An Annotated Bibliography of Selected Japanese Scholarship on Tokugawa Neo-Confucianism, Part Three

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Shitahodo Yūkichi  下條勇吉.
"Seijin kenkyū: Nakae Tōju (ni)

Shitahodo examines Nakae Tōju's (1608-48) understanding of sagehood via a study of his moral theory. Tōju's views on sagehood blended ancient Confucian notions with Neo-Confucianism. Shitahodo notes that Tōju believed that every person could attain sagehood, which is the highest potential of the human mind, and the goal which every person should seek to realize. As for Neo-Confucian element, Tōju interpreted the sage's mystic vision of his genuine self at one with the universe in quasi-ancient Confucian terms: the mystic oneness with the universe consists of filial piety, luminous virtue, an innate moral consciousness embodying the golden mean and harmony, and the ability to act morally in an expeditious way, so as to be in accordance with the contingencies of one's temporal and spatial surroundings.

In Part Three, Shitahodo argues that Tōju never, not even in his final years, turned away from his belief in the universal absoluteness of the principle of illuminating moral virtue. Shitahodo's work stresses the unity of Tōju's thought, not its diversity. This recent study thus differs significantly from Bitō Masahide's 重要但已過時的 monograph, Nihon hōken shisō shi kenkyū 日本封建思想史研究 (Historical Studies of Japanese Feudal Thought, 1961), and with Yamashita Ryūji's 山下龍二's "Chūgoku shisō to Tōju" 中国思想と藤樹 (Tōju and Chinese Thought [see below]). Bitō and Yamashita analyze Tōju's intellectual development, dividing it into three periods: (1) Tōju's early faith in Zhu Xi's 朱熹 (1130-1200) Neo-Confucianism; (2) Tōju's break with the Zhu Xi school and his move towards the Wang Yangming 王陽明 (1472-1529) school as
interpreted by its later thinkers like Wang Longxi (1498-1583); and finally (3) Tōju's turn to a Buddhistic form of Wang Yangming's thought stressing religiosity over practicality. Shitahodo also focuses on Tōju's belief that the Xiaojing (Classic of Filial Piety) and the Yi jing (Book of Changes) were most essential, if one wished to comprehend the Way but could not read all thirteen of the Confucian classics.

Part Four explores Tōju's views of the Sishu (Four Books): (1) the Daxue (Great Learning); (2) the Lunyu (Analects of Confucius), (3) the Mengzi (Mencius), and (4) the Zhongyong (Doctrine of the Mean), which are the basic canon of the Neo-Confucian School of Zhu Xi (Shushigaku 朱子學). Shitahodo shows that Tōju studied all these texts, but especially the first two, until the day he died. He questions the completeness of Tōju's rejection of Zhu Xi's ideas. Shitahodo contends that Tōju's Neo-Confucianism was unique; he claims that equating it with Shushigaku or Yōmeigaku (the Neo-Confucian School of Wang Yangming) reveals a Sinocentric outlook which fails to grasp the distinct features of Tōju's ideas, and Shitahodo notes that Tōju never referred to himself as a follower of Wang Yangming. He thus opposes calling Tōju the founder of Yōmeigaku in Japan. Tōju called his philosophy shisei musoku fuji ikan no shingaku or "the learning of the mind which is absolutely true, inexhaustible, non-dualistic, and essentially integrated with the universe," or more simply, shingaku 心學 "the learning of the mind." In including the Four Books and Five Classics within its curriculum, Tōju's shingaku resembled Zhu Xi's Neo-Confucianism. In its understanding of the original nature of a human being within the parameters of the Neo-Confucian mystical ethic of forming one body with the universe, Tōju's shingaku also resembled Yōmeigaku. In its emphasis on the cultivation of the mind, Tōju's shingaku foreshadowed Ishida Baigan's 石田梅巖 (1685-1744) later religious philosophy also known as shingaku. But Tōju's shingaku, Shitahodo insists, should not be subsumed under any of those rubrics. He concludes that "Tōju was nothing more than one 'representative Japanese' who formulated his own philosophy in pursuing his own Way."

Sōmi claims that Ogyū Sorai's 萩生徂徕 (1666-1728) learning, compared to the ideas of other Confucians, possessed a higher degree of coherence and logical structure. Previous studies, including those of Maruyama Masao, have not taken sufficient notice of this structure, Sōmi claims. The central theme of Sorai's philosophy is to govern in a way which brings peace and security to the people. Crucial to this theme, Sōmi contends, is Sorai's view of human nature as a neutral mixture which is potentially good but also potentially evil. People realize their potential goodness when they are made to follow the Way--concretely understood by Sorai in terms of rites, music, and other ritualized forms of behavior---instituted by the early sage kings. By following the Way of the sages, people overcome their selfish and personal inclinations and realize their more impartial and publically oriented virtues.


Tachibana acknowledges that Sokō (1622-1685) generally called his teachings the "learning of the Confucian sages." However, he points out that on one occasion, Sokō, in his Yamaga gorui 山鹿語類 (Classified Conversations of Yamaga Sokō), did refer to his teachings as nichiyō no gaku 日用の學, or "learning for daily practicality." Sokō's teachings also essentially emphasized daily activities rather than esoteric and unusual practices. While noting that Sokō's emphasis on practicality was related to his critique of Zhu Xi's teachings as vacuous and useless, Tachibana contends that the theoretical circumstances that led Sokō to stress practicality pertained to Sokō's ideas on the remark in the Analects, "rest in your fate." As Sokō understood it, this meant that one should avoid vain, useless actions. Tachibana speculates that that remark was also relevant to samurai, and he observes that as a philosopher of the Way of the samurai, Sokō was attracted to teachings that emphasized daily practice.

Tada Akira 多田顕. "Ogyū Sorai no kogaku to jimu ron" 萩生徂徕の古学と時務論 (Ogyū Sorai's Ancient Learning and His Discussions of Current Administrative Problems). Bunka kagaku kiyō 文化科学研究 40
Tada explores Sorai's notion of seido, "administrative regulations," as the solution to the economic problems facing the bakufu in Sorai's final years. Because Tada spends considerable time introducing elementary topics such as the nature of Neo-Confucianism in China, the ideas of major Song Neo-Confucians, the important Tokugawa thinkers prior to Sorai, and the philosophical ideas of Sorai, his analysis of Sorai's economic advice to Tokugawa Yoshimune 徳川吉宗 (1684-1751; shōgun 1716-1745) is not very detailed.


The main thesis of Tahara's argument is that Sorai was the first Tokugawa thinker to consider the feelings and emotions of people as the key political "factors" to be manipulated and governed by rulers via rites and music. For Sorai, government involved nothing more than governing the minds and emotions of the people by instituting the Way of the ancient sages. Using rituals and ceremonies to control the minds of people was, in Sorai's view, the myōjutsu 妙術, or "mysterious method," of the early kings. Sorai thus theorized politically as an ideorōgu (ideologue) for the bakufu. Motoori Norinaga 本居宣長 (1730-1801) followed Sorai's learning in a negative way by denying virtually everything that Sorai affirmed. Norinaga saw human feelings and emotions as entities which were in themselves worthy of investigation and gratification. They were the psychological nuclei around which Norinaga formulated his, in Tahara's words, jiko no gaku 自己の学, or egocentric study, of the ancient Japanese classics. Norinaga never viewed human emotions as resources which rulers should manipulate. In terms of his socio-political outlook, Sorai defended the ruling interests. Norinaga, while acknowledging and affirming the legitimacy of the realities of the Tokugawa political order, identified himself more with the people, i.e., those being governed. Economically, Sorai's ideas antagonized the Tokugawa merchant and commercial estates. Diagonetically opposed to Sorai's stance, Norinaga's thinking was more cordial to those groups.
Tahara argues that Sorai did not xenophobically dismiss Zhu Xi's thought as just another misguided foreign philosophy. Nor did Sorai comprehend Zhu Xi's ideas as interpreted, or perhaps misinterpreted, by Japanese advocates of Zhu Xi's philosophy. Instead Sorai understood Zhu Xi as a purist would have, appropriately and without creating subjective or rhetorical straw men to facilitate polemical attacks. Unlike other Tokugawa scholars who often distorted or adapted Zhu Xi's learning in discussing it, Sorai, Tahara claims, rightly appreciated Zhu Xi's definitive stances on numerous central philosophical issues, quoting the pertinent passages in Zhu Xi's Commentaries on the Four Books as evidence. Yet Sorai criticized Zhu's teachings as belonging to "a school of Confucianism which appeared in later generations," one which indulged in okken, or "subjective speculation," in its rationalistic, naturalistic, and egalitarian accounts of the way of the sages, human nature, and heaven's will.

Tahara examines Sorai's early critiques of Ito Jinsai (1627-1705) in his Ken'en zuihitsu and Bendo and Benmei, as well as Sorai's later critiques of Jinsai in the Ken'en zuihitsu, Bendo, and Benmei. In both cases, Tahara links Sorai's attacks on Jinsai to Sorai's views on the thought of Zhu Xi at the time of those attacks. Tahara explains that Sorai's initial attacks on Jinsai, expressed in the Ken'en zuihitsu, faulted Jinsai for celebrating ki, or material force, while omitting consideration of kotowari, or principle, from his metaphysics. Later in the Bendo and Benmei, Sorai took Jinsai to task for articulating a merely subjective analysis of kotowari. Tahara claims that the apparent switch in Sorai's critical strategy toward Jinsai reflected not so much an about-face than a purification of lines of thought towards the etymological study of the ancient mean-
ings of philosophical terms on Sorai's part, which had been present from early on in his intellectual development. Tahara also notes how Sorai, in both the Bendō and Benmei, considered these two very different thinkers--Zhu Xi and Jinsai--as being essentially of a like kind and representing basically the same sort of mistakes: both Zhu and Jinsai were latter-day Confucians who seemingly failed to appreciate the historically contingent nature of the meanings of words. Thus, they read their own subjective opinions into ancient texts, even while claiming to explicate objectively the meanings of notions in those works.

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sai's mind than it was representative of Zhu's ideas. Thus, Tahara concludes, Jinsai's thought did not emerge from that of Zhu Xi. Tahara even goes so far as to speculate that perhaps a real Zhu Xi school never existed in Japan at all. Yet Tahara claims that despite their many minor differences the philosophies of Jinsai and Zhu Xi were, as Sorai later suggested, quite similar.

Tahara analyzes the structure of Sokō's thought in relation to that of Zhu Xi. While he detects continuing structural similarities between the two systems, Tahara suggests that Sokō's understanding of Zhu Xi's thought was characterized by misunderstandings, misinterpretations, or subjective opinions rather than an accurate grasp of Zhu's tenets as they were meant to be understood. Further, Zhu Xi's thought, in its eternal, universalistic, and unchanging aspects, did not find easy congruences within the then contemporary trends of Japanese thinking. For Zhu's philosophy to be adapted to the Japanese mind it had to be refashioned in more particularistic, temporal, and mundane ways. Sokō, in Tahara's opinion, did precisely this. Among the more controversial claims Tahara makes is that Sokō's thought progressed from Buddhist/Daoist thinking directly to the formation of his ancient Confucian philosophy. The implication is that contrary to Sokō's account of his intellectual development, he never really adhered to Zhu Xi's philosophy as such. Tahara believes that this is clear from Sokō's criticisms of Zhu Xi, where Sokō either misunderstood or misinterpreted Zhu's thought. Had Sokō truly been, at one time, a serious believer in Zhu Xi, then he could have presented a more sophisticated and insightful rebuttal of Zhu's ideas than the one he actually offered. Tahara's essay concludes with an examination of Zhu Xi and Sokō as shizen hō shisōka 自然法思想家, or "natural law philosophers." Tahara argues that Sokō was much less of a natural law theorist than Zhu Xi.
Examining the formation and structure of Sokō's thought, Tahara first discusses Sokō's critiques of the Zhu Xi school. He notes that while Sokō praised Zhu Xi on occasion, in reacting against the apparent quietism and passivity implicit in Zhou Dunyi's 周敦頤 (1017-73) notion of mukyoku nishite taikyoku (無極而太極, "the ultimate of non-being and the great ultimate"), Sokō made a decisive and systematic break with Song Neo-Confucianism. Tahara sees this reaction against quietism as the monumental philosophical conversion in Sokō's life. Tahara analyzes Sokō's thought from its outer structure to its inner, noting how the outer structure of Sokō's thought was, like Zhu Xi's, moralistic: while Zhu's monism was based on kotowari, Sokō's was founded on a very practical understanding of the notion of kakubutsu (柵物, "the investigation of things"). Tahara's analysis of the inner structure of Sokō's thought finds similarities between Sokō and Sorai concerning the nature of the sage's creation of the rites. Tahara also exposes aspects of Sokō's philosophy based on misunderstandings or misinterpretations of Zhu Xi's thought. But, rather than denying that Sokō ever really understood Zhu Xi, Tahara alters his view, admitting that the ties between them are complex. For example, Tahara suggests that Sokō's notion of sincerity corresponds somewhat to Zhu Xi's notion of principle. Furthermore, Tahara relates that Sokō apparently believed that Zhu Xi also opposed Zhou Dunyi's notion of mukyoku nishite taikyoku. Throughout the study Tahara stresses Sokō's emphasis on a more active cosmology and a more practically oriented approach to the extension of knowledge. In a peculiar closing remark, Tahara notes, however, that within the Tokugawa world, Sokō was truly famous as a military philosopher, but that as a Confucian scholar he was virtually unknown. Thus, Tahara discounts the possibility that elements of Sokō's thought which seem to foreshadow later ideas, such as those of Sorai, might actually have influenced them.
Takagami sketches the history of Confucianism in Japan, showing how Japanese Confucian thought, though derived from Chinese texts and introduced to Japan by Koreans, differed from both the Chinese or Korean models. Takagami sees three major periods within the history of Japanese Confucianism: (1) from its introduction until the beginning of the Tokugawa, (2) the Tokugawa period, and (3) the 19th and 20th centuries.

The first edition of Takahashi's *Kangakusha denki shūsei* (Collected Biographies of Japanese Scholars of Chinese Studies) was the precursor of Ogawa Kando's *Kangakusha denki oyobi chojutsu shūran* (Collected Biographies and Bibliographies of Japan's Confucian Scholars, 1935). Takahashi provides biographical details about mostly Tokugawa Neo-Confucians, without concentrating on bibliographies as does Ogawa's study. Takahashi's work was in turn patterned after Hara Nensai's *Sentetsu sōdan* (Biographies of Leading Philosophers) and later supplements to it. Like *Sentetsu sōdan*, Takahashi's work opens with a biography of Fujiwara Seika (1561-1619) and ends with biographies of late-Tokugawa and early-Meiji Neo-Confucians. In all, biographical sketches of 381 Neo-Confucian scholars are presented, arranged in a vaguely historical order.

Takahashi discusses the close relationship between the Shintō thought of Hayashi Razan (1583-1657) and that of the medieval Yoshida school of Shintō, also known as Yuititsu Shintō. She examines Razan's Shintō-Confucian thought as found in his *Shintō denju* (Initiation into Shintō), *Shintō hidden setchū zokkai* (Exegesis of Esoteric Shintō Eclecticism), and *Razan sensei bunshū* (Collected Works).
of Razan). She notes how Razan's thinking was influenced by Kanetomo's Shintō tai'i (The Great Meaning of Shintō) in regard to his notion of kami and the relationship between kami and humanity. Takahashi's purpose is not to reduce Razan's ideas to those of the Yoshida school, but instead to reveal clearly which Shintō ideas were specifically those of Razan. Takahashi concludes that Razan's Shintō formulations, at a superficial level, were not very different from those of the Yoshida school: the real difference between them was in the world, and the worldview, in which they were couched. The Yoshida school devised its eclectic version of Shintō-Neo-Confucianism in order to interpret religious entities more naturalistically. Human beings lived in a world embraced by nature, heaven, and earth. For Razan, the ideas of the Yoshida school served only to insure the universal appropriateness of the Tokugawa social order as it accorded with the laws of the natural universe. Takahashi contends that Razan's Shintō-Neo-Confucian theories were formulated for the sake of their ideological value.


Takahashi compares Sorai's views on education with those of Zhu Xi and Itō Jinsai, the two thinkers whom Sorai most criticized. In contrast to them Sorai held that michi, or the Way, was created by human beings. The word michi had no inherent meaning: nominalistically, Sorai believed that it was a general concept which acquired its semantic value as a result of popular agreement. He asserted that the sages, ancients who devised the fundamentals of civilization, were simply men, not gods. Confucius, since he only transmitted and did not create, was not strictly speaking a sage, even though Sorai was reluctant to proclaim this in explicit, unequivocal terms. Humaneness, the central virtue that Confucius taught, meant bringing peace and security to the world. It was not a virtue that all could practice; only rulers had the power to realize humaneness. Since Sorai provided for no absolute, transcendental ethical formula, critics have charged him with being a pragmatist, a positivist, a utilitarian, or worse, with simply debasing morality and degrading education. And since several of Sorai's ideas were
similar to those in the *Xunzi*. Sorai was criticized for promoting ideas which, in the past, led to the excesses of Han Fei Zi's *Han Fei zi* (d. 233) Legalism. Takahashi argues, more sympathetically, that Sorai's ideas actually returned to the empirical positivism of early Confucianism, prior to its more naturalistic formulations by Mencius and other post-Confucius Confucians. Takahashi recognizes weaknesses within Sorai's views, such as his deemphasis on moral training. Yet Takahashi sees several positive tendencies as well, ones which in many respects foreshadow many aspects that can be found in contemporary education. These include Sorai's call for individualized instruction tailored to the skills and abilities of the student, instruction in technical and vocational skills useful to society, and mechanical and/or functional learning.


Takahashi defines T'oegye's place in the history of Korean Confucianism, placing him at the mid-point of a tripartite division. Takahashi pairs T'oegye with Yi Yulgok 李東煥 (1536-84), describing them as the two peaks, albeit opposing ones, of the middle period of Korean Confucianism. Anticipating Abe Yoshio's 阿部吉雄 dichotomy, as developed in his *Nihon Shushi-gaku to Chōsen* 日本朱子學と朝鮮 (Korea and the Development of the Japanese School of Zhu Xi), Takahashi describes T'oegye as the leading proponent of the Korean Neo-Confucian school of principle and Yulgok as that of the school of material force. However, Takahashi's discussion mostly centers on T'oegye's *Sŏnghak sipto* 聖學十圖 (Ten Diagrams of the Sages' Learning), supposedly T'oegye's greatest philosophical work.

In part two, Takahashi examines the correspondence between T'oegye and Ki Kobong's 奇高峰 (1527-72) which encapsulated the famous "four-seven" debate. Unlike Abe's studies, Takahashi make no sustained attempt to relate T'oegye's views on Zhu Xi to the rise of Japanese Neo-Confucianism. An earlier study by Takahashi on these topics is "Richō Jugaku shi ni okeru shuriha shukiha no hattatsu" 李朝儒學史における主理派主気派の 発達 (The Schools of Principle and Material Force in Yi Dynasty Neo-Confucianism). *Chōsen Shina bunka no kenkyū* 朝鮮文明文化 の研究 (Tokyo, 1929).

Takashima explains how the notion of seisei, or production and reproduction, is rooted in the ancient religio-philosophical ideas of Japan as well as in its early modern history. In both the Kojiki 古事記 (Records of Ancient Matters) and the Nihon shoki 日本書紀 (Chronicles of Ancient Japan), compiled in the early 8th century, there are accounts of a deity, or kami, called Musubi 産 whose task was the constant creation and recreation of all that was and will be. Later, National Learning scholars, advancing Motoori Norinaga's (1730-1801) understanding of the deity Musubi, attributed the work of seisei to that kami. For Jinsai, however, seisei referred to the creative activities of heaven and earth: the way of heaven and earth consisted of ceaseless production and reproduction. Jinsai believed that within the scheme of historical creation the seisei of heaven and earth raised humanity to self-consciousness between the days of Yao 禹 and Shun 舜, two legendary figures of ancient Chinese myths, and the time of Confucius. Takashima's study omits, however, any consideration of the extensive Neo-Confucian origins and interpretations of seisei (C., shengsheng).


Tamakake argues that conventional comparisons of Tōju's thought to that of Wang Yangming 王陽明 (1472-1529) are far too restrictive. He sees elements of Buddhist, Daoist, and Shintō thought in Tōju. Tamakake feels that Tōju's ideas must be grasped holistically rather than evaluated relative to some Chinese ideal. Tamakake explores the relationships in Tōju's thought between heaven, spirits, and man, as well as those between the individual and society, examining so-called "middle period" of Tōju's life. Tōju in that period envisioned a universe where the world of spirits and that of humanity overlapped. Heaven and spirits dwelt within the natural and human world, even though the supreme director of the universe existed
outside of it. Tamakake also compares Tōju's thinking in his middle period with that of Hayashi Razan.

Continuing the line of investigation initiated in his previous study of Tōju's thought, Tamakake lays bare the ways in which Kumazawa Banzan (1619-91) inherited Tōju's ideas from his "middle period" (ca. 1638-45). The latter include: (1) reverence of kōjōtei (C., huangshangdi, the august high lord), and the taiitsujin (C., taiyishen, the great god of creation), (2) dichotomies between the mind of the sage Confucius and its traces which appear in the ancient Chinese classics, and (3) recognition of ken (i.e., acting freely in accordance with the circumstances of time, place, and rank--all inherent in the true Way. Tamakake claims that Banzan's egalitarian reverence of ghosts and spirits, and his rejection of Cheng-Zhu naturalistic interpretations of ghosts and spirits, derived from Tōju's universalistic but fundamentalistic religious thinking. Also Banzan continued Tōju's thinking by distinguishing between the true Way, which is unchanging, from "traces" or the ever changing empirical phenomena of the world. Banzan differs from Tōju in details, but the logic of his dichotomy between the true Way and its traces harks back to Tōju's distinction between the mind and its traces. Finally, somewhat like Tōju, Banzan describes acting in accordance with the true Way as acting freely in accordance with specific factors of time, place, and rank. Tamakake thus concludes that Banzan's thinking is closest to Tōju's "middle period" philosophy.


Tomoeda analyzes Jinsai's early pro-Zhu Xi, Neo-Confucian writings, noting how they seem to be mere repetitions of Zhu's
thought. But, Tomoeda contends, a closer examination reveals certain tendencies in these early writings which foreshadow Jinsai's later vitalistic, anti-Zhu Xi philosophy of ancient meanings. Tomoeda notes that the Keisai no ki (Record of Abiding in Seriousness), written when Jinsai was only 27, largely accepted Zhu Xi's thinking on uyamai (C., jing, "seriousness"). But Tomoeda also insists that Jinsai virtually ignored the other half of Zhu's system, the practice of kyōri (C., qiongli; "the exhaustive investigation of principle"). In his Taikyoku ron (Essay on the Great Ultimate), Jinsai was faithful to Zhu Xi's notion of the great ultimate, but he stressed its activity more than its quiescence, thus foreshadowing his later vitalistic metaphysics. In Seizen no ron (Essay on the Goodness of Human Nature), Jinsai's ideas on the innate goodness of human nature recapitulate those of Zhu. However, in adding that the goodness of human nature pervades the universe, filling all within heaven and earth, Jinsai innovated, inserting his own ideas alongside those of Zhu Xi. In his Shingaku genron (A First Essay on the Learning of the Mind), Jinsai accepted Zhu Xi's distinction between the mind of the Way and the mind of man, and Zhu's ideas on the state of the mind after the emergence of emotions. But Jinsai demonstrated relatively little interest in the state of mind prior to the rise of emotions. Tomoeda thus suggests that Jinsai's later philosophy derived from one aspect of Zhu Xi's thought, the active, material aspect, as opposed to the quiescent, ideal aspect.

This essay concludes Tomoeda's study of Jinsai's early thought. Here Tomoeda emphasizes the process by which Jinsai moved away from Zhu Xi's ideas to formulate his own. Tomoeda shows, for example, that Jinsai's ideas on humaneness, expressed in Jin no setsu (Explaining Humaneness), derived partly from Zhu's Renshuo (Explaining Humaneness), insofar as Jinsai expanded vitalistic and life-affirming ideas found in Zhu's account of
humaneness as the principle of love. Jinsai ignored Zhu's notion of principle by contending that humaneness was identical with love. Tomoeda then explains how Jinsai's notion of uyamai (sincerity) emerged as he rejected Zhu's belief in the practice of "holding onto seriousness." Similarly, Jinsai's notion of seisei (production and reproduction), emerged from Zhu's writings on taiji (J., taikyoku; the great ultimate), a notion Jinsai otherwise rejected. Thus, Tomoeda contends that the major elements of Jinsai's early thought, often elaborations of isolated elements in Zhu's philosophy reworked along vitalistic lines, had emerged by Jinsai's 33rd year. However, Tomoeda suggests that Jinsai's ethical thought, in emphasizing the gorin (C., wulun, or "the five relationships," ) derived directly from that of Zhu Xi without substantive alteration.

Tomoeda praises Abe's detailed study of the transmission of Chinese Zhu Xi Neo-Confucianism to Japan via Korea. He claims that Nihon Shushigaku to Chosen marks the beginning of a new era in Japanese research on Neo-Confucianism.

The first section of Abe's book traces Fujiwara Seika's conversion to Neo-Confucianism at age 30, following his meeting with a Korean diplomat. Later Seika purchased a library of Korean books brought to Japan after Hideyoshi's unsuccessful attempts to conquer Korea. Abe also details the relationship between Kang Hang 姜沆 (1567-1618) and Seika, noting how Sino-Japanese versions of the Four Books and the Five Classics emerged from it. The Yanping dawen 延平答問 (Dialogues with Yanping), Abe claims, finally became Seika's most valued Neo-Confucian text via a Korean edition. Edited by Zhu Xi, Yanping dawen related Li Yanping's 李延平 (1093-1163) teachings to the teenage Zhu Xi on saluo 洒落 (J., sharaku), or "spontaneous action." Just as Li Yanping's teachings helped to ween Zhu Xi from Buddhism, so too did Seika perceive them as a help in his departure from the same. The first section also discusses the impact of Korean editions of mostly Chinese Neo-Confucian texts on Hayashi Razan and his rejection of Buddhism. Razan was especially influenced by Luo Qinshun's 羅欽順 (1465-1547) Kunzhiji 四知記 (Record of Knowledge Painfully Acquired), which emphasized qi 氣 (mater-
ial force) over li 理 (principle). Wang Yangming's position on li and qi, ironically, became one of Razan's favorites.

The second section discusses Yamazaki Ansai's strictly Zhu Xi Neo-Confucianism and Yi T'oegye. Abe suggests that while Razan had little use for T'oegye's writings, Ansai revered them as second only to those of Zhu Xi. Abe shows how Ansai's writings and his views repeat much that is found in T'oegye's works.

Abe traces the impact of Yi T'oegye's ideas within the history of Japanese Zhu Xi Neo-Confucianism in the third section. The fourth section recapitulates a theme running throughout most of Abe's writings: that in Ming China, Yi-dynasty Korea, and Tokugawa Japan, Zhu Xi Neo-Confucianism divided into two lineages, one stressing principle and the other emphasizing material force.

Tomoeda notes that Abe's studies may lead Korean scholars to rethink their appraisals of T'oegye and other Yi-dynasty Neo-Confucians who influenced Japanese understandings of Chinese philosophical doctrines.


Tsuboi presents a letter written by Sorai to his disciple, Yamagata Shūnan 山縣周南 (1687-1752), which Tsuboi found among some papers which belonged to Yamagata's disciples. Yamagata studied under Sorai from 1705-08. In 1708, he returned to his home in Nagato to serve the Hagi house. Sorai's letter addresses Yamagata's query regarding a possible friendship with Itō Tōgai, the son of Itō Jinsai. Sorai offered a bitter critique of Tōgai, stating that Tōgai did nothing but argue and debate. Sorai's feelings towards the late Itō Jinsai were milder. Significant as proof of the persisting enmity between Sorai and the Jinsai school, this letter also tells much about Sorai's personality.


Tsuji depicts the pressing socio-economic problems, especially those in Edo, confronting the Tokugawa shogunate in Sorai's day. These included rising samurai debt, rampant urban growth, urban overpopulation (especially in Edo), escalating merchant wealth, peasant impoverishment, agrarian riots, incompetent officials, and contradictory fiscal policies. These emerged as byproducts of Tokugawa policies, but bakufu administrators, being fastidious followers of precedents, rarely discerned their roots. Sorai perceptively recognized that most of the problems facing the bakufu were consequences of certain seido, or legal regulations that required samurai, merchants, and peasants to behave in certain ways. Sorai singled out two prominent seido as the roots of many problems: (1) heinō bunri, or the segregation of samurai within castle towns, away from the rural population, and (2) sankin kōtai, or the requirement that daimyos live alternately in Edo and in their domains. Tsuji notes that from time of the fifth shōgun Tsunayoshi (1646-1709), politics and Neo-Confucianism became intimately connected. Even though shōgun Yoshimune (1677-1751) did not personally enjoy Neo-Confucian lectures as Tsunayoshi had, Neo-Confucians were increasingly consulted in formulating bakufu policy from his time on. Tsuji devotes more attention to the problems of Sorai's day than to Sorai's role in solving them. Only in the final pages of the essay does he note that in the third lunar month of 1722 (Kyōhō 7), Yoshimune requested, through an intermediary, that Sorai undertake a secret assignment. Tsuji hints that Sorai's Seidan was probably written about this time. He speculates that it reveals Sorai's suggestions regarding social, economic, and political reform. Though Sorai died within five years, Tsuji notes that several of Sorai's disciples did become bakufu officials in Yoshimune's regime.


Tsuji analyzes Ekken's Yamato honzō, the culmination of Ekken's
lifelong research on botanical subjects, in the context of Ekken's understanding of Neo-Confucianism. Tsuji shows that Ekken's study of botany was influenced by his core belief in Zhu Xi's philosophy, especially its ideals of (1) zhizhi 知之 (extending knowledge), (2) gewu (the investigation of things), and (3) giongli (exhaustively investigating principles). For Zhu Xi these ideals applied primarily to moral and academic issues rather than the world of natural, empirical, scientific phenomena. However, their transference was easily made by later Neo-Confucians who were predisposed to proto-scientific investigation. Ekken was one such scholar. Tsuji notes how Ekken's contemporary, Ito Jinsai, who rejected the notion of principle as a "dead word," never produced scientific studies as did Ekken. Tsuji, while denying that there was a direct line from Neo-Confucianism to modern science, still reasons that if, in some sense, Western science was Christian, then Ekken's butsuri no gaku 物理の学, or his "study of the principles of things," was a form of Neo-Confucian science.


Tsujimoto focuses on Sorai's understanding of the radical heterogeneity of human nature. On this issue Sorai differed from most Neo-Confucians who asserted that human nature was innately good. Along with Sorai's pluralistic understanding of human nature, Tsujimoto emphasizes Sorai's concern for the full development of the talents and capabilities that are unique to each individual. Despite this seemingly modernistic stance, Tsujimoto admits that Sorai's views did not allow individuals any autonomous rights to cultivate their own natures as they saw fit. Instead, Sorai believed that the development of human talents had to be based on the needs of the polity. Thus the state, not the individual, decides what talents, capabilities, and virtues will be fostered. For Sorai, individuals were viewed functionally, as specialized parts of a whole; they were not seen as autonomous entities to be treated as ends-in-themselves.

Wajima Yoshio 和島芳男. Nihon Sōgaku shi no kenkyū 日本宋学史の研究 (Historical Studies of Song Neo-Confucianism in Japan).
This is a revised edition of Wajima's history of Japanese Neo-Confucianism through the Tokugawa period which was first published in 1962. Wajima's subject matter is Sogaku 宋学, or "Song philosophy," rather than simply Shushigaku, or Zhu Xi's philosophy. His work is unique in that most books on Neo-Confucianism in Japan focus on one particular thinker, as with Imanaka Kanshi's 今中寛司 Sorai gaku no kisoteki kenkyū 相 لدى 学の基礎的 研究 (Basic Research on Sorai's Thought); or on one aspect of Neo-Confucianism, as in Bitō Masahide's Nihon hōken shisō shi no kenkyū 日本 保 等 思 想 史 の 研 究 (Research on Early Modern Practical Learning).

Wajima's book has two parts: the first one presents the 1962 text; the second one includes eight essays that Wajima has published since then, revising his views on various topics. Part one includes three sections: the first traces Confucian studies in ancient Japan. Even in remote antiquity, Confucianism was, Wajima explains, esteemed at the highest levels of political power. Indeed the posthumous names of many Japanese emperors came from the ethical vocabulary of Han- and Tang-dynasty Confucian literature. Confucianism, however, was the preserve of the imperial court. Scholar specialists assisted emperors and aristocrats in reading selections from important texts. Neo-Confucian books of the Song dynasty entered Japan in the late Heian period, but Japanese appreciation for the Confucian philosophical tradition was so rudimentary that their significance was largely overlooked.

Wajima's analyses hinge on his characterization of Song Neo-Confucianism. He uses the term "Song learning" (or Song philosophy) in its narrowest sense to mean Neo-Confucianism as it developed by the end of the Song, but no further! Thus, he claims that, in China, Song Neo-Confucianism was not an orthodox philosophy: rather it was deemed a heterodoxy, a form of weixue 偏学 (false learning), twice proscribed by imperial decree. Song Neo-Confucians nevertheless debated regularly and freely among themselves. They also criticized the emperor for misrule. For Wajima this free debate and articulate criticism, rather than particular doctrines or theories, were the essence of Sōgaku.
In the second section Wajima examines the Japanese acceptance of Song learning during the medieval era from the Kamakura period through the Sengoku era. As formulated in Song China, Neo-Confucianism vehemently opposed Buddhism. Yet Chinese Neo-Confucian scholars who insisted on orthodoxy were not responsible for exporting Song learning to Japan; ironically, Japanese Rinzai monks who were predisposed to syncretic philosophies first introduced Song learning as one part of Rinzai teachings. Japanese Zen temples promoted Song studies, but only as hōben 方便, or expedient means for promoting Zen. Though still closely related to the imperial court, Song learning in late-medieval Japan was appropriated by some daimyos of the Sengoku era who saw political or strategic value in it. Thus, Song learning in Japan gained a samurai flavor.

The third section analyzes the appropriation of Song learning in the Tokugawa. Wajima refrains from cliches about Ieyasu and Song Neo-Confucianism. He argues that Ieyasu's acceptance of Song learning had nothing to do with that school's promotion of free debate and criticism. What Ieyasu saw in Song learning was a way of inculcating the rudiments of ethics in a samurai society which he meant to rule over as peacefully as possible. Ieyasu hired Hayashi Razan as a scholar of broad capabilities, but not as a Neo-Confucian propagandist. Razan's draft of the Buke shohatto 武家諸法度 (Laws for Samurai Houses) reflects virtually nothing from Song learning. And Razan's Shinobugaoka 月岡 Academy began as a private school where Razan could study and teach independently; it was not originally the official bakufu center for intellectual indoctrination. Wajima observes that though later generations of Razan's family did become hereditary scholar-servants of the bakufu, and though the Hayashi academy did evolve into a bakufu-controlled school, those were later developments. Rather than support the bakufu, Razan initiated histories like the Honchō tsugan 本朝通鑑 (Comprehensive Mirror for the Japanese Imperial Court), to refashion Song Neo-Confucianism and its frankly critical expression into a school of historical scholars which could criticize misdeeds and praise virtue via historical judgment.

Wajima claims that the fifth shōgun, Tsunayoshi, partly out of his fondness for Confucian learning, made the Hayashi College a school of token lecturers for the bakufu. Tsunayoshi thus inadvertently helped to cripple the Hayashi school. The eighth
shōgun, Yoshimune, though intent upon reform, could not envision a positive role for Song learning in his attempt at reviving Tokugawa feudalism. Matsudaira Sadanobu 松平定信 (1758-1829), despite his Kansei 寛政 (1789-1801) decree that Song studies were the bakufu-ordained orthodoxy, had no real faith in Song learning.

Wajima explains that Tokugawa samurai society allowed as little personal freedom as possible; thus, it gave advocates of Song philosophy no real path for development. It was perhaps inevitable that Song learning would stagnate in Japan. Wajima claims that with the Kansei Reforms, when Song learning was transformed into a more Japanese philosophy, i.e., one forbidding unorthodox debate and criticism, then Song learning in its original, Chinese sense entered its final stage of decay in Japan. Wajima makes this assertion because, in his view, being Japanese entails forbidding debate and criticism for the sake of harmony.

Wajima's book concludes with two appended sets of essays in which he revises some of his earlier views. The first, on medieval Neo-Confucianism, includes the following essays:

(1) "Chūsei Sōgaku shi no tenbō” 中世宋学史の展望 (The Historical Development of Song Learning in Medieval Japan). Orig. in Nihon rekishi 日本歴史 262 (March 1970). Wajima relates how, from the metropolitan Rinzai temples promoting eclectic Zen-Neo-Confucian studies, various regional schools of Song learning appeared in diverse hinterland spots of Japan during the medieval period. These hinterland schools, in part, assimilated the values and beliefs of their surroundings. The Ashikaga gakkō 足利学校, for example, specialized in studies of the Book of Changes 易經 (Yijing) for its samurai patrons.


(3) "Gidō Shūshin to Kiyowara Ryōken: Kiyowara ke seirişu no keiki" 義堂周信と清原良覧: 清原家成立の契機 (Gidō Shūshin and Kiyowara Ryōken: The Kiyowara Family's Establishment [as Japanese Confucian Scholars]). Ōtemae joshi daigaku ronshū 大手前女子大学 論集 11
(November 1977). Wajima sees the Rinzai monk, Gidō shūshin (1325-88), as the source of Kiyowara Ryōken's (1348?-1432) understanding of key Song texts, and thus of the rise of the Kiyowara family as interpreters of Confucian texts.

The second set of essays, listed below, treats issues related to early-modern Confucianism.

(1) "Kinsei shoki Jugaku shi ni okeru nisan no mondai" 近世初期 儒学史におけるニ先の問題 (Some Historical Problems in the First Period of Early-Modern Neo-Confucianism). Ōtemae joshi daigaku ronshū 7 (November 1973). Wajima examines the historical records on Hayashi Razan's public lectures on Confucian texts held between 1600 and 1603. These prompted complaints from the Kiyowara family, which had had hereditary rights over Confucian learning. Tokugawa Ieyasu allegedly settled this dispute in favor of Razan. Wajima suspects that Razan's descendants, however, fabricated the story.

(2) "Kanbun igaku no kin, sono Hayashi mon kōryū to no kankei" 安文異学の禁との林門興隆との関係 (The Kanbun Prohibition of Heterodoxies: Its Relationship to the Rise of the Hayashi School). Ōtemae joshi daigaku ronshū 8 (November 1974). Wajima argues that Hoshina Masayuki's 保科正之 (1609-72) persecution of Yamaga Sokō and Kumazawa Banzan secured the Hayashi family and its privileged position as bakufu scholars.

(3) "Hoshina seiken to Hayashi ke no gakumon" 保科正之と林家の学門 (The Regency of Hoshina Masayuki and the Hayashi School). Ōtemae joshi daigaku ronshū 9 (November 1975). Wajima again argues that Hoshina Masayuki's opposition to the learning of Sokō and Banzan helped to stabilize the status of the Hayashi family, whom Masayuki respected as bakufu scholars, even though his own teacher was Yamazaki Ansai.

(4) "Yanagisawa keien ni tsuite" 柳沢経筵について (On the Yanagisawa Lecture Mat). Ōtemae joshi daigaku ronshū 12 (November 1978). Wajima portrays the love of learning of the fifth shōgun, Tokugawa Tsunayoshi, as having actually been a love of giving and listening to lectures on learning. As these were frequently held at the mansion of Yanagisawa Yoshiyasu 柳沢吉保 (1658-1714), that place came to be known as the Yanagisawa lecture mat.
(5) "Tokugawa Yoshinao no kōgaku to Hayashi mon no hatten" (Tokugawa Yoshinao's Love of Scholarship and the Emergence of the Hayashi School). Otemae joshi daigaku ronshū 13 (November 1979). This essay discusses the contributions of Tokugawa Yoshinao (1600-50) to the Senseiden 先聖殿, or the Sage's Hall, at Razan's Shinobugaoka Academy in Edo. While significant, Wajima claims that it was only with Tsunayoshi's reign that the Hayashi family became the official hereditary bakufu scholars of Neo-Confucianism.

Wajima also includes a 17-page index of proper nouns, personal names, and book titles.


In discussing Sorai's view of Confucius, Wakamizu uses Sorai's Rongo chō (Commentary on the Analects of Confucius) as a key source. He does not rely exclusively on Sorai's Bendo and Benmei, because (1) the the Analects of Confucius includes the best primary source material on Confucius, along with Sorai's comments on Confucius' teaching, and, (2) in the Rongo chō Sorai expresses himself more fully than in the Bendo and Benmei. The Rongo chō, for example, states that the way of Confucius is identical with the way of the ancient sages. Also Sorai there declares that Confucius was a sage, even though he never held political power. As an educator, Confucius realized that human nature was not the same for all: different people must be taught via different means, depending on their particular natures. Contrary to the Neo-Confucian claim, Confucius never said that all people can become sages through study. In these and other respects, Sorai's own ideas on education and sagehood merge with his interpretation of Confucius. Sorai viewed Confucius as a man with feelings and passions, not as the desireless sage of Neo-Confucian portraits. More than harping on sagacity, Sorai depicts Confucius as a kind-hearted, morally passionate gentleman who, when teaching individuals, emphasized rites, music, poetry, and prose as the way to complete those particular virtues proximate to their individual natures.
In his "Preface," Wang states that he had too little time to do sufficient research in primary source material; thus, he had to rely on secondary studies more than he would have wished to if circumstances had been otherwise. In his "Postscript," he relates that he wrote his study under the direction of Minamoto Ryōen at Tōhoku University. Not surprisingly, Wang quotes Minamoto regularly. Among the other secondary sources upon which Wang relies are most of the more important ones in this bibliography. Wang relates that few Chinese scholars have specialized in Japanese thought or history. Nevertheless, references to the following Chinese scholarship on Japanese Neo-Confucianism do appear (titles are given in Japanese, though many were clearly written in Chinese):


2. **(2) Nihon no kogaku oyobi Yōmei gaku 明学 (The Ancient Learning and Wang Yangming Schools in Japan). Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1962.**


The real value of Wang's study resides in its breadth: few Japanese scholars have attempted as comprehensive and detailed a study of Confucianism in Japan, from earliest times through the post-Meiji modernization process. But ultimately Wang's ideas...
seem to be echoing too much of Minamoto's jitsugaku 実学 theses, namely that Japanese accepted those practical, empirical, and positivistic aspects of Confucianism, but rejected the abstract, metaphysical elements. Thus while Confucianism spread throughout East Asia, only in Japan did it entail a dramatic modernization process. Its ability to play that role in Japan, Wang suggests, was not due to its inherent applicability to science, technology, mathematics, government, or economics, but rather because Japanese had sculpted it down to its most pragmatic and realistic nucleus, one from which Confucianism was able to assist in facing the challenges of the West and of modernization.


Watanabe observes that most early-modern Neo-Confucians believed that history was political history, i.e., a record of past rights and wrongs, rises and falls, victories and defeats, all passed down to encourage goodness and deplore evil. Ogyū Sorai, he notes, was one major exception. Watanabe judges that Sorai's view of history and his kobunji gaku 古文辞学 seem very modernistic, but his system of thought as a whole was more feudalistic than modern. Rather than purge this contradiction, Watanabe suggests that Sorai hoped to restore, not transform, the feudal regime; socially and politically he was a reactionary, not a progressive.


In his "Review Article: Early-Modern Japanese Confucianism: The Gyōza-Manjō Controversy," published in the Sino-Japanese Studies Newsletter I.1 (November 1988), Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi reviews these and other articles by Watanabe Hiroshi in the context of historiography on Tokugawa thought. Wakabayashi's review is of
Watanabe's monograph, *Kinsei Nihon shakai to Sōgaku* (Early-Modern Japanese Society and Song Learning; Tokyo: Tōkyō daigaku shuppankai, 1985), which includes the two-part article listed above, "with very slight revision," and a supplementary essay, "Itō Jinsai, Tōgai," which had been included in Sagara Tōru's *Edo no shisōkatachi* (江戸の思想たち上) (Thinkers of the Edo Period; Tokyo: Kenbun shuppan, 1981). Wakabayashi renders Watanabe's studies more palatable by analyzing them in terms of what he calls the gyōza-manjū controversy. It might be added that Watanabe states that the aim of his two essays is to focus on "one thesis" which serves as a premise about the historical development of Neo-Confucianism in Japan. Watanabe's thesis is that during the early-modern period in Japan, Neo-Confucianism seemed initially to be a foreign system of thought with a decidedly non-Japanese feel to it. At the same time, Neo-Confucianism was gradually becoming more widespread within Japan.

Watanabe claims that, prior to the Tokugawa, most Sengoku daimyōs, or Warring States' period warlords, neglected Neo-Confucian theory: morally and intellectually, Song learning appeared to be unrelated to the samurai estate. Watanabe contends that those who studied Neo-Confucianism from early on were a minority; the Song system was neither widespread nor popular. Domain schools were, he claims, virtually non-existent in the seventeenth century. Watanabe argues that bakufu support for the Hayashi family did not signify bakufu support for Neo-Confucianism. Watanabe alleges that describing Neo-Confucianism as a ruling ideology of the bakuhan system overestimates its importance.

Furthermore, Watanabe denies that Neo-Confucianism was a perfectly appropriate match for either the social or the political system of Tokugawa Japan. Rather than legitimizing samurai rule or the social order of early-modern Japan, Neo-Confucianism's goal was the perfection of the individual through self-cultivation. Moreover, "the individual" signified for Zhu Xi the *shidafu* 学大夫, or the scholar-bureaucrat who ruled through the Chinese civil service system.

Watanabe reinterprets the contribution of the kogaku 哲學 movement, suggesting that rather than dissolving Zhu Xi's thought, it made it more indigenous. Indeed it was with Sokō, Jinsai,
and Sorai that Song learning became widespread among Japanese. Watanabe claims that most things that scholars have wanted to attribute to Neo-Confucianism seems to have been much more true of Ogyū Sorai's political thought, which was a Confucian system tailored particularly for the bakufu. Sorai's ideas did not legitimate shogunal power, however, so much as they mystified it. Unlike Zhu Xi's learning, Sorai's thought was formulated with a consciousness appropriate to the samurai engaged in bakufu rule. Similarly, Jinsai's reformulation of Neo-Confucianism made it something that Japanese townspeople could easily appreciate. Yamaga Sokō tried to bring Neo-Confucianism closer to the samurai world of his day by publicly criticizing seemingly irrelevant and textually groundless notions like ri, or principle, and the honzen no sei, or "original nature of humans." In their place, Sokō articulated his shido, or Way of the Samurai, thus making Neo-Confucianism more indigenous to the Japanese world.

Wakabayashi criticized Watanabe on several counts: (1) for neglecting the role of kokugaku, or national learning, scholars and Shintō theorists in popularizing Neo-Confucian learning in Japan, (2) for overlooking the political uses of eclectic thought at the end of the Tokugawa period, and (3) neglecting the Neo-Confucian legacy to post-Tokugawa Japan. Additionally, Watanabe's neglect of Abe Yoshio's studies is glaring. Abe's view is that the Neo-Confucianism which Japan accepted came not directly from China, but instead via Korea and so was colored with Koran interpretations that decisively influenced Japanese understandings of it. Watanabe never broaches the Korean connection.


Yamashita analyzes Sorai's Rongo chō by discussing the differences between Sorai's thought and that of Jinsai. Also Yamashita examines Sorai's criticisms of Jinsai's view of Confucius. Yamashita recognizes Inoue Tetsujirō's 井上哲次郎 and Yoshi-kawa Kōjirō's view that Sorai attacked Jinsai due to Jinsai's
never having replied to his, Sorai's, letter. Sorai's letter humbly sought to establish correspondence concerning philosophical and literary issues. Though Sorai's letter was never answered in Jinsai's lifetime, Jinsai's son, Itō Tōgai, had it published soon after his father's death. Yet Yamashita suggests that real philosophical differences might also account for the attacks. Since Jinsai valued the Analects above all other books and saw Confucius as the supreme sage of all history, Sorai was obligated to define his position concerning Confucius and the Analects relative to that of Jinsai's. But, also, one could claim that Sorai's view of Confucius as an excellent scholar of the Way of the early kings, but not as a sage, was one which issued from the Analects itself. Yamashita's analyses also suggest several respects in which Sorai's views on Confucius and other issues central to the Analects are similar to those of either Nakae Tōju (1608-48) or the Wang Yangming school.

This essay is essentially the same one that David A. Dilworth translated as "Nakae Tōju's Religious Thought and Its Relation to 'Jitsugaku'" in Principle and Practicality, ed. Wm. Theodore de Bary and Irene Bloom (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979): 307-30. It traces Tōju's early acceptance of Zhu Xi's thought through Tōju's eventual rejection of getao 格套 (J., kakuto, stifling formalism) and Zhu's rationalizations regarding guishen 鬼神 (J., kishin, ghosts and spirits). Tōju's increasingly fundamentalist Confucian religiosity, founded on notions in the Five Classics rather than the Four Books, eventually prepared him for an empathetic reading of the Xingli huitong 性命通 (Comprehensive Anthology of Commentaries on Neo-Con-fucianism), a late-Ming work including the views of Wang Yangming thinkers like Wang Longxi 王龍溪 (1498-1583). The latter, who criticized Zhu Xi, was an encouragement to Tōju in his own growing skepticism. Later, Tōju obtained the Wang Longxi yulu 王龍溪語錄 (Recorded Sayings of Wang Longxi); through reading it, Tōju's enthusiasm for leftwing Wang Yangming teachings, mixed with religious fundamentalism, climaxed in his Okina mondō 翁問答 (Dialogues with an Old Man), an attack on the formalism and atheism of the Zhu Xi school. From Wang Longxi's radical
teachings, Tōju finally moved back to the source, namely, the teachings of Wang Yangming.


Yamamoto explicates Jinsai's theory of sei (C., xing), or "human nature" by comparing and contrasting it with that of Zhu Xi. Yamamoto first notes that Jinsai regarded Confucius as his ultimate authority. Therefore, Jinsai could not wholly accept Mencius's claim that human nature is originally good. After all, Confucius never made such a remark: he only stated that by nature people are similar but they differ in practice. Though with slight equivocation, Jinsai did, like Mencius and, later, Zhu Xi, affirm the essential goodness of human nature. Yamamoto explains that while Jinsai recognized Zhu Xi's notion of the physical nature (qizhi zhi xing 氣質之性), he rejected Zhu's conception of the original nature (benran zhi xing 本然之性). Jinsai's positive view, vis-à-vis human nature, of human feelings (ninjō 人情) also differs from Zhu Xi, who often denigrated feelings. Yamamoto further argues that Jinsai did not completely reject the ideas of Gaozi (ca. 420-350 B.C.) on human nature. Yamamoto sees Jinsai's claim, sei sei nari (人情, or "human nature is innate), as deriving from Gaozi's theory, sheng zhi wei xing 生之謂性, or "human nature is one's innate psycho-physical constitution." Yamamoto also notes how Jinsai included Zhou Dunyi's idea of wuxing 五性, or "the five natures," which correspond to the five virtues of humaneness, rightness, propriety, wisdom, and trustworthiness.

Curiously, Yamamoto admits that Jinsai's Go-Mō jigi (Meanings of Terms in the Analects and Confucius), his primary source, was modelled after Chen Beixi's Xingli ziyi (The Meanings of Neo-Confucian Terms), but he never considers the possibility of that work's impact on Jinsai's theory of human nature. The Xingli ziyi discusses human nature in detail, analyzing the ideas of Confucius, Mencius, Gaozi, Zhou Dunyi and Zhu Xi, all the thinkers Yamamoto identifies in connection with Jinsai's theory of human nature. If Yamamoto's goal was to reveal the sources of Jinsai's ideas on human nature, then it seems he overlooked the single most
obvious source, Chen Beixi.


Yamazaki's article records his speech delivered at a commemorative ceremony at the Sen-Ju bochi 先儒墓地, or the "Cemetery of Early Japanese Confucians," sponsored through the Yushima seidō 湯島聖堂, or the Temple of Confucius, in Tokyo. Yamazaki first explains the whereabouts of Ekken's grave: it is not in the Sen-Ju bochi, though Ekken was familiar with the latter through friends living in Edo. Ekken's Nenpu 年譜 (Chronological Biography) states that his grave is in the Kinryū-ji 金龍寺 in Nishimachi 西町, without specifying the town. Another source says it is in the Kinryū-ji in Aratsu 荒津, but gives no details on Aratsu's locale. Yamazaki explains that recent research has found Nishimachi and Aratsu to be obsolete place names for areas today known as Chūō-ku 中央区 and Imagawa 今川 in Fukuoka on the island of Kyushu. Thus, Ekken's grave is in the Imagawa no (Kōunzan 耕雲山) Kinryū-ji, a Zen temple in the Chūō-ku of Fukuoka.

Yamazaki also explores Ekken's study of the Jin si lu 近思錄 (Reflections on Things at Hand), the famous philosophical anthology of Neo-Confucianism, compiled by Zhu Xi and Lü Zuójian 劉佐僑 (1137-1181). Ekken's Nenpu notes that Ekken first read the Jin si lu in 1651 (Kei'an 4), just three years after that work was first published in Tokugawa Japan. This shows that Ekken's study of the text preceded Yamazaki Ansai's lectures on the same work, which began in 1655 (Meireki 1). Though Ansai's school has been credited with popularizing the Jin si lu in Japan, Ekken's earlier study of the text reveals him as one of the first pioneers in Japanese scholarship on it.

Yasumaru's evaluation of Sorai in relation to the history of early-modern Japanese thought contends with earlier views offered by Maruyama Masao. Yasumaru claims that the desire to pursue self-profit, and consequently capitalism, is the driving force of modern society. Since Sorai never allowed room for the free pursuit of profit in his view of humanity, Yasumaru argues that Sorai should be seen primarily as a late feudal thinker whose ideas were meant to assist the ruling class solve a socio-economic crisis that resulted from the rise of a commercial economy within the feudal framework of Tokugawa Japan. Yasumaru states that while Maruyama perceived Sorai as the first "modern" thinker in Japanese history, he sees Sorai as among the last of the feudal thinkers. Yasumaru acknowledges that Sorai's thought included contradictions which unintentionally heralded modern thought. Specifically, Yasumaru notes that while Sorai claimed to liberate the personal sphere of human desires from the public sphere of state power, he actually did so not for the sake of the individual, but instead for the sake of the feudal order which he served. Though Sorai alleged that he had made provisions for the fullest realization of human talent and capabilities, in fact he recommended the creation of rules and regulations which would oppress rather than liberate the individual. Yasumaru nevertheless claims that inherent in the liberation Sorai effected was the possibility of opening a new, capitalist social system that would surpass feudalism.


Yoshikawa compares Jinsai's Rongo kogi with Sorai's Rongo chō. He notes how both of these commentaries on the Analects of Confucius were the chief works of their authors, and how each was the product of nearly five decades of study. Despite his
clear awareness that Jinsai and Sorai differed philosophically on virtually every issue, Yoshikawa suggests that the basic attitudes of both commentaries are the same: they oppose the Zhu Xi school's dichotomy of heavenly principle and human desires, one which degrades if not denies human desires and passions. Both Jinsai and Sorai affirm the value of the emotional wants and needs of human beings, and respect the role of human feelings and passions. They argue that people are obliged to value and respect human desires if they wish to fulfill completely the manifold capacities and potentialities inherent in human life. Yoshikawa suggests that Jinsai's and Sorai's position are consistent with the Analects, where Confucius is portrayed not as an utterly flawless sage, but rather as a man who is capable of error.


An English translation of this intellectual biography of Jinsai and Tōgai by Yoshikawa appears in Jinsai, Sorai, Norinaga: Three Classical Philologists of Mid-Tokugawa Japan (Tokyo: Tōyō gak-kai, 1983). Omitted, however, are the last four pages devoted to Jinsai's son and philosophical successor, Itō Tōgai. Yoshikawa admits that his specialty is not Japanese thought. Prior to his death in 1980, he was a renowned Japanese scholar of Chinese literature. Nevertheless, insofar as Jinsai was a Japanese scholar of Chinese philosophy, Yoshikawa's specialty did uniquely enable him to read and enjoy Jinsai's writings. Thus, his comments on Jinsai's scholarship are insightful. Yoshikawa regards the works of Jinsai, Sorai, and Norinaga as united in their primarily philological opposition to the Song Neo-Confucianism of Zhu Xi and his Japanese followers. Yoshikawa's sympathies are with those who "rejected the philosophical stubborness of...Neo-Confucianism." Yoshikawa sees these Japanese philological studies as having emerged from the Chinese practice of writing commentaries on ancient Confucian texts.

An English translation of this monumental essay appeared as the second part of Yoshikawa's *Jinsai, Sorai, Norinaga*, published by the Tōyō gakkai in 1983. Yoshikawa divides Sorai's life into three stages. The first stage, from Sorai's birth in 1666 until he was 40, climaxed with his service as a philological scholar to Yanagisawa Yoshiyasu (1658-1714), confidant of the fifth Tokugawa shōgun, Tsunayoshi. This period abruptly ended with Tsunayoshi's death in 1709. In the second stage (1709-1716), Sorai's rival, Arai Hakuseki 新井白石 (1657-1725), held sway as the Neo-Confucian advisor to two Tokugawa shōguns. Sorai, retired from public life and started a private school, the Ken'en 薫園 (Miscanthus Garden) Academy of Chinese literary studies in Edo. During these years, Sorai espoused his kobunji gaku theory vis-à-vis Chinese prose and poetry. He claimed that his inspiration for this theory, which he described as "a heaven sent grace," came from two Ming literati, Li Panlong 李攀龍 (1514-70) and Wang Shizhen 王世貞 (1526-90). The third stage lasted from 1716 until Sorai's death in 1728. In it, Sorai turned away from Neo-Confucianism, authoring his "two Ben," namely, the Benjō and Benmei, early in this period. His proposals on socio-political reform, the Taiheisaku 太平策 and the Seidan 政諌, apparently were written towards the end of his life.


Yūiki states that the arrival of Song Neo-Confucianism in the Kamakura period catalyzed new trends within medieval Japanese thought, invigorating Confucian learning which had been largely the hereditary preserve of specially appointed scholarly families. Yūiki recognizes that there are several accounts of the "first" appearance of Zhu Xi's Neo-Confucianism in Japan, some of which claim that it appeared during the late Heian (794-1185) period. However, Yūiki contends that, at the very least, Song learning had been introduced by 1241 (Ninji 2), via the Rinzai monk, Enni Ben'en 本園顕尊 (1202-80), who also founded the Tōfukuji 東福寺 temple. Ben'en returned to Japan that year from China where he had been studying Zen Buddhism; he later lectured on Neo-Confucian texts, such as the Zongjiao lu 宗敬錄 (Revered Reflections) for the Emperor Go-Saga 後嵯峨天皇 (r. 1242-46), and on the Daming lu 大明錄 (Records of Great Illumina-
tion), for the Hōjō 北条 regents. Yūiki suggests that there were several monks like Ben' en who went to late-Song China, searching for a superior education in Buddhism. In the process, they learned the rudiments of Zhu Xi's thought. The philosophy that Ben' en introduced to both the imperial court and the bakufu was a bastardized form of Neo-Confucianism, one merged with Buddhist teachings in an eclectic synthesis. Still, Yūiki suggests that the political role played by Zhu Xi's ideas in Emperor Go-Daigo's 後醍醐 (1288-1339) Kemmu 建武 restoration (1333-36) partly reveals its significant impact in Kamakura Japan.


Yūsa analyzes Banzan's reformist ideas as expressed in the Daigaku wakumon 大學或問 (Dialogues on the Great Learning). If given proper philosophical training, and a cancellation of their debts, Banzan thought that rōnin 決人, or masterless samurai, should be organized into kashindan 家臣团, or collective samurai bands. Once sent to rural areas, kashindan would, Banzan reasoned, restore the productive vitality of peasant life. Creation of kashindan would also eradicate the causes of poverty and distress in the countryside as well as in urban areas. Banzan's intention was, Yūsa claims, to restore dislocated samurai to their original historical status as managers of the countryside. Thus, Yūsa sees Banzan not only as the first economic thinker of early modern Japan, but also as a formulator of an ideology for the proposed kashindan. Banzan created this ideology by reformulating tenets of Neo-Confucianism for the sake of rōnin whom he wished to see organized and trained within kashindan. Banzan criticized Hayashi Razan's emphasis on learning as having degenerated into mere erudition, and Yamazaki Ansai's stress on self-cultivation as leading to little more than self-indulgent self-righteousness. Banzan advocated shindoku 慎独 or, "caution while alone" as a technique of self-cultivation leading the kashindan to an ideal state of desirelessness, one negating both selfishness and greed.