in supervising the Chinese, they [the Dutch] give to the head Chinese person the title ‘Kapitein,’ and if there is a law suit have them investigated. It will be useful to have each and everyone issued credentials.” And, Chinese society there was maturing with its own autonomous structure.

The fact that Chinese in these overseas places were enjoying freedom to a certain degree and a stable life was not considered a blessing by the Qing authorities. To the contrary, it only heightened the worries of the authorities. Around the time of the lifting on the South Seas ban, the Qing government responded in rapid succession by the enforcement of control over those traveling overseas and by implementing a policy to
enforce the limitations on repatriation from overseas. This was a manifestation of the vigilance against the expansion of autonomous overseas Chinese communities.

**Chinese Encircled**

Compared to the South Seas region, the Qing was able to obtain more highly reliable reports than on conditions at Nagasaki. In 1701 the Kangxi Emperor sent to Nagasaki as a spy Mo-er-sen 莫爾森 (Mai-er-sen 麥而森), warehouseman (a financial official) in the Imperial Household Department. The details of the report Mo-er-sen compiled remains unknown. Vigilance with respect to Japan at this time was high, and true and false reports about Japan seem to have been flying in—it was Mo-er-sen’s task to confirm them. After returning from Nagasaki, Mo-er-sen appears to have given the Kangxi Emperor the impression that these were “trumped up bogus words offered” and that the Japanese were adopting a passive—literally, “lazy and submissive” (nuoruo gongshun 懦弱恭順)—attitude toward foreign policy. According to the Yongzheng Emperor, the Kangxi Emperor had for this reason relaxed his vigilance vis-à-vis Japan and “thereafter ceased paying it much attention.” (Matsuura Akira 1978)

We know that that, by questioning spies and returnees to the Zhejiang region, Li Wei, governor-general of Zhejiang and Jiangsu, acquired reports about Nagasaki with high degree of accuracy, and this information was conveyed in great detail to the Yongzheng Emperor. Mention should be made of the fact that through these reports, issues of what sorts of activities were being engaged in by doctors, military men, intellectuals, and craftsmen of such things as weaponry who had traveled to Nagasaki in response to Japanese requests, and general merchants were placed under strict supervision and lost most of their freedom of movement.

When general trading merchants travel to that land, they are corralled in the city. There are high fences surrounding them; they have dwelling within, and many merchant dwellings have open shops. They call this the tuku 土庫 (local warehouse); it has a main gate and is guarded by heavily equipped soldiers. Gaining information by hanging around outside is not permitted. When they arrive, their freight is placed [in storage], and officials sell it off for them. All of the food and drink as well as female companionship is provided [for the Chinese merchants]; when they are ready to set sail for home, all of their accounts are settled in detail, and they are paid. The copper ore and produce which they get for their price are held at the merchant dwellings. (Li Wei, “Wei zou wenshi” 為奏聞事, Yongzheng 6/8/8, Gongzhongdang Yongzhengchao zouzhe, vol. 11)

What is referred to in this citation as “officials” had to have been the “senior figure” (otona 乙名) among the interpreters and merchants. Interpreters and otona were municipal functionaries appointed for “official business” (goyō 御用)—they were not truly “officials.” The issuance of trading licenses, however, was handled under the auspices of the Chinese interpreters, and it was they who were handed them out to Chinese merchants. Hidden from sight behind this was the power of the office of the administrator. From the perspective of the Chinese merchants were strictly overseen, the image if these Chinese interpreters was superimposed on it.

**The Use and Supervision of Chinese**

Li Wei encouraged attention being focused on how the shinpai system was used as a powerful tool to get the Chinese merchants to carry out all manner of demands. Two
years after the implementation of the *shinpai* system, the authorities in Nagasaki began to use the *shinpai* as a method of induce profits gained from those who cooperated with the Japanese. The first to do so was Chen Zuguan 陳祖觀 of a Guangnan vessel. Chen arrived in Nagasaki on August 7, 1717 (Kangxi 56, Kyōhō 2) without a *shinpai*. He had accepted the charge of verifying the truth or falsity of the report that forty-three shipmasters had had their licenses seized at Ningbo, and he received a *shinpai* for an arriving vessel in 1717 that were being issued anew. Chen immediately set off for Ningbo, and he was back in Nagasaki on September 5. He reported: “Every license was returned by the office of the Chinese government without exception, and the matter ended without a hitch. They should all soon be entering port.” (*Shinpaikata kiroku*）

Within China a *shinpai* rose from 7,000 taels to the exorbitant price of about 10,000. (Saeki Tomi 1971 [1958 original]) Aiming to get their hands on one, there arose a situation in which technicians such as doctors would make the voyage in response to the request of the Japanese and do their work in Nagasaki. “Merchants covet licenses,” wrote Li Wei of this scene, “and they will simply comply with the orders [of the Japanese] to engage in trade,” but this was something that the Qing could not allow tacit approval of for the preservation of security. (Li Wei. “Wei fú zhou huìtōng bānli Dōngyáng shāngchūan shìyì yàngqīng ruìjiān zhìxí zǔxíng shì” 為覆奏會同辦理東洋商船事宜 仰請睿鑒指示遵行事, *Gongzhōngdāng Yǒngzhēngchāo zōuzhe*, vol. 12) For these reasons there was no alternative of withdrawing from the Nagasaki trade. The The countermeasure Li Wei adopted was a system that selected eight merchants from Fujian and Zhejiang as *shangzong* 商總 (merchant councils) and through them instigated an investigation of the contraband and illegal travels, and at the same time the system carried out mutual surveillance among the various councils. This was not a strengthening of direct control by a government body but a reliance on merchants to self-regulate. The Yongzheng Emperor himself fully approved of this, saying: “This is wholly appropriate and fully agrees with my wishes.”

That such a tepid policy was adopted was an acknowledgement that actions violating the Qing’s ban induced by the profits to be made with a *shinpai* had become the norm; it was based on the judgment that such an abuse was relatively small. It was not that the outflow of contraband and people in Nagasaki was simply allowed to take its own chaotic course, for it was known from detailed investigative reports that the Japanese were implementing this system selectively and in a restrained manner. What was most feared was the possibility that an autonomous overseas Chinese society would develop within the sphere of Japanese control. The sprouts of this possibility had been thoroughly plucked in Nagasaki. The Chinese merchants shut up in the Chinese Compound had to depend on the Chinese interpreters to supply them with everything from foodstuffs to female companionship, and as soon as their business was completed, they were required to set sail for home as soon as possible. Taking children born of liaisons with Japanese women in Nagasaki back to China was not permitted. Ships arriving with *shinpai* in hand were ordered sent home immediately, and any merchant ship that sought to smuggle good elsewhere outside of Nagasaki would be mercilessly fired upon. (Ōba Osamu 1984; Matsuo Shin’ichi 2004) That a trading system with such strict controls was taking shape in Japan was reported, together with a certain amount of distortion and exaggeration, to the proper Chinese authorities by means of merchants with personal experiences, repatriates, and spies dispatched by the Kangxi
Emperor and Li Wei. Reports of this sort about Nagasaki were the diametrical opposite of those concerning the Chinese communities in South Seas port cities such as Java which were formed primarily by Chinese from Fujian and Guangdong. Unable to rid itself of wariness with respect to Chinese resistance, the Qing court detected a divide between stability and danger in the difference between “Dongyang” 東洋—meaning Japan—and “Nanyang” 南洋, meaning the South Seas area. Worthy of note here is the movement of commercial influence born in the civilized-barbarian interstice.

Maritime Restrictions and Regulated Trade

From the early seventeenth century until the surrender of the Zhengs in 1683 may be thought of as a tumultuous era of the Ming-Qing transition. This upheaval was an extension of the activity and disputation of commercial and military groups that had reached striking prominence since the midle of the sixteenth century. (Iwai Shigeki 1996) The forces of Portugal and Holland became involved in this in remote maritime regions. In the 1630s Japan opted for a maritime restriction policy later dubbed sakoku 鎖國 and planned to escape from dangerous regions. One of the actors in the “wakō scene” (Arano Yasunori 1987) thus disappeared from the stage.

Simply by having Japanese vessels flying the hachiman 八幡 (war deity) banner disappear from the East China Sea did not lead to the estimation that Japan was “lazy and submissive.” Trading controls via sakoku grew in severity with the imposition of the shinpai system, and be it smuggling contraband or shipwrecked vessels, Yamaguchi domain in Kyushu ceased acting in any manner that might be doubted as illicit interaction with Chinese. (Matsuo Shin’ichi 2004; Matsuo Shin’ichi 2005) The Chinese Compound “surrounded by high walls” and “heavily guarded” in Nagasaki awaiting arriving merchants. Under these circumstances, the sprouts of mixed civilized-barbarian communities that had developed in Hakata, Hirado, and Gotō were neatly plucked out. From the perspective of China, that “real Japanese” no longer appeared in the East China Sea and that a place for Chinese merchants operating as “Japanese pirates” had been swept away by Japan were surely not reasons to find peace of mind with respect to a “lazy and submissive” Japan.

That said, by contrast Luzon and Java continued to provide Chinese with a site for freedom of movement. These areas were highly likely to become a second Gotō and a second Taiwan; it was only nature, then, that the Kangxi Emperor would have become agitated by the danger that they might be allowed to take their course. The growth of the Chinese communities in Luzon and Java, however, could not be repressed by the implementation of maritime restriction. Their development was stimulated by the Qing’s change of policy direction from 1684 to the expansion of regulated trade after weathering the storm of upheaval in the transition from the Ming. The effective method for avoiding a recurrence of the crisis whose germination was feared was by no means maritime restrictions, but the maintenance of a peaceful system of regulated trade in which profits went in succession to “officials,” “private people,” and “barbarians.” (Iwai Shigeki 2009)

It needs be remembered that 1727 when the abandonment of the “maritime ban on the South Seas” was promulgated was the year when this was recognized anew. Thus, reports on peaceful institutions of regulated trade that had been realized at Nagasaki on the basis of “New Rules on Maritime Freight and Regulated Trade” were delivered to the court in Beijing and spurred this recognition anew.
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