Thomas Hill Green in Modern East Asia
and the Thought of Mao Zedong

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This paper was inspired by the recent interesting references to possible formative influences of the idealist philosophy of Thomas Hill Green on the thought of Mao Zedong (Wakeman 1973: Part V; Schram 1974:39). The purpose is neither to oppose the view that there was such an influence, nor to replace the thesis developed regarding the specifics of the relationship between Green and Mao. Properly speaking, the present paper is a footnote to works that already enjoy critical acclaim as major contributions to the study of Mao’s thought. If this footnote sheds an additional ray of light on the reason why it is possible to posit what appears as an improbable relationship, the author will feel amply rewarded for having assayed the task.

The following essay presents two major contentions. The one maintains that study of the Japanese interpretations of Green in the Meiji era is indispensable for proper understanding of the Chinese appreciation of Green. The other holds that in their attempt to comprehend Green, the Japanese scholars depended heavily on traditional East Asian categories of thought, and if Mao appears indeed to be indebted to Green’s philosophy, the reason lies not so much in the latter’s newness to Mao as in its congeniality to older Chinese teachings. The second of the two contentions coincides with the views of the school of Mao studies that emphasizes the importance of the Chinese heritage in his thought as the basis of his utilization of the philosophies of modern Europe (e.g., Schwartz 1968).

Yang Changji 楊昌泰 and His Japanese Sources

It has been established that Mao’s first channel to Western thought was Yang Changji, professor of philosophy and ethics at Hunan’s First Normal School, which the young Mao attended. Yang’s best known work, at least outside China, is a slender volume entitled Xiyang lunli zhuyi shuping 西洋倫理主義述評 [Exposition and Critique of Western Ethical Thought], published posthumously in Shanghai in 1923. It is a collection of serialized articles that originally

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appeared as Gezhong lunli zhuyi zhi lueshu ji gainiping 各種倫理主義之概評 [Exposition and Critique of Various Schools of Ethics] in Dongfang zazhi 东方雜誌, from February to April 1916. The sixth chapter, or the April portion of the articles, concerns this essay most closely, because it was there that Yang presented T. H. Green under the rubric of Ziwo shixian zhuyi 自我實現主義 [Doctrine of Self-Realization].

The ground for my contention that we need to study the Meiji Japanese interpretations of Green can be found in these writings by Yang. He prefaced both the article and the monograph by noting that his work was an "interpretation" (yi-shu 訳述 ) of the studies of a Japanese scholar by the name of Fukai Yasubumi 深井安文 . The difficulty is that his name appears in none of the biographical dictionaries of Japanese writers, a difficulty compounded by the fact that Yang did not mention the title(s) of the work(s) that he alleged to be interpreting. Unless Fukai Yasubumi is a fictitious name, the mystery can only be solved by concluding that it was a mistake (or misprint) for Fukasaku Yasubumi 深作安文, who in 1911 became an associate professor of ethics at Tokyo Imperial University. Before the publication of Yang’s work in 1916, Fukasaku wrote a great many articles for scholarly journals. Some were collected in Rinri to kokumin dōtoku 倫理と国民道德 [Ethics and National Morality], published in the same year. Fukasaku also authored the "Rinrigaku" 倫理学 [Ethics] section of Dai shisō ensai europeia 大思想エヌサイヨーピエイア [Great Encyclopedia of Thought], which was published in Tokyo in 1928 and included a chapter on Green. Although the publication date of the latter work presents a problem, the evidence is overwhelming that Yang’s chapter on Green was taken from Fukasaku’s writings on the same subject included in these two works.

The chapter on the doctrine of self-realization in Yang’s Exposition compares with the parallel portions of Fukasaku’s books in the following manner. The introductory paragraph of Yang’s chapter, consisting of two lines is a verbatim translation of a passage in the first chapter of II (pp. 8-9). The second paragraph, with nine lines of characters, was taken mostly from the same chapter of II (pp. 7, 9) and partly from chapter 5 of II (p. 117). The third paragraph, which contains fourteen lines, is another verbatim translation of I (pp. 45, 46). The fourth paragraph is a continuation from the same source, except for one and one-half lines in the middle which come from II (p. 92). The fifth paragraph includes four lines from I (p. 46), two from II (87, 88), approximately two unidentifiable lines, and another two representing a summary, probably in Yang’s own words, of the preceding paragraph. The remainder of Yang’s chapter, composed of five paragraphs, is almost entirely a translation from II
In Yang’s translation, Fukasaku’s comments and criticisms of Green are twofold. First, Green’s ethical theory, which recognized the importance of moral ideals in human action, was unique among English ethical thinkers dominated by empiricism and hedonism who contended that man was as unaffected by moral ideals as animals. At the same time the doctrine of self-realization had an advantage over Kantian rationalism, or the doctrine of "self-conquest." Whereas, according to Fukasaku, Kant erroneously maintained that all desires were the roots of evil and their annihilation the genesis of morality, Green rightly claimed that the desires themselves transcended morality and that their satisfaction in harmony with other components
of the self was the necessary element of a moral life. Second, Green's theory was problematic for two reasons. On the one hand, it regarded man merely as an instrument of the eternal spirit; on the other, it contained too many meanings, such as the "march" of God, the manifestation of eternal spirit, and the intellectual and other activities of man. The truth was that mankind was an autonomous and self-determining being with his own independent, not reflected, worth. In short, Green's theory placed too much emphasis on the world spirit and made little of mankind.

Green and Meiji Nationalism

The negative tone on which Yang's "interpretation" of Fukasaku closed is no indication of the general reception the Japanese accorded Green's thought. On the contrary, he was the most popular Western thinker in Japan from the late-nineteenth century through the first decade of the twentieth. His popularity reached its apogee on the eve of the Russo-Japanese War, when the first complete Japanese translation of his Prolegomena to Ethics was published (Green 1902), and none other Inoue Tetsujirō (1905), professor of ethics at Tokyo Imperial University and the most influential academic politician of the time, recommended study of Green's philosophy. Fukasaku himself was a leading disseminator of Green, and his articles actually ended with a more positive evaluation of Green than Yang's translation implied. What Yang "interpreted" from Fukasaku is of more than antiquarian interest if it is placed in the context of Green's significance in Meiji Japan.

The important reason for Green's popularity was the coincidence between his teachings, as the Japanese understood them, and the new turn of Japanese nationalism arising in the early 1890s. Nationalism was the preponderant mode of thought and behavior of the Japanese once their country became incorporated into the world political and economic system in the mid-nineteenth century. No Japanese questioned the importance of avoiding the colonization of Japan by the Western powers; differences existed only in the ways devised for maintaining national independence. Most advocated an authoritarian government, a strong military, and a charismatic emperor. Some thought that the best method was to release the creative energy of the individual through political and civil liberation. Those who believed in the latter approach professed an adherence to the political doctrine of Utilitarianism as espoused by John Stuart Mill before his departure from its classical formulation, which featured a laissez-faire economy and the safe-guarded political rights of the individual. These two approaches to national strength were clearly reflected in the second decade of the Meiji era in the major politi-
cal battles between the People's Rights movement, demanding a democratic government, and the oligarchic government of the Meiji emperor. In either case, nationalism in those days was open-ended in the sense that, for the sake of their country's strength, the Japanese allowed themselves to be influenced liberally by things Western.

The issue, however, was settled for the foreseeable future in the Constitution of 1889. The advocates of a powerful imperial government won out when the emperor declared his overweening prerogatives and granted the people a measure of freedom and rights as an act of grace on his part. With the capitulation of the People's Rights movement, the ideas of J. S. Mill and English liberalism were transformed from what had been a nuisance to the Meiji government into a positive embarrassment for their erstwhile exponents, who lost little time in shedding them. A stage began in which Japanese nationalism was no longer in any way restrained by liberal political doctrine. The best illustration of this swing was the Imperial Rescript on Education issued in 1891. The emperor not only claimed that the bounden duty of his "good and faithful subjects" was to "guard and maintain the prosperity of Our Imperial Throne coeval with heaven and earth," but also prescribed to the Japanese such traditional, and some Confucian, virtues as filial piety, modesty, and self-sacrifice unto death in case of war, in order to protect "the State." Hereafter, things Western would be welcome only so long as they conformed to the spirit of the Rescript and Japan's national identity deriving from it.

It was at this juncture that T. H. Green was introduced into Japan by Nakajima Rikizō (1892; 1893), an idealist philosopher and student of Kant. In all likelihood, it was not Nakajima's intention to provide greater momentum to the new wave of Meiji nationalism by interpreting Green for his countrymen. The political situation of the time and the part intellectuals chose to play in it as the guardians of the Rescript, however, promptly removed Green's thought from Nakajima's control so that it might be tailored to a nationalist fit. Fukasaku's exposition and commentary which Yang translated offer a fair overview of Green's Prolegomena to Ethics as well as represent the Meiji standards in Green studies.

In England, Green was the first philosopher and political activist to criticize both contractual theory of the state implicit in the early nineteenth-century notion of political freedom and absolute exonomic freedom of the individual explicit in the principles of liberalism. Green earned lasting recognition by supplying English political thought of his day with a theoretical framework to rectify the excesses of liberalism. As Fukasaku's article intimated, Green did so first by pointing out the fallacy of Rousseau's concept of the
state of nature—the antithesis of society—in which men existed in isolation from each other, and then by reinstating the Aristotelian concept of man’s existence, the moral good that mankind had to achieve would be "good for the person who conceives it with others" (Green 1906: 232); namely, goodness which is good for "you" equally as it is for "me." The ultimate state of self-realization that Green envisioned involved the individual in selfless devotion to the public good common with one’s own. In the light of this moral requirement, Green believed it to be the government’s duty to interfere with the economic activities of the individual. In relation to contemporary English social conditions, Green’s ethical and political doctrines were an appeal to prosperous Victorians to heed the moral and material plight of the destitute working class. In the parlance of traditional political thought, self-realization was liberty, and common good, equality. Little wonder that Green came to be regarded as a precursor to the democratic socialism of later times (Ulam 1951).

How the precursor of democratic socialism in England became a prophet of nationalism in Japan ceases to be a puzzle if one recalls the role of J. S. Mill and English liberalism in Japanese political developments, leading to the Meiji Constitution, and if one examines Green’s relation to Mill. In the second decade of the Meiji era, there was no opposition between socialism and liberalism but between nationalism and (nationalistic) liberalism. The simple rule of alliance destined Mill’s opponents to become regarded as allies of the nationalists. To the extent that Green criticized laissez-faire economic and political theory, he was indeed Mill’s adversary, albeit a highly respectful one. The fact that Green was introduced into Japan at the time that Mill’s adherents abandoned their quest for a liberal and democratic government tipped the balance in favor of a nationalistic interpretation of Green’s thought.

Green’s concept of the "common good," or that which was good for society, also lent itself to the view that it was a plea for patriotism. Literally speaking, the Japanese were not entirely incorrect in contending that Green taught the importance of the development of society as a prior condition for the development of the individual, or self-realization. In emphasizing how correct Aristotle was, Green (1906: 218) declared laconically: "Without society, no person." This dictum had a ring similar to the familiar argument in the Meiji era that if Japan, like India, were conquered by an alien race, there would be no Japanese free and alive under its rule. The point the Japanese either missed or dismissed was that by "society" Green meant, above all, the relationship among men who recognized each other as persons equally entitled to rights and freedom. To put it differently, the basic fabric of society was constituted by this
recognition of the personality of a "Thou" by an "I" and vice versa (Green 1906: 218). For Green, then, the good of society was the good of actual human beings, not the good of an impersonal institution, the nation, mankind, or history. For him, "the ultimate standard of worth is an ideal of personal worth," and all other values were "relative to value for, of, or in a person" (Green 1906: 210). To Meiji-era Japanese, even when they were reading and explicating Green’s thought, "society" remained the whole which could be called by any number of terms, such as the state, the nation, and the country, and which somehow followed a developmental law all to itself, giving the individual a fringe benefit once it achieved its own well-being. Even Nakajima Rikizō (1913: 112), the least nationalistic of the Meiji exponents of Green, insisted that it was the development of society that implemented the realization of a person and not the other way around. The Japanese predilection was amply evidenced by their failure to take note of the question of equality implied in the "common good." Nishida Kitarō (1957), for instance, definitely conveyed the sense not of equality but of collectivity when he opposed "commonism" to individualism, by which he meant the individual’s isolation from others.

Thus, Green became the first English voice which sounded to Japanese ears like concurrence with their efforts to make their country strong.

Green and the Zhongyong

Despite its resounding success in Japan, Green’s thought was by no means the ideological backbone of post-constitution Meiji Japan. The essential ingredient of the latter was Confucianism (or Neo-Confucianism), which was reinstated by the Rescript on Education after having been submerged for more than two decades first by the strong current of nativist thought (kokugaku 国学) on the eve of the Meiji Restoration and later under the waves of Westernism following the Restoration. Inoue Tetsujirō, the leading architect of the national morality school (kokumin dōtoku 国民道德), which developed as a commentary on the Rescript, demonstrated the importance of Confucianism by writing monumental works on its various schools of the Tokugawa period. If nationalist ideologues read into Green’s concept of the common good something coinciding with their own goals, this was done in the context of Confucian teachings naturalized into Japanese ethical and political thought.

For that matter, Green was no exception. In the latter half of the Meiji era, it virtually became the rule that things Western pass a "Confucian examination" before being alloyed to Japanese nationalist symbols. If the idea was to substantiate traditional thought and
morality by philosophies from the West, it was never so admitted. In addition to its mistaken identity as a call for nationalism, Green's philosophy derived its persuasiveness from its compatibility with the classical Chinese Doctrine of the Mean or Zhongyong.

The first printed comparison of Green's philosophy to the teachings of the Zhongyong was probably that of Nishida Kitarō, published originally in 1904 as a series of articles and later in 1911 as a monograph, Zen no kenkyū [A Study of the Good]. Since Nishida (1957) made merely a passing remark in a few phrases, it is impossible to say more than that he saw a resemblance between the doctrine of self-realization and the concept of cheng (sincerity or the truth) in the Zhongyong. A more detailed treatment of the subject appeared in 1913 in the journal of the Teiyū Association for Ethical Studies in a response to a reader's inquiry. The reader suggested that the theory of self-realization had "a different name but the same meaning" as cheng (Aikawa 1913: 105). The response came from a columnist writing under the syllabic initials "Fu" and "Ya," presumably Fukasaku Yasubumi.

In the opinion of "Fu Ya," a comparison of self-realization to cheng was possible in three senses. First, self-realization as the "completion of one's potentiality" corresponded to the idea of cheng expressed in the opening sentence of the Zhongyong: "That which is bestowed by Heaven is called man's nature; the fulfillment of this nature is called the Way." Cheng denoted truthfulness to the complete nature that was within him. Second, given the self as a system of various desires unified by a rational will, harmonious activity of this system might be compared to the following passage from the Zhongyong: "Knowledge, humanity, and courage--these three are the virtues universally binding. And that by which they are practiced is one." In other words, mind, heart, and will constituted the self and were represented, respectively, by knowledge, humanity, and courage. Furthermore, as Zhu xi had said, the word "one" in the above citation was cheng itself, and self-realization was identical with cheng as a state of harmonious activity of the three virtues. Third, rational will was equally the core characteristic of cheng and the self in the theory of self-realization (Fu Ya 1913: 105-07).

Columnist Fu Ya's opinions were incorporated, in a more diffuse manner, into Fukasaku's main concern to establish a resemblance between Green's "self-realization" and the concept of cheng in the Zhongyong in such a way as to maximize, on the one hand, the importance of man's self-exertion toward moral ideals and, on the other, to identify moral ideals with the existing norms of the society in which he lived. To achieve the first objective, Fukasaku equated what he called Green's ethical activism, which demanded unstinting
effort toward the realization of one's ideal self, with the famous distich in the Zhongyong: "Cheng is the Way of Heaven. The attainment of cheng is the Way of man." Concerning the second, Fukasaku presented the following argument. Green believed that the laws, mores, customs, and rules of a society were projections of men's desires. For instance, his desires for possessions gave rise for laws protecting property. In turn, these norms formed and nourished man's conscience, guiding him in the path of right conduct. This belief of Green's was analogous to cheng, since the latter pointed toward an attitude of abiding by one's conscience. Like the Zhongyong, Green taught the importance of obeying the moral order of society (Fukasaku 1916: 93-96).

As in the case of the Japanese interpretations of the common good, these comparisons of Green's theory of self-realization to cheng were not free from problems. It was not correct to suggest, as Fukasaku did, that Green defended status quo societal institutions. Green may not have been a revolutionary, but neither was he a conservative who held that such institutions were infallible and immutable. In his judgment, they were right only to the extent that they conformed to the eternal spirit as revealed to man. Should they prove inconsistent with revealed truth, it was man's duty to rectify them. Moreover, conscience was for Green more that a mere plaster cast of societal norms. With it man could see beyond history, and this was his unique attribute arising from his relationship to the Absolute. Fukasaku (1916: 102) could not be brought into agreement with these dimensions of Green's thought, because he refused to accept the "eternal, perfect,...and divine" principle, the fundamental premise of Green's idealism, on the ground that it was an object of religious faith and defied the spirit of inquiry.

Owing most to this comparison with the Zhongyong and possibly partly to Fukasaku's confusing presentation, Green's moral teachings acquired an alarmingly Confucian touch. Men were fitted into one or another station in the five networks of human relationships and were told that fulfillment of the duty ascribed to each station was the command of conscience (Fukasaku 1916: 95). Fukasaku's montage was not irredeemably at variance with the original images of Green, for the latter did speak of men's stations in society and the responsibilities attached thereto. However, Green's idea of station differed significantly from the Confucian concept of human obligations. Occupational differentiation, for example, was both necessary for the people as a whole and desirable for individuals. To wit, it is neither necessary nor possible for every person to become, say, a butcher. As for the responsibility arising from one's station, Green meant performing well in one's vocation. What was important for
Green was that everyone find a station on his own accord and one suitable to his innate capacities. "Self-realization" meant, therefore, development of each to the best of his capability and according to his calling. The idea resembled, if anything, the Socratic teaching, "know thyself."

Furthermore, in Green’s view, "self-realization" was a political as well as an ethical concept. As pointed out earlier, its equivalent in the traditional language of political thought was "liberty." Defined in a more positive manner, it was a demand for the individual’s rights necessary for his personal development and for which government had to provide. These included the right to receive elementary schooling and the right to be protected against the capitalists’ abuse of the freedom of contract. In its own way, cheng was a prescription for government, but for a government immune to the kind of individual freedom that Green advocated.

With regard to the Zhongyong, it is noteworthy that Fukasaku refrained from leveling the same positivistic criticism against its idea of tian 天 (Heaven) that he directed against Green’s Universal Self-Consciousness. This is especially noteworthy in view of the fact that he thought there was a structural similarity between the relation of ethics to the Eternal Consciousness in Green’s philosophy and of ethics to tian in Confucianism. In this connection, columnist Fu Ya’s opinion is instructive. Fu Ya (1913: 106) wrote that cheng "has its foundation in the natural world, so that to follow it is the Way and the fulfillment of man’s nature." The implication is that tian is within, or coextensive with, the natural world inasmuch as cheng is its inherent characteristic. The point is that even though it is possible to argue that conceptually the continuity of being holds man and tian together, an assertion of such continuity may not stand empirical scrutiny. If Fukasaku’s reservation on the nature of Heaven was based on the same ground as Fu Ya’s reasoning on cheng, then his comparison of Green to the Zhongyong failed at a vital point.

Given these incongruities between Green and the Zhongyong, why did their resemblances loom larger than their differences in Meiji writings? There are three possible answers. First, within a limited scope, the similarity is striking. It is difficult to challenge the view that cheng is, at the human level, man’s self-completion of the highest moral good. Interestingly enough, some Chinese authors in Taiwan still concur with the Japanese on this question. One writer, Chen Shaoyong (1974: 108), recently noted that a "person’s self-realization" was the expression of the "combined force of cheng and ming 義 in the spirit of the self." Only a Chinese who sees an affinity between Green and the Zhongyong would sum up a teaching of this
Chinese classic as "the philosophy propositioning that the combined force of cheng and ming realizes the wellspring of the creative capabilities of the individual whose creative activities take place in the universe and holds as principle the achievement of individual development at the highest goal" (Chen Shaoyong 1974: 111).

Secondly, resuscitation of a Confucian classic in conjunction with a carefully selected Western philosophy was, after all, a welcome buttress to the Rescript on Education and Japan's "national morality." Fukasaku's insertion of the ethic of the five human ties into Green's concept of self-realization illustrates this point, since the duties arising from these relationships were fundamental moral imperatives of the Rescript. The national pride of the Meiji Restoration notwithstanding, it was in reality Green who sanctioned the revival of their traditional ethics, rather than the other way around.

Finally, Green was seen as allied with the Rescript and the proponents of national morality fighting against Utilitarianism. In his Prolegomena to Ethics, he attacked the Utilitarian denigration of moral philosophy. In Japan, this opposition met with an enthusiastic reception among the supporters of the Rescript to whom Utilitarianism was synonymous with hedonism. Self-indulgence in the pleasure of the senses ran counter to the moralism of the Rescript; nurturing national strength required self-denial on the part of the people. Those who opposed Utilitarianism in the political arena could bring the Confucian asceticism of the Rescript nearer to a victory over "hedonism" in the social arena by letting a foreigner fight their foreign enemy.

Some Reflections on Mao's Thought

One difficulty in assessing the relationship among T. H. Green, his Japanese exponents, Yang Changji, and Mao Zedong lies in the fact that it is far from self-evident to what extent Yang's translation represented his genuine judgments of Green's philosophy and the Japanese interpretations of it. As noted above, Yang closed his "interpretation" of Fukasaku with critical remarks. Even more disconcerting for the purposes of this paper, Yang gave no hint of the Japanese invocation of the idea of cheng. One must, however, avoid the hasty conclusion that Yang selected for translation only those passages that discredited Green in his eyes or that he omitted others because he disagreed with what they conveyed. This caution is justified by some simple facts. Yang wholeheartedly endorsed the idea of shixian lixiang wo (realization of the ideal self) as advocated by Green. Furthermore, Yang used as a textbook for his course Cai Yuanpei's translation of a work by Friedrich
Paulsen, a German neo-Kantian who Fukasaku (1916: 117) said belonged to "the Green school...that contributed significantly to ethical studies around the world," but whom Yang ignored completely in his "interpretation."

In order fully to reconstruct the relationship between Green and Mao, one at least must consult Yang’s Lunyu leichao [Topics from the Analects] and Dahua ji dushu lu [Reading Notes from the Dahua Study], on the one hand, and Mao’s Jiangtang lu [Notes from Lectures], on the other. A comparison between the first and the last of these sources brings to light both Yang’s view of Green and Mao’s reaction to it. The second work may reveal whether Yang read the Prolegomena firsthand or learned of it through Japanese studies. This task is indispensable, for even though Yang may have assimilated Yang’s judgments critically and selectively, the teacher’s judgments would still form a part of the student’s mental world. Unfortunately, none of these sources was available to me at the time of this writing, although Li Rui’s (1957; 1977) valuable and competent biography of the young Mao afforded a glimpse of them. In the absence of these vital works in their entirety, the following discussion relies primarily on Li Rui’s citations and concurs with the Chinese author that Mao put down what agreed with his thought even though it may not have originated in his own head. Furthermore, two realistic assumptions are made. First, Yang took cognizance of the Japanese contentions that Green was a nationalist and that his theory of self-realization was an Occidental equivalent of cheng. Second, whether or not he ultimately agreed with the Japanese views, he at least mentioned them to his students. These assumptions seem reasonable considering that Yang went to Japan in 1902 and spent several years there and that he was an accomplished Confucian scholar concerned about the fate of his own country.

Regarding the significance to Mao of the Japanese characterization of Green as a nationalist, no detailed discussion is necessary. Mao’s self-identification with China’s nationalistic cause is an accepted fact. He did not need to read Green as interpreted by the Japanese to become a nationalist himself. The truth probably was that a "patriot Green" commended himself favorably to Mao. At the same time, it is entirely possible that Mao responded more sensitively than the Japanese to the element of equality in Green’s idea of the common good, thereby confirming a nationalism that mobilized socialistic aspirations. As far as the socio-economic equality of the populace was concerned, it was not the Meiji Japanese but Mao and his fellow revolutionaries who attempted to follow Green’s prescription. Whether or not Green would have agreed with the Chinese on the methods used is another matter altogether.
As for the doctrine of self-realization and the teachings of the Zhongyong, their rudiments were at the very heart of Mao’s thought in his student days. Although he did not express himself as consciously associating one with the other, his understanding of one was noticeably affected by the other. For the purposes of exposition, the musical form of the fugue affords the best analogy. The Mao fugue consisted of two voices, each taking turns in presenting the theme, Man and the Universe. One voice declared and developed the theme as follows. Commenting on the saying that a brave man cuts off his arm if a venomous snake bites his hand, Mao wrote in his Jiangtang lu that the "man of ren 仁 loves the cheng of the world for all ages and loves not his body of his family" (Li Rui 1957: 38-39). In other words, for a man of ren the whole world was his body, and his own body or life and that of his family were its ultimately dispensable arms.

The idea was acted out dramatically in 1920 when, moving toward what became the Chinese Communist Party, Mao on the death of his mother asked his family to remember "that the burden of the nation’s difficulties required ‘abandoning the family for the nation’ and ‘concerning oneself with the large family and not merely the small family’" (Friedman 1974: 219-20). In these expositions the essence of cheng was the universal principle, the Truth, existing outside and independently of man. Cheng, however, became internalized in man in Mao’s composition entitled "Cai mu wen" [In Memory of Mother], which he wrote in eulogy to his mother who died in 1919, when he was 26, and shortly after he graduated from First Normal School. "My mother was noble-hearted. Above all she loved all people. Her untrammeled mercy moved all souls. Her far-reaching love issued forth from unalloyed cheng (Li Rui 1957: 8). In this requiem, the universal and impersonal principle was emphatically turned into a personal virtue of an individual human being.

To continue the musical analogy, if one line of the fugue registered its origins as the Zhongyong, the other entered the voice of none other than Green. It restated the man-and-universe theme in the following fashion: "The self of an individual is the small self (xiaow0 小我) and the self of the universe is the large self (daw0 大我); the self of an individual is the physical self (routi zhi wo 肉体之我) and the self of the universe is the spiritual self (jingshen zhi wo 精神之我)" (Li Rui 1957: 38). The subject was then developed thus: "Expand and enrich the sphere of the self [of the individual], and this is to turn the universe into one large self" (Li Rui 1957: 38). The terminology used in these passages are alien to the classics, and if their sources can be established at all, one of them is unmistakably Yang’s translation of Fukasaku,
especially the final paragraph. "The doctrine [of self-realization] declares," Fukasaku wrote (quoted in Yang Changji 1923: 38-39), "that the essence of the world is the great self-conscious spirit... Man-kind is no more than the carrier of this great spirit; the small self is no more than the organ for the self-realization of the large self. The large self is the end and the small self is the means." (Note the striking similarity between the means-end category in Fukasaku’s explication and the body-arms metaphor in the line cited above.) Mao’s sayings quoted here come from his Jiangtang lu, and if there is any doubt about whether Green made an impression on him, the circumstances surrounding that work— that it was the record of Yang’s lectures of either 1913 or 1914 and that Yang’s "interpretation" was first published in 1916— should decide the issue.

To those unconvinced skeptics, it may be pointed out in corroboration that the notion of the large self and the small self was very much in the air in China in 1918, suggesting that Green had become a mainstream current. In that year Hu Shi (1965: 103-04):

As I reviewed the life of my dead mother, whose activities had never gone beyond the trivial details of the home but whose influence could be clearly seen on the faces of those men and women who came to mourn her death,... I came to the conviction that everything is immortal. This line of reasoning led me to what may be called the religion of Social Immortality, because it is essentially based on the idea that the individual self, which is the product of the accumulated effect of the social self, leaves an indelible mark of everything it is and everything it does upon the large Self which may be termed Society, or Humanity, or the Greater Being... This Great Self lives forever as the everlasting monumental testimony of the triumphs and failures of the numberless individual selves.

Assuming that Mao took his vocabulary from Green through Fukasaku, the world he envisioned with it nonetheless resembled not that of Green, but of the classics. In order to support this contention, we must return to Mao’s note that to expand and enrich the individual self is to turn the universe into one large self. The point of this note is that its author saw the human self and the self of the universe as a continuum and, moreover, that he believed it possible for a small self to become a large self. It posits the same "continuity of being" that was mentioned above in connection with the discussion of Fukasaku’s "rationalist" approbation of the idea of tian in contrast to his positivistic criticism of Green. Mao envisaged "the universe" as the ultimate being that presupposed no other
existence but its own, whereas for Green the universe existed by virtue of the Universal Self-Consciousness or absolute principle. In Green’s system, man was fated never to become absolute principle no matter how far he expanded and enriched the sphere of his self.

Was the significance of Green's philosophy to Mao, then, merely a matter of providing him with a new vocabulary to give expression to an old thought? Possibly so. However, before dismissing the question as a proverbial case of pouring old wine into new skins, it may be remembered that in the transmission of Green to China through Japan, self-realization of an individual was wedded to both the social and the national good. Without the injection of the idea of the good of the populace and the good of China in the world community of nations, it is difficult to see how any classical doctrine of self-fulfillment through moral self-cultivation could have inspired any socially and nationally conscious modern Chinese. In addition, the time of Mao’s encounter with Green’s philosophy makes its impact vital and inescapable. Realistically speaking, self-realization is preeminently a problem of young adulthood when the search for self-identity for the sake of creativity is most intense. Mao came across Green’s theory of self-realization in his early twenties. After four years of independence from his parents and reckless wanderings in search of a vocation, he had just then found a tolerable lot as a student in a teachers college. It was at this point in his life, which coincided with a momentous change in China’s history marked by the fall of the Qing dynasty, that Mao first apprenticed himself patiently and intelligently to his lixiang wo as the leader of a political movement. Nothing summed up Mao’s task better than the opening statement of Yang’s "interpretation" (1923: 32): "To fulfill the developmental possibilities that the self possesses is called the realizing of the self; to make the realization of the self the highest goal of human conduct is called the doctrine of self-realization."

If the Zhongyong was so important to the young Mao, the questions inevitably may be asked of how, unlike the Japanese of the post-Rescript generation, he escaped the grasping hand of the ethic of the five human relationships and why he resorted to revolutionary means rather than the "golden mean" to transform Chinese society. Briefly, the answer to the first question lies in three areas. First, political conditions differed in China and Japan. The Japanese emperor’s demand for the people’s loyalty and filial piety was politically both expedient and necessary for those in power. In China, there was neither an emperor nor his ministers to make such a demand. Second, Yang’s view of the Confucian ethic is germane. He commended to his students the philosophy of the late-Ming scholar,
Wang Chuanshan 王船山 (Wang Fuzhi 王夫之), who believed that loyalty and filial piety did not mean serving one's lord and parents but the way of following the rules that govern one's body and mind (Li Rui 1957: 22). Third, and most important, however, was Mao's unfortunate relationship with his father, a man he found it exceedingly difficult to love in the way prescribed by tradition.

As to the second question, concerning his choice of revolutionary means, this writer is prepared only to respond in the form of another query: Does the title Zhongyong mean the center of two extremes placed on a horizontal line? It is not improbable that zhong yong represents a glass or two of wine with a meal every evening as opposed either to alcoholism or total abstinence. Similarly, is there a zhong between kindness and unkindness, definable as halfway between one and the other of these two poles? If the answer is in the affirmative, then sage-king Shun was certainly not a man of virtue. As the phrase zhongdi 中的, or hitting the bull's-eye, suggests, zhong yong seems not to point invariably to the middle of two extremes, but at times to the extremity itself, if it is the state of faultlessness. The vital issue is what is right. If Mao's revolutionary politics need to be explained in terms of this Chinese classical text because of the relevance to his pre-Communist phase, the key to the matter may be to revolutionize his view of zhong as "the mean" and accept the possibility that, for Mao, that which was right was zhong, not that which was "the mean" was right. (It is easier to argue that he got it all out of his system when he pledged allegiance to Marx and Lenin).

Conclusion

This paper was not written with a view that more proof is needed to sustain the thesis that China's traditional culture gave Mao more than the much publicized Shuihuzhuan 水滸傳 and Sanguo zhi yanyi 三國之演義. Neither was it written to trifle with the provocation, often heard nowadays, that for Mao all Western thought was tinted glasses to create an aura of mystery without substance. This writer realizes that Mao studied the Four Books first between ages eight and thirteen and again at age sixteen. There is also the possibility that in those years he merely memorized the classics without comprehending them. However, this writer contends that the old teachings engraved on Mao's memory would have been truly dead had not the Japanese, Yang Changji, and T. H. Green rendered them meaningful to the young Mao. Conversely, Green mattered to the East Asians because they saw in him a way of being patriotic and ethical as well as of liberating individual energies in contradistinction to the acquisitive individualism of capitalism.
In addition, this paper may serve as one more reminder that at least at one point in modern times, Japan was a way-station for Western civilization journeying to China, and by tracing the Japanese trails, explorers of Chinese history may still stumble on stones worth examining.

Notes

1. Hereafter, for convenience, "Rinrigaku" [Ethics] of the Great Encyclopedia is represented by I, and Rinri to kokumin dotoku by II.

2. The most notable example of this school was Fukuzawa Yukichi 福沢諭吉.

3. The official English translation of 1907 may be found in various publications. See, for example, Lu 1974.

4. In addition to the Prolegomena to Ethics, Green 1960 and Green 1888 are essential to obtain a fuller picture of his thought.

5. The following translations are free adaptations of de Bary, Chan, Watson 1970. In understanding the Zhongyong, I benefitted much from Akatsuka 1972.

6. The Meiji Japanese overlooked this point because their study of Green was solely based on the Prolegomena to Ethics and not on the Principles of Political Obligations.

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