Reviews


In this short collection, Li Qing, a consummate bibliophile and long-term resident of Japan, has brought together a number of marvelous documents which are, as his title suggests, “rarely seen.” Many of these texts he discovered or rediscovered himself, and to all he, and occasionally a colleague, offer extensive annotations. All were originally written in literary Chinese or Kanbun (sometime translated as “Sino-Japanese”). Most are short texts, such as letters from eminent Chinese intellectuals to Japanese colleagues or the transcripts of “brush conversations” (C. bitan 笔谈, J. hitsudan). They are arranged chronologically from Huang Zunxian’s (1848-1905) 黄遵憲 “Brief Letter on Korean Policy” (1880) through thirty-seven letters (dated 1934-58) from Wang Gulu 王古鲁 (b. 1900) to Aoki Masaru 青木正兒 (1887-1964), the famed scholar of Chinese literature.

The annotations are of two sorts. There are explanatory notes to names and terms in the various texts. In addition, there are jieshuo 解説 (explanations) of the principle figures in a given “interchange.” Both, especially the latter, are invaluable.

What follows is a selected list from the twenty-nine chapters that comprise this book: the text of a brush conversation (1880) between He Ruzhang 何如璋 (1837/8-91) and Huang Zunxian, both members of the early Chinese missions to Japan, with the Korean reformer Kim Hŭngjip 金弘集 (1842-96); Huang’s Zunxian’s 1881 brush conversation with the scholar and poet Miyajima Seiichirō 宮島誠一郎 (1838-1911); the extensive brush conversations, beginning in 1881, between the book collector Yang Shoujing 杨守敬 (1839-1915) and the Japanese scholar Mori Tateyuki 森立之 (1807-85); an 1882 poem and numerous letters dated 1882-83 from Yu Yue 俞樾 (1821-1907) to Kitakata Mamoru 北方蒙 (1850-1905); a poem dated 1890 from the early Chinese Japanologist, Yao Wendong1 姚文禮 (1852-1929), to the historian of Confucian philosophy in Japan, Inoue Tetsujirō 井上哲次郎 (1855-1944); the dedicatory colophon, dated 1901, inscribed by historian Wen Tingshi 文廷式 (1856-1904) on the *Yuanchao mishi* 元朝秘史 (Secret History of the Mongols) to the great prewar Sinologist, Naitō Konan 内藤湖南 (1866-1934); a letter (1902) from Chen Yi 陈毂 to Naka Michiyu 那珂道世 (1851-1908), progenitor of modern Japanese Sinology; the brief text of a brush conversation between the revolutionary scholar Zhang Taiyan 章太炎 (1868-1936) and the great lexicographer and Confucian scholar Morohashi Tetsuji 諸橋徹 (1883-1993), concerning several high Qing thinkers (dated 1920); the texts of seven notes and postcards from philosopher and literary critic Wang Guowei 王国維 (1877-1927) to historian Suzuki Torao 並木虎雄 (1878-1963) dated 1912-13; the texts of four separate

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1 See the article by Benjamin Wai-ming Ng, “Yao Wendong (1852-1927) and Japanology in Late Qing China,” *Sino-Japanese Studies* 10.2 (April 1998), pp. 8-22.
brush conversations (all dated 1920) between Morohashi Tetsuji on the one hand and Chinese scholars Hu Shi 胡適(1891-1962), Zeng Guangjun 鄭廣錦, Ye Dehui 杨德輝 (1864-1927), and Chen Baochen 陳寶琛 (1848-1935) on the other; the text of a poem from Chen Baochen to Morohashi Tetsuji (dated 1921); and letters, dating from the 1920s through the 1950s, from Hu Shi, Zhou Zuoren 周作人 (1885-1967), and Zhao Jingshen 趙景深 (b. 1902) to Aoki Masaru.

This is the sort of collection that is likely to be of use to many scholars working on the modern history and culture of Sino-Japanese ties.

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When it comes to the study of the contemporary foreign relationship between China and Japan, according to Christopher Howe, “while the Chinese and Japanese themselves are most naturally placed to study it, they both find it a difficult subject to approach.”2 The constant presence of history in Chinese research on Japan and the persistent search for appropriate meanings of China for Japan in Japanese research are often identified to be two of the root causes for such a state of affairs. By extension, such causes lead to nationalistic biases in academic research produced by both Chinese and Japanese scholars.

The publication of Li Enmin’s book on (officially) unofficial economic diplomacy between China and Japan in the 1945-72 period is a development that demonstrates a greater degree of objectivity in Chinese research. As is true of research on any pair of Sino-foreign relations, knowledge of the language of the overseas country and extended living and research experiences in that country are necessary (although not sufficient) preconditions for fairness in reaching research conclusions. Li was a doctoral candidate under a joint educational program between the History Department of Nankai University (in Tianjin, China) and the Faculty of Social Sciences of Hitotsubashi University (in Tokyo, Japan). This puts him in a position to conduct extensive research in both countries about the history of economic diplomacy between China and Japan from 1945 to 1972. The result, his doctoral dissertation submitted to Nankai, is a richly documented history that incorporates Chinese, English, and Japanese language sources as well as interviews with living Chinese and Japanese practitioners of the economic diplomacy during the years under inquiry.

In Chapter One, Li defines the notion of “unofficial economic diplomacy” (minjian jingji waijiao 民間 經濟外交) as “cross-national economic exchanges conducted by businessmen, business groups or intermediaries unauthorized by the government”(p. 8). Such exchanges are conducted through formal or informal channels.

and selectively utilized by the two governments in their pursuit of bilateral diplomatic goals. It should be noted that Li’s definition of the term is more fitting to the Japanese government’s handling of its economic diplomacy with China than that of the government of the People’s Republic. As the rest of the book makes clear, for Japan, extending both covert and overt support to the business sector was more a matter of finding a balance between the desire to enter the China market and the necessity of doing just enough as not to upset its political-security alliance with the United States and the latter’s policy of containment against China. Japan did move against the will of its China-related business interests in 1958, partly as a result of protests by Taiwan (pp. 226-249). The Chinese government, in contrast, strictly and persistently subjugated its trade relations with Japanese businesses to its judgment of the political orientations various Japanese moves were indicating at each stage. Such political considerations included the role of Japan in supporting American security actions in Asia, Japan-Taiwan relations, and the perceived revival of Japanese militarism.

The rest of the book under review is chronologically organized into six chapters of history and a conclusion. The following is a concise summary of each chapter, highlighting some of Li’s arguments and insights that differ from the usual nationalistic Chinese rhetoric on developments in Sino-Japanese relations from 1945-1972. Much of the same historical data reported in Li’s book can be found in Yoshihide Soeya’s documentation of Japanese economic diplomacy towards China (1945-1978), although Soeya’s work fails to tap into Chinese sources on the same subject matter.

From 1945 to 1952 (Chapter Two), Japan was under occupation by the U.S.-led allied forces. The United States first routinely vetoed the Japanese government’s proposals for trading with China and later locked Japanese participation into the U.S.-led Western economic blockade against China through arranging for Japan’s membership in the Paris-based Coordinating Committee and its China Committee in September 1952. Noticeable during this period was the signing of the first “Private Trade Agreement” by three Japanese Diet members in their private capacities and officials from the China International Trade Promotion Committee in Beijing on June 1, 1952. The same period witnessed the institutionalization of Japan-Taiwan relations by way of the Japan-Taiwan Peace Treaty as well as the beginning of Japanese foreign policy following the so-called Yoshida Doctrine. By digging into Yoshida Shigeru’s 吉田茂评论 on Japan-China relations at the Diet, Li concludes that it was China, which viewed Japan as an American puppet state, not Yoshida, that had shut the door on formal contacts between the two governments until 1972 (pp. 88-90).

Chapter Three focuses on the success stories in reaching and implementing the three “Private Trade Agreements” between China and Japan in the years 1952-1957. Five percent of the first of these barter trade arrangements were implemented. Over seventy-seven percent of the third Agreement had been implemented when it was extended (p. 190). More significantly, technology trade and steel trade would have become possible with the fourth agreement of 1957 (which failed to materialize). Sino-Japanese trade exhibitions in both countries became a reality and were well received by their respective consumers. Also during this period, non-governmental bodies of the two countries successfully negotiated a fisheries agreement in 1956 with annual extensions

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until 1958. China and Japan seemed to have found the formula for conducting an officially unofficial economic diplomacy.

Chapter Four looks into the forces that brought economic interactions between the two countries to a complete halt in 1958. Beginning in 1954, China worked hard to push for upgrading its political relations with Japan through the negotiating process of the “Private Trade Agreements.” The fourth such agreement, reached on November 1, 1957, went one step further to include, in its appendix, an arrangement for permanent trade missions to be established in both countries. Through this appendix China won Japan’s agreement to meet its demands (hoisting national flags at the mission buildings, de facto treatment of mission staffers and their families as diplomatic personnel, and the freedom to decide the number of staffers) for such establishments (p. 221). But the fourth agreement did not materialize due to the Nagasaki flag incident—two youths belonging to a rightwing Japanese political group pulled down the Chinese national flag at a Chinese trade event being held in the city of Nagasaki. In protest, China terminated its economic ties with its former Japanese business friends and announced a policy of linkage between trade and politics (of Japan’s role in the China-Taiwan rivalry). Japan, by contrast, continued to emphasize its policy of separating politics from trade.

On the Nagasaki flag incident, Li’s contribution is that he has located a Taiwanese diplomat’s memoirs that acknowledge the Taiwan government’s cash rewards to the two Japanese youths who pulled down the flag in the first place (pp. 231-33). This episode sheds light on the limits of Taiwan’s tolerance for the warming of China-Japan economic ties in the late 1950s.

Chapter Five covers the first five years of the 1960s, during which “friendship trade” between China and Japan began and flourished. What prompted China to change its earlier Japan trade policy was the change of Japanese prime minister-ship from Kishi Nobusuke to Ikeda Hayato in July 1960. For the Japanese side, small- and medium-sized firms looked at China as a promising market for new business opportunities, which were becoming rarer within Japan. “Friendship Trade” from 1960 and in particular LT (named after Liao Chengzhi and Takasaki Tatsunosuke) Trade (1962-68) not only restored bilateral trade to the pre-1958 levels but also deepened the trade relationship into one that involved plant transfers, large volumes, long-term (five-years as opposed to previous one-year periods) arrangements. Furthermore, LT Trade arrangements served as a “window” for the political and financial leaders of Japan to explore new possibilities for a change in Japan-China relations (p. 293).

The Japanese government supported such unofficial arrangements with both finance and personnel (pp. 308-11). The second unofficial Sino-Japanese fisheries agreement was reached in 1963. Exchanges of journalists between the two countries also became possible. As expected, Taiwan took a series of actions to demonstrate its protest against Japan for its policy of separating politics from economics in Japan-China relations.

According to Li, LT Trade between China and Japan had to change to Memorandum Trade (Chapter Six, 1965-70) because of the Satō administration’s renewed anti-Communist foreign policy and the start of the Cultural Revolution in China. Indeed, Liao Chengzhi, who had been the key figure in having made the LT trade arrangement possible, lost his personal freedom to political struggles within China.
China’s politicization of “friendship trade” by demanding the withdrawal from Sino-Japanese friendship trade those firms that were dealing with Taiwan as well alienated non-governmental support within Japan for a more sympathetic policy towards China. Indeed, Li is one of the very few Chinese historians who speculates that Zhou Enlai’s 1969 pronouncement of his government’s “four principles” actually worked to the opposite effect among Japanese firms (p. 400). Zhou Enlai has remained a figure larger than life, particularly among Chinese intellectuals, and is often regarded as the godfather of contemporary Chinese diplomacy. This chapter also informs us that external (i.e., U.S. and Taiwan) factors were, after all, less destructive than the power of domestic politics in China (i.e., radical Communist ideology) in the evolution of Sino-Japanese relations.

Chapter Seven covers efforts (1971-72) by Japanese businesses to spearhead the drive to re-normalize diplomatic relations with China in the wake of the Nixon shocks. China embraced such efforts by loosening its demands on Japanese firms to take political sides. When Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei decided to visit China in 1972, he was “well-advised” by influential Japanese businessmen who had made numerous trips to China partly in protest of the Satō administration’s staunch pro-America and anti-China policy orientation (pp. 445-52). On this score, though, Li perhaps overestimates the value of the Japanese businessmen’s knowledge of China, as the quick evaporation of Japan’s “China fever” (which is not covered in Li’s book) in the wake of the Tanaka visit to Beijing showed.

In his four-page epilogue (Chapter Eight), Li re-emphasizes the significance of Japanese firms in “opening the door to [normal] Sino-Japanese relations” (p. 469). This is but one of the conceptual weaknesses in Li’s research. He errs by implying that private Japanese businessmen acted as willing promoters of goodwill between the two peoples of China and Japan. Such notions create a blind spot, blocking the necessary inquiry into the self-interest of those businessmen-pioneers of Sino-Japanese relations at the governmental level. It also fails to examine the structural changes in the global economy from the 1950s to the 1970s and their impact on Japanese business behavior. In this regard, it is little wonder that Li throughout his book devotes more effort to describing activities of individuals (business and political leaders) rather than digging deeper into the domestic-international forces behind their behavior. Indeed, the book’s appendix pages list 571 individuals introduced, with no reference at all to major events in Sino-Japanese relations over the period 1945-72.

In addition to the contributions highlighted above, the value of Li’s research is in its meticulous treatment of details. This makes the book a useful reference for students of the history of Sino-Japanese economic relations. Li’s extensively uses Chinese sources published in the 1950s and 1970s, recently de-classified diplomatic documents from the Japanese government sources, and internal publications by some of those Japanese firms directly involved in Sino-Japanese trade in the 1945-72 period. Students of the contemporary history of Sino-Japanese economic relations can also learn, through reading Li’s book, recent developments in Chinese approaches to the study of Sino-Japanese relations.

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For an English language assessment of these principles, see Soeya, pp. 113-19.

These relative inexpensive volumes contain a gold mine of research on Sino-Japanese relations primarily in the Ming period, though some go back as far as the Tang and others come as far forward as the high Qing. Professor Liang is a graduate of National Taiwan University and Tōhoku University, with a doctorate from Tsukuba University. He has written a great many works, and it is wonderful that his principal essays have been collected in these volumes.

These essays cover a multitude of topics, from the *wakō* (wokou) incursions along the South China coast to relations with the Ryūkyū Kingdom, to the fate of seminal Chinese texts in Japan, to Japanese monks who visited China, to bilateral trade. Most fall within the area of political history, though some would also have to be classified as religious history and others as literary history.

By contemporary Western criteria, Liang is an old-fashioned historian in all the best senses of the term. He works extremely closely to his sources, and he is at home in a plethora of them. Thus, while they may not be structurally innovative, these works are as empirically sound as can be imagined.

This note is meant merely to introduce this material to readers who may not have been aware of it. There is no adequate way to review these essays without going on for many pages.

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