Orthodoxy and Legitimacy in the Kimon School

Part 2

Maruyama Masao
丸山真男

Translated by Barry D. Steben
National University of Singapore

(Sino-Japanese Studies is saddened to report that Professor Maruyama passed away on August 15, 1996. Thus, the help that he gave with the quotations in the first half of this translation was one of the last scholarly activities of his long and productive career. The scholarly world, not the least those in Japanese intellectual history, deeply mourns his passing. In view of Maruyama’s scathing critiques of Japanese fascism, however, there is something fitting in the fact that he passed away on August 15, the anniversary of the day that saw the collapse of Imperial Japan. As he wrote near the end of the essay translated here (his last major work): “The greatest incident since the founding of the nation for the oracular legitimacy of the Japanese state was the conclusion of the Second World War by Japan’s unconditional acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration.” This acceptance was decided on the 14th, but announced to the nation in the famous broadcast of the emperor’s address on the 15th. Few scholars have done as much as Maruyama to rebuild the Japanese people spiritually since that collapse, by working to construct a new Japanese sense of self that remains connected to the roots of the tradition but can resist the excesses of collectivism and ethnocentrism that led to the tragedy of the war. [BS])

5. The Coincidentia Oppositorum

The Kimon school (Keigigaku 敬義學) is said to be the first school that “Japanized” Zhu Xi learning. Roughly speaking, this cannot be said to be erroneous. However, if we emphasize only the ethico-political side of what the Kimon school learned from Zhu Xi learning, that is, the theory of names and statuses concerning civilization vs. barbarism and inner vs. outer and the great righteousness between ruler and subject, this does not represent a fair approach to or a complete understanding of the Kimon school. Even with regard to the problem of universal and particular examined in

the last chapter, the Kimon—or at least the eminent teachers of the school—tried to investigate this thoroughly in the light of what was referred to in the Zhu Xi school as the metaphysics of principle and material force, that is, in the light of the fundamental philosophical categories of what was classified in Reflections on Things at Hand as “the substance of the Way.” The aim of the textual narrowness that became the target of criticism from the Edo period on, as well as the school’s manner of lecturing over and over on specific chapters or specific paragraphs of the Four Books—apart from whether or not this was the best means for the purpose—lay in the conviction that one could only approach the philosophy of the classics through a close reading of the texts that was both “narrow and deep.” This was the reason for distinguishing the best aspects of the Kimon school from a mere fanatical faith and from its opposite, broad learning for its own sake. An examination of the school’s individual interpretations of the basic categories of classical studies is beyond the scope of this bibliographical introduction, but the above also applies to the problem of orthodoxy (seitō) that we have been considering.

As the one who cries “Lord, Lord” is not necessarily Jesus’ disciple, a mere enthusiasm for shouting orthodoxy and condemning heterodoxy is not a guarantee of the orthodoxy of the Way one has embraced. The problem of orthodoxy arises in any world religion, but in each there are certain conditions of thought—not to mention political, economic, and social conditions—that must be met before a position can become orthodox. This problem of conformity with the orthodox tradition is a pattern of thought common to all sorts of religions and world views, transcending the substantial differences in doctrinal content. Since it is not the task of the present essay to present a general theory concerning this problem, the following summary will have to start out almost arbitrarily from the conclusion.

For a world view to have completeness and consistency as something that gives meaning to the universe, the world, and man, it must fulfill the condition of the unification of duality. This corresponds almost exactly to what Nicholas of Cusa (1401–64) called the coincidentia oppositorum, and if one has not grown weary of the vulgarization of the term, we may call it the dialectical unification of contradiction. The concrete form of these dualities or opposites themselves varies with the particular doctrine or religion in question. In the Christian tradition, which saw a typical development of the dogmatics of orthodoxy vs. heterodoxy, the unification of the contradiction between the divinity and humanity of Jesus is at the core of the problem. On that foundation are encompassed all sorts of dualistic tensions—between man’s “original sin” and his conscience, between interiority and ritual, between the principle of “non-resistance” toward the enemy as preached in the Sermon on the Mount and the justice of the Crusaders, between the sanctification of secular power (the idea that all authority comes from God) and the right of resistance (“follow God rather than man”). The unbalanced advance of one of the moments of this duality at the expense of the other was what orthodoxy saw as the intellectual characteristic of heterodoxy. Such an unbalanced advance occurs because, unable to bear the continuous tension of the contradictory and opposed moments, there is an attempt to obtain unity by discarding or giving up one of them, or to solve the problem by a single leap toward the final goal. Thus direct mystical unity with the Absolute, a philosophy of all-at-once, an extreme simplification of life attitude, and a longing for purity of spirit and freedom from rules,
and so on, have since ancient times always been the common characteristics of thought tendencies that are made into heterodoxies. Conversely, the reason why “unity” or “congruity” become necessary in the orthodox thought pattern, needless to say, is that they correspond to the monism of order and the demand for “one truth” discussed above. If the single truth collapses, for orthodox thought this means a disintegration of the universe and the world toward a frightening chaos. On the one hand, it is a question of how to put a stop to the diversification of truth that leads to the morass of disorder; on the other hand, however, it is a question of how to deal with the danger of exhausting the fertility of the world and losing the catholicity of world interpretation—this itself comes back again to the problem of the unification of contradiction.

If we were to list at random the categories from the Cheng-Zhu school according to the problem of dualistic opposition or “contradiction” expressed characteristically in the orthodox thought pattern, none of the following polarities would be excluded: the Great Ultimate vs. yin and yang and the five agents, principle vs. material force, the unmanifest (weifa; mihatsu 未發) vs. the manifest (yifa; ihatsu 已發), principle as one vs. the diversity of particularities, substance vs. function, the nature vs. the emotions, the preservation of the mind vs. the extension of knowledge, intellectual inquiry vs. honoring the virtuous nature, reverence to straighten the internal vs. righteousness to square the external, self-cultivation vs. the governing of others, and so on. These categories mutually overlap, and they are also subdivided further (as, for instance, in the logic of “distinguishing and uniting” between the “moral feelings” (qing; jō 情) of Mencius’s four beginnings and the ‘emotions’ (qing; jō 情) of pleasure, anger, sadness, and happiness). However, what is important for the problem at hand is not to look at the debates over the meaning of these individual categories, but at the coexistence of a magnetic force toward the opposite direction between each of the two poles of concentration and diffusion, inwardness and outwardness, the transcendental (senkenteki 先驗的) moment and the empirical (kōtentei 後天的) moment, analysis and intuition, the commonplace and the lofty, impersonal objectivization and practical self-examination, as well as at the “non-continuous continuity” tendency of thought that runs through the entire structure of Zhu Xi’s philosophy. The loss or severence of this balance leads to a falling into various forms of heterodoxy, such as the heterodoxies of overemphasis on the inner (e.g., Buddhism and the Lu-Wang school) or overemphasis on the outer (e.g., Legalism), the heterodoxies of overemphasis on the lofty or overemphasis on the commonplace, and the heterodoxies of overemphasis on literary pursuits or overemphasis on practice. Only when they are situated within this bipolarity can one understand the great importance placed on propositions like “substance and function are of one source,” “the Way that unites inner and outer,” or “the Way that unites the lofty and the lowly.” In this sense, the criticism they were subjected to by the Lu-Wang school of “the defect of excessive diversification” (shiri 支離) serves rather to illuminate in reverse the thought pattern of the unification of opposites in the Zhu Xi school. Even though the Zhu Xi school was once branded as “false learning” (weixue; gigaku 僞學), the reason that it was able to represent the “orthodox transmission of the Way” as against the Lu-Wang school—although there were, of course, various historical and social conditions—was that it better fitted in with the above sort of orthodox pattern of thought.
The Ansai school did indeed Japanize the learning of Zhu Xi, but insofar as this was the Japanization of Zhu Xi learning, it learned the above sort of thought pattern from the thought structure of the Zhu Xi school. And it learned it frantically. In spite of the intense passion that the Kimon school wagered on "the Way," the sort of sense of equilibrium seen in their method of learning and in their understanding of the Cheng-Zhu school, or the paradoxical propositions born from their attempt to express contradictory elements simultaneously as one truth, seem to be deeply rooted. Naokata's paradoxical metaphors, such as his dictum that, "Learning is not achieved in a hurry, nor achieved by putting around at leisure; one braces oneself for the effort and then moves forward step by step," or his statement that, "The [Confucian] Mean (ちゅうじゅく中庸) is a wonderful thing. Not to want money, but not to have no use for it either. Not to long for a wife, but not to despise having one either. To long for things is human desire, to despise things is heterodoxy [refers to Buddhism]." Such metaphors are sometimes explained as Naokata's Zen-like tendency. But such an explanation requires the following supplementary comments. First, to come out with this sort of paradox in expressing a truth that transcends generally accepted ideas is something by no means limited to Zen (the Sermon on the Mount is full of paradoxes!), and it can also be found in proverbs of everyday life like "when in a hurry, take the long way around" (isogaba maware 速かば迂 れ). Second, the coexistence of opposite directionalities and the logic of the equilibrium of contradictions found in the Ansai school permeates not only such simple proverbs, but every aspect of the positioning or interpretation of the categories of classical studies or of the classics themselves. This is not limited to Naokata or his lineage, but for convenience I will first illustrate it with examples from Naokata. Naokata situates the Zhu Xi school's theory of principle and material force between the following two "deviations."

The first is the Buddhistic heterodoxy typified by Zen. (As a precaution, let me say that "heterodoxy" is used at times as in the examples above in reference to specific objects seen as heterodox, such as Buddhism or philosophical Daoism, and at other times in reference to the heterodox mode of thought in the dynamics between orthodoxy and heterodoxy). The Buddhist hatred for principle is its "diversity of particularities" (fenshu; 分殊) aspect. "Heterodoxy despises reason and logic (じ り理); recklessly saying that all is one, that good and evil are not two, that heterodox and orthodox are one (jasei ichinyo 邪正一如). This is also the reason for its dislike of the investigation of principle." To investigate principle in relation to each individual thing or affair is "cramped and confined, unable to operate freely, so that it is something that they have evaded as 'obstruction by principle' (ristō 理障)." From their evasion of the principles that operate within material force, they say "lofty things," confusing this with the truth of the ultimate of non-being (mukyoku 無極). Cheng Yi said about this that "The more [they] get close to principle the more [they] confuse the truth." Regarding Buddhism's "discarding the self and leaving family life," that is, its fleeing from the world, and its loftiness, "Our Confucian Way" is such that "although there are all kinds of hardships within the five relationships, we do not try to evade them, but act according to the

---

2 This dictum is highly praised by Inaba Usai in Usai Sensei gakuwa 1.
3 Unzōroku 13, recorded by Nagai.
normative principles of these affairs." Escaping from the hardships (of "overcoming self" and "energetic practice") in the ordinary world is "something that seeks what is agreeable to one's self alone." "People in the world who do not care about principle are often called "self-willed" (kizui 氣 隨 )" (another metaphor based on common sayings). However, there is on the other hand a deviation in precisely the opposite direction.

Confucians who lack insight understand the aspect of logical sequence (jōri) and particularity (bunshū), but because they do not know that one principle, they are entangled in things. Even if we say that those of the Cheng Yi school drifted into Zen-like ideas, this was because they were not worldly Confucians. Among the scholars of practical learning in the world, there is no apprehension against drifting into heterodoxy. Therefore Zhu Xi said that the insight of Confucians today is even worse than that of the heterodox.⁴

That is, Naokata holds that even though "the principles of the Way (dōri) dwell in the patterns of the friction (momei 摩障) between principle and material force," "heterodoxy goes forward on one leg." That is, he sees the heterodox mode of thought as consisting in a deviation of leaning to one or the other extreme, losing this 'catholicity' of the unification of contradictions. If we say that Naokata inclines toward "Zen ideas," this is because of his own brand of strategic judgment that in the Japanese spiritual climate the deviation of the "scholars of practical learning"—the deviation toward particularity—was stronger than the opposite deviation toward principle as one. (The same judgment flows in his persistent criticism of military studies). It is another question whether Naokata’s understanding of Buddhism is correct when he rejects the idea that heterodox and orthodox are one, or whether his position managed objectively to avoid the "two deviations." It is sufficient to take note of the thought pattern underlying the inclination seen above.

What must not be overlooked in this sort of orthodox thought pattern is that the equilibrium between the two poles by no means signifies holding to a mechanical middle position, and further that the discrimination of the orthodox position from heterodoxy is not something as easy as simply "drawing a line." This is expressed plainly in the grounding of the Doctrine of the Mean within the Zhu Xi school. Among Zhu Xi's collected commentaries, it was in his Zhongyong zhangju 中庸章句 commentary on the Doctrine of the Mean that he systematically put forth the idea of the orthodox transmission of the Way (daotong) and developed his theory of heterodoxy. The order of the study of the Four Books in the Zhu Xi school, and hence in the Ansai school—the Great Learning, the Analects, the Mencius, and the Mean—was strictly observed, but this was not only because the Mean contained the most difficult to understand metaphysical categories, but because Zhu Xi saw the basic proposition of the logic of O-orthodoxy in this work. (To ignore the above order of study and jump into the ultimate truth of the Mean corresponds to the "one-leapism" mentioned above). Mutual contradiction imposes the difficult and extremely delicate task of maintaining the equilibrium of the two opposing moments without abandoning either of them and without one-sidedly enlarging

either of them—in other words maintaining the “mean”—both as the problem of interpreting the “equilibrium of the unmanifest” (weifa zhi zhong 未發之中) and as a practical virtue (what the Mean calls “according with the time and holding to the middle” (shizhong 時中). In this way, two theses that are also common to orthodox thought in every age and clime are born as the above set of tasks. One of the two theses is the statement of Cheng Yi that appears in the preface to Zhu Xi’s commentary on the Mean that “the closer [they] get to principle the more [they] confuse the truth.” Heterodoxies which were heterodox from the start, like those of Yang Zhu, Mo Zi, and the Legalists, are immediately distinguished as such. If truth and heterodoxy are clearly separated by a line, then from the beginning no difficulty arises. Precisely because the balance that contains a coexistence of opposite directionalities collapses at a hairline discrepancy, the closer a heterodoxy comes to the truth the more dangerous it becomes. The argument between Arius and Atanasius over the definition of Christ that Gibbon describes dramatically, though somewhat simplistically, in The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire—the course through which the latter was ultimately made into orthodoxy in the interpretation of the Nicene Creed—unfolded around the difference between homoiousios (Christ is a resemblance of God) and homoousios (Christ is identical with God)—a difference of only one letter. This is an excellent symbol for the fact that the distance between orthodoxy and heterodoxy that in time becomes a gigantic gulf at first begins as a hardly perceptible discrepancy. In the Confucian tradition, this second set of orthodox thought patterns is expressed by the proverb “a miss of a millimeter leads to a difference of a thousand li.” However, just because this is true, the living maintenance of orthodoxy must risk the “ideological hazard” (kannen no boken 観念の冒険) of stepping into heterodoxy by a discrepancy as thin as a sheet of paper. Consider Naokata’s above-mentioned criticism of “scholars of practical learning” to the effect that “the scholars of practical learning in the world are not apprehensive about drifting into heterodoxy [Buddhism].” For the scholars of practical learning, who have from the beginning securely situated themselves in the safety zone away from “Zen-like ideas,” how can there be an understanding of the dialectics of the unity of principle vs. the particularity of specifics? Naokata liked to use the maxim, “If you don’t enter the tiger’s lair, how can you catch tiger cubs,” to describe the attitude one should have toward learning. “The way that the scholars of today read books is like a person aiming his spear while a long way from the river. They don’t have the slightest intention to step in and strike to kill.”5 In recounting the development of Confucianism, Inaba Mokusai also speaks of the fact that the Cheng-Zhu school’s very orthodoxy itself was born as the dynamic process of the sublation of contradiction:

Because they had studied the annotative exegesis of Han and Tang Confucian learning, in the books of the two Cheng brothers moral principle is spoken of in lofty terms. And because their followers subsequently further deviated recklessly in the direction of loftiness, Zhu Zi corrected and rebuked them. All of these were rectifications appropriate to their times. The scholars of today say “Master Zhu, Master Zhu,” rashly repeating over and over only commonplace things, ending up as worldly Confucians. If we consider this in the light of the gradual trend from the Han and the

5 Jiang Jinsilu wei zhusheng ji (Lecture on Reflections on Things at Hand), in Unzōroku 5.
Tang, it is now the turn of the scholars of our school to become worldly Confucians. It would be best if we study with a clear understanding of that fact.\(^5\)

The moment one tries to maintain statically the equilibrium within the Zhu Xi school between the Han and Tang exegetical learning and the metaphysics of Cheng Yi, which was constituted from a unification of opposites, orthodoxy falls into “worldly learning.” The sense of danger regarding “the learning of our school” and the self-criticism that was based on that sense are demonstrated beautifully in the logic of orthodoxy. The rigorism of the Kimon school was not simply an ethical puritanism in the narrow sense. It was nothing less than an attitude of spirit born from the awareness of the hairline difference between holding to and deviating from the mean.

This logic is also basically carried through in Asami Keisai’s approach to classical learning. Regarding the same problem of the positioning of the mean, Keisai asked why, although Zi Si (reputed author of the \textit{Mean}) transmitted the Way of Confucius and Zeng Zi, he only expounded the mean and did not speak of humaneness? According to Keisai, this was because “The essential thing (sōkane 線かね) is not to be confused on account of heterodoxy and not to shrink from the heterodox theories of ten thousand generations, because if it were not for the one word ‘middle’ [i.e., the ‘mean’] the lineage of the Way would go astray. When the correct line of the transmission of the Way is spoken of, it is called the Mean.” “Because the \textit{Mean} takes on heterodoxy and tells exhaustively about the subtleties of our Way, it is especially important.”\(^7\) This is an accurate grasp of Zhu Xi’s consciousness of the problem in his commentary on the \textit{Mean}. The relationship between humaneness and righteousness must also be grasped as this sort of unification of opposites. The paradoxical definition that humaneness is something “unpresentable” (furippa 不立派) and righteousness is something “presentable” (rippa 立派), which can already be seen in Ansai, is introduced by Naokata as “interesting” (omoshiroshi 面白い).\(^8\) Keisai explains the relationship between the two as follows. At the stage of Confucius, humaneness possessed an all-inclusiveness that encompassed righteousness. “If one speaks of the totality of humaneness, then humaneness and righteousness are both fully present as a matter of course. Confucius spoke completely of the goal that is attained in one’s own person.” However, “at the time of Mencius, not just personal attainment, but study and so on were confounded by heterodox teachings. Thus if he did not establish the concept of righteousness, humaneness and so on would have been misunderstood by people as meaning universal love, compassion, or equality.” “When it comes to the word ‘righteousness,’ this is a dreadful word that is very difficult to approach. Even if we could catch hold of Sākyamuni and ask him, ‘How can it be acceptable for human beings to leave the basic human relationships? How would it be if the first born son of Brahma abandoned his parents?’ he would not be moved.” Look! When the word ‘righteousness’ appears, no one can make any objection. “If we speak in terms of the totality of humaneness, it is the one word humaneness; if we speak in terms of the sequence (sujime 節目) of humaneness, it is the one word righteousness; if again with regard to this humaneness and righteousness we completely tie together the two

\(^5\) Gakuwa, ge, 9.
\(^7\) Keisai Sensei isho 1, leaf 35才.
\(^8\) Unzōroku, shū 襲藏録拾遺 10.
extremes, then this will cause propriety and wisdom as well to separate out from their midst.\(^9\) The "of itself" (an sich) orthodoxy that was "harmoniously complete" in Confucius became in Mencius the "for itself" (für sich) orthodoxy confronting heterodoxy, and the addition of "righteousness" became necessary. The general law of orthodoxy that the arising of heterodoxy first propels the definition and refining of "dogma" is set forth here, even if Keisai did not intend it as such. In that sense the interpretation to the effect that Keisai put the emphasis on righteousness rather than humanity is not necessarily correct. If we look respectively at the way he positions humanity and righteousness, Keisai's teachings are in common with those of other scholars of the Cheng-Zhu school. But the feeling that humaneness, precisely because it represents "totality," holds within it the danger of falling into heterodoxy, kept Keisai's vigilance well-honed. Those who only know Keisai as the author of the Seiken igen, as a common citizen out of office fervently lamenting the state of the world, will perhaps be surprised at his interpretation of the phrase, "The superior man is cautious about what is not seen and apprehensive about what is not heard," which appears in the opening section of the Doctrine of the Mean, and especially at the almost scholastic, "exhaustively precise," word-for-word argument he pursued in four letters exchanged with Satō Naokata\(^{10}\) concerning the categories of "what is not seen and not heard" and "the unmanifest and the manifest." The argument goes beyond Zhu Xi's two commentaries on the Mean (the Zhangju and the Huowen) to include his Classified Sayings and Collected Works. However, as through and through a scholar of the Zhu Xi school, Keisai criticized the tendency to jump beyond analysis and try to arrive at unity with one leap, so that it was reported that, "Master Keisai said that the learning of the Lu-Wang school only dislikes analysis and likes unity (hunhe 混合). For this reason they just dreamily idolize moral principle (giri 義理)." For the sake of maintaining the totality of the Way, he even dared choose to risk the danger of "excessive diversification." In his own way Keisai tried to walk the narrow ridge between the two ravines of the objectivistic deviation of the investigation of principle on the one hand and the sentimentalistic deviation referred to in the following criticism of Shinto on the other:

The virtue of gentle straightforwardness (seichoku, shōjiki 正直) taught by Shinto is a good thing, but if there is no examination of true and false, heterodox and orthodox, ... but just an exaltation of the absence of evil (jaki 邪氣) in the heart and of a clear temperament, even if there may be no defilement in the heart, actually one is able to know nothing at all.\(^{11}\)

Of course, the aiming for the equilibrium of the two poles that is demanded by the orthodox thought pattern, as I have repeatedly said, is a different matter than the question of whether a particular thinker has achieved this equilibrium. Rather, since it is a question of a hairline balance, in the actual world there is no way to avoid the appearance of an inclination based on an unintentional deviation or a somewhat intentional preference conditioned by the temperament or environment of the specific thinker in

\(^9\) Keisai Sensei isho 1, leaf 28才．
\(^{10}\) Ibid., leaf 33才 and following.
\(^{11}\) Ibid., Isho 1, leaf 32才．
question. In particular, it is a natural phenomenon that, as different thinkers view each other from the opposite side, a deviation from the mean in the opposite direction from oneself will stand out. Thus the mutual denunciation of “deviation” is something that almost always accompanies the debate over orthodoxy. Wakabayashi Kyōsai made the following criticism of Naokata’s theory of ‘humaneness’:

If one looks at Mr. Satō’s theory of humaneness, although it is not bad, yet because he tends to speak from an angle of contemplation apart from actual things and affairs, one can see there something extremely different from the style (shitate 仕立 ) of Keisai.12

But on the other hand, we are told by Usai, Ogino Shigehiro ( 萩濃重祐 Ogino Heikisai 萩濃彌己齋), and others of the Naokata line that Keisai’s Seiken igen and his lectures on it expressed in a concentrated way precisely the tendency to be ensnared by “things and affairs” and to fail to discern the substance of the Way spoken of in Reflections on Things at Hand. Even more interesting are characterizations of Keisai and Naokata such as the following passage in Hinkenroku 演見錄.

Master Asami is cordial in interpersonal relations. Master Naokata speaks only in terms of principle. Master Miyake [Shōsai] ... possesses both these qualities in combination. Master Naokata holds that the overthrow of an evil ruler (hōbatsu 放伐) should also be [included within] the principle of reform. Master Asami speaks from the point of view of the idea of the Jiyuoucao (Fidelity in Imprisonment), so he takes the position that the overthrow of a ruler is evil under any circumstances.

Inaba Usai himself said that,

If everything is brilliant, the substance becomes sparse; when there is substance there is no brilliance. [Sima] Wengong 司馬溫公 [Sima Guang] was [a man of] substance, and for that reason he was not brilliant. Zhang Nanxuan 張南軒 [Zhang Chi 張栻, 1133-80]13 was a man of brilliance, so his substance was sparse.

Using the same description in another passage, Usai declares that “both Master Naokata’s brilliance and Master Miyake’s cordiality are harmful.”14 Here there is a divergence between the two accounts in the position of Miyake Shōsai, at the further expense of clarity, but this in itself, as in the other cases, can be seen as signifying the compromise position of Shōsai in relation to the other two eminent teachers. At any rate, do not these

---

12 Zatsuwa hikki 2, leaf 27才.
13 Zhang Chi was a follower of Hu Hong 胡宏 who held that “the unmanifest” referred to the nature and “the manifest” referred to the mind. Since the unmanifest cannot be an object of sensual awareness, he held, it is not an object of cultivation. One perceives and cultivates the heavenly principles that appear in the manifest until one is finally able to realize heavenly principle itself. Zhu Xi met with Zhang and admired his thought, later writing his own essay on the subject. While Zhu Xi argued against Zhang’s theory, its influence on Zhu Xi’s own theory was great. See entry by Takabatake Tsunenobu 高畑常信 in Chūgoku shisō jiten 中國思想辭典, ed. Hihara Toshikuni 日原利國 (Tokyo: Kenbun shuppan, 1984), p. 305. (tr.)
14 The above are from Hinkenroku 1.
respective characterizations of Naokata as “brilliant” (sae 剛) and of Keisai as “cordial” (atsui 厚い) or “substantial” (jitsu 実) vividly illuminate their intellectual inclinations? It is not clear why Usai thought that both of them were harmful. Perhaps this is a consequence of Usai’s wholesome banality. Indeed, in the end neither Naokata’s “brilliance” nor Keisai’s “cordial substantiality” could escape paying a price both logically and historically. What appears on the scene as a test case for these two opposite inclinations is the debate over “the righteousness between ruler and minister” and over the problem of legitimacy with which it is intertwined. Ever since the Meiji period, whenever the thought of the Kimon school was mentioned, this principle had to be given special prominence. And so it is that a theme that became stereotyped to such an extent comes to the surface on the route of an inquiry into the orthodox mode of thought.

6. The Righteousness between Ruler and Minister

The righteousness between ruler and minister, needless to say, is the ethic of the relationship between the ruler and his minister as tied together by the norm of “righteousness.” Thus in it there are two sides—the way of the ruler or lord and the way of the minister or vassal.  

The words of Confucius that “the ruler employs the minister with propriety and the minister serves the ruler with loyalty” (Analects 3:19) give the classical expression of the reciprocity of the two. Zhu Xi’s commentary quotes the words of a man named Yin to the effect that: “Ruler and minister are united by righteousness. Therefore, if the ruler employs the minister with propriety, then the minister serves the ruler with loyalty.” This further clarifies the reciprocity of the relationship between ruler and minister as united by righteousness by adding the character meaning “if... then” (ze; sunawachi 則). Yet, looked at from the side of the way of the minister, since there is the important premise that the status distinction (mingfen 名分) between ruler and minister is strictly maintained, outside of an extremely unusual situation, disobedience or, even more, resistance, toward the ruler is seen as contrary to the righteousness between ruler and minister. This “unusual situation” would include tyrannical government or misgovernment by the ruler. Here, normally, the logic of “the righteousness between ruler and minister” has been posed in a way that it is difficult to separate from the theme of the legitimacy (L-orthodoxy) of rule, which involves not only the relationship between the ruler and the minister, but also that between the ruler and the people. However, for convenience of exposition, here I will first separate the two and take up the problem from the side of the relationship between ruler and minister in the narrow sense.

The mutuality of the relationship between ruler and minister stands out more than anywhere else in the problem of “remonstration” (jianzheng; kensō 諫爭). A good
example is the contrast seen in the Quli 章 禮 chapter of the Liji 禮記 (Book of Ritual) between the righteousness between ruler and minister, expressed in the principle that “if one remonstrates three times and is still not heard one takes one’s leave,” and the affection between father and son, expressed in the phrase “if one remonstrates three times and is still not heard one weeps and obeys.” This escalated from the Analects’ “The great minister serves his ruler on the basis of the Way; if he is not heard he ceases” (11:22) to Mencius’s “if the ruler regards the minister like dirt, then the minister regards the ruler like his enemy” (4B:3). Since from the beginning the priority of the value of order (the status distinction between superior and inferior) over the value of justice is included in the content of the norm, the mutual limitation of ruler and minister inherent to the concept of “righteousness” by no means signifies “equality before the Way.” Yet certainly, in regard to ruler and father, the idea that ruler and minister are united by righteousness and father and son are united by Heaven (Nature) is the essence of original Confucianism. One cannot deny that the development of political history from Tang to Song was a process of the strengthening of the absolute authority of the ruler, and that, reflecting that, the moment of reciprocity in the righteousness between ruler and minister suffered a further retrogression. Yet there is a problem in whether in fact we can expand the view expressed in the Juyoucao and its Cheng-Zhu interpretation—the view that placed ruler-minister and father-son on the same level and emphasized absolute loyalty—into a general proposition of the system of Zhu Xi learning. An exploration of this theme is not within the scope of this essay. If we ask, rather, how far the normative character of the ruler-vassal relationship that is clear in the Cheng-Zhu school even in the interpretation of the Juyoucao is grasped on the level of “principle,” here, too, a parting of the ways within the Kimon school is already abundantly apparent at the stage of Ansai’s direct disciples. It is, after all, Satô Naokata who represents, relatively speaking, the “dogmatic” interpretation.

Although lord and father are said to be the same thing, because there is the distinction between lord and father, there must to that extent be a difference between the two. Under heaven there are many people who are called lords. Although while one is serving him one’s lord is one person and no other, in time another person becomes one’s lord... It is not the case that one’s one lord is one’s lord forever even if it means becoming a rônin. Even Confucius served many rulers. Wang Zhu’s 16 saying that one does not serve two lords meant mainly that one does not serve the enemy of one’s lord.

This seems to be a dry argument indeed, but even Naokata is not saying that it is all right to change one’s lord according to one’s own convenience. Rather, he is talking about the contrast in principle between the fact that “even a gentleman (kunshi 君子) will be compelled to change his lord if in his serving there is something that does not accord with what is right (giri),” and the fact that, because “there is no other person like one’s father

16 Chûkô fûryô zenben 忠孝不兩全辨 (Loyalty and Filial Piety Cannot Both Be Fulfilled), Unzôroku 5. Wang Zhu was a man of the state of Qi in the Warring States Period who, after Yan defeated Qi, committed suicide rather than accepting an invitation to serve the Yan ruler. See Shiji 史記 82, and Hanshu 漢書 20.
between heaven and earth,” it is absolutely unrighteous to take an adopted son from another family. In this point, Miyake Shōsai took exactly the same position.

Lord and vassal are united by righteousness; if you are not listened to, you take your leave. This is a constant principle in the world, the timeless great righteousness which cannot be changed. However, people who are in positions of authority think that if this is the case, then how will those [vassals] with whom they are not on intimate terms discard their selves and serve them with their whole heart and mind? As a result, they regard those who flatter and fawn—the eloquent sycophants with shallow wisdom, those who hasten to their tasks and are eager to win merit—as good vassals who can assist them on the right and the left. They do not realize that it is only those who will leave if they are not listened to who are able to discard their selves, devote their whole heart, and carry matters to completion, rendering meritorious service to the lord to whom they are united by righteousness.

In Shōsai’s declaration that taking one’s leave if one’s remonstrances are not heard is a “constant principle”—the duty commanded by the “Dao”—there is a poignant echo of his own unhappy fate of having been suddenly imprisoned in the fifth month of 1707 (Hōei 4) on account of his remonstrance to and retirement from the service of Abe Masataka 阿部正義, daimyō of Oshi domain in Musashi province. On the other hand, though Shōsai was congenial by character, concerning the prohibition of adopting sons from different families—a corollary of the Heaven-born bond between father and son—he was totally intolerant, permitting no excuse of any sort from his disciples regarding the fulfillment of this principle.

However, concerning the contrast between lord and father in the matter of “if not listened to, one leaves,” the opposition within the Kimon school is seen mostly between those in the Confucian camp and those in the Suika Shinto camp. Between the line of Keisai and Kyōsai and the line of Naokata, there is not that much of a difference in principle. Rather, the strong influence on Miyake Shōsai in the basic ethic of the prohibition of adopting sons from different surnames came from Asami Keisai’s work Shizoku benshō 氏族弁證 (On the Discrimination of Clans). Here as well, even more interesting in terms of intellectual history than Shibukawa Shunkai’s 滝川春海 (style, Santetsu 聖哲 or Junsei 順正) and Tani Shinzan’s zeal to distinguish the “Way of our country” from the Way of China is the inclination seen in Keisai and his line to seek the philosophical foundation of the “Way” completely in the Cheng-Zhu school—an inclination of thought that even transcends their own intentionality. The orientation toward seeking the core of the righteousness between lord and vassal in the one-sided loyalty of the vassal and the son cannot but lead to the sentimentalization of “righteousness.” Keisai’s lecture, Kōyūsō shisetsu 招幽操師說 (Our Teacher’s Interpretation of the Juyoucao), finds the essence of the perfect sincerity and loyalty of King Wen toward King Zhōu in “the heart of deep attachment and fellow feeling (kenken sokudatsu 纏縈僧怛) that he calls “not having a trace of the mind of resentment (urami 怨) towards one’s lord, for ‘is it not that the retribution for not caring for the person who
cares for me is that the person whom I care for does not care for me?" 17 If in the treatment one receives from one’s lord there is the slightest thing that does not accord with one’s wishes, the mere thought that “in spite of all the service I have rendered him he does not listen to me” leads directly to the mind that wants to “immediately murder one’s lord.” 18 The feeling, no doubt, is that “a miss of a millimeter leads to a gulf of a thousand li.” However, when we get to Keisai’s disciple, Wakabayashi Kyosai, the inclination toward emotionalism already revealed in the quotation from the ancient song reaches the point of an equation of “righteousness” with the deep emotion of romantic love, in which one chooses the “poignancy” of feeling (shimijimi) over “reasonableness” (dôri).

Love is a poignant thing, and the yearning of love is not necessarily limited to husbands and wives and men and women. The attachment of love between parents and children, between lords and vassals, and between brothers and friends is the same thing.

In our land the Way of our country is expressed with the herb of forgetfulness; in that other country [China] the Way of humaneness is expressed with the one character “self” (ji; onore 佗). 19 The wonderful agreement without prior arrangement—the unity of principle in the universe—is just this sort of thing.... This is why a section of love poems is established in the poetry books.... Their power to move us is at once their principle (dôri). The punitive campaigns (hôbatsu) [of Kings Tang and Wu] accord with principle, but they are not something poignant. The obstinate people of Yin do not accord with principle, yet they move us poignantly. The Duke of Zhao and the Duke of Zhou [acted in] accord with principle, yet they do not move us poignantly. This poignancy is the real thing, ... it is precisely this that is the core of loyalty and filial piety. 20

Here the moment of objective normativeness called “united by righteousness” has been markedly diluted, and there is but a hair’s difference from the philosophy of the Hagakure 葉隠, wherein both Sâkyamuni and Confucius are no longer necessary for a single-minded loyalty toward the lord of the Nabeshima 鍋島 house, a loyalty that is

17 See Nihon shisô taikei, v. 31, p. 232. The passage quoted by Keisai is from Kokinshû 古今集 19, zatsu.
18 Ibid., p. 230.
19 The herb of forgetfulness = wasuregusa or koiwasuregusa, an herb (yellow day lily) traditionally offered to the gods at the Sumiyoshi 住吉 Shrine, which was believed to enable one to forget the pain of love if carried on the person. Here the meaning seems to be that the Way of Japan is symbolized by the deep yearning of romantic love. The “self” said to signify Confucian Way of China likely refers to the definition of true learning by Confucius as “learning for oneself” (wei ji zhi xue), rather than learning done for utilitarian goals. (tr.)
20 Both quotations from Zatsuwa hikki 9, leaf 11 to 12. The “obstinate people of Yin” is an allusion to the Book of History (Duoshi, preface, and Biming), and refers to those Shang loyalists (probably aristocrats) who, after the victory of the Zhou, remained attached to the old ways and did not wish to follow the new government. King Wen had them relocated to his capital at Luo in order to keep them under supervision. The Duke of Zhao (Zhao Bo) was the son of King Wen and the younger brother of both King Wu and the Duke of Zhou. He assisted Wu’s successor King Cheng after Wu’s death. (tr.)
compared to unrequited love between a man and a woman. It is highly suggestive that in the passages quoted above Kyōsai refers to the tradition of setting up a “love section” in Japanese poetry collections. It was precisely the “heart that knows mono no aware” expressed in medieval love poems and love romances from which Motoori Norinaga 本居宣長 later derived his categorical negation of normative (tōiteki 當為的) propositions and his view that “it is the absence of education that is most to be prized.” Instead of reading an artistic fantasy in the Japanese “myths,” Kyōsai and his line (including the other branches of Suika Shinto) were bent on extracting a Chinese-style (karagokoroteki 漢意的) ethico-political theory. From the point of view of Norinaga, it would seem, they can be situated in the transitional stage of the breakaway from “ideology.” However, it is not difficult to imagine that, for those in the lines of Naokata and Shōsai, the Japanese revisionism of the Way of the sages that expanded the significance of love to the point of making it the “root” of the five relationships appeared as an extreme deviation from the normative philosophy of “principle.” In the theory of abdication and expulsion (zenjō hōbatsu 禪讓放伏), which can be grounded only on a concept of legitimacy (L-orthodoxy) based on virtuous rule or the Mandate of Heaven, this dissociation and incongruity takes on a decisive modality.

Yet for both Keisai and Kyōsai, who emphasize absolute loyalty to the ruler, “ruler” (kun, kimi 君) referred directly to the liege lord within the lord-vassal relationship among the bushi. In this lay the highly problematic nature of preaching “the righteousness between lord and vassal” under the bakuhan system. When Asami Keisai heard in Kyoto about the above-mentioned incident of Miyake Shōsai’s imprisonment, he stated his feelings as follows:

To appeal to the obligation (giri) between friends and sneak him out [of prison]—such a thing would be a great wrong (fugi 不義). If that is the case, Mr. Miyake’s acting on account of a great disloyalty in violation of the mind dedicated to serving one’s superior is, for the present, an ignoble thing. From my side, there is nothing I will say to him but the words “song of an upright spirit” (seikika 一個歌). From that point on, there is nothing to be concerned about on this side. It is up to those on his side.

Of course, since Shōsai’s younger brother Hiraide Jinzō 平出信蔵 was his own flesh and blood, it was natural for him to try to get Shōsai out of prison, but “this righteousness is something that cannot be urged from outside.” If the situation gets tense, he writes, “one appeals to those in authority and first tries to have his death postponed; even if this is not the true wish of Mr. Miyake,” for his blood brother there was no choice in the matter. Like the story in the Shiji (Records of the Historian) of trying to help the imprisoned Xi Bo 西伯 even to the point of giving gifts to King Zhōu through his favorite retainer, even

---

21 “Abdication” refers to the concept that succession to the position of ruler should not necessarily be based on heredity, but on the virtue of the successor, as typified by Yao’s turning the empire over to Shun. “Expulsion,” as discussed previously, is the concept that it may be justified to overthrow an evil ruler, as typified by Kings Tang and Wu. (tr.)
if it is something expected of a vassal or a son, "yet this does not constitute the rule." Here also, by overlapping the image with that of the Juyoucao, Keisai is trying to spell out his own brand of "righteousness." It becomes apparent that it is not merely as metaphors for the convenience of persuasion that in Kōyūwō shisetsu Keisai mentions things like "stipend increment" and "one-person support." This application of "the righteousness between ruler and minister" to the bushi stratification system does not undergo a qualitative change even with the assertion of "the great righteousness of reverence for the emperor" (sonnō no taigi 尊王の大義), whereby the emperor is placed above the shōgun as the supreme authority. Ansai had already validated the bakuhan system by his teaching that:

Heavenly matters are [the concern of] the present emperor (kinri 禁裏). As for the pacification of things, the fact that order is established by means of the sword is the same for the shogun of today as it was for Susa-no-o and Namuchi no Mikoto (Kuninushi no Mikoto) in ancient times. This is the way it has been in Japan since the age of the gods.

But Keisai, who was in later times deeply admired by the imperial loyalists because of the anecdote that he "wouldn’t set foot on the land of Kantō," also maintained the basic position that:

If there is someone who raises a rebellion against the Son of Heaven, one ought to rally to the support of the Son of Heaven without waiting for orders. If someone has the idea that the shōgun should oust the Son of Heaven, one ought to do everything possible to dissuade him. Even if there is a suggestion of overthrowing the shōgun from the Son of Heaven, one should not go along with it. Why? Because [the shogunate] has committed no crime. Since it is thanks to this sort of buke 諸家 that we enjoy peace now, I think [the shogunate] is important. This could not have been accomplished just on the strength of those like Lord Konoe 近衛.

If seen in historical context, this affirmation by Ansai and Keisai of government by the buke (warrior families), together with its converse, Hayashi Razan’s theory of reverence for the emperor, has nothing sufficient to distinguish it. Since even Motoori Norinaga’s

---

22 Above from Keisai sensei ishō 3. King Wen, while still a vassal of King Zhū, was called Xi Bo (Western hegemon) because he had been appointed head of the Western feudal lords and given the exclusive right to use military force by King Zhū.


24 Jindaikan kōgi 神代卷講義 (Lecture on the Book of the Age of the Gods).

25 Bunkai hikki 文會雜記 . The "land of Kantō," of course, was associated with the rise of bushi power and the founding of military governments ever since the late Heian period. Keisai reportedly had an aversion for this region.

26 Jōwa zakki 常話雜記 . held by Hibiya Library, Kaga Bunko 加賀文庫 . "Lord Konoe" must refer to Konoe Iehiro 近衛家熙 (1667–1736) and his aristocratic house, which was directly descended from Fujiwara no Motosane 藤原基貫 (1143–66) of the northern branch of the Fujiwara. Iehiro, who held many high ranks around the emperor, was famous for his broad learning and his calligraphy.
Way of the Imperial Land (sumera mikuni no michi 皇国の道), which was of a much later period, sanctified the government of the bakuhan system from top to bottom as a progressive delegation of authority from the emperor to the shogun to the daimyo to the domainal samurai, the only way the Juyoucao style of absolute loyalty could be expressed was as a political ethic of obedience that concretely supported this class progressively from the bottom as long as there was no explicit withdrawal of the delegation of authority from the emperor. In a crisis situation, this would foment a conflict among a plurality of loyalty duties of a sort that could not occur under a centralized bureaucratic system like that of China. It was precisely this that was the dilemma actualized on a national scale in every domain during the upheavals of the bakumatsu period.

The Matsudaira 松平 clan of Iwami Hamada 石見濱田 domain had their fief transferred from Tatebayashi 館林 in 1836 (Tenpō 7), but in the Tatebayashi period Inaba Mokusai had named his domain school the “Dōgakukan” 道學館, saying that with this name, “afterward the followers of Itō Jinsai and Ogyū Sorai may dare brazenly to show their faces, but there is no way they will get to enter and give lectures.” From Nariatsu 齊厚, the first Matsudaira to study under Mokusai, each generation of domain lords was fervently devoted to the Keigi learning, so that this became one of the domains where the Kimon was firmly established as the domainal learning. But in 1866 (Keiō 2) after joining the second expedition against Choshū, the domain was defeated, its castle was burned, and the lord and his followers were transferred to a new fief in Tsuruta 鶴田. After the transfer, the style and curriculum of learning were still exclusively devoted to Ansai learning, and the chief retainer (karō 家老) at the time, Ozeki Hayato 尾関集人, whose father was a prominent disciple of Mokusai, also studied himself under Okudaira Seichian 奥平健延. When the court was faulted for the fact that the domainal troops resisted the imperial troops in the Boshin War (1868–70), he took responsibility as karō and committed suicide. This was but one small example of the innumerable tragedies born of the dilemma of “the righteousness between ruler and minister.”

In Obama 小浜 domain, the base of Kimon learning in Wakasa 若狭, learning other than that of the Kimon school was prohibited and a unification of learning was carried out in 1782 (Tenmei 2), eight years before the “Kansei Prohibition of Heterodoxy.” In Obama, moreover, the “Bōnangen” lineage was dominant. Umeda Unpin 梅田雲濱 (1815–59), who was heir to this line and became a pioneering victim of the sonnō jōi doctrine in the bakumatsu period, was also a samurai of Obama domain. Yet this was the domain of the celebrated fudai clan of Sakai 酒井, which continued generation after generation up to the bakumatsu period. Sakai Tadayoshi 酒井忠義, as the deputy superintendent of palace and daimyo affairs (shoshidai 所司代) in Kyoto, devoted himself with great energy to the mediation between the court and the bakufu, but he incurred the bakufu’s rancor and was dismissed from his post. His son, Tadauji 忠氏,

27 In works such as Tamakushige 玉くしげ.
28 Engenroku zokuroku 5, leaf 25巻.
29 Incidentally, in terms of “lineage,” Mokusai was of the line of Naokata, but he did not necessarily agree with Naokata in theory, frequently lecturing on the Juyoucao and speaking out against the neglect of the Seiken igen.
30 The southwestern part of modern Fukui prefecture.
took his place, but when as a result of the clash between the imperial troops and the troops of Tsu 津 domain in the battle of Toba-Fushimi 鳥羽伏見31 he was refused entry to Kyoto, he experienced the conflict of loyalties in the minutest detail. Even for the Bônangen lineage, it is difficult to say that they carried through the great righteousness of revering the emperor to the end and did not “fail to discriminate between loyalty and treason” in the trend of affairs within the domain.

Shibata 新发田 domain had become another stronghold of the Kimon school in the Hokuetsu 北越 region (Echigo 越後 and Etchû 越中). At the time of the Boshin War, it is said, “most of the domains of Hokuetsu allied themselves with the Northeast Army and resisted the imperial troops. Shibata domain was caught between them, isolated with no one to come to its aid. Then they were able to fulfill their loyalist integrity to the limit.”32 However, within the whirling vortex of civil disorder, their actions in reality were filled with twists and turns. In the first month of the first year of Meiji, the domain was urged by the court to dispatch troops for the subjugation of Tokugawa Keiki, and in the second month troops from the domain entered Kyoto as the imperial army. In the fifth month, however, there was a second switch and they joined the Mutsu-Dewa 雨奥出羽 alliance against the imperial government.33 Then in the seventh month, no sooner had the imperial army landed at Matsuzaki 松崎 and Tayu-hama 太夫濱 than they switched for a third time, serving as the vanguard of the imperial army. In reference to this point, a commentator on “the Yamazaki learning in Shibata domain” argues in Shibata’s defense in the following terms:

Those who discuss history may say: “They switched their loyalties (hyôri hanpuku 表裏反覆) like a harlot, sold their fidelity (setsugi 信義), and broke their vows.” Nevertheless, to judge them on the basis of this as having been fence-sitters unable to commit themselves one way or the other (shuso ryûtan 首鼠兩端) is indeed to be lacking in reasonableness. Shibata domain was loyal to the emperor from start to finish.... To condemn Shibata domain only on the basis of this one time [i.e., the time they joined the Mutsu-Dewa alliance] can be said to be a mistaken view that arises from an insufficient knowledge [!] of the style of learning in Shibata, of the fundamental thought of the people of the domain, and of foreign relations in a time of war.34

Of course, to judge Shibata domain’s dilemma of being “at first tormented by the duress of the rebels, and later afflicted by the requisitions of the government army”35 as opportunism would be too severe. First of all, in the case of each of the domains mentioned above, to attribute their choices and decisions all to the Kimon school is only a reversal of the “emanation theory” referred to at the beginning of this essay that aims at glorifying

31 A battle which took place in Kyoto between the supporters of the shogun Tokugawa Keiki 徳 川慶喜 and the Satsuma-Chôshû troops, in which the shogunate troops were defeated. This battle was the beginning of the Boshin War.
33 A military alliance of thirty-one domains in the Northeast and Hokuetsu, formed in 1868 (Keiô 4) against the Restoration government.
34 Denki gakkai, comp., Yamazaki Ansai to sono monry , revised and enlarged edition.
35 Aoki Seijô 青木青城, memorial of Meiji 1, written by Gamô Keitei 蒲生兼亭, in Kinsei ijin den 近世偉人傳 (Biographies of Great People of Early Modern Japan).
the school. It is no different from the latter in being an oversimplification of the situation. Yet it is also an undeniable fact that, in a crisis situation, the Kimon style of righteousness between lord and vassal or the Juyoucao style of absolute obedience of the vassal did not necessarily point in practice to a single, unequivocal mode of action.

7. “Inheriting Heaven and Establishing the Pole”

With regard to the problem of L-orthodoxy, due to the limitations of space, I will limit myself to a few supplementary points related strictly to the Kimon school. The word “government by virtue” has often been considered to be characteristic of the Confucian philosophy of government, as opposed to the “government by law” of Legalism. Such a conception is valid as far as it goes. This is the import of the famous dictum in the Analects, “Guide them by edicts, keep them in line with punishments, and the common people will stay out of trouble but will have no sense of shame. Guide them by virtue and keep them in line with the rites, and they will, besides having a sense of shame, reform themselves.”36 However, when we speak of “government by virtue” as a problem of L-orthodoxy (legitimacy), it is not simply a policy-level problem of whether one rules by virtue or by law. It is a problem of whether or not virtue rules. That is to say, it is the concept that only a virtuous or wise person who has received the Mandate of Heaven qualifies for the position of ruler, and that an unvirtuous or “unworthy” (buxiao; fushō 不肖) person loses the right to be ruler or the right to succeed to the position of ruler. The presence or absence of virtue, concretely speaking, is expressed in “benevolent government,” and whether or not benevolent government is being practiced is, concretely speaking, expressed in the obedience or rebellion of the people. In this case, the obedience or rebellion of the people is the sign of the possession or lack of possession of the Mandate of Heaven, and this is the meaning of the passage “Heaven sees as my people see, and Heaven hears as my people hear” in the Taishi 泰誓 chapter of the Book of History. Therefore, this must be distinguished from a concept of legitimacy being based in the sovereignty of the people—in the sense that the freely expressed will of the people decides the ultimate form of government. Yet what is important here is that “Heaven” transcends any particular, concrete ruler or dynasty. None of the sage kings from Yao and Shun on down stands in a genealogical, blood relationship with Heaven. In principle this is the same as the fact that, in Judaism—which is said to be an “ethnic religion”—the supreme God, Yahweh, is not the ancestor god of the the Jewish people or of the Jewish king. The importance of this axiomatic principle for the present discussion lies in the fact that, not the Shinto wing, but the “Japanese” (Nihonteki) revisionists of Confucianism within the Kimon school made an ingenious change in the reading of the phrase “inherit Heaven and establish the pole” in the preface of Zhu Xi’s commentaries on the Great Learning (Daxue zhangju) and the Doctrine of the Mean (Zhongyong zhangju). Neither of the terms “inherit Heaven” nor “establish the pole” were created by Zhu Xi, but he put them together in the sentence: “From high antiquity the sagely gods

---

inherited Heaven and established the pole, and the transmission of the lineage of the Way (daotong) began from there.” His purpose, needless to say, was to proclaim the origin of the lineage of the Way (O-orthodoxy) in the sense of establishing the standard of the “Way” as an inheritance of the Way of Heaven or the will of Heaven. It is precisely for this reason that the instances of “abdication” (shanrang; zenjō 賛讓) from Yao to Shun and from Shun to Yu appear immediately after the above sentence. Compare this, however, with the interpretation expressed, for example, in Wakabayashi Kyōsai’s statement that,

The ruler of men is the ancestral leader of Heaven and Earth; our country’s great goddess Amaterasu, who inspires us with awe, is immediately the honorable ancestral leader of Heaven and Earth. Because she is the sagely god who inherits Heaven and establishes the pole, even in ten thousand generations there can be no change in the legitimate line of succession.

Here, “inheriting Heaven and establishing the pole” is adduced as the standard of reference for the concept of legitimacy based on the continuity of the blood line from Amaterasu to Ninigi no Mikoto to the successive generations of the imperial line, tying “Heaven” directly to the divine ancestor of the imperial line. The heterogeneous nature of the meaning of the two conceptions should be clear. In Confucianism, though, precisely because of the transcendent nature of Heaven, the expulsion of a tyrannical ruler in an extreme situation is recognized, as formalized in the statement in the Tuan treatise of the Book of Changes that “Heaven and Earth revolve (ge 革), and the four seasons find completion. The revolutions (geming 革命) of Tang and Wu accorded with Heaven and responded to man.”

Needless to say, this contrast between China and Japan in the matter of L-orthodoxy, as seen above, is internally connected to the problem of the structure of the Japanese myths, in which the beginning of the universe is built into the “birth of the country.”

The concept of dynastic revolution (ekisei kakumei 易姓革命) is in reality not as much of a threat to the monarchical system as it seems on the surface. First of all, unlike ancient Greece and Rome, ancient China did not experience any form of government other than a monarchical system (or government by a king). Therefore, under the concept of legitimacy based on the Mandate of Heaven, in ordinary circumstances, succession to the position of ruler was carried out according to the hereditary principle. The recognition of abdication in favor of a wise and virtuous person in preference to an unworthy son, let alone of the expulsion of a tyrannical ruler on the part of a wise and virtuous person, was strictly limited to an extreme situation. (The two characters in fangfa

37 Kyōsai sensei zatsuwa hikki 10, Bōnan shobun, leaf 7ウ. The same rereading appears frequently in the literature of the Suika Shinto wing.
38 Yijing, xiajing, hexagram 49: ge (“radical change” or “revolution”).
have different meanings, “to expel” and “to subjugate by military force,” but it is not necessary to discuss this here). The premise behind the legitimacy of abdication and expulsion was the interrelatedness and harmony between the regular natural cycle of the four seasons and the “order” of pacifying the realm (ping tianxia 平天下). The tyrannical rulers Jie and Zhōu, by disturbing the harmony of this system, lost their qualifications as rulers and ended up as what Mencius called “ordinary fellows.”40 “Revolution” is nothing other than expelling this ordinary fellow and restoring the order of the system. This is probably what Max Weber had in mind when he labelled dynastic revolution (ekisei kakumei) the “traditionalist revolution.” Mencius, who made the concept of legitimacy based on virtuous rule into a fundamental principle, at the same time recognized both abdication and hereditary succession as righteous on the basis of the Mandate of Heaven: “In the Tang and Yu eras (the reigns of Yao and Shun), [succession was determined by] abdication. In the Xia, Yin, and Zhou dynasties, [it was determined by] hereditary succession. The principle (gi X) is the same.”41 However, the proposition of Karl Schmidt that extreme situations determine the essence of the ordinary state applies particularly well to L-orthodoxy (i.e., legitimacy). Since L-orthodoxy is at bottom the problem of the basis of authority, distinguished from relations of “fact,” it is only in an emergency situation that it comes into action in an overt way in anyone’s awareness. To put it the other way around, the principle of L-orthodoxy that in normal circumstances is hidden or vaguely defined is illuminated with a sudden flash of light in an emergency situation.

Both the story of the abdication of Yao and Shun and the story of the expulsion of Jie and Zhōu by Tang and Wu were virtually universally known in the world of the educated. And the long controversy in classical studies beginning in the Han dynasty about whether abdication and expulsion should be recognized as legitimate from the point of view of the righteousness between ruler and minister was generally known in Edo Confucianism. However, it was Ansai’s disciples who were the first to debate the issue concretely within the same school in the light of Japan’s concept of legitimacy based on the unbroken continuity of the imperial line. Moreover, this was the only school where such diametrically opposed positions were encompassed in mutual tension within the same school. For better or worse, their study of the “Way” was carried out not simply as the abstract arguments of classical studies, nor as the rote repetition of the stock phrases “virtuous rule” and “benevolent government” in a routine professional consciousness, but as something upon which one wagered one’s whole personality. In this the distinctive nature of the Kimon school is vividly revealed.

Among the various “logics” that could harmonize the concept of rule by virtue with the special character of Japan’s concept of L-orthodoxy—known by such names as “the single imperial ancestral line” (kōtō ichiin 皇統一胤) or “one king, one kind” (ichiō isshu 一王一種)—there were, broadly speaking, two series. One was the recourse of making the imperial regalia (jingi 神器) symbolize virtue, what Ansai refers to when he says: “Even a ruler without the Way becomes a virtuous ruler by the transmission of the divine regalia. This is because the divine regalia and the person of the emperor are one

40 Mencius 1B:8.
without distinction.” Ōgimachi Kinmichi (1653–1733), Ansai’s disciple and successor in the Suika line, added to this the comment that, “Because the venerable person and the divine regalia are one, even an evil king has virtue in his person.” Yet, as seen in Hayashi Razan’s assigning of the virtues of wisdom, benevolence, and courage to the three regalia, this cannot be said to be an aspect that distinguishes the Kimon school. Likewise, as regards the connection between the possession or non-possession of the regalia and the theory of imperial legitimacy (seijunron)—especially in the concrete instance of domestic disorder in the Northern and Southern Courts period (1336–1392)—this was a problem of a scale that reached far beyond the Kimon school. Within the school, it was mainly the Shinto wing that developed the theory of the regalia. In the Confucian lineages of the three eminent teachers or the basic Confucian wing, what became the standard of reference of legitimacy was still the theory of the basic categories of classical studies, as well as the “theory of orthodoxy” that had so animated the learning of the Song dynasty. For convenience, I will first briefly consider the latter.

The reason that Asami Keisai invokes Zhu Xi’s Outline or Fang Xiaoru’s discussion of legitimacy in treating this problem is his realization that Song learning had not been successful in explaining the succession of the throne or of dynasties by one criterion in the light of China’s history of change of dynasties since ancient times. The split of opinion within Song learning regarding the legitimacy of specific monarchies or dynasties based on the relative degree of emphasis on either the “great dwelling in rectitude” (dajuzheng) or the “great unification” (dayitong) was a natural consequence of the fact that, to begin with, the principle of legitimacy based on virtuous rule (the Mandate of Heaven) was not discarded, and that moreover it was maintained under the hereditary succession that accompanies a monarchical system. The comparison and judgment of standards of legitimacy was naturally taken as a premise by all, including the Zhu Xi school (or rather, for that very reason, the theory of legitimacy becomes a meaningful debate within historiographical theory). Therefore, if conversely we view the problem from the position that a legitimacy based on “one royal lineage” is superior, abdication and other forms of “legitimate” (not based on usurpation) succession to the throne by someone of a different lineage—say nothing of the overthrow of an evil ruler—are ultimately seen as a confusion of the...
standards of L-orthodoxy. This is the reason why Keisai, while he praises Fang Xiaoru's exclusion of usurping ministers (cuanchen 誅臣), rebels who became rulers (zeihou 賊後), and barbarians (yidi 夷狄) from the ranks of legitimate rulers as "the superb opinion of an era," sees even Zhu Xi's theory of legitimacy as the "the least harmful choice" coming out of the realities of Chinese history. Keisai writes,

Now there is a point about which [Fang's] theory of legitimacy does not say enough. If it is true, then the understanding is that outside of these three [types of illegitimate rulers], if a ruler just succeeds in uniting the whole empire under one stable rule, he is legitimate. Dynasties like the Han, Tang, and Song were of this type. But even these [dynasties], if one examines their origins, were all lacking in the great righteousness.... He was wrong in thinking that, just because they appear as legitimate in the Outline, Zhu Xi had unconditionally accepted their legitimacy.45

Yet the question of whether Zhu Xi was really that reluctant in his judgment of the legitimacy of the dynasties from the Qin and Han onward can itself become a problem. If the point of view is changed, this is the basis of Naokata's criticism that the single imperial line is nothing more than "good fortune" based on "custom," and not at all a question on the level of "righteous principle" (giri).

I cannot consent to the view that the correct Way consists in the idea that the descendants of the person who first took over the realm at the beginning of heaven and earth should continue [to rule] forever. The person who becomes the lord of the realm ought to be a person of virtue.

The establishment of the correct pedigree of the Son of Heaven in Japan becomes the upright thing (richigi 律義) according to the customs of the country. It is not something done on the basis of virtue, nor is it the "light of the age of the gods." It is just that people have followed the custom. It does not reflect an awareness of the righteousness of revering the ruler.

When Naokata says that, "just because one says the Mandate of Heaven, this does mean that the argument of orthodoxy or unorthodoxy (seitō fuseitō 正統不正統) enters in,"46 he is not saying that it is not a question of L-orthodoxy. Rather, he is asserting precisely from the standpoint of the orthodoxy (O-orthodoxy) of the Confucian "learning of the Way" (daoxue) that the theory of legitimacy centering on the continuation of the bloodline does not constitute the foundation of L-orthodoxy. If historical reality is adduced as evidence, it is obvious that there is no necessary connection between peace and popular contentment on the one hand and the presence or absence of dynastic change on the other. There have been emperors who, "their father or elder brother having been killed by a vassal, assumed the position of emperor on the orders of that same vassal and did not think it shameful." Since one can say that struggle over the throne within the imperial house is even more "unrighteous" than the seizing of power by someone of another lineage, "it is thus difficult to say that Japan is superior to all other countries in the

---

45 Seiken igen kōgi 8, "Seitō setsu" 正統說 (The Theory of Legitimacy).
46 Above quotations from Chūgoku ron shū 中國論集, Unzōroku 14.
correctness of the principle of righteousness between ruler and vassal."\(^{47}\) With this the dispute looks somewhat like a futile argument. After all, the superiority of Japan’s L-orthodoxy is not merely a reference to the history of a continuous royal lineage. Rather, it must be founded on an oracular legitimacy in which the status distinction of ruler and subject—i.e., the unchangingness of the imperial line—is determined eternally and inherently (sententekini 前天的に) by the divine oracle of Amaterasu Ōmikami.\(^{48}\) The reference to the Chinese concept of legitimacy presents interesting problems within the context of Chinese history, but it is fated to be swept away with with one fell swoop before this concept of oracular legitimacy.

Among the categories and phrases of the Confucian classics, what became a particular focus of controversy was first and foremost the problem of how to relate the argument over the interpretation of “regular” (jing 經) and “expedient” (quán 權) to the rebellions of Tang and Wu. The argument over the regular and expedient began with Mencius’s question of whether to reach out one’s hand to save one’s elder brother’s wife from drowning was a violation of the ritual rule forbidding direct contact between men and women. Ever since Han Confucians used the concept of “expedient” to refer to cases where the regular rule is violated but the result is in accord with the Way, this has been a point of contentious controversy among Confucian scholars, and even in the Cheng-Zhu school opinions were not necessarily of one accord. The arguments are complex, so I will not go into them here. Suffice it to say that the character used to mean “expedient” originally meant a weighing scale, and that various interpretive combinations were established regarding whether the regular and the expedient should be seen as one Way or separated into two, depending on whether the emphasis was put on the aspect of determining correct action by weighing the changing contours of the concrete situation or on the aspect of irregular means that are contrary to the constant way. (These two are not, of course, unrelated). Therefore, if we leave out the substantive assignment of meaning, as in the case of the theory of civilization vs. barbarism (ka’i-ton 華夷論), we will only fall into arguments that do not engage one another. For instance, Wakabayashi Kyōsai wrote:

If we speak of the “regular Way” and the “expedient way” side by side, we end up with two Ways. If people wish to speak solely also of what is called the “expedient” and to utilize the momentum of the time as they please, this is because at bottom (ōne ni 大根二) there is something that smells of one thing.\(^{49}\)

Here, he is asserting that if we concretely divide the Way into two, the revolutions (hōbatsu) of Tang and Wu would also be approved as “expedient,” giving people an excuse for usurpation. Yet since it is also possible to derive an affirmation of revolution against an evil ruler from a monistic theory, as long as we do not examine in the particular instance in what definition and context the theory of regular and expedient is

\(^{47}\) Ibid. See Yamazaki Ansai gakuha, p. 424.
\(^{48}\) This oracle refers to the words that the Sun Goddess, Amaterasu, conferred upon her great grandson Ninigi no Mikoto, together with the sacred Yata mirror, when she sent him down from Heaven to rule Japan.
\(^{49}\) Zatsuwa hikki 1. See Nihon shisō taikei, v. 31, p. 468.
being used, it does not help us very much in clarifying the present point of controversy. Rather, there is another argument over the interpretation of a classical phrase that is worthy of note as a dispute on the same turf. This argument developed around the passage in *Analects* 3:25 in which Confucius evaluates the Shao 韶 tunes that are the music of Shun as “completely beautiful, and also completely good,” while he says that the music of King Wu of Zhou is “completely beautiful, but not yet completely good.” The phrase “not yet completely good” refers directly only to the theory of music. However, the lineage of Keisai and Kyôsai that denied the legitimacy of revolution cites the fact that in the same *Analects* the description “perfect virtue” is used in reference both to the story of Tai Bo 泰伯 (eldest son of King Tai of Zhou) turning over the realm to his third son, Ji Li 季历, and King Wen’s dividing of the empire into three parts and holding on to two of them while he served the Shang dynasty. Here Keisai and Kyôsai try to see Confucius’s meaning by contrasting this evaluation of “perfect virtue” with the evaluation of King Wu as “not yet completely good.” Since the commentary on precisely the same Tai Bo passage in Zhu Xi’s *Collected Commentaries on the Analects* cites both the case of King Wen and the legend of Bo Yi 伯夷 and Shu Qi 叔齊, who (as recounted in the *Shiji*) remonstrate with King Wu as he sets out on his campaign to overthrow Shang dynasty, the contrast between the “perfect virtue” and “not yet completely good” becomes more and more emphasized.

If one does not understand the feeling of “a difference of one millimeter leads to a distance of one thousand li” within the Kimon school, this controversy will probably appear as nothing more than a pedantic, idealistic argument within the scholar’s study. Even in the Cheng-Zhu school itself, in concrete contexts there was a delicate wavering regarding the rebellions of Tang and Wu and the difference between Kings Wen and Wu, and each of the two wings of the Kimon school mobilized classical discourses that were to its own advantage. If one invoked the Cheng-Zhu explanation of the *Juyoucao*, the other would quote passages like Cheng Yi’s “the methods of Yao, Shun, Tang, and Wu were all of the same kind” or Zhu Xi’s “the abdication of Yao and Shun and the revolutions of Tang and Wu were in no case other than the straight and ordinary” (*Daxue huowen*). Regarding the “not yet completely good,” if one wing said that “even if it is thrown away or falls over, the ‘not yet’ character cannot be stripped off,” Naokata’s side would ask why, if Confucius rejected King Wu’s overthrow of the Shang dynasty in principle, he did not clearly say “not good” instead of “not yet completely good.” Since revolution is only righteous in the unusual and special circumstances where above there is an evil ruler like Jie and Zhou and below there is a great worthy or sage like Tang and Wu—since it is not an everyday norm for the ordinary person—Confucius also distinguished it from the cases of Yao and Shun and King Wen. Naokata’s skillful metaphors, such as viewing the cherry blossoms when clad in a straw raincoat or taking the bad road of Kisoji 因曾路 because the Eastern Sea Route is impassible, were designed solely to emphasize the emergency nature of the situation and the unusual

50 Allusion to *Mencius* 4B:1.
52 *Tôburon* 楊武論 (On Tang and Wu), and other places.
conditions. And even for the side of Keisai and Kyōsai, to the extent that they based themselves on the learning of the Confucian classics, it was impossible to single out only King Wu for obliteration from the ranks of the sages. For, even if one does not bring in the affirmation of Tang and Wu in the Tuan treatise of the Book of Changes or the Mencius, it is written large in the Doctrine of the Mean that Confucius transmitted the teachings of Yao and Shun and took Kings Wen and Wu as his paragons. If King Wu is removed, then the problem extends to the Duke of Zhou, and even Ji Zǐ—praised by Confucius as one of the “three benevolent men”—becomes questionable from the point of view of righteous principle (giri), since he was enfeoffed in Korea by the “lord-murderer” Wu. This is the reason that even Kyōsai, who represents the “hard-line” wing stemming from Keisai, accepted Tang and Wu, saying that although they “happened to be born in bleak times,” yet since their revolutions “were expulsion campaigns undertaken purely for the public interest (dagong mingbai) of the realm for ten thousand generations, from the principle of having not a trace of private interest and having absolutely no choice in the matter,” thus “there is no doubt that they were the actions of a sage.” Only “in Japan, too, the actions of emperors such as Buretsu can be seen as hardly less tyrannical than those of Jie and Zhōu. Nevertheless, “when we see that” “the hundred officials endured” and in the end “the world moved in a propitious direction, it would seem that even a Tang or a Wu could not have improved the situation.... Even Jie and Zhōu would hardly have stayed on the throne for two hundred or three hundred years.” He concludes that, therefore, “if one reflects about [the difference between] us and them, one cannot but deplore the matter of overthrowing a ruler.” While the Keisai wing was afraid that the idea of righteous rebellion had become an excuse for the usurpation of power by rebellious vassals and bandit sons, those on the side of Naokata and Shōsai made a complete distinction between the actions of an “official of Heaven” and the power struggles or “squabbling of scoundrels” of later ages, afraid rather of bringing plurality into the Way by creating grades of superiority and inferiority among the sages. If in this way we only bring out the question of the interpretation of the classics, then the distance between them is at most a difference of weight in their points of emphasis. Nevertheless, both sides were keenly aware that the matter was deeply connected to the question of Japan’s L-orthodoxy at the highest level. This can be seen in Naokata’s statement:

53 Incidentally, the natural law-based theory of rebellion of the Monarchomachists in sixteenth-century Europe and the theory of right of resistance put forward by leaders of the Reformation also put a severe status limitation on who could exercise the right; it was absolutely not something that could be tolerated on the part of the people in general.

54 The Ten Wings, which include the treatise on the Tuan, were believed to have been written by Confucius.

55 Zatsuwa hikki 1, in Yamazaki Ansai gakuha, pp. 468–69.

56 The 25th emperor, who reigned from 498–506.

57 Zatsuwa hikki 4, leaf 22-7–23才.

58 The reason that neither wing discusses the abuse of power by the monarchy or in the name of the monarch in the proportion that they consider the problem of abuse of power by vassals is that the reciprocal nature of “the righteousness between lord and vassal” itself is originally unequal.
Because in our country in the succession of the imperial line we assert and exalt the absence of a change in the Mandate that involves a change in lineage, we raise up King Wen and Tai Bo and revere the concept of the Juyoucao, so that finally we do not look deeply into the meaning of the anti-dynastic rebellions of Tang and Wu.  

As can be seen in Kyōsai’s juxtaposition of Jie and Zhòu with Buretsu in the passage quoted above, it was this that distinguished them from those many Confucians since Hayashi Razan who had on the one hand readily affirmed the abdications of Yao and Shun and the revolutions of Tang and Wu while on the other hand they extolled the continuity of the Japanese imperial line.

The dilemma that lurks here is not the conflict between the duty of loyalty to a plurality of lords. And if this depended only on suspending all ethical judgments of right and wrong or good and evil regarding the virtue of the ruler and only extolling the “fact” of the continuity hitherto of the imperial throne (hōsa 寶祚) and the prospect that this would continue in the future, then there was no room for it to be constituted as a dilemma. It was precisely because of this point that Wakabayashi Kyōsai was impatient with the optimistic attitude of the “Shintoists,” resting as it did on historical “fact.” Immediately after a passage extolling the imperial house as “truly not of human kind,” because it had “inherited without interruption the blood line from Amaterasu Ōmikami in one line to the present,” Kyōsai wrote:

Those who are called Shintoists today say that due to the fact that our country is a divine land (shinkoku 神国) this must be so, but this is a foolish thing... How do we know that there will not be a Tang or Wu?... Even if we can say that, by good fortune, the blood line has not been cut off and there has been nothing like the abdication of Yao and Shun or the revolutions of Tang and Wu, it is ridiculous to speak so pretentiously about a royal house that today does not even have as much power (ikioi 勢) as the Honganji.

Therefore,

Of course [one should] look up to and revere the imperial line. However, the urgent need today is to be constantly in fear about when change will occur and what sort of change it will be. Even if there has been no change that goes against the edict of the Sun Goddess, there was still a Kiyomori 清盛, there was still a Yoritomo 賴朝, and one never knows when a Masakado 將門 or a Sumitomo 純友 will appear.  

 Already Tōburon, in Yamazaki Ansai gakuha, p. 223.
61 Taira no Masakado was a warrior of the mid-Heian period who killed his uncle, raised a rebellion, and set up a regime in Sarujima in Shimousa province in imitation of the imperial court, calling himself the “new emperor” and commanding both civil and military officials until he was defeated in 940. Fujiwara no Sumitomo became the leader of pirate gangs in the Inland Sea, pillaging official food supplies and lording over most of the Inland Sea region from his base in Iyo until he was overcome in 941.
This sense of crisis was felt not, of course, because people by nature love disorder and rebellion, but because the possibility of the appearance of an emperor whose lack of virtue or talent would give a suitable pretext to “rebellious ministers and bandit sons” was unavoidable as long as legitimacy is premised on the blood-line succession. The Confucian norms of rule by virtue and the contentment of the people were already indelibly imprinted upon Kyōsai’s spirit, and for the maintenance of the “eternal continuation coeal with Heaven and Earth,” he could only keep sounding the warning bell almost like a man possessed. This can also be seen as the prototype of one kind of “theory of the perpetual crisis of the national polity” that characterized the radical ultranationalists of modern Japan.

Naokata, who saw the concept of legitimacy based on the Mandate of Heaven as a universal principle, pursued with the same thoroughness his determination to trace the case of Japan back to its starting point in the divine edict (shinchoku 神敕) of Amaterasu. Instead of guaranteeing endless prosperity to her descendants, Amaterasu should have sent down a divine edict of revolution based on virtuous rule!

If the oracle (takusen 託宣) of the Sun Goddess said “I will protect my descendants for five million years,” it would not be a good thing. If it said “If among my descendents there is one who commits unrighteous acts, I will kick him to death,” that would be a good thing. This fits perfectly together, like the two opposite sides of a tally, with the later logic of Motoori Norinaga, which, rejecting all normative value judgments as the “Sinitic mind” (karagokoro), saw the tradition of the imperial land (sumera mikuni 皇御國) that was superior to all other countries as consisting in the fact that it had been presided over by the successive generations of temmō 天皇 just as in the age of the gods “whether [they were] good or evil.” These two complementary logics together form the political image of Japan. Of course, in the actual history of thought, the two pure types of L-orthodoxy represented by Naokata and Norinaga appeared rarely. The Shinto wing or the Shinto-leaning wing of the Kimon school here also, though there is a difference of degree, was unable to avoid compromising with ideals derived from the “Sinitic mind,” and it is unnecessary to point out that the “subsequent” reconfiguration of political Shinto by Motoori’s National Learning school also embraced diverse ideas of foreign origin. Moreover, in the internal development of the Kimon school as a tradition of learning, the line of Naokata and Shōsai was extremely strong. As discussed earlier, it was this line that quickly regained its footing after the Meiji Restoration. Yet with regard to the

62 Before the descent of the grandson of Heaven (Ninigi no Mikoto), Amewakahiko was sent from the high plain of Heaven to pacify the country in the midst of the reed-plains. However, he failed to fulfill his mandate, and shot and killed the crying maiden peasant who was sent to call him to task. He died when the god Takami-musubi caused the arrow to shoot back toward him.
63 Ibid. 5, leaf 22∫.
64 Unzōroku, fifth edition, Setsuwa kikigaki, 56∫.
tenacious and consistent questioning of L-orthodoxy in Japan, the line from Inaba Mokusai to Okudaira Seichian, retreated, rather, from the “brilliance” of Naokata, and to that extent it decreased its distance from the Brnangen lineage. Even at Naokata’s stage, as he writes in Tōburon: “This is not something known by the Shintoists and the like. If one follows this line of reasoning persistently there is something that they find offensive.” Even under the bakuhan system, that is, there was a “high pressure area” surrounding this question even in the abstract discussions of Shinto. In addition, the thought of the Later Mito school (which along with the Hirata school of National Learning provided the ideological foundations for the sonnō jōi movement) was strongly colored with Confucianistic norms even if it cannot be said to be a “Confucian” school, and it supported the advocacy of the unity of Shinto and Confucianism. As introduced at the beginning of this essay, all of these circumstances gave plausibility to the explanation that derived the great chorus of bakumatsu imperial loyalism in its entirety from the Ansai school. However, the fact that Satō Naokata and Motoori Norinaga—who were “in accord” from opposite directions in the sense of their methodological thoroughness regarding L-orthodoxy—both ended up as isolated existences was the other side of the coin. Then, in the Imperial Constitution (especially the Imperial Declaration and rescripts)—born out of the domestic disorder of the Restoration and the popular rights movement of the 1880s—and in the “quintessence of the national polity” of the Imperial Rescript on Education, the two bases of legitimacy—“blood” and “sagely virtue”—were officially unified.

The greatest incident “since the founding of the nation” for the oracular legitimacy of the Japanese state was, needless to say, the conclusion of the Second World War by Japan’s unconditional acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration. The Imperial Council (gozen kaigi 御前會議) was split in two over the interpretation of the Potsdam Declaration, and, as is well known, the greatest point of controversy that delayed its acceptance was the matter of “the maintenance of the national polity.” The proposition that the future form of government of the Japanese nation would be entrusted to the free choice of the people was after all incompatible—not as a problem of actual result, but as a problem of the basis of legitimacy—with the principle (tattemae 建て前) that the imperial line’s presiding role over the power of rule was determined a priori and eternally by “sacred edict.” The tangle over the acceptance of the declaration was finally solved through the “sagely decision” of the Emperor. Subsequently, the coup d'état by those officers who questioned a “sagely decision” that accepted the Potsdam Declaration without assuring the protection of the national polity met the same tragic fate as the domains that resisted the imperial army in 1866 because they regarded the imperial command to attack the shogun Keiki as a secret plot by the Satsuma and Chōshū “traitors” supporting the child emperor, the same tragic fate as the series of insurrections against the Restoration government that culminated in the Satsuma Rebellion, the same tragic fate as the rebel soldiers or radical rightists who rose up to eliminate the “bakufu-like existences” who were blocking the “true” manifestation of the sagely will during the “Shōwa Restoration.” The judgment (meibun 名分) that there are “traitors on the side of the monarch” invokes from below the material standards of right and wrong, good and evil, and in that it involves arbitrarily inferring the will of one’s lord, it would seem that it cannot avoid colliding with the idea of obedience as the Way of the vassal put forward in
Zhu Xi's interpretation of the Juyoucao and exalted by Ansai as “the principle that the vassal or son does not speak of his lord’s or father’s wrongs.” However, for those who took part in this “sagely decision” as well, it is hard not to confront them with the question of whether their acquiescence was based on their assent to a fatal change in the oracular basis of legitimacy, or on a position of unquestioning compliance (shōshō hikkin 承詔必謹) that suspends value judgments regarding the content of the imperial decision and takes it as absolute simply because it is the imperial decision—in other words, whether it was based on the reason that “in Shinto it is said that the way of our country is not to discuss the rights or wrongs of the sovereign’s virtue, and this is something for which one should be deeply grateful.” It appears that this question, which barely floated up above the waves in the short, stormy period between the catastrophe of defeat and the enactment of the new constitution, again disappeared from sight along with the “normalization” of politics and the “growth” of the economy.

Incidentally, the imperial edict which announced the conclusion of the war to the people contains the phrase: “We wish to open up the great peace for ten thousand generations.” “Open up the great peace for ten thousand generations” is a phrase of Zhang Zai 張載 that appears in “The Essentials of Learning” chapter of the Neo-Confucian anthology Reflections on Things at Hand. It is said that when Asami Keisai got to this passage when lecturing on the anthology, he roused his voice and said to his disciples, “Even when I have finished lecturing on this text today, for all of you here this will still open up the great peace for the sake of ten thousand generations.”

Conclusion

In spite of the antiquity of the introduction of Confucianism to Japan, and in spite of the multiplicity of the streams of Cheng-Zhu learning in the early modern period, the first school that struggled to personally realize (tainin 體認) this school as a world-view in both its theoretical and practical dimensions was the Ansai school. And this was not only the Kimon school’s view of itself; even from the komonji 古文辭 school of Ogyū Sorai, its head-on opponent within the Confucian camp, there appeared the following generous evaluation:

[Hattori] Nankaku said: “As for the Song Confucian theory of exhaustive investigation of principle, how could it be easy to master its tenets? Though people today are not even able to understand the finer points in Zhu Xi’s Collected Commentaries on the Four Books, with an arrogant expression they call themselves the [representatives of] Song learning. This is so laughable. In this land is it only Yamazaki Ansai who has understood Zhu Xi’s meaning?”

Inaba Mokusai characterized “the learning of our school” very aptly using the word “impetus” (hazumi ハツミ):

65 Kyōsai Sensei zatsuwa hikki 4, leaf 23 ㊞.
66 Sentetsu sōdan 先哲叢談 6.

32
If the learning of our school loses its impetus it does not serve any function. It is sustained only by its impetus. The Hayashi family and the like, because of their scholarly achievements (waza), are able to make it as Confucians even if their learning is without impetus. But because those of our school do not care about scholarly achievements, we are only sustained by our impetus.\textsuperscript{67}

As the “severing of relations” of the Kimon school was contrasted elsewhere to the “trucking” of the Hayashi school, here also “impetus” (or “momentum”) is contrasted with the Hayashi family’s “achievements” or “works,” that is, to its talent character. “Impetus” was certainly also the motive power that caused the outstanding figures of the Kimon school each in his own way to “go to excess.” However, is it not the case that through this going to excess the Ansai school led the way, if unintentionally, in bringing out the various philosophical problems that arose in Japan when people devoted themselves wholeheartedly to the “Way of a foreign country”—or, strictly speaking, to a totalistic world-view that originated abroad? In this lay both the glory and the tragedy of the Ansai school.

\textsuperscript{67} Gakuwa, A, v. 5.