Of the many Japanese travelers' accounts about their journeys in late Ch'ing China, Nishimura Tenshū's (1865-1924) 広瀬十兵衛 Kohan sokai roku 江漢遊記 [Notes on an Upstream Journey on the Yangtze River] is undoubtedly a distinguished one. Written in literary Chinese without punctuation and in diary style, Kohan sokai roku gives us a series of pictures of Shanghai, Nanking, and Hankow on the eve of the Hundred Days Reform of 1898, providing a Japanese journalist's views on Chinese tradition. Moreover, since Tenshū was a participant in rather than an observer of contemporary Sino-Japanese relations, the account itself is worthy of consideration as a valuable historical record. In the period of nearly a century from the time of its composition, though, few scholars have carefully examined his account. One of the reasons for this is that the account is not a single volume but is included in Tenshū's collected writings, Seki'en sensei bunshu 碧園先生文集, copies of which are rare and can be found in few libraries. Kohan sokai roku thus remains unknown to many readers interested in the history of modern Sino-Japanese rela-
tions. Below are some of the results of a study of this travel account and other relevant documents.¹

The Motives behind Tenshū's Journey

According to a statement by Tenshū at the very beginning of the Kōkan sokai roku, throughout his entire life he had held the position that, because the Japanese and Chinese were of a "common culture and common race" (dōbun dōshū 同文同種), the two peoples should maintain good neighborly relations. It was his aspiration to visit China and discuss that viewpoint with Chinese literati and statesmen. Granted two-months' leave by the resident of the Asahi shinbun 日日新聞 company in Tokyo, Tenshū (himself the chief editor of the newspaper) was thus able to realize his wish.²

Considering Tenshū’s academic background, it is reasonable to trust the statement that his journey was based on personal interest. Born into a family of samurai and Confucian scholars from the domain of Satsuma in 1865, Tenshū had been well-educated from childhood. As soon as Tokyo Imperial University established its department of Chinese classics in 1883, Tenshū easily passed the entrance examination, and his scholarship was soon recognized by his classmates and professors in the department. His career was similar in certain ways to that of Naitō Konan 内藤湖南 (1866-1934), his close friend and the writer of his epitaph. Being a journalist and an editor, Tenshū published numerous articles on the current political situation and on Japanese intellectual history in the Asahi newspaper; as a researcher of Chinese literature, he was appointed lecturer at Kyoto Imperial University.³

A main argument of his representative work, Nihon Sōgaku shi 日本国學史 [A History of Japanese Neo-Confucianism], was that Neo-Confucianism was a general principle in Tokugawa education and it would remain functional in establishing modern "national morality" (kokumin dōtoku 国民道德) which emphasized loyalty to the throne and patriotism. He considered Western learning a kind of utilitarian learning and advocated that the Neo-Confucian tradition of moral cultivation should be revived. And, he realized that both the Japanese and the Chinese were confronting the difficult problem of how to keep their traditional values while being shocked by the impact of the West. In 1899, he even submitted a written statement to Kabayama Sukenori 桑山資紀 (1837-1922), the Minister of Education and a fellow Satsuma provincial, suggesting that the Shōheikō 昌平學, the old Neo-Confucian academy sponsored by the Tokugawa shogunate, should be reestablished.⁴

However, from an article by Oka Kōshichirō 岡重次郎 which was entitled "Tenshū hakase to Chō Shidō" 天因博士と張之洞 (Dr. Tenshū

29
and Chang Chih-tung) and published shortly after Tenshū’s death, we
know that Tenshū’s journey to the Yangtze Basin was not a purely
personal activity, but was in great measure a special mission to
improve Sino-Japanese relations. The international background of
that mission may be considered as follows.

After the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95, relations between the
two countries had steadily deteriorated. Although the Treaty of
Shimonoseki of 1895 had ensured Japan new rights in the Yangtze Basin
(besides those rights obtained previously by other powers)—such as
"the opening of new ports (Shashi, Chungking, Soochow, and Hangchow),
steam navigation rights on the Yangtze River from Ichang to Chungking
and on the Woosung River from Shanghai to Soochow and Hangchow, and
manufacturing rights in the treaty ports that exempted goods produced
from tariff duties"—for many reasons the Japanese could not suffi­
ciently enjoy the rights. Moreover, because of Russia’s contribution
in forcing the Japanese to give up the Liaotung Peninsula, the Ch’ing
government went so far as to establish a secret military agreement
with Russia in 1896 which was directed against Japan.

Fortunately, there occurred an opportunity for Japan to restore
and improve its relations with China. In late 1897, Germany, one of
the three powers that had helped China to regain the Liaotung Penin­
sula, dispatched forces to occupy Kiaochow Bay, because a German
missionary had been killed in Ts’aochow, Shantung. It seemed that
Russia had no intention of stopping its German partner’s activity,
but tried instead to take advantage of the occasion to obtain Lushun
and Dairen. Thus, the General Staff Office (Sanbō honbu 参謀本部, hereafter GSO) of the Japanese Army worked out a plan to draw the
Ch’ing government into a Sino-Japanese alliance or a triangular con­
federation between China, Japan, and Britain, and decided to focus on
Chang Chih-tung (1837-1909) as the chief objective of its political
persuasion. Being the Hu-Kwang Tsungtu 湖広総督 (governor-general of
the Hu-Kwang provinces), Chang was the dominant political authority
in the important provinces of Hupeh and Hunan which were located
along the middle reaches of the Yangtze, and therefore he had connec­
tions with the British who were influential in the Yangtzu Basin.
Chang was also a powerful figure who might exert considerable impact
on the policy-making functions of the Ch’ing central government.

Utsunomiya Taro 宇津宮嘉太郎 (1861-1922) of Saga prefecture, an
elite graduate of the Military Staff College (Rikugun daigakkō 陸軍
大学校) and a section chief of the GSO, was appointed as "per­
suader." Tenshū was also chosen as a persuader because of his close
personal relationships with fellow Satsuma provincial Kawakami Sōroku
川上操六 (1848-99), the Vice-Chief of the GSO, and with Fukushima
Yasumasa 福島安正 (1852-1919), the proposer of the political plan for
whom Tenshū had published an account of his (Fukushima’s) travels in Siberia. But, the most important reason for the choice was that Chang Chih-tung was a scholarly, high-ranking official and a leader and sponsor in the Chinese academic and educational worlds. Contact and communication with Chang required a persuader who was proficient in the literary Chinese language and culture, and Tenshū was indeed the qualified person.6

Tenshū’s Activities in the Yangtze Basin

The credibility of Oka Kōshichirō’s article is supported by Tenshū’s account and relevant documents. For example, he mentions "Captain Utsunomiya" once in Kōkan sokai roku, recording that the latter joined him when he arrived in Nagasaki, and the two were in the same passenger cabin when they set off for China on December 12, 1897. According to Oka, Tenshū and Utsunomiya together met Chang Chih-tung in Wuchang. However, in Tenshū’s account of his meeting with Chang on the last day of 1897, one finds no mention of Utsunomiya at all.7 It seems that Tenshū was unwilling to mention Utsunomiya’s name too often, so as to distinguish between the army man and himself, a prominent journalist, though both were messengers of the GSO.

It was also true that Tenshū was concerned about the development of Japanese commerce in the treaty ports. "The Yangtze Basin is fertile and populous, and it is indeed the source of China’s wealth. Hankow is indeed the hub of commerce in the Yangtze Basin," he wrote as soon as he arrived in Hankow,

but there are few merchants of our country in those ports I have passed, and two companies, Tōhi 東肥 and Tōeki 東益 by name, are here [in Hankow]. From Hankow to Shashi, Ichang and Chungking along the upper reaches of the Yangtze, the footprint [of a Japanese merchant] cannot even be found any longer. On the contrary, though being separated distantly, the Russian, German, and British merchants have settled in the ports and steadily consolidated their foundations. So, they are the "fishermen" [the third parties to the Sino-Japanese War and the real beneficiaries of it] of the rights ensured by the peace treaty [of Shimonoseki in 1895].8

For certain reasons, he visited the Chinese tax bureaus and talked with the officials while in Hankow. Partly because his visit to Hankow and Shanghai took place around the New Year’s celebrations for both the solar and the lunar calendars, Tenshū was often invited by Japanese companies to their receptions and dinners. These companies also provided him with accomodations during his stay in the two metropolises.
Nevertheless, Tenshū spent much of his time in contacting Chinese literati, which was his long-cherished wish. He considered that there were three advisable ways to maintain a good relationship between the two countries: (a) the governments should handle matters impartially and speak out from a sense of justice; (b) people and merchants should keep their promises and seek mutual benefits and interests; and (c) intellectuals should uphold justice to influence popular feelings, public opinion, and governmental policy-making. He thought particularly highly of the decisive role to be played by intellectuals, suggesting that both Japanese and Chinese should establish learned societies in their own countries in order to conduct scholarly activities, such as translating and re-translating Western books, and so as to carry out international academic exchanges during peacetime, as well as to find ways of resolving disputes once they occurred between the two countries.10

He was accompanied in Hupeh by Huan Hui-chih 宣誨之, a Confucian scholar and relative of Li Shu-ch’ang 黎庶昌 (1837-97), the former Chinese ambassador to Japan (1881-85, 1887-91). Together they visited many local academies, including the famous Tzu-ch’iang hsueh-t’ang 自强学堂 and the Liang-Hu shu-yuan 長湖書院. Tenshū also had opportunities to converse with Fan Chung-ch’ing 范仲卿, the chief editor of the Han pao 漢報 newspaper, and Chiang Chien-hsia 江建霞, the Director of Education of Hunan province and the originator of the Hsiang hsüeh-pao 湘學報 newspaper. During Tenshū’s stay in Shanghai, Tung K’ang (b. 1867), the chief editor of I-shu kung-hui-pao 譯書公會報 (Newsletter of the Association for Translation) who later became a famous jurist and a close friend of Ariga Nagao 有賀長雄 (1860-1921) and Naitō Konan, apparently accompanied him. Tenshū was able to meet such interesting figures as Tseng Ching-i 曾國藩 (1911-72), and K’ang Kuang-jen 康廣仁 (1867-98), the younger brother of K’ang Yu-wei (1858-1927).

Because of his title and his views on issues, Tenshū became popular in Shanghai’s journalistic circles. Wang K’ang-nien 汪康年 (1860-1911), the president of the Shih-wu pao 時務報 newspaper, and Li Pao-chia 李寶嘉 (1867-1906), the chief editor of the Yu-hsi pao 游戲報 newspaper, became his friends, and on the eve of his departure for Japan on February 5, 1898, the chief editors of the principal daily newspapers of Shanghai gave him a farewell dinner party.

Being a sharp-eyed journalist, Tenshū made several insightful remarks on China’s contemporary situation and cultural tradition. When he visited the park in the Shanghai concession and discovered that Chinese were not allowed to enter, he became very angry. He wrote in his account that "it is right and proper that there be distinctions between the host and the guest. Though it is a concession,
it also should be under the authority of the Ch'ing."\(^9\)

Showing sympathy for China's misfortunes, Tenshū nevertheless criticized the Chinese cultural tradition sharply. When he visited the Liang-Hu shu-yüan, the finest academy of higher learning in Hupeh and Hunan, he was deeply surprised by the fact that there were no Japanese books in its library and promised to send Japanese books to the academy's collection. He wrote:

The two nations share a common culture and religion, and many Japanese books on history, the Chinese classics, and legal systems were written in Chinese. All the universities and middle schools in Japan have Chinese and Western books. Therefore, institutions in China also have to study the neighboring country's literature, so as to know both Japan and China itself.

Tenshū even gave the examples of Emperor T'ai-tsung (r. 596–649) of the T'ang dynasty and Napoleon I (1769–1821) to support his viewpoint: "If T'ai-tsung were alive today, he would draw lessons from the history of foreign countries. The French Emperor Napoleon also had a Chinese dictionary at hand to serve as a reference for his invasion. This shows how eager he was to know the other countries. What makes a country that shares culture and religion with another country not do so?"\(^11\)

Tenshū realized that the superiority complex of the Chinese was the main reason they underestimated and excluded foreign civilizations. He strongly argued that it was the Chinese attitude of treating the Japanese as "island barbarians" (tōi 島夷) that had caused the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95, and the Japanese had no way to disprove the insult other than by defeating the Chinese.\(^12\)

The Chinese were not only unwilling to value foreign civilizations, but also were not good at keeping up their own tradition. This was a conclusion that Tenshū arrived at after he visited many places of historic interest and scenic beauty. He had been to Huanghai lou in Wuchang, Hupeh, and Ta-kuan t'ing in Anking, Anhwei. He had also paid homage in Nanking to the mausolea of T'ai-tsu 明太祖 (r. 1368–98), the founding emperor of the Ming dynasty, and Fang Hsiao-ju 方孝孺 (1357–1402), a famous scholar of the early Ming period who had an unyielding integrity in opposing the usurpation of the throne by the Yung-lo 永樂 Emperor (r. 1403–24). When he stopped at the tablet with an inscribed poem by the K'ang-hsi 康熙 Emperor (r. 1662–1722) in memoriam to T'ai-tsu, he found there were defects in the tablet and it was difficult to read the lines. He noted with deep feeling:

Since I entered China and visited its buildings, I have been surprised by their magnificent exteriors and dilapidated
interiors. I presume the Chinese exert themselves in creat-
ing [these structures] but pay no attention to sweeping and maintenance. Though for years they have been deteriorating, the Chinese live in them with equanimity. It is because of their national character. Not only in the case of buildings are they used to doing so. In the case of traditional legal systems and moral standards, although they were magnificently formulated [in ancient times], they have not been kept up and well revised by later generations, and therefore have ceased to be binding. Now that they do not know how to maintain the systems and standards, how can they expect to make appropriate adaptation of them in the light of current conditions?... From such a trivial tablet, we may know the reason for the deterioration of Chinese civilization.13

Tenshū’s Influence on Chang Chih-tung

The main result of Tenshū’s journey, however, was undoubtedly the influence he was able to exert over Chang Chih-tung’s political attitude toward Japan, and that influence can be demonstrated through a textual comparison of Tenshū’s memorial, Renkō shigi 联交私議 [Personal Views on the (Sino-Japanese) Alliance], and several chapters of Chang’s Ch’uan-hsüeh p’ien 勉學篇 [Exhortation to Learning].

As mentioned earlier, it was on the final day of 1897 that Tenshū paid a visit to Chang. That was only a courtesy call, however, as he was unable on that occasion to discuss any substantive issues with Chang. Tenshū’s Renkō shigi was a note on his "conversation by writing" (or "brush conversation," hitsudan 笔談) of January 7, 1898 with Ku Hung-ming 楊錦 (1857-1928), Chang’s secretary for foreign affairs. The note was also transcribed and submitted to Chang by Ku.14 Apparently Chang thought highly of Tenshū’s memorial and distributed copies of it to his subordinate bureaus and various academies. Chang even sent Tenshū in his own calligraphy a quotation from Ssu-ma Kuang’s 司馬光 (1019-86) Yü-shu 浮書 [The Writings of a Foolish Old Man].15

Composed in March and April of 1898 and recommended by the Kuang-hsu 光緒 Emperor (r. 1874-1908) three months later, Chang’s Ch’uan-hsüeh p’ien became so popular that one million copies of the book were sold.16 However, those chapters of the book relevant to China’s foreign relations obviously had drawn inspiration from Tenshū’s Renkō shigi.

(a) "Asians are the same race."

The viewpoint asserting that all "Asians are of the same race" (Ya-chou t’ung-chung 亞洲同種) was stated in the "Chih lei" 知類
(Knowing Races) of the Ch'uan-hsüeh p'ien. According to Chang, China and its peripheral nations were situated in the same Asian region, and people in those countries were members of the same yellow race and shared the same religion and culture. Because of a lack of foreign challenge, however, these formerly civilized nations had gradually become conservative and feeble; they were now colonized or faced with a serious crisis of being colonized by the European powers.  

Chang's view here is precisely what Tenshū had emphasized in the first part of Renkō shigi. With the German occupation of Kiaochow Bay and the Russian seizure of Lushun (which Tenshū learned of when he read an account in the Osaka asahi newspaper in Hankow on December 31, 1897) as examples, Tenshū argued that it was an unfortunate reality that the weak were the prey of the strong, and that the Europeans would not stop their invasion of Asia. India, Burma, Indo-China (Vietnam), and Siam (Thailand) already had been or were in the process of being subjugated. China and Japan were the only two independent countries in Asia, but they were next in line to be bagged by European power hunters. Consequently, there must be a decisive engagement between the Europeans and the Asians. He especially pointed out the threat to the Far East posed by the Russians, because they were building the Trans-Siberian Railway. He emphasized that sharing a region, race, culture, and religion, China and Japan were now in the same boat; they shared a bitter hatred of the enemy and should fight together with one heart and one mind.  

As for the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95, Tenshū claimed that it was a "quarrel between brothers" (kyōdai gekishō 兄弟闘争; Chinese, hsiung-ti hsi-ch’iang) which should be forgotten, and now it was high time to join forces against attacks from without. But, since the strength of the Sino-Japanese alliance was insufficient to oppose the triangular confederation linking Russia, Germany, and France, it was advisable to join hands as well with Great Britain, the naval superpower.  

It should be noted that, because Tenshū was in a sense an Asianist (or Pan-Asianist), his advocacy might have been sincere. The intention of the GSO which had sent him on this mission, though, was by no means so simple. From the late Meiji period, joining the Western powers and invading China had become the basic tendency of Japan's foreign policy. Therefore, the emphasis laid by Japanese on the contradictions between Europe and Asia or between the white race and the yellow race bore a double interpretation. It could have been merely a persuasive way to draw China into a Sino-Japanese alliance.  

Holding for years a geopolitical viewpoint that the genuine threat to China was not Japan, a small ocean country, but Russia, a huge continental empire with a long, common boundary with China,
Chang Chih-tung also considered that it was time to join Japan in friendship to resist Russia and Germany, now that Japan had shown an amicable sign. So, he was easily influenced by Tenshū's point of view.

(b) "Do Not Cease Armaments."

One of the chapters of the Ch'üan-hsueh p'ien was entitled "Feimi-ping" (Do Not Cease Armaments). In this chapter, Chang criticized the opinion that China should seek security and peace in the East Asian region by depending on international law and the European Peace Conference. He pointed out that after the establishment of the Conference in Vienna, Austria, the Western powers had never stopped their encroachment on the East. Recently, there had occurred the German occupation of Kiaochow Bay and similar Russian actions in Lushun. However, no one had ever heard a member of the Conference come forward to be a "Master Lu Lien" (a famous figure who upheld justice in the Warring States period, 475-221 B.C.). Therefore, Chinese should strengthen their armaments rather than cease producing them; and they should not rely on international law but on their own force, courage, and wisdom.

These arguments of Chang's also included some inspiration from Renkō shig. Tenshū had emphasized in his memorial that, although it did not lack justice, international law per se could not insure that the small and weak nations would be treated equally in cases in which they found themselves in disputes with the powers. If a nation wanted to defend itself in the world where "the law of the jungle" still prevailed, the chaos caused by wars could never be forgotten and combat readiness should never be lacking. If a nation had no armaments, though there were a hundred men like Su Ch'in (a political strategist of the Warring States period) and a thousand like Lu Chung-lien, it would not succeed in its diplomacy. The German occupation of Kiaochow Bay provided an absolute example for these realities.

(c) Taking a Shortcut to Wealth and Power.

In search of wealth and power, as the famous saying goes, Chang Chih-tung agreed with a general principle for education which called for "Chinese learning for the foundation, Western learning for practical use" (Chung-hsueh wei t'i, Hsi-hsueh wei yung). He realized the necessity of receiving Western learning, but argued that it was advisable to follow the example of Japan, whose version of Western learning provided a shortcut to wealth and power. In "Yu-hsueh" (Studying Abroad) and "Kuang-i" (Translation), two chapters of Ch'üan-hsueh p'ien, he enumerated the follow-
ing reasons to explain his position:

As for which foreign country to go to for study, the Western nations are not as good as Japan. [Japan] is close to China and it is easy to investigate it; Japanese is similar to Chinese and it is easy to thoroughly understand it; Western books are so numerous and Western learning is difficult to master. However, the Japanese have reduced both to the bare essentials. Since China is similar to Japan in customs and manners, [the Japanese version of Western learning] is easy to imitate. It is better than anything else to get twice the result with half the effort.\(^2\)\(^3\)

We can locate here too the influence of Renkō shigi. Tenshū had made the following suggestions in this memorial:

The urgent task of your country is turning over a new leaf, so as to keep up with the times and to seek wealth and power. All the schemes for wealth and power can be found in Western learning... However, when you adapt the strong points of Western learning, you have to make necessary adjustments. Your country is of a common culture and common race with our country, and it is similar in conditions and customs to ours. [Western systems and technology] which are suitable for our country must be suitable for your country. Now that we have made the necessary adjustments in order to gear them to our conditions, it would indeed be a shortcut if you model yourself on us, taking the strong points of Western learning which are fit to you to turn over a new leaf and to improve your general affairs. Moreover, the expenses for engaging one European teacher can be used to engage two Japanese teachers; the expenses for sending ten students to Europe can be used to send fifty students to Japan... It takes five years for students to graduate from European schools, but in Japan it only takes three years. The situation is so different between Europe and Japan that, if you follow the Japanese model, you can get twice the result with half the effort and expense... So, today's urgent task is to engage Japanese teachers for work in China and to send Chinese students to Japan. The more you engage and send, the greater results you shall have. You may change the general mood of your nation within a year and resist foreign aggression and hold sway over the region within three years.\(^2\)\(^4\)

Needless to say, Tenshū's proposal was very attractive to Chang who was then worrying about China's future. It provided a perspective on becoming powerful in a period as short as three years, and Chang must have been stimulated by it. In fact, immediately after
Tenshū and Utsunomiya visited Chang, the latter telegraphed in cipher to the Tsungli Yamen, suggesting in all seriousness that the Ministry adopt the Japanese proposals for a Sino-Japanese alliance and a triangular confederation among China, Japan, and Britain. "Now that Japan is willing to help us," wrote Chang, "we should make the best use of its help. Japan cannot resist Russia and Germany, but the British navy can. An alliance with Japan is the key to an alliance with Britain." Chang's suggestion, however, was rejected by the Tsungli Yamen, and neither the alliance nor the confederation were established. Nevertheless, as a leader of Chinese educational administration, Chang played a decisive role in sending Chinese students to Japan and engaging Japanese teachers for work in China. It is common knowledge that these extensive exchanges greatly influenced the academic and political trends of Ch'ing China in its closing days. Chang's Ch'üan-hsüeh p'ien, as Saneto Keishū (1895-1985) put it, was indeed a "great manifesto" (dai sengen 大宣言) for sending Chinese students overseas to Japan and for receiving the Japanese version of Western learning. Tenshū was very glad that his opinions in Renkō shigi were adopted in Ch'üan-hsüeh p'ien. He showed his concern for the Chinese students in Japan and published several articles in the Osaka asahi to encourage Japanese educators to go to China. He advised those who were invited to teach Western subjects there that they should also value traditional Chinese learning, and that scholars of Chinese learning should be accommodated despite their differences with Western learning. When he traveled to China again in 1900, he brought with him as a vade mecum and a proud memento the copy of Ch'üan-hsüeh p'ien which was a gift from Chang, and he sent a letter to Chang which began with a mention of their last meeting and of the relationship between his memorial and Chang's Ch'üan-hsüeh p'ien.
Notes

1. Nishimura Tenshū, Kōkan sokai roku, in Seki'en sensei bunshū (Osaka: Kaitokudō kinenkai, 1936), volume 3. Nishimura’s given name was Tokihiko, while Tenshū and Seki’en were his pen names. On other Japanese travelers to China in the prewar years, see Joshua A. Fogel, "Japanese Literary Travelers in Pre-War China, 1902-1937," Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 49.2 (December 1989), pp. 575-602. Professor Fogel is also working on a comprehensive study of all Japanese travelogues of China for the period 1862-1945.


3. Naito Konan, "Bungaku hakase Nishimura kun bohyō" [Epitaph for Mr. Nishimura, Doctor of Letters], and Yoshida Hayao 吉田銘雄, "Seki’en Nishimura sensei nenpu" [Chronological Biography of Professor Nishimura Seki’en], Kaitoku 懐徳 7 (1929), pp. 93-94 and 95-106, respectively.

4. Umetani Noboru 梅溪昇, "Kaitokudō to Nishimura Tokihiko (Tenshū)" [The Kaitokudō and Nishimura Tokihiko (Tenshū)], Kikan Nihon shisō shi 20 (1983), pp. 58-74. Umetani is Professor Emeritus of Osaka University and is now a professor at Bukkyō University in Kyoto. His article skillfully narrates and analyzes Tenshū’s life and thought. Stimulated by this article, I decided to write this essay to confirm Tenshū’s contribution to Sino-Japanese cultural interchange. I should also emphasize that because I was born in Shanghai and have Wuchang, Hupeh as my ancestral home, I was especially interested in Tenshū’s travels to the Yangtze Basin nearly a century ago. In addition, Tenshū was the most important pioneer in studies of the Kaitokudō, which I chose as the topic of my doctoral dissertation research.


6. Oka Kōshichirō, "Tenshū hakase to Chō Shidō," Kaitoku 2 (1925). Oka appears to have been particularly knowledgeable in these matters, though his status cannot be confirmed. Kawakami Sōroku, who was soon to be promoted to Chief of the GSO, directed the plan. According to Tokutomi Sohō 徳富蘇峰 (1863-1957), Kawakami had en-
listed many able-minded youth in the GSO to conduct massive intelligence activities throughout East Asia over a long period of time, and therefore he had earned the name "Tō-A senkakusha no daiichininsha" (the first among the pathfinders in the Japanese [exploitation] of East Asia) given him by Tōyama Mitsuru (1855-1944). Utsunomiya was promoted by him; Fukushima’s travels in Siberia were also undertaken at his direction. In accordance with the plan, he had instructed Kamio Mitsumi (1855-1927), the military attaché to the Japanese embassy in Peking who was able to speak Chinese fluently, to persuade Chang Chih-tung. Early in 1893, Kawakami himself traveled to Korea and China. He met with Yuan Shih-k’ai in Korea and with Li Hung-chang in China. He also tried to contact Chang Chih-tung, but the latter was unwilling to meet with him. However, after the intercourse in 1897-98 through "persuaders" like Kamio and Utsunomiya, the two came to know one another. When Kawakami died in 1899, Chang sent a message of condolence. In his telegram to the Chinese ambassador to Japan, Chang wrote: "It is a pity that a Japanese hero (Jih-tung hao-han) has died." See Tokutomi Sohō, Rikugun taishō Kawakami Sōroku [General Kawakami Sōroku of the Army] (Tokyo: Daiichi kōronsha, 1942), pp. 109-24, 179-85. For recent work in English in this area, see Kitaoka Shin’ichi, "China Experts in the Army," and Barbara J. Brooks, "China Experts in the Gaimushō, 1895-1937," in The Japanese Informal Empire in China, 1895-1937, ed. Peter Duus, Ramon H. Myers, and Mark R. Peattie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989).


10. Nishimura Tenshū, Kōkan sokai roku, in Seki’en sensei bunshū, vol. 3, p. 54. Regarding journalism in Shanghai, he recorded one person’s analysis: "The funds of most daily newspapers are provided by the foreigners; therefore, these newspapers’ arguments are not pertinent. By contrast, the chief editors of the weekly and ‘hsün-k’an’ [appearing once every ten days] newspapers profess their own original views. Personages who are distinguished both in morality and scholarship can be found in these editors." See Nishimura


14. Although Tenshū did not point out that it was Ku with whom he had had this exchange and who had submitted his memorial to Chang Chih-tung, I have concluded that Ku was the most likely figure to have helped him to do so through a textual analysis of Kōkan sokai roku, Renkō shigi, and "Yü Chang chih-chün lun shih-shih shu" and "Chung chih-chün lün shih-shih shu" [On Current Events: A Letter to Governor-General Chang]. It should be noted that in its original form the Renkō shigi bore no title. The title was added to it by Tenshū when he compiled his Seki’en bunkō 碔園文稿 [Draft Essays by Seki’en]. For that reason, I have read the title in Japanese rather than in Chinese. The last item listed here was a letter to Chang by Tenshū written when he visited China in 1900; "chih-chün" in the title here is another name for the post of governor-general. Ku and Tenshū met twice during his stay in Hupeh, the first time on December 29, 1897, two days before Tenshū’s meeting with Chang, and the second time on January 7, 1898, just three days before Tenshū’s departure from Hankow. Since Tenshū mentioned in "Yü Chang chih-chün lun shih-shih shu" that "on the eve of my departure from your country, I had sent a memorial to state my humble opinions" (lin chü kuei-kuo, ch’eng i-shu ch’en pi-chien 致去貴國,呈一書陳鄙見), the second date is best taken as the day on which they conducted their hitsudan. Another important piece of evidence for the relationship between Tenshū and Ku was an exchange they had in 1924. Tenshū was then a secretary for drafting imperial edicts under the patronage of the Kunaichō 宮内庁 or Imperial Household Agency. From 1921 he served in this position on the recommendation of Matsukata Masayoshi 松方正義 (1835-1924), the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal or Naidaijin 内大臣 and a former prime minister, as well as a fellow Satsuma provincial who had thought highly of Tenshū’s literary talents from the early 1890s. Tenshū was also a councilor of the Shibunkai 斯文會, the chief editor of the Shimazu kōshaku henshūbu 島津公爵編輯部 (the Editorial Staff Department of Prince Shimazu), and a lecturer at the Daitō bunka gakuin 大東文化學院. Invited by the Tōhō bunka kyōkai 東方文化協会, Ku visited Japan and
made a series of presentations. He was also engaged as a lecturer by the Daitō bunka gakuin and published an essay entitled "Shina bunmei no fukkō to Nihon" [The Renaissance of Chinese Civilization and Japan] in the first issue of Kaitoku, the journal of the Kaitokudō Association which Tenshū inaugurated.


16. William Ayers, Chang Chih-tung and Educational Reform in China (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 149-50. In a sense, the influence of Ch’üan-hsüeh p’ien in late Ch’ing China can be compared with that of Fukuzawa Yukichi’s Gakumon no susume in early Meiji Japan; 200,000 copies of the latter text were sold during that period. It is interesting to note that, when it was translated into Chinese and published by Shangwu yinshuguan in 1962, it was given the Chinese title Ch’üan-hsüeh p’ien.


20. Li Kuo-ch’i 李國祁, Chang Chih-tung ti wai-chiao cheng-ts’e 張之洞的外交政策 [The Foreign Policy of Chang Chih-tung], number 27 in the series, Chung-yang yen-chiu-yüan chin-tai-shih yen-chiu-so chi-k’an 中央研究院近代史研究所集刊 (Taipei: Chung-yang yen-chiu-yüan, 1970). Chang’s geopolitical viewpoint was obviously different from that of Li Hung-chang, the bigwig of the Ch’ing government who advocated that China should approach Russia in friendship to restrain Japanese expansion.


25. Chang Chih-tung, "Chih Tsung-shu" 致總署 [Telegraphic Memorial to the Tsungli Yamen], 10th day, 12th month of Kuang-hsu 23 (corresponding to January 2, 1898), in Chang Wen-hsiang-kung ch’üan-chi, chüan 79, p. 1417. "Tsung-shu" is another name here for the Tsungli Yamen. From this telegram, we know that thereafter Chang began to contact Japanese diplomats and military officers more often. It seems that Odagiri Masunosuke 小田切万寿之助 (1868–1934), Japanese consul in Shanghai and one of Tenshū’s close friends who met him on several occasions during his stay in Shanghai, was on familiar terms with Chang. When the Shashi Incident and other disputes between the two countries took place, and when K’ang Yu-wei and Liang Ch’i-ch’ao 梁啟超 (1873–1929) took refuge in Japan after the collapse of the Hundred Days Reform of 1898 and the Ch’ing government wanted to exile them to the United States with the aid of the Japanese authorities, Chang always attempted to settle the issues more advantageously through Odagiri’s special tie with the Japanese Foreign Ministry.


27. Nishimura Tenshū, "Kyōiku ka to to-Shin o nozomu" 教育家の渡清を望む [Encouraging Educators to Go to Qing China], June 29, 1902, Osaka asahi shinbun; "Ohei to-Shin no kyōiku o okuru" 应聘渡清の教育家の送る [Parting Advice to the Educators Who Have Been Invited to Ch’ing China], Osaka asahi shinbun, September 30, 1902 and October 1, 1902.

28. This is "Yu Chang chih-chūn lun shih-shih shu," in Seki’en sensei bunshū, vol. 1, cited several times above.