
These three articles discuss the close relationship between Fujiwara Seika (1561-1619) and the Korean prisoner of war, Kang Hang 姜沆 (1567-1618; pen name: Suun 睛隠), who lived as a captive in Japan from 1598-1600, following Toyotomi Hideyoshi's 豊臣秀吉 (1536-98) final invasion of Korea. Virtually no attention is devoted to Kang Hang's relationship to Yi T'oeugye's 李退溪 (1501-70) understanding of Song Neo-Confucianism, nor to the significance of the fact that Seika imbibed that particular version of Neo-Confucianism. Yet these articles were partly the precursors of Abe Yoshio's 阿部吉雄 studies of Kang Hang and Seika, which do delve more into the philosophical significance of Seika's friendship with Kang Hang. Matsuda examines the documents revealing the origins, the nature, and the length of the Seika-Kang Hang friendship.


Anticipating a theme developed in his later studies of practical learning and empirical rationalism in the early Tokugawa period, Minamoto here critically questions Maruyama Masao's 丸山真男 understanding of the development of rationalistic thought. He relates how Kaibara Ekken 貝原益軒 (1630-1714) and Nishikawa Joken 西川如見 (1648-1724), while acknowledging Zhu Xi's 朱熹 (1130-1200) understanding of principle in the world of morality, postulated a world independent of Zhu's speculative and essentially moralistic notion of principle. Minamoto sees Ekken as the initiator of the move away from Zhu's view of the continuity
of the moral and natural worlds, and Joken, an early Tokugawa astronomer, as the one who advanced the view of a world of "empirical rationalism" apart from the world of Neo-Confucian values. In Minamoto's view, the rise of rationalism began out of, rather than in opposition to, Zhu Xi's school.


The text of this article formed the first half of the paper that Samuel H. Yamashita translated in Principle and Practicality, Essays in Neo-Confucianism and Practical Learning, Wm. Theodore de Bary and Irene Bloom, eds. (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1979), pp. 375-418. In the latter, Yamashita translated the title as "'Jitsugaku' and Empirical Rationalism in the First Half of the Tokugawa Period." Minamoto traces two forms of jitsugaku, or "practical learning," in the thought of early Tokugawa Neo-Confucians. He identifies one form as morally practicable jitsugaku, and the other as "empirical jitsugaku." These two, which were not mutually exclusive, he traces in the thought of Hayashi Razan 林羅山 (1583-1657), Nakae Tōju 中江藤樹 (1608-48), Kumazawa Banzan 熊沢蕃山 (1619-91), Kaibara Ekken (1630-1714), Satō Naokata 佐藤直方 (1650-1719), Yamaga Sokō 山鹿素行 (1622-85), Ito Jinsai 伊藤仁斎 (1627-1705), and Ogyū Sorai 烏生徂徠 (1666-1728).

In Philosophical Studies of Japan 11 (Tokyo: Japan Society for the Promotion of Science, 1975): 61-93, an English translation of another essay by Minamoto Ryōen, entitled "The Development of the Jitsugaku Concept in the Tokugawa Period," appears. This essay, while paralleling the above mentioned Shisō article at various junctures, summarizes Minamoto's vision of jitsugaku thought as something which continued after the Meiji Restoration in the writings of Tsuda Mamichi 津田真道 (1829-1903), Fukuzawa Yukichi 福澤諭吉 (1834-1901), and Nishi Amane 西周 (1829-97).

"Ito Jinsai no jitsugaku to sono shisō" 伊藤仁斎の実学とその思想 (Ito Jinsai's Practical Learning and His Philosophy). Tōhoku daigaku bungakubu kenkyū nenpo 東北大学文学部研究年報 26 (1976): 91-149.
Minamoto analyzes Jinsai's conception of *jitsugaku*, or practical learning in the context of Jinsai's mature thought. First, Minamoto briefly discusses Jinsai's intellectual development from an early devotion to Zhu Xi towards an eventual rejection of quietistic practices that he associated with Zhu's learning. Minamoto notes how Jinsai's thought differs from Zhu Xi's in details, yet remains similar to Zhu Xi's thought in viewing *jitsugaku* as "the pursuit of truth, by a human being, through the practice of morality." Minamoto acknowledges the absence of a detailed system of socio-political thought in Jinsai's philosophy, but suggests that Ogyū Sorai, who took over Jinsai's method of "philosophical anthropology," developed a quite detailed system of political theory. This implies that Jinsai's *jitsugaku* was not necessarily void of political implications.

Minamoto discusses what he calls the *nijū sei* or "the two-layered nature" of Sorai's thought. One the one hand, Minamoto sees Sorai as an empirical rationalist who encouraged human endeavors, praised simple teachings, and advocated a form of humanistic government based on rites and music. On the other hand, he describes a parallel Sorai who leaned towards mysticism, recognized the existence of a transcendental power limiting the efficacy of human actions, acknowledged the profound and complex nature of reality, and resorted to superstitious practices like *Yijing* divination. Minamoto does not see these two layers as being inherently contradictory. He believes that they derived from Sorai's respect for Chinese culture and from Sorai's nascent nationalistic consciousness. Minamoto argues that for Sorai's ruler, moral action and mystical reverence were means and methods of governing a state and pacifying people. Thus Minamoto recognizes the mystical, seemingly superstitious aspects of Sorai's thinking on, e.g., ghosts and spirits, but he also denies that Sorai's remarks can be taken literally. Instead, Minamoto contends that they are fabrications of sorts meant for use in governing. Minamoto argues that Sorai's philosophy largely emerged from
contradictions that Sorai witnessed between his 14th and 24th years while living in exile in Kazusa with his father who had been capriciously banished from Edo for a decade. In exile, Sorai's father required that his son read a colloquial version of Zhu Xi's commentary on the Great Learning. That work, replete with idealistic prescriptions regarding moral government, was starkly at odds with the primitive, superstitious society of peasant farmers and fishermen around whom Sorai lived.


Minamoto structurally analyzes Fujiwara Seika's thought in an effort to show its relation to jitsugaku, or practical learning. Minamoto admits that Seika never called his own learning jitsugaku, but he did refer to it in somewhat similar terms. For Seika, and for Song and Ming Neo-Confucians, jitsugaku meant not technical or mechanical learning, but instead learning that, because it promoted ethical practice, should be applied to governing. Minamoto sees Seika as an eclectic thinker who retained many psychological elements of Rinzai Zen teachings even after leaving the Shōkokuji 相国寺 temple in Kyōto and accepting Neo-Confucianism. Minamoto's analyses of Seika's thought complement the scholarship of Abe Yoshio and Imanaka Kanshi 今中寛司 regarding the origins of Seika's ideas. Recognizing the important role played by Yi T'oege in Seika's early understanding of Neo-Confucianism, Minamoto also points out the influence of a number of other thinkers on Seika. Minamoto sees the influence of the late Ming syncretist, Lin Zhaoen 林兆恩 (1517-98), as operative relative to many of Seika's views, including his interpretation of kakubutsu 根物 (C: gewu), or the "investigation of things." In Seika's thoughts on the Great Learning notion of "loving the people," Minamoto sees Wang Yangming's 王陽明 impact. Minamoto also contrasts Seika with the more philosophically realistic Hayashi Razan, whose rejection of Buddhism was more complete. Though it never wholly disappeared, Seika's idealistic approach to governing, Minamoto claims, never came to dominate early modern Japanese intellectual history.

Minamoto's monographs on Tokugawa Neo-Confucianism include:


Miyake opens this ambitious article with a survey of post-WWII studies of Jinsai. He concludes that despite the considerable work done, Maruyama Masao's evaluation of Jinsai and Sorai, set forth in *Nihon seijī shisō shi kenkyū* 日本政治思想史研究, has not been surpassed. But Miyake believes that Maruyama's methodology was limited, and that unless new research transcends Maruyama's framework, scholarship will stagnate. Miyake then attempts to surpass Maruyama with a new paradigm for theoretical analysis: the polarity between *doitsu no genri*, or "the principle of identity," and *benshōhōteki shi'i*, or "dialectical thought." He states that these categories should supplant Maruyama's dichotomies of nature and artifice, and rationalism and irrationalism. Despite this contribution, Miyake seems, after all, to be rewriting Maruyama instead of going beyond him. Much as Maruyama earlier traced the dissolution of the Zhu Xi mode of thought in the ideas of Jinsai and Sorai, so does
Miyake again introduce the reader to the rise and fall of Zhu Xi's thought. For Miyake this process culminated with Jinsai's theories rather than those of Sorai. Miyake does give a better account of Zhu Xi's thought than Maruyama did. And, he acknowledges Abe Yoshio's scholarship concerning the "Korean connection" in the development of Japanese Neo-Confucianism. But often Miyake's interpretive terminology seems anachronistic. Also, the textual evidence he cites seems too slender to buttress his ponderous conceptual dichotomy.

Miyake couples his distinction between "unitary principle" and "dialectical thought" with a more historical attempt to reveal the influences affecting Jinsai's thinking as formulated in his kogigaku 古義學, or study of ancient meanings. Miyake notes the influence of works of the Cheng-Zhu 程朱 school, especially Chen Beixi's 陳北溪 (1159-1223) Xingli ziyi 性理字義 (J. Seiri iigi; The Meanings of Neo-Confucian Terms), as having played a major role in Jinsai's attempt to redefine Neo-Confucian concepts in accordance with their original meanings. Miyake denies, however, that Wu Suyuan's 吳蘇原 (1489-1559) critique of Zhu Xi, the Jizhai manlu 吉齋漫録 (Jottings of Jizhai) was the source of Jinsai's thought, as several Tokugawa scholars asserted. Miyake claims that the Cheng-Zhu philosophy functioned as a crucial mediator in the formation of Jinsai's thought. More specifically, Miyake argues that Jinsai expanded some of the dialectical tendencies of Cheng-Zhu thinking and certain philosophically materialistic tendencies and notions which had been earlier associated with Cheng Hao 程顥 (1032-85). Miyake admits Abe Yoshio's view that Luo Qinshun's 洛欽順 (1465-1547) Kunzhiji 困知記 (Knowledge Painfully Acquired) influenced Jinsai's thinking, concluding that the impact of Luo's ideas on Jinsai is doubtless. But Miyake denies that Luo's thinking played a formative role for Jinsai's mature philosophy.
Miyake opens his review by noting how research on early modern Japanese Neo-Confucianism has been extremely slow due to: (1) stagnation in the methods of analysis, and (2) the lack of new analyses of historical resources. Thus, scholars have yet to go beyond Maruyama's analyses of nature and artifice and rationality and irrationality; nor have they investigated and analyzed primary source materials other than the ones which Maruyama used, despite Maruyama's omission of several key works by the thinkers he studied. Turning to studies of Sorai, Miyake laments that since the publication of Iwahashi Shigenari's 石橋 晋成 Sorai kenkyū 佐貳研究 (Research on Sorai) (Tokyo: Sekishoin, 1934), no noteworthy advances have been made. Miyake proceeds to critique Imanaka, noting how much of the information included in his Soraigaku no kisoteki kenkyū 佐貳質疑 comes from either Iwahashi's Sorai kenkyū or from Ishizaki Matazo's 石崎 又造 Kinsei Nihon ni okeru Shina zokugo bungaku shi 近世 日本における支那 傳語文学史 (History of Chinese Vernacular Literature in Early Modern Japan) (Tokyo: Kōbundo shobō, 1940). While praising Imanaka for his detailed analyses of Sorai's Ken'en zuihitsu 謀園随筆 (Ken'en Miscellany) and Doku Shunshi 读荀子 (Reading Xunzi), Miyake faults him for not examining Sorai's Rongocho 論語微 (Commentary on the Analects). Imanaka is also criticized for his description of Zhu Xi's philosophy as one which privileged the metaphysical notion of kotowari 理 (C. li; "ideal principle"), while subordinating that of ki 气 (C. qi; "material force"). The faultfinding continues, leaving the reader somewhat disappointed with both Imanaka's failings and Miyake's attacks.

Miyake analyzes the oldest extant manuscript by Jinsai, the Sansho tomo jūippon 三書共十一本 (The Three Books: The Analects, Mencius, and the Doctrine of the Mean, in Eleven Volumes), which Jinsai supposedly wrote in his late forties or
early fifties. Miyake also discusses Jinsai's Machi naka sadame (Neighborhood Rules). Miyake relates how Jinsai's Three Books emerged out of Jinsai's reaction against Zhu Xi's Sishu jiizhu (Commentaries on the Four Books). Miyake reiterates that while Jinsai rejected Zhu Xi's philosophy, the latter mediated Jinsai's own ideas. This essay's thesis is that Jinsai's affirmation of the primacy of private emotions is linked to his support for the relative autonomy of various machi, or neighborhoods, in Kyoto over against the bakufu's policy of converting the machi into administrative cells of the bakufu. Miyake notes how Jinsai's affirmation of watakushi, or the realm of the private and personal, ran counter to the attitudes of "ideologues" who supported the bakufu in their affirmation of ōyake, or "the public order." Miyake admits, however, that this early feature of Jinsai's thought did not continue in his later writings, nor in the thinking of his disciples.

Miyake describes Jinsai's monistic philosophy of ki, or material force, in terms of Jinsai's rejection of Zhu Xi's notion of principle. He suggests that Jinsai rejected: (1) the fundamental reality of principle, (2) the transformation of material force through the direction of principle, and (3) the substance-function dichotomy. The latter three characterized Zhu Xi's unique view of principle. Instead, Jinsai asserted that heaven and earth existed prior to material force, and that the latter, which he interprets as the forces of yin and yang, presuppose the existence of Heaven and earth. Regarding tendō, or the way of heaven, Jinsai distinguishes between ten, or heaven, which appears as a supervisory nature, and tendō, "the way of heaven," which creates the myriad things, taking the movements of yin and yang as its principle. Principle is nothing more than the connections between things and affairs. It is not
equatable with either heaven or man. While man is created by the activity of yin and yang, the latter do not control him. For Jinsai, tenmei 天命, or the decree of heaven, is the decree that man should act morally.

Miyake discusses four issues crucial to prospective research on Jinsai's learning. The first concerns historical resources. Miyake notes that within Jinsai's lifetime the Gomō jigi 氾孟子義 (Meanings of Terms in the Analects and Mencius) was published without Jinsai's permission. The pirated edition widely circulated: a copy of it fell into Sorai's hands, thus providing him access to Jinsai's ideas before they were published. The official version of the Gomō jigi, however, differs from the pirated one. Thus, Miyake cautions researchers that they must be specific in assigning familiarity with a certain text to a certain person, as the versions of Jinsai's philosophy in circulation sometimes differed widely. The second issue pertains to the belief that Jinsai's teachings were transmitted as part of a family school. Miyake warns that Jinsai's son and philosophical successor, Itō Togai 伊藤東涯 (1670-1736), may not have transmitted his father's ideas and interpretations as faithfully as some scholars like Inoue Tetsujirō 上哲次郎 have assumed. Thus, works by Jinsai which were published posthumously, under the editorial direction of Tōgai, might be better understood as statements of his thinking rather than that of his father. Regarding the third issue, Miyake warns against discussing Jinsai's thought exclusively in terms of the works which Jinsai authored in his later years, without examining Jinsai's earlier ideas. Fourthly, Miyake insists that Jinsai's personal history must be investigated in conjunction with studies of Jinsai's ideas. And, biographical studies of Jinsai need to be based on primary source material other than what Itō Tōgai produced about his father, as Tōgai often presented his father's actions and ideas in terms that most reflected his, Tōgai's, own concerns rather than those of Jinsai himself.

In this recent monograph, Miyake recapitulates many of his previously published essays, synthesizing them into a study which is more than a mere anthology of past articles. A considerable amount of new scholarship is included. For example, Miyake offers exceptionally detailed comparisons of various versions of Jinsai's Gomō jigi, thus laying bare the need for precision on the part of any intellectual historian who hopes to track the impact of that work on others known to be familiar with the Gomō jigi.

Miyake also co-edited Itō Jinsai shū (Collected Writings of Itō Jinsai), and Kogaku sensei shibun shū (The Collected Poems and Prose of the Scholar of Ancient Learning).


Miyagi praises Imanaka's empirical analyses of the rise of political thought in early modern Japan. She notes that Imanaka questions conventional accounts of the relationship between Seika and Razan. Imanaka asserts that Razan created the Seika sensei gyojo (Biography of My Teacher Seika), which recounts Seika's supposed denunciation of Buddhism, in an effort to bolster his own standing as a Confucian advisor to the bakufu. Razan's main rivals within the bakufu were Buddhists. Trying to give his new philosophy, Neo-Confucianism, a Japanese genealogy, Razan claimed to have received his teachings from Seika, who like him, Razan, had also repudiated Buddhism in favor of Neo-Confucianism. Imanaka believes that Seika's Neo-Confucianism, which stressed self-cultivation and book-reading, was not as adverse to Buddhism as Razan's biographical sketch of Seika alleged. Imanaka suggests that Seika's urbane approach to Neo-Confucianism allowed for embracing elements of Buddhism, contrary to Razan's portrait of Seika's life and ideas. Razan, on the other hand, was more concretely political in his views of Neo-Confucianism: drawing ideas from the Kiyowara teachings of medieval Japan, ones which syncretized Shintō political dogmas...
with Neo-Confucian notions, Razan spun theories which would potentially legitimize bakufu rule. Despite Razan's efforts at linking his ideas with Seika's, Imanaka shows how, at least in the field of Razan's Shintō thought, Razan drew from Kiyowara and Yoshida Shintō ideas that circulated at the Kenninji temple where he had briefly studied as a teenager.

Miyagi praises Minamoto's 600-page study of practical learning in the early period of the Tokugawa era as the product of some twenty-five years of research. She explains that this book is part one of Minamoto's grand life work, a study entitled Jitsugaku kenkyū (Research on Practical Learning). Miyagi notes how Minamoto explicates the notion of jitsugaku comparatively, explicating its development in China, Korea, and Japan. Next, Minamoto examines the role played by jitsugaku in the modernization of not just Japan, but Korea and China as well. Admitting that the notion jitsugaku embraces many nuances, Minamoto asserts that a central thread connecting them all is the relevance of jitsugaku to riaru na mono, "real things," i.e., naiyō no aru mono, "things possessing meaning and significance." Originally, however, Minamoto admits that jitsugaku was first a polemical notion. Theories contrary to one's own were dismissed as "false learning," while one's own ideas were lauded as jitsugaku, or real, significant learning. Later jitsugaku came to refer to learning which pertained to governing nations and bringing peace to the world. In this volume, Minamoto traces the transition from jitsugaku as a learning of politically-relevant, moral practice to a more positivistic, empirical, and rational learning which was more for the sake of individuals. Most generally, the modernization process for jitsugaku thought involved a differentiation of Neo-Confucianism into diverse areas, definable by two schools: the school of kotowari, or principle, being primarily involved with metaphysics, empiricism, and physics; and the school of ki, or material force, associated with positivistic and empirically-rationalistic tendencies. Miyagi's review is much more detailed, describing the minute points of Minamoto's painstaking analyses. While refraining from excess in praising
the work, Miyagi seems strangely reluctant to offer much in the way of even friendly criticism.


Having noted how Banzan and Hakuseki are often praised jointly as two of the intellectual giants of Tokugawa Japan, Miyazaki explores Hakuseki's understanding and evaluation of Banzan. But in the majority of his essay, Miyazaki outlines points of congruence and incongruence between Banzan and Hakuseki. In the end, however, Miyazaki concludes by noting how difficult it is to find substantial, systematic points of comparison between them.

Miyazaki discusses Banzan and Soko as two 17th-century samurai philosopher-teachers whom the bakufu either placed under house arrest or exiled. And this despite, but also possibly because of, the popularity of their ideas among, in Banzan's case, both the courtiers of Kyōto and samurai of southwestern Japan, and, in Soko's case, samurai and daimyō from all corners of Japan. Miyazaki notes that Arai Hakuseki first associated Banzan and Soko in a letter to Sakuma Tōgan 佐久間源翁 (1653-1736), referring to them as rekireki 歴紀, "illustrious" figures of their day. Miyazaki follows up on Hakuseki's remark, noting many significant parallels between Banzan and Soko, thus illuminating the fate of both. For example, Miyazaki observes that both Banzan and Soko were tolerated and even flourished during the reign of the third shogun, Iemitsu 家光 (1603-51). But, after Iemitsu's demise, Soko, under the administration of Hoshina Masayuki 保科正之 (1609-72), and Banzan, under that of Sakai Tadakatsu 酒井忠勝 (1587-1662) came to be persecuted as thinkers whose respective writings, the Seikyō yōrokū 聖教要録 (Essentials of the Sagely Confucian Teachings) and the Daigaku wakumon 大學或問 (Questions and Answers on the Great Learning), were deemed insufferably dangerous to the public order. Miyazaki unveils other significant parallels and disparities regarding their views of Confucianism, the bakufu and the
imperial court, the Tokugawa social order, and methods of government.

Miyazaki compares Banzan and Sorai, grouping them as two Tokugawa thinkers whose ideas were critical of the institutions and social, economic, and political policies of the Tokugawa regime. Banzan's critiques, in his *Daigaku wakumon*, were precursors of Sorai's, expounded in the latter's *Taiheisaku* 太平策 (Plan for an Age of Great Peace) and his *Seidan* 政談 (Political Discourses). The latter, written late in Sorai's life, were submitted to Yoshimune 吉宗 (1684-1751), the eighth shogun. Miyazaki notes that Sorai is today the most frequently praised Confucian scholar in all Japanese history. Yet Sorai, Miyazaki observes, praised Kumazawa Banzan as a thinker who would remain a giant among Confucians even a century after his death. Furthermore, Sorai extolled Banzan's social and political ideas as "a model which cannot be surpassed or improved." Miyazaki's study of Banzan and Sorai shows how Sorai's ideas regarding reform of the Tokugawa polity drew in large part from those of Banzan. While his study seeks to elucidate these ties, ones noted also by later generations of Tokugawa scholars.


Mizuta observes that Imanaka's *Soraigaku no kisoteki kenkyū* views Sorai as an optimist, in diametrical opposition to Maruyama's portrait of Sorai as a pessimist. In *Soraigaku no kisoteki kenkyū*, Imanaka does question Maruyama's earlier study of Sorai at every turn. In touting Imanaka's work as one which greatly exceeds all earlier achievements in the field of Sorai studies, and as one which has established the grandest foundations for future Sorai studies, Mizuta suggests that Imanaka has gone beyond Maruyama, at least in the field of Sorai scholarship. Mizuta further praises the work as one which will be necessary reading for a long time to come among those doing research on

Morimoto's analysis of the historical character of Sokō's philosophy of ancient learning suggests that it can be seen as originating out of the Song Neo-Confucians' historicist attack on Buddhism as a foreign religion which had no roots in Chinese antiquity. Morimoto's analyses of Sokō's thought partially derive from Maruyama Masao's dichotomy of "nature" and "artifice:" Morimoto contends that in combining elements of naturalism and artifice, Sokō's thought reveals a typical pattern of Tokugawa feudal thought. The tension between nature and artifice was alternately resolved, Morimoto claims, in favor of artifice with Sorai's thought, and towards naturalism in Motoori Norinaga's kokugaku. Morimoto sees Sokō's balance of nature and artifice as being evidenced in the dichotomy of bun 文, "culture," and bu 武, "military arts," and also in his eclectic use of Confucian and Shinto thought. Morimoto repeatedly characterizes Sokō's system, and Tokugawa thought generally, as "ideological." Morimoto concludes that Sokō's later ideas caused the quickening of Japanese nationalism.

Morimoto first briefly analyzes the development of Japanese Confucianism in three periods: (1) from its introduction in Japan to the mid-18th century; (2) from the mid-18th century until the mid-20th century; and (3) from that time until the present. Morimoto's focus however is on the nature of Confucian and Shinto ideorogii, their compatibility or incompatibility, their similarities and dissimilarities, and their roles and functions. Much of his discussion centers on the presence or absence of these in the Kojiki (Records of Ancient Matters, 712) and the Nihon shoki (Chronicles of...
Ancient Japan, 720). Briefly stated, Morimoto sees the two as being consanguineous ideologies used by those who ruled China and Japan. Morimoto admits that Shinto was the weaker of the two ideologies, but that it was invigorated through association with Confucianism.


Murakami argues that while Yamaga Sokō, Itō Jinsai, and Ogyū Sorai have been grouped together as the kogaku, or ancient learning school, Sokō's thinking in particular made a much less complete break with Zhu Xi's thought. Murakami suggests that while Sokō disagreed with Zhu on numerous points, beginning with the legitimacy of the notion mukyoku shikashite taikyoku 無極而太極, "the ultimate of non-being and the great ultimate," he did so within parameters that were allowed even by Zhu Xi schoolmen. Without making facile equations between Sokō and Zhu Xi, Murakami shows how Sokō's thinking on many issues arose from problems central to Zhu Xi's Song philosophy, such as his interpretations of the opening passages of the Great Learning. While there are several weaknesses in it, Murakami's interpretation is a valuable corrective to accounts of the kogaku school which blithely speak of the disintegration of the Zhu Xi mode of thought as concomitant with, and because of, the rise of kogaku, which supposedly began with Sokō. Murakami rightly characterizes Sokō more as a military philosopher than as a kogaku scholar. In the perspective of Tokugawa intellectual history, Sokō's key role was in converting Zhu's ideas into ones suitable for samurai as their duties moved away from the battlefield and closer to the halls of government.


While centering his attention on Sorai's thought, Murakami
examines the ethical theories of Sokō, Jinsai, and Sorai—the so-called kogaku school. Murakami concludes that more than the Ming critics Li Panlong 李攀龍 (1514-70) and Wang Shizhen 王世貞 (1526-90), whom Sorai praised as the literary and philosophical sources of his kobunjigaku approach, Yamaga Sokō and Itō Jinsai seem to have been the real sources of Sorai's methodology. In analyzing Sorai's objectification of the Way, Murakami, following Imanaka, notes the utilitarian and pragmatic orientations evident in Sorai's ideas. Murakami contrasts that orientation with the more personalistic, moralistic concerns of Sokō and Jinsai. Regarding Sorai's affirmation of the desires and emotions, Murakami suggests that Sokō and Jinsai exercised considerable influence on him regarding this issue. Murakami contends that all three thinkers may have been reacting against the austere seriousness associated with Yamazaki Ansai's 山崎安泰 (1611-99) fundamentalistic school of Zhu Xi learning.

Relative to Sorai's concept of humanity, Murakami notes how Sorai saw human beings as creatures possessing talents that could be trained as habits, which in turn could be used for the political ends of rulers. Though admitting Sorai's recognition of the diversity of human nature, Murakami sees little that is desirable in Sorai's analysis of human nature. While he observes the empirical, materialistic, positivistic, and relativistic tendencies apparent in much of Sorai's thought, Murakami notes how Sorai, falling into an irrational sort of mysticism, also contends that men should have absolute, total faith in the sages' Way. He suggests that this extreme fidelity might have been influenced by Yamazaki Ansai's quasi-religious faith in Zhu Xi and/or by Shinran Shōnin's 観世音繩葉 (1174-1268) Jōdo Shinshū 真宗宗 (True School of Pure Land Buddhism), both of which also emphasized the need for faith. This lapse into irrational mysticism makes Sorai's thinking distinctively Japanese, Murakami contends.

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Murakami's essay on Sorai's conception of human talents and abilities focuses on the ideas evident in Sorai's Gakusoku,
articles six and seven. Murakami notes how Sorai insisted that no human talent or ability could be discarded, asserting that "the sage does not turn his back on people lightly." He also notes how Sorai's understanding of the variety of human natures, and the attention which must be devoted to the development of each person's capacities, influenced later Tokugawa thinkers such as Yoshida Shōin 吉田松陰 (1830-59).


Nagaoka reviews the history of scholarship on Fujiwara Seika from the earliest attempts at an intellectual history of Tokugawa Japan, beginning with late Tokugawa works like Nawa Rodō's 那波隆堂 (d. 1789) Gakumon genryū 學問源流 (Sources of Learning and Scholarship; published in 1799), the Sentetsu sōdan 先哲薫 (Biographies of the Leading Philosophers), and proceeding into the 20th century, beginning with the studies of Inoue Tetsujirō and Nishimura Tenshū 西村天真 (d. 1924). Nagaoka surveys the various interpretations of Seika's Shishō gokei wakun 四書五經倭訓 (Japanese Version of the Four Books and the Five Classics), Seika's supposed rejection of Buddhism and conversion to Neo-Confucianism, characterizations of Seika's scholarship, and his historical significance. Generally, Nagaoka recognizes Imanaka's views, set forth in Kinsei Nihon seijisō no seiritsu, as the final word. But attention is also given to Abe Yoshio's Nihon Shushigaku to Chōsen, and Kanaya Osamu's essay on "Fujiwara Seika and Hayashi Razan," in Fujiwara Seika/Hayashi Razan (NST, volume 28).


This bibliography uses the classification system in the Naikaku bunko 内閣文庫 bibliographies. Nagasawa's "Postscript" first traces the history of donors, from Uesugi Norizane 上杉憲家 (1411-66), who gave the Ashikaga School its earliest texts, dating from the Song dynasty, to post-Meiji donors. Nagasawa next analyzes the kind of books collected in the Ashikaga School, explaining the rationale for each collection. Nagasawa
sketches the vicissitudes of the Ashikaga School from its founding to its post-Meiji revival.


This reference work is one of the indispensable tools for textual studies of Tokugawa Neo-Confucianism. It catalogues, according to the Chinese siku 四庫, or "four libraries" (classics, histories, philosophy, and collected works), system of classification, Japanese woodblock editions of Chinese texts, giving the date of publication, the publisher, the location of the publisher, the date and place of the Chinese edition upon which the woodblock edition was based, the number of chapters, and the number of reprints of each edition.


Nakamura discusses the antagonism between Ogyū Sorai and Muro Kyūsō (1658-1734) over the Rikuyu engi 六諭 衍義 (C. Liuyu yanyi; Commentary on the Six Edicts), a simplified Japanese version of the six remonstrances promulgated by the Qing dynasty. Sorai originally punctuated the Chinese text, and wrote a preface to it, but Sorai's preface was later preempted in favor of another written by Kyūsō. While Sorai was rewarded for his work, the text to which Kyūsō attached his preface and commentary, the Rikuyu engi tai' i 六諭 衍義大意, became extremely famous in the Tokugawa and Meiji periods as a basic primer for moral instruction. The fame following publication went to Kyūsō, much to Sorai's chagrin. Though Sorai's unrivalled abilities in reading and punctuating colloquial and classical Chinese made the publication possible, he was less valued as a moral commentator.

Nakada discusses Sorai's correspondence with the Priest Eppo (Yuefeng; 1655-1734), a Chinese Obaku Zen monk living in Japan. After arriving in Japan in 1686, Eppo was invited to lecture in 1708 in the presence of Yoshimune, the shōgun, and his advisor, Yanagisawa Yoshiyasu (1658-1714). For the remainder of his life, Sorai corresponded with Eppo. Sorai's letters reveal his skills in Qing-dynasty colloquial Chinese. Nakada analyzes the correspondence between Sorai and Eppo to assess Sorai's abilities in the written language, which Nakada finds to be less than exceptional. While much of Nakada's examination of the twenty-year correspondence is revealing, it does not attempt to relate Sorai's Chinese-language experiences to his kobunji哲学.


Noguchi's analysis of fiction and reality in Sorai's political thought, while different from Maruyama's Nihon seiji shisō shi kenkyū and its approach to Sorai, is obviously indebted to that work more than any other. In Maruyama-like fashion, Noguchi sets out to reveal the aspects of Sorai's thinking which led to "modern patterns of thought." Noguchi concludes that in "discovering the fiction of government," i.e., in discovering that government is a created entity, and not a naturally or divinely ordained institution, Sorai introduced Japanese political thinking to modernity. Noguchi suggests that in so doing, Sorai played a role analogous to that of the the social contract theorists, especially Hobbes, in overturning Thomistic political thought. As warmed-over Maruyama, this article is only of marginal value.

Noguchi suggests that Jinsai's Commentary on the Doctrine of the Mean.
the Mean reveals the early formation of Jinsai's kogigaku methodology. Noguchi systematically explicates Jinsai's critique of Zhu Xi's Commentary on the Doctrine of the Mean, thereby revealing the philosophical philology operative in Jinsai's analysis. Noguchi does not consider the question: Was Jinsai right? so much as the one: What was the nature of his critique of Zhu Xi's understanding of The Mean? A valuable article for those interested in an early statement of Jinsai's philological criticism of Zhu Xi's ideas.

Noguchi opens this two-part article by quoting the late Mishima Yukio 三島由紀夫 (1925-1970) on the teachings of Wang Yang-ming. Just two months before his death, in November of 1970, Mishima published a work entitled Kakumei tetsugaku to shite no Yōmeigaku 革命哲學としての陽明學 (Wang Yangming's Teachings Viewed as a Revolutionary Philosophy). There, Mishima observed: "In contemporary Japan, Wang Yangming's teachings are buried in the dust, or left aside deep in a stack of books on a shelf." Mishima recognized the important role played by the Wang Yang-ming school in bringing about the Meiji Restoration of 1868. In an effort to test Mishima's characterization of the Wang Yang-ming school as "a revolutionary school," Noguchi traces the extent to which scholars of that school interpreted the seventh chapter of the Mencius as a statement of the way of true kings or as a form of revolutionary thought. But Noguchi's aim is also much wider: he examines many passages in the Mencius which were crucial to the formation of Japanese Wang Yangming thought, showing thus not only the distinctive features of the Japanese school, but additionally how Wang Yangming teachings came into being.


Odajima explains that most studies of Kaibara Ekken examine Ekken's Taigiroku 大疑録 (Record of Grave Doubts), comparing it either to Zhu Xi's philosophy or that of the kogaku school.
Odajima states that his study will not depart from that well established path. Thus, he considers the extent to which Ekken's world view and his philosophical methodology derive from and/or are comparable with those of Zhu Xi. Nevertheless, Odajima emphasizes that his concern is with Ekkengaku, or Ekken's learning, including Ekken's Confucian thought, his studies of botany, medicine, history, geography, linguistics, and Shintō. Odajima analyzes Ekken's Yamato honzō (Flora and Fauna of Japan), an analytic taxonomy of over 1,550 objects of nature in Japan. Odajima sees the Yamato honzō as typifying Ekken's many achievements in the realm of natural science. Then, from the more organic perspective of Ekkengaku as a whole, Odajima interprets the Taigiroku, especially as it relates to Ekken's scientific research on the world of nature.

Ogata Korekiyo readily acknowledges that he is an eighth generation descendant of one of Jinsai's disciples, and that, moreover, his family is related to Jinsai's first wife. In the first line of his conclusion, Ogata states, "Jinsai was a man of generosity, harmony, modesty, and kindness." He continues by praising Jinsai's virtues as a son, father, husband, and thinker in unreservedly positive terms. Though interesting and perhaps accurate, this article cannot be called critical scholarship given the author's evident, and readily admitted, biases.


This is an important reference work for studies of Japanese Confucians and Neo-Confucians. Typically the entrees give the Confucian's family name and his pen name, or gō, other names that he used, place of birth, the era name and the year of birth, the year of demise, the grave site, the school affiliation, occasional miscellaneous information, and a bibliography. Kangakusha denki oyobi chōjutsu shūran includes 1,256 such biographies, and lists some 14,800 books. Surnames are ar-
ranged according to the order of the kana syllabary. The information compiled is based on the critical use of bibliographies extant throughout Japan. Several indexes at the end of the work, for pen names, style names, and book names, provide alternative avenues for locating information.


To place *Edo ki no Jugaku* in the context of Okada's earlier scholarship, Yoshida first lists the ten major monographs that Okada has published. Yoshida categorizes them as studies of: (1) early-modern Chinese thought, especially that of the late-Ming period, (2) more general topics that center on Confucian thought, and (3) early-modern Japanese thought as compared to that of China. *Edo ki no Jugaku* belongs to the last category.

Yoshida relates that Okada's book is composed of two halves: the first, centering on the early Edo period, focuses on Yamazaki Ansai, Kaibara Ekken, and the kogaku movement; the second half examines the schools of Zhu Xi and Wang Yangming at the close of the Edo and beginning of the Meiji periods. Yoshida notes that *Edo ki no Jugaku* includes the 13 essays that Okada has either published or presented previously. Okada does not attempt a systematic, holistic historical interpretation, then, of Edo thought. Since Yoshida's book review can be seen as a set of reviews of Okada's journal publications, it will be summarized here more or less as such. Bibliographical data on, and recapitulations of, the chapters composing *Edo ki no Jugaku* are given below.


Okada recounts that Ansai's Kimon school of Zhu Xi Neo-Confucianism was very influential throughout the Edo period. Despite the philosophical depth of Kimon doctrines, scholars of Japanese thought have often either neglected them or found them to be
disagreeable. From the perspective of its notion of tainin (C. tiren), or "sincere personal experience," Okada examines Kimon teachings on methodology, heterodoxies, duty, the mind's "storehouse of wisdom," and practical learning. Okada claims that because the crucial Kimon doctrine is tainin jitoku or "sincere personal experience and self-realization," naimenteki introspective research is extremely important. Okada suggests that if the basic spirit of Zhu Xi's practical learning is centered around ideas about sincere personal experience and self-realization (C. zide ; J. jitoku), then Ansai's Kimon school is an exceptionally excellent branch of Zhu Xi's school. Okada also admits that the Kimon school later became very kokusuishugi, or nationalistic. Yoshida notes that this essay exemplifies the style and content of Okada's scholarship.

(2) "Kaibara Ekken no jugaku to jitsugaku" (Kaibara Ekken's Neo-Confucianism and Practical Learning). Seinan gakuin daigaku bunri ronshū 西南学院大学文理論集 15.1 (October 1970).

Okada states that, while Ekken was a disciple of Zhu Xi's ideas, he nevertheless doubted many of them. And, though he never overcame his skepticism, Ekken remained Zhu's disciple until the end. This tension between doubt and fidelity was, Okada asserts, a distinctive aspect of Ekken's thought. Okada recognizes links between Ekken's objective and rationalistic practical learning and Zhu Xi's discussions of investigating things, plumbing principles, and the relationship between principle and material force. However, he contends that the driving force behind Ekken's avid pursuit of practical learning was the notion of humaneness as a mystic virtue of ultimately cosmic proportions, one enabling a person to form one body with the universe. Okada also views Ekken's practical learning in terms of his achievements in the natural sciences and geography, and vis-à-vis Ekken's criticisms of Zhu Xi's thought.

(3) "Yuikiron to rigaku hihan ron no tenkai" (The Development of Materialism and Critiques of the Neo-Confucian School of Principle).

This paper summarizes one that Okada presented at the Jūhachi seiki no Chūgoku shisō kenkyūkai 十八世紀の中国思想研究会
(Society for Research on 18th-century Chinese Thought) in California, June 1977.

(4) "Tai Shin (1724-1777) to Nihon kogakuha no shisō" 戴震と日本古学派の思想 (Dai Zhen and the Thought of the Japanese School of Ancient Learning). Seinan gakuin daigaku bunri ronshū 18.2 (February 1978).

According to Yoshida, Okada's third essay recapitulates the fourth; thus only the latter will be summarized here. Okada explains that the development of Chinese thought reveals a movement away from vacuity and towards materialist accounts of substantial reality. Okada notes how several Ming thinkers rejected Neo-Confucian rationalism, advocated materialism, and proclaimed their return to ancient learning, calling Confucius and Mencius their teachers. Okada portrays the late-Ming, early-Qing thinker, Dai Zhen, as the successor to this trend toward materialism. Moving to Japan, Okada describes the kogaku, or ancient learning, movement, as a philosophically-materialistic rejection of Neo-Confucian rationalism. Yoshida expresses mild reservations about Okada's terminology, which does seem too abstract.

In evaluating the book as a whole, Yoshida concludes that Okada's achievement in Edo ki no Jugaku consists in showing that the ideas of the late-Ming, early-Qing schools of Zhu Xi and Wang Yangming in China were reaffirmed in the Tokugawa and early Meiji periods in Japan. Yoshida states that earlier scholars were not aware of the extent to which late-Ming Neo-Confucian thinking permeated late-Edo thought. Okada's analyses establish, Yoshida adds, that solid research on bakumatsu Neo-Confucianism needs to be thoroughly grounded in studies of late-Ming, early-Qing Neo-Confucian developments.


(6) "Minmatsu Jugaku no tenkai, bakumatsu no shin Shu-ōgaku" 明末儒学の展開 廄末の新朱子学 (The Emergence of Neo-Confucianism at the End of the Ming Dynasty, the New Schools of Zhu Xi and Wang Yangming in the Late-Tokugawa Period). Kyūshū daigaku
Yoshida explains that since essays four through eight are rather similar, he reviews them collectively. As representatives of the Zhu Xi school, Okada discusses Ōhashi Totsuan 橋諦灌 (1816-62), Kusumoto Tansan 楢本端山 (1828-83), Kusumoto Sekisu 楢本誠水 (1832-1916), and Namiki Rissui 並木稲水 (1829-1914). Vis-a-vis the Wang Yangming school, Okada examines Hayashi Ryōsai 林良寛 (1807-49), Ikeda Sōan 池田道徳 (1813-78), Yoshimura Shūyō 吉村秋陽 (1797-1866), Higashi Takusha 東浪渦 (1832-91), Kasuga Sen'an 春日深蔭 (1811-1878), and Yamada Hōkoku 山田方谷 (1805-77). Although these thinkers lived through a monumental period of social, political, economic, and intellectual transformation in Japanese history, Okada focuses on them due to their personal exemplification of the Neo-Confucian notion of tainin jītoku. Yoshida states that these essays perfectly explicate Okada's pet theory from the last several years. In his concluding evaluation of Edo ki no Jugaku, Yoshida admits that Okada's characterization of late-Ming Neo-Confucianism in terms of tainin jītoku is not overly simplistic. Yoshida observes, however, that precisely what tainin jītoku involves, especially in terms of communicable knowledge, is not clearly explained.

(9) "Hayashi Ryōsai to Ōshio Chūsai" 林良寛と大塩中泰 (Hayashi Ryōsai and Ōshio Chūsai). Tōyō bunka 東洋文化 reprint of nos. 30-32 (June 1973).
Yoshida reviews essays nine and ten jointly. Of the bakumatsu Neo-Confucians who addressed the notion of tainin jitoku, Okada most esteems the Zhu Xi scholar Kusumoto Tanzan and the Wang Yangming schoolman, Hayashi Ryōsai. In essays nine and ten, Ryōsai is the central figure. Essay nine explores the teacher-disciple relationship between Ōshio Chūsai (1798-1837) and Ryōsai, comparing and contrasting their approaches to Wang Yangming's thought. Essay ten examines Ryōsai's debates with his philosophical adversary, Kondō Tokuzan (1766-1844), a Zhu Xi scholar who had studied under Bito Nishū.

Okada examines the life and thought of the bakumatsu Wang Yangming scholar, Ikeda Sōan, with a special emphasis on his embodiment of tainin jitoku.

Yoshida states that this is the most richly detailed essay of the entire book. It was originally written as the kaisetsu, or expository essay, for the first volume of the Complete Works of Kusumoto Tanzan and Kusumoto Sekisui. Tanzan (1828-83) and Sekisui (1832-1916), bakumatsu followers of Ansai's Kimon school of Zhu Xi studies, were sharp critics of Wang Yangming's teachings. Yoshida adds incidentally that scholars of Edo Neo-Confucianism must be familiar with the Kusumoto Tanzan, Sekisui zenshū as it includes not only the poetry and prose of the Kusumoto brothers, but also Japanese writings on the history of Neo-Confucianism, a keifu, or genealogy, of the Kimon school, and chapters juxtaposing ideas of the Zhu Xi and Wang
Yangming schools.

(13) "Nanmongaku to Ri Taikei—Ansai no gaku to Taikei no michi" (The Kusumoto School and Yi T'oegye, Ansai's School and the Way of Yi T'oegye). Okada presented this essay before the Ri Taikei gakkai (Society of Yi T'oegye Scholars) in Kyoto in 1980.

Okada clarifies here the nature of Yi T'oegye's impact on the bakumatsu Kimon scholarship of the Kusumoto brothers.


Okasaka discusses Sorai's Doku Shunshi, in which Sorai adumbrates his understanding of words and language as symbols. Okasaka notes how Sorai's views grew out of the Xunzi's essay on language, Zhengming (J. Seimei; "Rectifying Names"). In the Doku Shunshi, Sorai states that mei wa kigo nari (words as symbols), thus equating words with symbols. Okasaka discusses three aspects of Sorai's ideas about words as symbols which focus on the conventional significance of his understanding of symbols. These three aspects are: (1) the temporal context of the word's symbolic content, (2) the contractual context or the social agreement on the word's symbolic content, and (3) the notational context of the symbol or word as symbolic of what it denotes. He suggests that Sorai's view of words as symbols may be comparable to Charles Peirce's symbolic interpretation of

Okubo explains that Sorai clearly perceived how Edo had changed from a small castle town into a sprawling urban capital by the late-17th and early-18th centuries. His thoughts on Edo life are found in his Seidan, Taiheisaku, and Kenroku 銓録 (Record of Military Matters). Sorai was one of the few who realized that the socio-economic changes occurring in Edo—the explosive rise of a merchant and artisan presence that controlled much of the Edo economy—undermined the social, political, economic, and even military security of the bakufu and the samurai, for whom Edo was supposed to be a bastion of feudal security, power, and strength. As the warrior government and its samurai supporters became more and more economically dependent on commercial groups, i.e., as they came to live as though they were, in Sorai's words, "dwelling in an inn," their militaristic mode of life, based largely on the ultimate virtue of loyalty to the feudal lord, was compromised by luxury and sensual indulgence. To rectify the situation, Sorai called for seido 制度, or regulations which would strictly control every aspect of life among the Edo populace.


Ono's analysis of Sorai is interesting as a pre-Maruyama piece. Amusingly, Ono concedes that already more than enough literature on Sorai exists, noting the recent publication of Iwahashi Shigenari's Sorai kenkyū (Tokyo: Seki shoin, 1934) and Nomura Kontarō's 野村兼太郎 Ogyū Sorai (Tokyo: Sanshōdō, 1934). Ono states that Sorai's learning, in propagating "the way of the ancient kings" in Japan, was "nothing more than an attempt at absolutizing and strengthening the principle of supreme rule by the bakufu (bakufu shugi no zettai kyōka no tame no mono de aru 幕府主義の絶対強化のためのものである, p. 1481). Ono even goes so far as to suggest that Sorai's philosophy was self-serving: would not Sorai the man be required, Ono asks rhetorically, if the bakufu actually decided to resurrect the
ancient rites and music of the sage kings? After all, it was Sorai's philosophy which claimed to expound them correctly. This anti-Sorai view differs markedly from later post-Maruyama studies.


Ozeki treats the debate between Sorai and his critics by first analyzing Sorai's attacks on Zhu Xi and Itō Jinsai, noting the vehemence with which those attacks were delivered. Ozeki then traces the later critiques of Sorai by Ishikawa Rinshō 石川鹿洲 (1707-57), Mori Tōkaku 森東郭 (1729-1801), Kamei Shōyō 髙見昭陽 (1773-1836), Kani Yōsai 蟻養齋 (1705-78), Nakai Chikuzan 中井竹山 (1730-1804), Tominaga Sōrō 東傍浪 (1732-65), Inoue Kinga 井上金娥 (1732-84), Hattori Somon 藤部蘇門 (1724-1804), and Ishikawa Kozan 石川二山 (1736-1810). Most interesting is Ozeki's interpretation of these thinker's often acerbic and pointedly critical reactions against Sorai. The vehemence found in anti-Sorai attacks was, Ozeki suggests, generated by the mean-spirited nature of Sorai's own critiques of Jinsai and Zhu Xi.


Rai examines the life of Bitō Nishū, one of the key figures in the Kansei educational reforms that Matsudaira Sadanobu 松平定信 (1758-1829) enacted at the Seidō 聖堂, or "Sage's Hall," of the Hayashi Academy. At first a student of Sorai's learning, Nishū later converted to the Zhu Xi school. Rai organizes his brief biographical account around the three places that Nishū lived. The first was Kawanoe 川之江, in Iyo 伊予 province (now Ehime 愛媛 prefecture) on Shikoku, where Nishū was born and raised. The second was Osaka, where he first studied Sorai's thought, but later switched to the Zhu Xi school. Rai notes that despite Nishū's conversion, he was never a pure Zhu Xi schoolman. Instead, he vacillated, mixing Cheng-Zhu learning
with poetic themes harking back to Sorai's kobunigaku. Finally, Rai details Nishū's life in Edo, where Nishū served, from 1791 until his death, as one of the new, supposedly orthodox, lecturers on Zhu Xi's learning at the Seidō.


Sakasai examines the historical bases of Jinsai's learning in order to reevaluate the nature of the school of ancient learning. While Sakasai questions the validity of Maruyama's accounts of the kogaku school, his thinking was obviously influenced by him. For example, Sakasai speaks of Jinsai's ideas effecting the dissolution of Zhu Xi's philosophy. In part one, Sakasai discusses Jinsai's learning in terms of its denial of the continuative nature of human nature and the cosmos, suggesting that the political implications of this denial amounted to an indirect critique of the ruling samurai estate. In part two, Sakasai analyzes the connections between Jinsai's thought and its socio-economic bases in Tokugawa history: Jinsai's philosophy developed in the midst of the emergence of a commercial economy in Kyoto. Jinsai's thinking partially fulfilled the needs of those involved in that economy for a philosophy which recognized the desires and feelings so important to them, and the flux of history which had brought them, as urban commercialists, into being. Sakasai thus sees Jinsai's empiricism and rationalism as responding to the emergence of a commercial economy in Kyoto.


Sakuma examines Nakae Tōju's thought in the final three years of stage, Sakuma suggests, was characterized by Tōju's yuishinron teki shisō sekaikan 唯心論的三種世界観, or "mind-only worldview." His spiritualistic perspective conceived of the
mind as the original substance of reality, transcending space and time, and life and death. This spiritualism colored Tōju's interpretations of the three religions, i.e., Confucianism, Buddhism, and Daoism. Sakuma denies, incidentally, that Tōju believed that the three religions were one: rather Tōju saw Confucianism as the true religion. He accommodated Buddhism and Daoism when they meshed with Confucianism; otherwise, he criticized them. Kokoro no junka 心の純化, or "purification of the mind," served as a foundation of Tōju's learning. Sakuma views the latter as having come only from Wang Yangming's brand of Neo-Confucian teachings, and not from those of Zhu Xi or Buddhism.

Sakuma sees Sokō's thought as essentially Confucian in structure, but meant in content to serve the purposes of the early rulers of the Tokugawa. This was especially true of the so-called Yamaga-ryū heigaku 山鹿流兵学, or "the Yamaga School of Martial Philosophy." Historically, Sakuma suggests that by age 35, Sokō, in his Shūkyō yōroku 修教要録 (Essentials of Self-Cultivation), was beginning to criticize Ming Neo-Confucians for their useless and impractical overemphasis on mind control. Sokō's critiques relied on ideas about jitsugaku, or practical learning, found within the Zhu Xi school's own critical opinions regarding Ming Neo-Confucians, especially those belonging to Wang Yangming's school. Within ten years, Sokō turned the same criticisms on the Zhu Xi school itself, thus laying the foundations for his own philosophy. The latter culminated in the Seikyō yōroku 聖教要録 (Essentials of the Sagely Confucian Teachings). Sakuma concludes by noting that Sokō's lifelong dream, serving the Tokugawa regime as a martial philosophy teacher, was never realized. Yet he adds that in formulating a military ideology, Sokō in effect performed the same role that a bakufu ideologue would have.


This brief article gives a summary account of the textual
history of Sorai's Seidan. In the latter, Sorai offered his own ideas about how to reform Tokugawa Japan so as to solve many of the social, political, and economic problems which plagued the samurai world. Sorai composed the Seidan, and the Taiheisaku, at the request of the shogun Yoshimune. Sasagawa provides a detailed list of the topics discussed in the four chapters of the Seidan.


Sawai examines Sorai's Benmei and his Ken'en zuihitsu in an effort to unveil Sorai's view of the Daxue (J. Daigaku; Great Learning). Sorai believed that either Zengzi 子 , a disciple of Confucius, or a disciple of Zengzi's school, produced the Daxue. Sorai believed the Daxue to be a more purely Confucian work than the Zhongyong (J. Chūyō; Doctrine of the Mean); he also considered the Daxue to be closer to Confucius's day than to the time of Mencius. Unlike Jinsai, Sorai accepted the Daxue as a legitimate Confucian text. Sawai shows that while Sorai rejected Zhu Xi's emendations of the Daxue, Sorai's interpretations of the work were, in the end, closer to Zhu Xi's than they were to those of Jinsai. Properly speaking, Sorai held, the Daigaku is one of the ki 記 (C: jì; records) which are included in the Raiki 礼記 (C: Liji; Records of the Rites); the Daigaku was not, Sorai asserted, an independent book. Nevertheless, because the Daigaku chapter of the Raiki does describe ritual behaviour, Sorai saw it as an exceptionally valuable resource for governing through adherence to the ancient rites and music.


Ch'ien Mu (Qian Mu) praises T'oegye as a shanshi 善士 , or "a good scholar-gentleman," not just of Korea but of all East Asia, including China and Japan. As such, T'oegye set his intentions on the moral Way, aspired to become either a sage or a worthy, based himself in virtue, relied upon humaneness in making
decisions, and amused himself in the literary and fine arts. To explicate the significance of a shanshi, Ch'ien Mu contrasts Eastern thinking, which tends to be holistic, highly ethical, and integrally artistic, with Western thinking, which is much more compartmentalized, often "value free," and not necessarily aesthetic. Ch'ien Mu clearly believes the Eastern way to be superior: he notes how the specialized, amoral approach of Western science gave the world the atomic bomb, nuclear weapons, capitalism, imperialism, etc. These horrendous discoveries would most likely never have been produced by a shanshi, since for the latter science would have involved ethics and art, and a consciousness that all things, animate and inanimate, are akin to one another. This quasi-mystical understanding would have obviated the invention of things which, while conducive to self-profit, destroyed the greater totality of life.


Seya explains the special political backing that Mito learning had as a domain school, given the status of Mito domain as one of the gosanke 御三家, or the three honorable families, i.e., the three closest and most powerful collateral relatives of the Tokugawa shoguns. The lord of Mito domain was so powerful that he was sometimes referred to as tenka no fuku shōgun 天下の副将軍, or "the vice-shogun of the realm." Further, the Mito lord was required to reside permanently in Edo, giving him a proximity to the halls of shogunal power rare among daimyō. Mito scholars realized the high standing and exceptional power of their lord. Seya examines the impact of this unique political crucible on the development of Mito ideas from their beginnings through the end of the Tokugawa. Seya particularly examines the extent to which townspeople and farmers rose from within the Mito-sponsored school, the Shōkōkan 聖孝館, to prominent positions in either the domain or bakufu administrations between 1789 and 1871, when the han was finally abolished. Seya also notes how the Shōkōkan, named in 1672, and based in Edo until 1829, attracted scholars of various affiliations, including both the Hayashi and Kimon schools of Zhu Xi philosophy, as well as the schools of ancient learning and national
learning. Though the Edo branch was closed in 1829, the Mito branch of the Shōkōkan remained active. Shōkōkan scholars, for example, readily responded to crises within the Mito government. They were also increasing conscious of the foreign threat. Thus, between 1789-1830, Shōkōkan scholars produced, as a new ideological trend, iōi 撃鬼, or "repel the barbarian" thought.


Shimizu's bibliography begins with Naitō Chisō's 内藤直望 (d. 1903) article, "Jinsai-Sorai gakujutsu no dōi" 仁齋佐良學術の同異 (Differences and Similarities in Jinsai and Sorai's Scholarly Methods), published in Tōyō tetsugaku 東洋哲学 3.2 (1896). Shimizu lists articles in scholarly journals, chapters in anthologies, monographs, articles in newspapers and monthly reports, speeches, dialogues, interpretive essays, book reviews, etc., through the early 1980's. While he includes Joseph John Spae's biography of Itō Jinsai published through the Monumenta Serica Monograph series (1948), along with IA. B. Radul'evskii's "Materialisticheskia filosofiya Ito Dzinsai (1627-1705), Sovetskoe Vostokovedenie II (Moscow: Institut Vostokovedeniia, Akademiia Nauk, S.S.S.R., 1941), no other Western language studies of Jinsai are presented. Still, this is a valuable resource for scholars of Jinsai, Tōgai, and/or the Kogidō.

An earlier version of this bibliography appeared under the title of "Shuyō sankō bunko" 主要参考文献 (Important Scholarly Literature), in Itō Jinsai/Itō Tōgai, Yoshikawa Kōjirō and Shimizu Shigeru, eds., NST, vol. 33 (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1971): 654-57. There, Shigeru is given as Shimizu's first name, not Tōru. Shimizu also presents a bibliography of Jinsai and Tōgai's works, listing Tokugawa, Meiji, Taishō, and Shōwa editions of them. Preceding these bibliographies is the "Itō Jinsai Itō Tōgai ryaku nenpu" 伊藤仁齋伊藤東涯略年譜 (An Abbreviated Chronological Biography of Itō Jinsai and Itō Tōgai), ed. by Shimizu, with a "Kaidai" 解題 (Explanatory Analysis) on Jinsai's Gomō jigi, his Kogaku sensei bunshū 古学先生文集 (Collected Writings of the Teacher of Ancient Learning), and Tōgai's Kokin gakuhen 古今學変 (The Philosophical Transformation from Antiquity to Modern Times).