

The Japanese Literati and the “China Incident”: Hayashi Fusao Reporting the Battle of Shanghai

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At home the “China Incident” (*Shina jihen* 支那事變), as the Japanese government referred to the unofficial war with China from early September 1937, inspired patriotic sentiments in many Japanese writers. Both Japanese and American literary scholars have noted that unlike the Manchurian Incident of 1931, which the intelligentsia generally denounced and which the literary world largely ignored, the Japanese invasion of China proper caught the interest of the Japanese intellectual community.¹ As the demand for information concerning the invasion increased and as the Japanese literary world’s interest in the combat magnified, journals and magazines began sending Japanese writers and novelists to report on the war for its readers. Entering what had traditionally been the domain of newspaper reporters dispatched to cover the war, the Japanese press dubbed the members of the literati sent out to the battlefronts in China, “*jūgun sakka*” 従軍作家 (campaign writers).²

General interest periodical *Chūō kōron* 中央公論 was the first magazine to send out these campaign writers. It began its coverage of the war in August 1937, sending writer and literary critic Hayashi Fusao 林房雄 (1903-75) to Shanghai’s International Settlement and popular novelist Ozaki Shirō 尾崎士郎 (1898-1964) to northern China. Ozaki and Hayashi reported on the war in a special section of the *Chūō kōron*’s October issue.³ In their articles, they wrote about the people they encountered, the actual conditions of the war, and their experiences while in China. Soon after their return, the major periodicals in Japan sent more than twenty other writers to China to report on the war. A year later, in August 1938, members of the Cabinet Information Division (*Naikaku jōhōbu* 内閣情報部) met with a group of Japanese writers to establish the Pen

¹ See Donald Keene, “The Barren Years: Japanese War Literature,” *Monumenta Nipponica* 33 (Spring 1978), p. 67; Tsuzuki Hisayoshi 都築久義, “Jūgun sakka no gensetsu” 従軍作家の言説 (The campaign writers’ works), in *Jidaibetsu Nihon bungaku shi jiten, gendaihen* 時代別日本文学史事典：現代編 (A dictionary of Japanese literature by era, the contemporary period), ed. Jidaibetsu Nihon bungaku shi jiten henshū iinkai (Tokyo: Yūseidō, 1997), p. 153.

² Derived from the term *jūgun kisha* or war correspondent, the expression *jūgun sakka* is perhaps more literally translated as “writer-war correspondent.” However, here I have followed David Rosenfeld’s recent usage of “campaign writers” for the sake of consistency. David M. Rosenfeld, *Unhappy Soldier: Hino Ashihei and Japanese World War II Literature* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2002), p. 12.

³ Ozaki Shirō, “Hifū senri” 悲風千里 (A thousand miles of plaintive winds), *Chūō kōron* 52 (October 1937), pp. 429-36; Hayashi Fusao, “Shanghai sensen” 上海戦線 (Shanghai battlefront), *Chūō kōron* 52 (October 1937), pp. 437-63.

Corps (*Pen butai* ペン部隊). This literary group could not accommodate all the writers who wanted to join it and, as one scholar of Japanese literature has noted, the formation of the Pen Corps marked the first stage in the unprecedented cooperation between the state, the military, and the literary world.⁴

Most studies of Japanese war literature from the Sino-Japanese War have concentrated on those authors and those works thought to have vividly depicted the war and the soldier's experiences in the war.⁵ Tsuzuki Hisayoshi 都築久義, one of the leading literary scholars on Japanese war literature, observed that early attempts such as Hayashi's and Ozaki's "lacked a strong awareness of war and a realistic portrayal of the actual conditions of the war."⁶ Because of these shortcomings, Tsuzuki argues that the 1938 works of Ishikawa Tatsuzō 石川達三 (1905-85) and Hino Ashihei 火野葦平 (1907-60) attracted more attention. Both Ishikawa and Hino, Tsuzuki points out, gave compelling accounts of the war and of the ordinary Japanese enlisted men's ordeals during the war.⁷ With this distinction, Tsuzuki suggests that serious Japanese war literature focusing on the Sino-Japanese War and its combatants did not emerge until early 1938.

While I do not disagree with Tsuzuki's assessment that early reports from the front lines are lacking in some respects, I do contend that trivializing these early reports on the war creates a gap in our understanding of Japanese war literature. Although scholars have done substantial work on Ozaki Shirō's essay from northern China, "Hifū senri," Hayashi Fusao's report from Shanghai's International Settlement has remained largely untouched. It has been overlooked primarily because Hayashi and his writing have become so strongly associated with his *tenkō* 転向 during the 1930s.⁸ *Tenkō* is an expression that means literally "a change of direction," and in June of 1933, two leaders of the Japan Communist Party, Sano Manabu 佐野学 (1902-53) and Nabeyama Sadachika 鍋山貞親 (1901-79), used the expression *tenkō* to renounce their ties to the Party.⁹ From then on, *tenkō* became closely identified with the meaning of recanting

⁴ Yoshio Iwamoto, "The Relationship between Literature and Politics in Japan, 1931-1945," Ph.D. thesis, University of Michigan, 1964, pp. 270-71.

⁵ See, for example, Haruko Taya Cook, "Many Lives of *Living Soldiers*: Ishikawa Tatsuzō and Japan's War in Asia," in *War, Occupation, and Creativity: Japan and East Asia, 1920-1960*, ed. Marlene J. Mayo and J. Thomas Rimer with H. Eleanor Kerkham (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2001); Keene, "The Barren Years"; Rosenfeld, *Unhappy Soldier*; and Tsuzuki Hisayoshi, *Senji taiseika no bungakusha* 戦時体制下の文学者 (Literary men under the wartime system) (Tokyo: Kasama shoten, 1976).

⁶ Tsuzuki, "Jūgun sakka no gensetsu," pp. 154-55.

⁷ Ishikawa Tatsuzō's *Ikiteiru heitai* 生きている兵隊 (Living soldiers) was scheduled for publication in the March 1938 edition of the *Chūō kōron* while Hino Ashihei's *Mugi to heitai* 麦と兵隊 (Wheat and soldiers) was published in the August 1938 issue of *Kaizō* 改造. Tsuzuki, "Jūgun sakka no gensetsu," p. 155.

⁸ For more information in English on Ozaki Shirō's wartime writings and about his experiences in northern China, see Zeljko Cipris, "Radiant Carnage: Japanese Writers on the War against China," Ph.D. thesis, Columbia University, 1994, pp. 97-103; Keene, "The Barren Years," pp. 84-90.

⁹ Tsurumi Shunsuke 鶴見俊輔 (b. 1922) wrote the classic definition of *tenkō* for a three-volume

one's leftist connections and beliefs, in particular the rejection of Marxism and Communism, and one's association with the political and cultural left in Japan.

Hayashi Fusao's interest in Marxism and participation in leftwing groups began while he was a student at the Kumamoto Fifth Higher School and continued through his days at Tokyo Imperial University as a member of the New Man Society (Shinjinkai 新人会). He eventually joined the proletarian literature movement in 1926 but began to question his Marxist ties and views while serving two prison sentences during the early 1930's. In 1936 Hayashi disavowed both his belief in Marxism and his affiliations with the leftwing literary movement. Eventually, he became a proponent of the Japanese imperial system and remained an outspoken advocate of Japanese nationalism until his death in 1975.

By the onset of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937, Hayashi's writing of the historical novel *Seinen* 青年 (Youth) and his literary efforts critical of merging politics and literature had established his reputation as a *tenkō* writer (*tenkō sakka* 転向作家). Literary critic Honda Shūgo asserts that even though the publication of Murayama Tomoyoshi's 村山知義 (1901-77) *Byakuya* 白夜 (White Night) in 1934 marked the beginning of *tenkō* literature (*tenkō bungaku* 転向文学), once the literary world turned its attention to *tenkō* literature, it was Hayashi, not Murayama, who received notoriety as the first literary man to *tenkō*.¹⁰ The reason for this distinction, Honda states, was Hayashi's words and actions from 1932 to 1934 which were most often associated with the serialization of *Seinen* and Hayashi's criticism of the proletarian cultural movement's Communist leadership during that time.¹¹ The inclusion of *Seinen* in the "Nihon no Bungaku" 日本の文学 series' volume on *tenkō* literature, a series with an editorial staff that included Tanizaki Jun'ichirō 谷崎潤一郎 (1886-1965), Kawabata Yasunari 川端康成 (1889-1972), Itō Sei 伊藤整 (1905-69), Takami Jun 高見順 (1907-65), Ōoka Shōhei 大岡昇平 (1909-88), Mishima Yukio 三島由紀夫 (1925-70), and Donald Keene, solidified Hayashi's status in the postwar period as one of the preeminent *tenkō* writers of the 1930s.¹²

His reputation as a *tenkō* writer notwithstanding, Hayashi's October 1937 work, "Shanghai sensen" (Shanghai battlefront) will be treated as war literature here. Moreover, the argument will be made that the essay presents both a "realistic portrayal" of what it

set on *tenkō* produced by the Shisō no kagaku no kenkyūkai 思想の科学の研究会 in 1959: "We define ideological transformation [*tenkō*] as a mutation in thought brought about by duress exerted by authority." See Shunsuke Tsurumi, "Cooperative Research On Ideological Transformation," *Journal of Social and Political Ideas in Japan* 2 (April 1964), p. 55. *Tenkō* is a word that scholars have translated variously according to their understanding of it. Perhaps the most appropriate translations of *tenkō* out of these attempts have been either "ideological conversion" or "apostasy." In this work, however, I have chosen to leave the word *tenkō* untranslated.

¹⁰ Honda Shūgo 本多秋五, *Tenkō bungaku ron* 転向文学論 (On *tenkō* literature) (Tokyo: Miraisha, 1985), p. 196.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Tanizaki Jun'ichirō, ed., *Hayashi Fusao, Takeda Rintarō, Shimaki Kensaku* 林房雄, 武田麟太郎, 島木健作, *Nihon no Bungaku*, vol. 40 (Tokyo: Chūō kōronsha, 1968).

was like to be on the front lines as well as a “strong awareness of war.” Hayashi’s narration of the Battle of Shanghai not only introduces the reader to life on the front lines, the Japanese military, and the diverse group of Japanese living and working in Shanghai at the time, it also reflects the domestic pressures acting on Hayashi as a Japanese writer and observer in China. In this way, a case study of Hayashi’s “Shanghai Battlefront” will allow us, first, to bridge a significant temporal gap in the research on Japanese war literature between those initial accounts from the late summer of 1937 and the works of Ishikawa and Hino from 1938. Likewise, we can address the disparity in scholarly work conducted on Hayashi’s wartime report from China. After setting the context for Hayashi’s arrival in Shanghai, an introduction of the essay’s narrative will follow with a translation of the section in which Hayashi recounts his visit to the battlefield, so that we may encounter Hayashi’s voice and his portrayal of the front on its own terms. Finally, an examination of Hayashi’s critical perspective on the war will conclude the essay.

The Battle of Shanghai, August 1937

Hayashi Fusao spent nearly three weeks from August 29 to September 18 in Shanghai. While still observing the ongoing battle near what Western residents often spoke of as Shanghai’s “Little Tokyo,” the area in and around the Hongkou 虹口 district of the International Settlement, Hayashi reported these wartime experiences from his first ten days in the essay “Shanghai Battlefront.” After returning to Japan in mid-September, Hayashi put together a novel based on these experiences and his own observations entitled *Sensō no yokogao, bungakusha wa sensen de nani o mita ka* 戦争の横顔, 文学者は戦線で何を見たか (A profile of war, what one writer observed on the battlefield). Published in December 1937, Hayashi included details in the novel that he left out of the essay and expanded the content of the novel threefold from which the original article comprised pages 3-76.

Hayashi entered Shanghai’s International Settlement less than a month after Jiang Jieshi’s 蔣介石 (1887-1975) Nationalist forces had expanded the scope of their clash with the Japanese military. The conflict in Shanghai broke out on August 13, 1937 and during the first week of battle, fighting between the Chinese army and the Japanese Naval Landing Party (*rikusentai* 陸戦隊) was fierce. Inexperienced members of the Chinese air force attempted repeated attacks upon the Japanese flagship, the *Izumo* 出雲, anchored in the Huangpu River. However, the Chinese air raids did more damage to Western merchant ships moored nearby than to Japanese warships and posed a greater danger to civilians than to Japanese sailors.¹³

On August 14 while a typhoon buffeted Shanghai, Chinese bombers inadvertently dropped their payloads first on a major shopping district in the International Settlement and later near the Great World Amusement Palace in the French Concession. Chinese refugees had gathered in both places to escape the battle raging in the Zhabei 闸北, Hongkou, and Yangshupu 楊樹浦 districts of the city. Resulting in more than 1,700 Chinese and foreign fatalities, the failed aerial assaults also claimed the life of Robert Karl Reischauer. Reischauer, who had just started his teaching career at Princeton

¹³ J. V. Davidson-Houston, *Yellow Creek: The Story of Shanghai* (Philadelphia: Dufour Editions, 1962), pp. 147-48.

University, was the older brother of the distinguished Japanese historian and American ambassador to Japan in the 1960s, Edwin O. Reischauer. He was leading a study group through a tour of East Asia that summer. Having just arrived in Shanghai, Reischauer was registering the group at the front desk of the Palace Hotel when the bombs fell and flying glass from the blown-out windows of the hotel struck him. Members of the group rushed Reischauer to a local hospital for treatment but he bled to death before doctors could stabilize him. As his younger brother later remarked, “Bob was, in a sense, the first American casualty in World War II.”¹⁴

Though the Chinese air force had little success in hampering Japanese naval operations, Jiang Jieshi committed his two best German-trained and modernized army divisions, the 87th and the 88th Divisions, to the Battle of Shanghai. In the opening days of the battle, some 100,000 Chinese troops confronted the Japanese Naval Landing Party who totaled about 2,500 in all.¹⁵ With superior numbers, the Chinese army initially kept the naval troops bottled up in the Hongkou district. However, the landing of a large contingent of Japanese reinforcements on August 23 and General Matsui Iwane’s 松井石根 (1878-1948) decision to extend the battlefront northward toward the Yangzi River allowed the Japanese army gradually to outflank the Chinese forces in the immediate Shanghai area. By the time of Hayashi’s arrival on August 29, the Japanese sailors had begun to make some headway against the Chinese army.

Narrating the Battle of Shanghai

Hayashi begins his essay “Shanghai Battlefront” more than one week after his arrival, reflecting back on his first week in Shanghai. Joining a group of naval correspondents, Hayashi visited the battlefront during the second day, August 30, of his stay. A Lieutenant Shigemura 重村大尉 from the Naval Landing Party was in charge of overseeing the newsmen’s visit to the front. Hayashi noted that Shigemura looked more like a quick-witted journalist or a young professor than an army officer but that he and other reporters relied upon Shigemura for accurate information concerning the battle’s disposition. About 2:30 p.m. they headed down North Sichuan Road on the way to the front (from this point apparently the military censors have expurgated references to the headquarter’s actual location, the names of commanding officers, and the number of troops defending the headquarters and the Japanese town in Hongkou, most likely because the Battle of Shanghai was still being fought when the *Chūō kōron* published Hayashi’s essay in their October 1937 issue). Soon they drove into the courtyard of a white, modern building.¹⁶ This was the Naval Landing Party’s headquarters and the bustle inside the courtyard gave Hayashi his first impression of being in a combat zone.¹⁷

¹⁴ Edwin O. Reischauer, *My Life Between Japan and America* (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1986), p. 62.

¹⁵ James L. McClain, *Japan: A Modern History* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2002), p. 446.

¹⁶ For a photograph of the building that served as the Naval Landing Party headquarters, see Kobori Rintarō 小堀倫太郎, ed., *Natsukashi no Shanhai: shashinshū 懐かしの上海：写真集* (Nostalgic Shanghai, a photographic collection) (Tokyo: Kokusho kankōkai, 1984), p. 26.

¹⁷ Hayashi, “Shanghai sensen,” p. 457.

However, the commanding officer and the building's interior presented a much different impression. Hayashi met the commanding officer in a beautiful room replete with a sofa, *ikebana* displays, and a bowl of goldfish. Contrary to his expectations, a certain calm lingered in the headquarter's hallways, despite it being the target of repeated air strikes and artillery fire. Moreover, the commanding officer was young with clear eyes and a low voice with which he described the myriad obstacles that confronted the Naval Landing Party in Shanghai. First, he told Hayashi and the rest of the group about the difficulties of being essentially a defensive unit; this required that they simply try to hold their ground and await the Japanese army's arrival. Second, he noted that their small numbers limited them, so instead they relied on superior strategy, on intensive military training, and on having the world's most mechanized military unit to defend Hongkou. Third, their conduct in Shanghai was under intense scrutiny. As a result, the naval troops endeavored to refrain from any actions that the Chinese might find provocative, even canceling their daily training drills in the wake of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident the previous July. Still, the commanding officer gave credit to their military training in readying them for the earlier Chinese raids on their position. Hayashi discerned a faint smile of satisfaction appearing as the commanding officer recalled how all of the International Settlement had observed the fruits of the Naval Landing Party's military training. During the interview, Hayashi gained a new respect for this commanding officer who did not aspire to discuss politics or economics, but simply focused on military-related matters.¹⁸

Shortly after the meeting, Lieutenant Shigemura escorted the group of correspondents to the rooftop so that he could show them where the Chinese army had taken up their positions. For the unaccustomed like Hayashi, the defensive arrangements struck him as sparse. They were protected with nothing more than sandbags, anti-aircraft guns, and iron plating; yet, the naval troops guarding the rooftop were relaxed, clowning around and asking the group of reporters to take their pictures.¹⁹ Through slits between the iron plating, Shigemura pointed out the North Station of the Shanghai Railway and another building in which the Chinese army had concentrated its forces.

“Shanghai Battlefront”

In the essay's climax, Hayashi described his visit to the front for the readers. Entitling this section “Touring the Battlefront,” Hayashi wrote:

From the Naval Landing Party's headquarters, Lieutenant Shigemura led us directly to the front lines.

It was a distance of five minutes by car....

You can probably already tell from the preceding pages, but the battles and bombardments usually take place after sundown. Otherwise, they occur near daybreak; that's why Lieutenant Shigemura chose the least dangerous time, mid-afternoon, to escort us [to the front]. We were not serving in the war as such, but simply visiting. We were on a tour [of the battlefront]. Please read [the next few pages] from that perspective. Those reporters who work on the front lines are the truly brave ones. I tip my hat to them. Next to the soldiers, these war correspondents are the most courageous.

¹⁸ Hayashi, “Shanghai sensen,” p. 458.

¹⁹ Hayashi, “Shanghai sensen,” p. 459.

The car stopped in front of a redbrick house in the middle of a field. Yelling “who’s in charge here?” Lieutenant Shigemura walked quickly inside the building. At certain key points like this [during our visit], this young officer displayed the demeanor expected of a military man.

This redbrick house was the headquarters of OO unit.²⁰ This is a unit that readers will already be familiar with because of the well known battlefield death of First Lieutenant Jō 城中尉. It is also famous for the story about how this unit’s troops saved an old Chinese woman who failed to escape [the combat zone] in time. I hear that even now this old Chinese woman is mending clothes for the Japanese soldiers [to express her gratitude].

Lieutenant Commander OOOO greeted us with a calm expression. Since we are about the same age as an officer who has achieved the rank of a lieutenant commander in the Navy, we got along well. For several moments we chitchatted while someone served us green tea. Then smiling he said, “Well, I guess that we should escort you to the front, shouldn’t we? But you should know that people don’t like to visit the front here because ours is an active battlefield.” Saying this, he called on a subordinate. Here again, a red-faced handsome young man was the deputy commander. “How are you today,” asked the lieutenant commander? In response, the subordinate officer said, “I’m fine.” We left in the protection of this sailor holding a Bergman submachine gun.

We passed through a break in the fence running behind the redbrick house and entered an open field. A vine of morning glories wound its way along the fence and there was a stand of poplar trees and a bunch of sunflowers blooming [in the field]. The weeds in the field looked pretty much like those in any Tokyo suburb and the sky was deep blue. We came up to the edge of a pond just as some ducks flew away. Chasing the ducks were sailors whose laughing rose from the underbrush. We laughed too. Looking up, we saw blue sky, white clouds, and two black dots between the clouds; [the two black dots] were airplanes. “Are they ours?” [I asked], and [the junior officer answered], “Yes.” Pausing, we observed an impressive bombing run and heard the whizzing of the falling bombs. Quickly, we started walking down a narrow path that ran between the pond and the underbrush. We passed by a soldier carrying food supplies and dishes and exchanged greetings. Something caught my foot. It was a downed power line in the grass. “Another scar from the shelling,” the deputy commander told me. On the right-hand side of the path was a crater in the clay about two meters in diameter. “[The crater] is so small, isn’t it?” I quipped. “Since it fell in the mud, it didn’t go off.” “You mean a bomb is buried in there?” “Yes,” replied the deputy commander.

We passed by a small hut that looked like a pigpen on a farm. It was covered with dirt and grass and we didn’t notice anything as we walked by it. [But the deputy commander informed us that we had just passed by the] “... position.” After closer scrutiny, however, [we discovered] a soldier under the grass roof smiling at us from out of the darkness.

We came out onto a larger road. Someone said that this was the Eight-Character-Bridge 八字橋 road that became so famous during the Shanghai Incident [of January 1932]. To me, it looked like any other village road in Japan. Next to the road was a battered house with a vermilion gate and a white wall. It was the only place that really looked Chinese along the way.

²⁰ One method that the Japanese authorities used to censor written materials was to place *fuseji* 伏字 (elliptical marks) in the works. *Fuseji* usually consisted of X’s, O’s, or dots inserted in the text to take the place of the original Japanese characters.

Turning off the road and going down a narrow alleyway, we saw a pile of sandbags stacked high. It was an earthen bulwark that looked like a small mountain. Three soldiers who had camouflaged their iron helmets with beanstalks were surveying the area ahead of them. One of them was straddling something and peering through a telescope. From our angle, the telescope looked like a horn growing out of his helmet, and his helmet resembled one of those old samurai helmets. With the tufts of green leaves from the beanstalks sticking out, it made his helmet look like one of those parade hats.

Next to the sandbags was a small hut sheltered with marsh-reed blinds. Inside, the soldiers had put down some straw so that they had some place to spend their free time. Upon entering the hut, the smell of excrement was overpowering. Right away, I felt sorry for the troops, but the soldiers were in good spirits and had hung mosquito-repellent incense from the ceiling. They were writing letters, reading magazines, and taking turns resting during the day. [We found] the unit's commanding officer rolled up like a giant shrimp on top of the straw. Once we sat down beside him, he woke up, smiling and telling us that it was that time of the day for a nap.

"Things must be tough here?" I said, as we looked around the hut. One of the soldiers replied that "it was tolerable as long as it doesn't rain." Yesterday a two-hour downpour [flooded the hut], leaving the straw and the boards on the floor floating, someone commented. Our one great weakness here is the rain, the commanding officer explained.

"It is unexpectedly quiet, isn't it?" I remarked. The commanding officer informed me that "the battles are fought during the night. During the daytime, [the enemy] retreats inside and they don't come out. But once the sun starts to go down, they begin shooting again." Other soldiers chimed in: "The nights are difficult around here." "Because of the hail of bullets, it's so deafening that we can't hear each other talk, much less the communication phone ringing."

I climbed up under cover of the sandbags, and the soldiers let me look through the telescope. One soldier told me "to be careful because sometimes snipers are still around" and just as I acknowledged his warning and was leaning forward, the crack of five or six shots from a rifle rang out. I cringed instinctively and asked the soldier, "was it ours or theirs?" He answered: "It was theirs. Three enemy soldiers are in the trench over there; here, see for yourself."

Looking through the telescope, I could see the enemy trench as if it was right under my nose. "Is it that close?" I asked, and the soldier responded that "it was about two-hundred meters away." Reflecting through the lens, I saw the trench's dark outline dug in front of a row of mud-brick Chinese houses. Barbed wire was strung so that it seemed to cover the trench, and I could see clearly how the sun's white light glimmered off the millet and beans [growing near the trench]. But I didn't see any soldiers. Asking about this to the sailor, he replied that "they were there a minute ago. I guess they must have gone back inside again. They are probably taking it easy during the afternoon as well."

Then where are the shots coming from, I asked him, and he told me that only [the sniper with] the rifle constantly fired upon them from that clump of trees off to the right. Relinquishing the telescope to Mr. Yaegashi 八重樫, I was about to come down from the sandbags when Lieutenant Shigemura told me, "look over here. These are grenades," pointing to a small box near my feet. They looked like pineapples with strings attached to them, and [I was amazed] by how casually they were kept inside that box. Lieutenant Shigemura continued, "you just pull the safety pin and throw them. You need them sometimes when the position is being overrun."

Returning to the hut, I talked with some of the naval troops for a while. “You probably saw the corpses out there, didn’t you?” one of them asked. Taken aback, I asked “dead bodies are lying out there?” One soldier replied that “two or three hundred enemy corpses are still lying in front of the trench. When the wind blows, you can smell the stench from over here.” Another soldier added that “the swarm of flies is awful,” and yet another soldier remarked, “yeah, there are mosquitoes that are the size of birds out there too.”

The average Japanese soldier doesn’t talk much. Closemouthed, they unrelentingly go about their work. Sometimes they bandy crude jokes around, but that’s about it. Since I am working on a report here, I should urge them to talk more, but I feel guilty and can’t do it. Since they are looking over here and smiling, I feel that just returning their smile is enough, especially considering how self-conscious we Japanese are as a people anyway.

After about twenty minutes, we left the battlefield with the sound of gunfire in the background. Our car was waiting for us next to the Chinese-looking house we passed on the way in. We remembered that there were some small bottles of whisky and some beer cans inside the car and returned to the sandbags carrying those [bottles and cans] with us. Running across the open field with nothing to protect us from [enemy] gunfire was an eerie feeling. Inviting them to “drink up,” we gave the whisky and beer to the soldiers. “Give them to the commanding officer,” was their resounding reply, so we gave the whisky and beer to the commanding officer. On the way back to the car, I suddenly found myself in a dead run. It wasn’t as though somebody was shooting at me, but [for some reason] I had the feeling that the sound of gunfire was growing more intense behind me.

I wanted to boast: “Hey, I’ve survived the heat of battle; now I’m no longer afraid of anything,” but I couldn’t do it. I knew that we were more like the proverbial mice touring the front while the cat was away. To make matters worse, one of my naval correspondent colleagues voiced the generally accepted opinion that being in the rear where the bombs fell randomly was far more terrifying than facing a hail of bullets on the front lines, because in the rear you couldn’t know where the bombs were going to drop. As for myself, it will only be after we return to the rear that I can even conceive of such matters; these guys are indeed fearless.²¹

Hayashi ends the essay on a reflective note. Writing that the ship conveying this manuscript to Japan will set sail in less than an hour, he intends to finish writing about his experiences in Shanghai’s International Settlement later. He has had the opportunity to visit the eastern section of the battlefield and to interview and talk with people from the embassy, the consulate, the commercial attaché’s office, officers and enlisted men, and the leaders of the local Japanese community in Shanghai.²² Yet, even if he takes all the information he gained from these conversations into account, Hayashi asserts that he still cannot draw any definite conclusions about the current situation in East Asia. It is a subject that demands more thought and analysis, something for which he will have more time once he returns to his home in Kamakura.

Despite his protestations to the contrary, I believe that Hayashi’s description of the front sheds a different light on the Japanese military experience than do those later

²¹ Hayashi, “Shanghai sensen,” pp. 459-463.

²² Hayashi visited the Japanese ambassador’s residence during the late afternoon of August 30. See Hayashi, *Sensō no yokogao*, p. 416.

works of Ishikawa, Hino, and the members of the Pen Corps. On the one hand, Hayashi gives us an account of the soldier's life while stationed on the eastern front. From the sheer boredom of afternoons spent wiling away the hours in a small hut that rain periodically floods to the intense battles that rage at night, Hayashi's article narrates the Naval Landing Party's defense of Shanghai's Japanese residents against a numerically superior Chinese force.

Most campaign writers followed the Japanese army during its offensive maneuvers either in northern China or up the Yangtze River valley. Unlike them, however, Hayashi visited the front when the Japanese troops were on the defensive. Though confident, the Japanese sailors recount witnessing hundreds of dead enemy corpses strewn in front of the trenches and inform Hayashi of the continued danger of snipers. Likewise, Lieutenant Shigemura goes out of his way to explain the significance of the box of grenades placed next to the mountain of sandbags.

In addition, Hayashi renders a graphic picture of "Little Tokyo" and its Japanese residents under siege and fearing for their safety. For example, at one point during his stay Hayashi observes that many residents worry that the Chinese attack on Little Tokyo might turn into another Tongzhou Incident, where during the early morning hours of July 29, a Japanese-trained Chinese militia massacred more than 200 Japanese civilians and soldiers in an eastern suburb of Beijing.²³ In another example, Hayashi described how the Japanese residents attempted to carry on with their lives behind the sandbags, the iron doors, and the barbed wire that shielded the Hongkou district. Consequently, at first for Hayashi, "[Hongkou] was a dark town. It was an exhausted town. Every building was bullet-marked and the haze of gunpowder hung over the town. It was a town at war. It was the August sun and an eerie silence, burning asphalt, and most of all the swarm of 'blue flies' (*aobae* 青蠅) hovering around his feet!"²⁴ Throughout the essay, Hayashi presents a "realistic portrayal" of what it was like to live in a war zone and to be encircled by enemy troops. Although his essay is not focused solely on military men, the nature of the combat he observed during that first week in Shanghai demanded that he tell the story of "total war," a report that included all those Japanese he observed taking part in and supporting the war effort.

Interpreting the Battle of Shanghai

Several places in "Shanghai Battlefront" reveal Hayashi's open sympathy and enthusiasm for the Japanese military and its mission to defend Little Tokyo. Nonetheless, literary scholar Hoshō Masao, one of the few scholars to place Hayashi's "Shanghai Battlefront" within the anthology of Japanese World War II literature, in his reading of this essay sees more than Hayashi submissively giving into the political constraints weighing upon any writer working in the 1930s. Hoshō argues that in one sense Hayashi viewed the onset of war with China as a chance to exorcize his leftwing past.²⁵ He

²³ Hayashi, "Shanghai sensen," pp. 441, 450.

²⁴ Hayashi, "Shanghai sensen," p. 448.

²⁵ Hoshō Masao 保昌正夫, "Shōwa jūni nen: Shimaki Kensaku 'Saiken,' Hayashi Fusao 'Shanghai sensen'" 昭和十二年：島木健作『再建』林房雄『上海戦線』(Shōwa 12 [1937]: Shimaki Kensaku's "Reconstruction," Hayashi Fusao's "Shanghai Battlefront"), *Kokubungaku, kaishaku to kanshō* 国文学解釈と鑑賞 48 (August 1983), pp. 28-29.

contends that Hayashi was indirectly attacking the political left in Japan by criticizing the pacifists and the antiwar sentiment back home.²⁶

We do find Hayashi attacking pacifism in several passages of “Shanghai Battlefield.” Midway through the essay, he asserts that the antiwar arguments of the pacifists diminish the importance of the war and threaten Japan with destruction.²⁷ Moreover, Hayashi writes that “only ruin awaits those nations that do not fight. One nation’s pacifism leads to defeatism and the loss of one’s homeland.... Only those nations that do fight can achieve true world peace. That is history’s destiny.”²⁸ Hayashi proceeds to call on his two sons to be ready to fight, because the war might persist through their lifetimes and perhaps extend into his grandchildren’s generation. He finally ends this passage by reiterating that humankind can only achieve world peace through war.²⁹

Hayashi’s personal history in the 1930s, I believe, also confirms that his conservative invective against the pacifists was meant primarily for members of the leftwing literary movement. In the spring of 1932, Hayashi signaled to the preliminary court officials investigating his case that he “was wavering in his commitment to Marxism,” and the authorities then released him three months early on parole.³⁰ His prison diary and the notebooks he kept while in prison—his first incarceration was from July 1930 to April 1932—also establish that from the fall of 1931 through his second stay in prison from November 1934 to November 1935 he had decided to give up his political fight against the state.³¹ Hayashi instead chose to concentrate his efforts on protecting the “literary spirit” of the proletarian literature movement (PLM) from those who would attempt to politicize it.³² Hayashi made this decision at a time when the state was expanding its crack down on the leftwing cultural movement’s major organizations. The state had at its disposal a variety of means to impede the work of these organizations and it used them readily, incarcerating the leaders of the PLM, breaking up its meetings, and severely censoring its publications.³³

Hayashi blamed the new set of leaders of the PLM that emerged in the 1930s for its demise. Most of its current leaders entered the Japan Communist Party in the early 1930s and their major goal was to politicize the leftwing literary movement in accordance with their directives from the Comintern.³⁴ In so doing, they hoped to produce

²⁶ Hoshō, “Shōwa jūninen,” p. 28.

²⁷ Hayashi, “Shanghai sensen,” p. 453.

²⁸ Hayashi, “Shanghai sensen,” p. 455.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Hayashi Fusao, “Gokuchūki” 獄中記 (Prison diary), in *Hayashi Fusao chosakushū* 林房雄著作集 (Selected works of Hayashi Fusao) (Tokyo: Tsubasa shoin, 1969), vol. 3, p. 125.

³¹ Hayashi Fusao, “Dokubō zakki” 独房雜記 (Prison notes) (dated June 7, 1935), personal library of Hayashi Fusao (Kamakura, Japan), vol. 1, pp. 98-104, 158-9; Hayashi, “Gokuchūki,” pp. 91-145.

³² Hayashi Fusao, “Sakka toshite” 作家として (As a writer), *Shinchō* 新潮 29 (September 1932), p. 57.

³³ George T. Shea, *Leftwing Literature in Japan: A Brief History of the Proletarian Literary Movement* (Tokyo: The Hosei University Press, 1964), pp. 229-32.

³⁴ Some examples include Kurahara Korehito 蔵原惟人 (1902-91) in 1929, Nakano Shigeharu 中

Communist writers who would then popularize the political agenda of the Party.³⁵ From 1932 until 1934 when the PLM officially disbanded, Hayashi frequently criticized the goals of the leadership through his literary efforts.³⁶ He consistently argued that, in pressuring proletarian writers to become Communist Party members and engage in political activities, the PLM leadership was inviting government suppression of the leftwing cultural movement as a whole. This sentiment emerges most clearly in “Shanghai Battlefront” when Hayashi praises the Naval Landing Party’s commanding officer for concentrating on the military situation at hand, rather than seeking to clutter his soldiers’ mind with political or economic affairs.³⁷

While in prison the second time and even after his release in 1935, Hayashi still thought of himself as a “proletarian writer” in spirit, if not altogether one in the substance of his writing. After other leftist writers began to criticize his literary works and activities as “unproletarian,” however, Hayashi publicly announced in the spring of 1936 that he would give up any pretense of being a proletarian writer.³⁸ From this point until

野重治 (1902-79) in 1931, Kaji Wataru 鹿地亘 (1903-82) in 1932, Kobayashi Takiji 小林多喜二 (1903-33) in 1931, Miyamoto Kenji 宮本顕治 (b. 1908) in 1931, and Miyamoto Yuriko 宮本百合子 (1899-1951) in 1931. Shiota Shōbei 塩田庄兵衛, et al., eds., *Nihon shakai undō jinmei jiten* 日本社会運動人名辞典 (Biographical dictionary of the Japanese social movement) (Tokyo: Aoki shoten, 1979), pp. 224, 414, 157, 247, 550, 552.

³⁵ Kurahara Korehito acknowledged these goals in a roundtable discussion held during the early postwar period. Hirano Ken 平野謙, et al., eds., “Nihon puroretaria bungaku undō no saikentō” 日本プロレタリア文学運動の再検討 (A reexamination of the proletarian literature movement), in *Tōron: Nihon puroretaria bungaku undō shi* 討論：日本プロレタリア文学運動史 (Discussion: The history of the proletarian literature movement) (Tokyo: San’ichi shobō, 1955), p. 30.

³⁶ Hayashi’s reproach came out most prominently in his literary criticism during the spring and summer of 1932. Hayashi Fusao, “Sakka no tame ni: jō, chū, ge, sakka no shikaku to ninmu to kenri to” 作家のために：上、中、下、作家の資格と任務と権利と (For writers, three parts, the qualifications, responsibilities, and rights of a writer), *Tōkyō asahi shinbun* 東京朝日新聞 (May 19, 20, 21, 1932), p. 5, p. 9, p. 9; Hayashi Fusao, “Bungaku no tame ni” 文学のために (On behalf of Literature), *Kaizō* 14 (July 1932), pp. 105-17; Hayashi, “Sakka to shite,” pp. 57-65.

³⁷ Hayashi, “Shanghai sensen,” p. 458.

³⁸ Hayashi Fusao, “Haishi o sengen su, puro sakka no jishō” 廃止を宣言す、プロ作家の自称 (Declaring my intention to end the pretense of being a proletarian writer), *Miyako shinbun* 都新聞 (April 8, 1936), p. 1. Nakano Shigeharu criticized Hayashi’s efforts to preserve the Independent Writers’ Club 独立作家クラブ as a leftwing literary group that excluded liberalist writers. Nakano Shigeharu, “Kurabu e no kibō” クラブへの希望 (Expectations of the [Independent Writers’] Club), *Bungaku hyōron* 文学評論 3 (April 1936), pp. 102-05. Hayama Yoshiki 葉山嘉樹 (1894-1945) severely attacked Hayashi’s literary efforts in his historical novel *Sōnen* 壮年 (Manhood); and Takami Jun discussed Takeda Rintarō’s desire to leave the Bungakukai 文学界 group because of his dissatisfaction with Hayashi’s direction of the group. Hayama Yoshiki, “Soko ni shizumu, Hayashi Fusao ni tou, ichi, ni, san” 底に沈む：林房雄に問う、一、二、三 (Sinking to the bottom, questioning Hayashi Fusao, parts 1, 2, 3), *Tōkyō nichinichi shinbun* 東京日日新聞 (April 5, 7, 8, 1936), sec. A, p. 9. Takami Jun, *Shōwa bungaku*

his arrival in Shanghai the next summer, Hayashi began experimenting with themes and participating in groups more associated with Japanese cultural nationalism than with the cultural left in Japan.³⁹ He also helped, in the same month as the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, to establish a patriotic literary group (Shin Nihon bunka no kai 新日本文化の会: Society for a new Japanese culture) sponsored by Matsumoto Manabu 松本学 (1886-1974) from the Home Ministry.⁴⁰ This last move put Hayashi under the patronage of the state and affirmed his conservative credentials before departing for Shanghai.⁴¹

Yet, as Hoshō also has observed, behind Hayashi's condemnation of pacifism and its proponents lay a subtle warning of the China Incident's destructive potential for Japan.⁴² The initial subtitle for Hayashi's essay was "The Terror of September Third" (*Kyōfu no kugatsu mikka* 恐怖の九月三日), and in that opening paragraph Hayashi wrote: "It is one week today since I came to Shanghai. But it feels as if I have been here for a month. Days and nights filled with one ordeal after another continue like a nightmare. For someone born and raised in the Japanese islands like myself, everything here is a new experience. The frequency and unpredictable nature of these incidents far exceed my expectations. And with this constant strain and anxiety, I imagine a person would age at three times the normal rate."⁴³ In several passages throughout the essay Hayashi related just how scared and cowardly he felt while enduring the air raids and the shelling of Little Tokyo.⁴⁴ These were feelings that he also expressed to his friend, the renowned literary critic Kobayashi Hideo 小林秀雄 (1902-83), when he returned home to Kamakura. Hayashi told Kobayashi that if he had any doubts as to just how spineless a writer could be then he should go to the front lines and find out himself.⁴⁵

Besides discussing his own feelings of distress, Hayashi also commented on the possible duration of the war. On the afternoon of September 3, while enduring another round of shelling, Hayashi related an extended conversation he had with the editor-in-chief for the *Shanghai nippō* 上海日報, Gotō Kazuo 後藤和夫.⁴⁶ During their conversation Gotō interjected that nobody enjoys war, but that once it has started, people

seisui shi 昭和文学盛衰史 (A history of the rise and fall of Shōwa literature) (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 1965), p. 243.

³⁹ Hayashi became a member of the most well-known cultural nationalist group of the day, the Nihon rōmanha 日本浪漫派 (Japan Romantic School) in August 1936 and worked strongly with Kobayashi Hideo to lead the literary group Bungakukai in a more nationalist direction from 1935 onward. Kevin Doak, *Dreams of Difference: The Japan Romantic School and the Crisis of Modernity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), p. 155.

⁴⁰ Odagiri Susumu 小田切進, ed., "Shōwa jūnendai bungaku-geijutsu nenpyō" 昭和十年代文学—芸術年表 (A chronology of literature and art in the decade between 1935 and 1945), *Bungaku* 文学 29 (May 1961), p. 602.

⁴¹ Hayashi, "Shanghai sensen," p. 453.

⁴² Hoshō, "Shōwa jūninen," p. 29.

⁴³ Hayashi, "Shanghai sensen," p. 437.

⁴⁴ Hayashi, "Shanghai sensen," pp. 437-43.

⁴⁵ Kobayashi Hideo referred to his conversation with Hayashi about his experiences in Shanghai soon after Hayashi returned to Kamakura from his assignment in China. Kobayashi Hideo, "Sensō ni tsuite" 戦争について (On war), *Kaizō* 19 (November 1937), p. 218.

⁴⁶ Hayashi, "Shanghai sensen," p. 440.

would not stop until they have decided the outcome. In response, Hayashi lamented that it might take “a second or even a third war of global scale” before they could restore peace.⁴⁷ As the bombing intensified around them, Hayashi wistfully commented that everything was peaceful in the Japanese homeland. To which Gotō replied: “I suppose that it is peaceful. If this were Japan, do you think that the Japanese at home could endure a month of this?”⁴⁸ Outside a plane started its bombing run directly over them and as they heard the bomb explode some distance from their location, they shared a knowing smile in answer to Gotō’s question.⁴⁹ Lastly, Gotō informed Hayashi that although the Japanese army was formidable, the Chinese army would not fold easily and that the Japanese must be ready for an extended conflict in China.⁵⁰ When Hayashi later asserted that the war might continue until his grandchildren’s day, he indirectly substantiated this notion while criticizing the pacifists in Japan.

In a subsequent passage, Hayashi mentioned the potential for material damage to the Japanese homeland if the war were to spread. After arriving at the Naval Landing Party’s headquarters, Lieutenant Shigemura led Hayashi and the group of reporters to the rooftop of the headquarters where he pointed out some defensive positions which the Chinese army had fortified. Acknowledging the significant role that the anti-aircraft guns play in preventing successful aerial attacks on the building, Hayashi observed: “There isn’t another city in the world more vulnerable to an attack from the air than Tokyo. It’s something we must keep in mind.”⁵¹ Immediately following this comment, in an aside pondering the harrowing Chinese air raids the night of September 8, Hayashi sought further to alert his readers to this new danger: “Now that the attack is over, I feel like I must advise the citizens of Tokyo as to just how terrifying an air raid can be; just thinking of the great number of wooden buildings in Tokyo, I have to let them know how dreadful [an aerial attack on Tokyo] could be.”⁵² In both passages, Hayashi circuitously warned his fellow compatriots of the catastrophic prospects of modern-day warfare for the Japanese homeland.

Early Shōwa Militarism and Hayashi Fusao

Hayashi recorded that trying to understand the Battle of Shanghai was for him like viewing the conflict “through the eye of a needle.”⁵³ Grasping the ongoing battle’s complexity was futile, as he could hope for little more than snippets of insight about the lives of the diverse group of Japanese living, working, and now fighting in Shanghai. Ultimately, Hayashi even refrained from articulating a clear position on the Japanese presence in East Asia.⁵⁴ Thus, to quote Hoshō, “undeniably, Hayashi wrote much about the battlefield; he was *forced* to write much about the battlefield.”⁵⁵

⁴⁷ Hayashi, “Shanghai sensen,” p. 441.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Hayashi, “Shanghai sensen,” pp. 441-42.

⁵¹ Hayashi, “Shanghai sensen,” p. 459.

⁵² Hayashi, “Shanghai sensen,” p. 460.

⁵³ Hayashi, “Shanghai sensen,” p. 445.

⁵⁴ Hayashi, “Shanghai sensen,” p. 463.

⁵⁵ Hoshō, “Shōwa jūninen,” p. 29, emphasis mine.

Several circumstances obliged Hayashi to concentrate on his impressions and experiences from Shanghai. As we have already noted, domestic pressures undoubtedly played a large role. Hayashi's position as a campaign writer and the precarious nature of his background as a former political prisoner of the Japanese state necessitated that he be quite cautious in his comments concerning what he experienced in Shanghai. Richard Mitchell has documented in great detail the Home Ministry's attempt to enforce its will over the publishing world during the second Sino-Japanese War.⁵⁶ From early July of 1937, the Home Ministry began issuing orders that set proscribed topics for the publishing world. Among those prohibited topics were the following: "any view that the Japanese were afraid of war,...any argument suggesting that war would injure the people's living standard,...and any argument that justified China or exposed a Japanese fault."⁵⁷ If we consider that the editors and the censors were to expurgate this subject matter from their publications, Hayashi's observations concerning the duration and the destructive potential of the war for Japan and the Japanese people—not to mention the confession of his own cowardice in the face of an enemy attack—seem to be outside the bounds of acceptable commentary on the battle. Despite this, either the *Chūō kōron* editors, government censors, or military censors predominately focused on expunging those references to the disposition of the Japanese military in Shanghai.⁵⁸ Those who reviewed the essay must have considered Hayashi's remarks concerning the battle and its prospects harmless then.

This government action or, better yet, this government inaction toward Hayashi's essay is in marked contrast to the harsh steps that the authorities subsequently took against writer Ishikawa Tatsuzō's story *Living Soldiers*. Japanese historian Haruko Taya Cook has given us the most detailed English-language explication of the government litigation against the author, the editor, and the text of *Living Soldiers*, which Ishikawa wrote after visiting Nanjing in early January 1938 as a special war correspondent for the *Chūō kōron*. After documenting how the author, the publishers, and the authorities, who ultimately prohibited the publication, acted to censor the work, Cook speculates that the military and bureaucratic branches of the Japanese state may still have been in the process of sorting out who held what responsibilities regarding thought crimes and thought criminals, in particular because the war in China was in its beginning phase.⁵⁹ She also focuses our attention on the conflict between the Home Ministry and the army on censorship matters regarding Ishikawa. Since Hayashi visited the battlefield in central China and published his report on the Battle of Shanghai earlier than Ishikawa, perhaps he too benefited from this confusion among the Japanese authorities? That is possible,

⁵⁶ Richard H. Mitchell, *Censorship in Imperial Japan* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), pp. 283-318.

⁵⁷ Mitchell, *Censorship in Imperial Japan*, p. 284.

⁵⁸ Once curious exception to this rule of censorship is a passage where Hayashi described a talisman given to the Taiwanese driver of Hara Masaru's 原勝 car. Hayashi noted that he saw a talisman from Mt. Narita affixed to the dashboard of the car and that the driver told him that it was a present from someone's wife. Both the name and title of the person giving the present have been censored in the text. Hayashi, "Shanghai sensen," p. 439. In *Sensō no yokogao* this passage was restored and the person giving the gift was the wife of the Japanese ambassador to China at the time, Kawagoe Shigeru 川越茂. Hayashi, *Sensō no yokogao*, p. 7.

⁵⁹ Cook, "Many Lives of *Living Soldiers*," p. 162.

but we must also take into consideration Hayashi's background as a political prisoner and his prior disavowal of his ties with the left wing in Japan. It may be that the editors of the *Chūō kōron* and the government and military censors reviewing Hayashi's reporting from Shanghai concluded that his remarks on the outlook of the war were innocuous because Hayashi was a well-known *tenkōsha* 転向者 and, as a result, had forfeited already his critical position vis-à-vis the Japanese government.

Another *tenkōsha* who made a name as Japan's most popular soldier-author during the early years of the China Incident was Hino Ashihei. Hino based his best-known literary work, *Wheat and Soldiers*, on the diary he kept while covering the May 1938 Japanese attack on Xuzhou. Hino, unlike Hayashi, served in the Japanese military and acted under direct military orders and had specific directions about how he was to describe the battles he witnessed.⁶⁰ Still, Hino worked his heartfelt sympathy for the common soldier, into *Wheat and Soldiers*.⁶¹ Where in *Living Soldiers* Ishikawa portrayed the Japanese troops' savagery in Nanjing, Hino depicted the nobility and courage of those ordinary Japanese infantrymen who willingly sacrificed their lives for their native land. Patriotic sentiments in *Wheat and Soldiers* far outweighed the few times that Hino contemplated the brutalizing effects of warfare on the Japanese troops.⁶² For Ishikawa, however, the dehumanization of these soldiers was the main point of *Living Soldiers*.

In Hayashi's essay, "Shanghai Battlefield," his support for his fellow citizens living in Shanghai—whether part of the military, the government, the media, or the residents—is just as apparent as is his condemnation of the pacifists at home. His time in Shanghai did generate a genuine display of patriotic sentiment for those Japanese involved in the war effort, not unlike Hino's focus on the "common soldier." Nevertheless, in his criticism of the pacifists we find a certain amount of pragmatism, as if the Arab proverb "the enemy of my enemy is my friend" applied. Throughout the wartime years Hayashi willingly worked with many state-sponsored and rightwing literary groups.⁶³ Yet, if Hayashi's support for the Japanese war effort is unmistakable, he definitely had serious reservations about the battle's long-range implications for the Japanese land and its people. These sentiments were radical inasmuch as they were critical of the Japanese state and its prosecution of the China Incident. Hayashi may have ended his overt political resistance to the authorities with his *tenkō*, but his animosity toward the Japanese government was still manifest in his commentary on what he witnessed in Shanghai. Hayashi's criticism of Japanese militarism, in contrast, was much more ambiguous and muted than Ishikawa's unequivocal depiction of how warfare turned individual Japanese military personnel into nearly unrecognizable monsters. Compared with Ishikawa's disturbing story, understanding how the authorities could overlook Hayashi's subtle reproach of the Japanese state is easy because he regularly characterized the naval troops defending Shanghai's Little Tokyo in heroic terms. Obviously, the

⁶⁰ Keene, "The Barren Years," p. 76.

⁶¹ Keene, "The Barren Years," p. 77.

⁶² Keene, "The Barren Years," p. 79.

⁶³ During the years leading up and into the Pacific War, Hayashi worked with such rightwing groups as the Nihon bungakusha kai 日本文学者会 (Japan literary society), Kageyama Masaharu's 影山正治 (1910-79) Daitōjuku 大東塾 (Great east institute), and the Bunka ishin dōmei 文化維新同盟 (Cultural restoration league).

boundaries of permissible criticism were more fluid when it came to matters of the state than when it concerned the military during the early stages of the Sino-Japanese War.

A Stranger in Shanghai

His unfamiliarity with the local area (this was Hayashi's first visit to a foreign country) also seriously limited his understanding of the battle. This meant that he relied on those Japanese from the military or the press to lead him around Shanghai; therefore, he observed the battle from a strictly Japanese point of view. As historian Joshua Fogel has noted, this was common for those Japanese who traveled in China during the time of the China Incident as was the display of a "less sympathetic attitude toward the Chinese people and Chinese problems in general."⁶⁴ Hayashi was no exception. He largely confined his description of "Shanghai" to Little Tokyo and focused his story on the Japanese and their problems. What few lines he allotted to the Chinese were either generic—reporting the damage done to Chinese homes as the transport ship *Nagasakimaru* 長崎丸 sailed up the Huangpu River and relating how Japanese soldiers helped an elderly Chinese woman—or they were derogatory.⁶⁵ For instance, in one passage Hayashi wrote that he felt "strange" as he walked by some Chinese who were sweeping the streets of Hongkou. His guide at the time told him that they worked for the Shanghai Municipal Council. Though the Chinese laborers paid no attention to him, Hayashi recollected the words of someone who said that "only those who are literate and can think for themselves should actually be called the public."⁶⁶

Fogel also concluded that most of the travelers to China who did criticize the Japanese state's wartime policies were from the Japanese literati.⁶⁷ Here again, Hayashi was no exception. Allowing the Japanese residents to speak for him, Hayashi indirectly attacked the Japanese state's jingoistic propaganda concerning the Battle of Shanghai.⁶⁸ He further decried the government's lack of preparation for and the scarcity of thought put into the various issues that would soon confront the Japanese as the fighting in China spread.⁶⁹ Like the other Japanese literary men and women that Fogel draws on, Hayashi offered his own gesture of defiance toward the Japanese state. This suggests a willingness among Japanese writers to continue questioning government leadership in the late summer of 1937, in spite of the risk of repression.⁷⁰

This is remarkable in itself, but what is even more interesting about Hayashi's essay is the sympathy for the Japanese military, the Japanese residents living in Hongkou, and those government officials working in the Japanese consulate that he displays. By 1937, Hayashi began mentally to objectify the Japanese state, as he had the Japan Communist Party earlier, as an amorphous, impersonal force to which he could ascribe

⁶⁴ Joshua A. Fogel, *The Literature of Travel in the Japanese Rediscovery of China, 1862-1945*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996), p. 276.

⁶⁵ Hayashi, "Shanghai sensen," pp. 446, 460.

⁶⁶ Hayashi, "Shanghai sensen," p. 450.

⁶⁷ Fogel, *The Literature of Travel in the Japanese Rediscovery of China*, pp. 287, 295.

⁶⁸ Hayashi, "Shanghai sensen," p. 445.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Many of the literati that Fogel selected for this section of the chapter were Hayashi's colleagues and close friends, including Kobayashi Hideo, Asano Akira 浅野晃 (1901-90), and Shimaki Kensaku. Fogel, *The Literature of Travel in the Japanese Rediscovery of China*, pp. 287-95.

the bulk of the injustices that had befallen him during the early Shōwa years.⁷¹ With his implied criticisms of the Japanese state in the essay, Hayashi, on the one hand, seems to reject militarization of the domestic order; thus, we witness Hayashi along with the Japanese residents of Shanghai's International Settlement chiding the Japanese government for controlling the media at home and for neglecting the long-term implications of starting a war that has the capacity to bring material suffering and devastation to the Japanese land and people.

On the other hand, he exhibited genuine and often boisterous support for precisely those physical manifestations of the Japanese state's militarist policies in Shanghai. In the subsequent novel, *A Profile of War*, Hayashi wrote that he stayed calm throughout the domestic disturbance of the February 26 Incident in 1936, but that after the outbreak of war with China he could not remain quiet any longer.⁷² Taken from his journal for the trip and dated August 21, this passage shows that Hayashi was ready to answer his country's call to arms. Though his only weapon was his pen, Hayashi did respond passionately and actively to the national project of war against China in 1937. He experienced firsthand the generosity of the government officials, the Japanese residents, and the naval troops and the hazardous conditions under which they performed their duties in Shanghai. Having undergone Chinese air raids and artillery attacks himself, he also identified with the fear among expatriates that Chinese troops might massacre them. Although Hayashi may have objectified the state, allowing him to convey his distrust of its civil policies, he also emotionally identified with those Japanese living, working, and fighting in Shanghai's International Settlement.

In this way, Hayashi's "Shanghai Battlefield" shows a "strong awareness of war" and its greater ramifications for Japan. However, it also draws attention to the complex and sometimes even contradictory nature of Japanese war literature right from the outset of the China Incident. Hayashi's reporting is at once an emotional response to the fighting he has witnessed while in Shanghai's International Settlement and an intellectual response to the Japanese state's management of the defense of and the battle for Shanghai, revealing a critical perspective that is judicious and reserved, not one that has been utterly crushed and defeated. Consequently, a study of Hayashi's essay suggests the potential for further research into the Japanese literati's initial accounts of the China Incident, in particular for those who seek to trace the intellectual and cultural development of Japanese war literature from the 1930s to the Pacific War.

⁷¹ For more on this process of objectification of the Japan Communist Party and the Japanese state, see chapters three and four in Jeff E. Long, "Overcoming Marxism in Early Shōwa Japan: Hayashi Fusao's *Seinen* and the Turn to Ultrationalism," Ph.D.thesis, University of Hawai'i, 2000, pp. 65-157.

⁷² Hayashi, *Sensō no yokogao*, p. 394.