Missionary education has been credited with introducing to China beneficial cultural and social elements. It has also been roundly condemned as a facet of imperialism. Richly endowed and distinctly un-Chinese, many missionary schools in Republican China symbolized much that was diametrically opposed to the country's contemporary needs and nationalistic sentiment. After some less than promising beginnings, a handful of missionary institutions of higher education did blossom into distinguished centers of secular teaching and research as well as hotbeds of student radicalism. In the late 1920s when Christian universities sought accreditation from the newly established Nationalist government, they agreed to make religious studies an elective on campus. But increased secularization did not change the opinion of many Chinese who ranked missionary universities below Chinese ones. However, the Lugouqiao incident altered such a stance. During the war years, especially before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Yanjing University and other missionary schools in the occupied region enjoyed record enrollment. This sudden turnabout may in part be attributed to widespread disapproval of higher education sponsored by "puppet governments." It also in part reflects what missionary institutions perceived as their Christian obligation to accommodate more Chinese students at a time of national emergency, in spite of reduced operating budgets. Their decision to remain in operation heightened the tension between the cosmopolitan, international precepts of Christianity and the demands of Chinese nationalism, a problem that had been plaguing many missionary schools since the 1920s. Thus the wartime experiences of Yanjing other missionary universities operating under the Japanese occupation have been given a variety of interpretations.

Researching the wartime history of Yanjing University affords an interesting lesson in historiography. Whereas the Beijing and Beijing Normal universities that are in operation today dismiss outright the wartime institutions bearing their names as illegitimate creations of the "puppet government," Yanjing still takes pride in its ability to have kept functioning until the outbreak of the Pacific War. Under these circumstances, official and semi-official histories of the school, especially those published in Taiwan, describe its wartime campus as an island of autonomy and integrity in a sea of "slave education." A semi-official history of Furen University published in Taiwan claims that the school had received secret instructions from the Ministry of Education of the Nationalist government to remain open so as to be able to utilize its international connections to cultivate patriotic youth in occupied China and to
continue national (presumably as opposed to slave) education. Moreover, according to this source, Furen was advised to band together with other international schools operating in the Beijing-Tianjin area in observing three principles: 1) administrative independence, 2) academic freedom, and 3) not displaying the flag of the "puppet government." Records of Yanjing University, Furen’s purported comrade in these endeavors, contain no confirmation of this secret directive, but the official history of the university also makes similar claims for unimpeachable behavior during the time between the Lugouqiao incident and the attack on Pearl Harbor. An examination of contemporary sources, however, reveal that Yanjing University chose to accommodate itself at least partially to the political authorities.

YANJING UNIVERSITY

Yanjing University (Yanjing daxue, or Yanda for short) came into existence in 1919 as the result of a merger of four institutions in Beijing supported by one British and three American missionary societies. After John Leighton Stuart accepted the appointment as Yanda’s president in 1918, he began to search for a new location to replace the dilapidated and fragmented campus with the city. The university selected as its new site the summer garden of a former Manchu prince in the city’s western suburb, about a mile from Qinghua University. Yanda commissioned an American architectural firm to construct buildings in traditional Chinese style with modern materials and to equip them with centralized heating, running cold and hot water, and other amenities unimaginable on most university campuses in China. Yanda moved to the new campus in the fall of 1926.

Throughout its history this missionary institution showed appreciable sensitivity to Chinese needs and willingness to adapt itself accordingly. The university had been registered with the Beijing government in the early 1920s; in 1929 Yanda obtained the approval of the Nanjing government and was duly recognized as an institution of higher education. However, it never renounced its Christian evangelical (not sectarian) tenets. Yanjing University’s bilingual curriculum and bicultural campus life, generous endowment, strong ties with the United States, and its relatively wealthy student body all underscored its distinctive and privileged status. This special status, plus the leadership of John Leighton Stuart, enabled Yanjing University to function during the first half of the war, but it also once again highlighted the institution’s ambivalent status in China’s academic community.

When the War Came

Officials of Yanjing University had been fully aware of the unstable political situation in north China. But unlike many institutions of higher education in north China, Yanjing University did
not seem to have drawn up plans for evacuation and relocation in the event of a Japanese occupation. In July 1937 between the outbreak of hostilities near the Marco Polo Bridge and the start of the Japanese military occupation of Beijing, Yanda was not spared the intense anxiety that gnawed at residents inside the city walls of Beijing. 5 When the Japanese were about to enter Beijing, university officials declined the offer of the American Embassy to provide shelter in the Legation Quarters. However, Yanda officials were not reluctant to display American flags forthrightly over all university properties when the Japanese conducted air raids against retreating Chinese soldiers near the campus. Japanese bombers took care to avoid damaging the campus. 6 As a further step to protect the university from possible Japanese interference, Yanda's Chinese chancellor was removed from his post, and his duties were taken over by its American president John Leighton Stuart.

About one week after the Japanese entered Beijing, general conditions were calm enough so that Yanda faculty and administrators were able to go into the city again. As usual, they rode to and from the city on the bus owned and operated by the university; but as reminders of recent changes, they found themselves accompanied by Japanese guards on these trips and were subject to frisking at the city gates. The campus was surrounded by a host of potentially disruptive conditions. Nonetheless, Yanjing University was able to administer its entrance examinations in mid-August, and the school began its fall session more or less on schedule in September. 7 Yanda's politically shrewd president also called on several important Chinese and Japanese leaders in the newly established regional and municipal administrations to explain the university's "neutral" position. 8

CLASSES

The war made traveling difficult and dangerous. Some students and their families worried about more than just a perilous journey. Understandably, they had doubts about the prudence of attending school in the occupied territory. In late summer of 1937 John Leighton Stuart assigned an American faculty member, Lucius Porter, to travel to Tianjin twice to give students and their families assurance and encouragement. Japanese guards, arranged by the president with the authorities, escorted Porter and those willing to return to campus. On business trips to central China, Stuart also brought back students.

Yanda began its first wartime semester with an enrollment of about 300, approximately half the anticipated number. As the fall semester progressed, conditions on campus, like conditions throughout the metropolitan area, lost some of the uncertainty and hysteria of the summer and early fall. As a consequence, close to 600 students enrolled in the second semester. 9 During the three and one-half
years from July 1937 to December 1941 when the university was able to function, student enrollment and course offerings both increased.

In the spring of 1938 the university decided to expand its admissions quota vastly. In the fall of 1938, 509 out of the total enrollment of 945 were newly admitted students. This largest incoming class in the university’s history did not have to compete vigorously for admission; the acceptance ratio was approximately two to one. In the following two years, university officials had to reduce drastically the quota for incoming students and place bunk beds in most of the dormitory rooms in order not to cause severe overcrowding. Nevertheless, conditions in north China were deemed too unstable to justify the construction of new dormitories and classrooms. Starting in 1939 Yanda became for the first and only time an extremely selective institution, at least in a purely numerical sense: the acceptance ratio had widened to nine to one. When the institution was forced to cease operation after Japan attacked Pearl Harbor in December 1941, it boasted an enrollment of 1,100, approximately 300 over the university’s normal capacity.

Paradoxically, the enlarged applicant pool offered narrower geographical and probably socio-economic distributions. Although Yanda was able to administer its entrance examinations not just in Beijing but also in Tianjin, Jinan, Shanghai, and Xiamen (Amoy), the overwhelming majority of the applicants and, in turn, newly admitted students (especially female students) came from the Beijing-Tianjin area. Similar to the make-up of Yanda’s prewar student population, about half of the students had graduated from Christian schools; approximately 60% of the other half came from private secular schools, and the rest from government schools. At least one American teacher at Yanda suspected that the university’s wartime students did not have the caliber of the prewar students. Although observers unanimously agreed that Yanda’s wartime students were more serious and diligent, available figures for overall grade average suggest less than sterling academic performance.

During its first wartime academic year, in addition to its regular students, the school admitted 71 "guest students" from institutions forced to close by the war. In subsequent years, no "guest students" were accepted and those wishing to transfer to Yanda faced fierce competition in the entrance examination. (For example, 150 applicants vied for 8 places reserved for transfer students in the 1939-1940 academic year.) Available statistics suggest that instead of offering the few available places beyond the freshman year to transfer students, the institution favored the return of its own students who had been forced to take leaves of absence because of the war.

Though almost impossible to calculate precisely or even roughly, the flow of people between the occupied and unoccupied areas during the war years was a decidedly two-way phenomenon. The university itself encouraged both students and teachers to return to the campus
in the western suburb of Beijing, much to the displeasure of some alumni in the unoccupied areas.  

Some Yanda students were among those who for one reason or another found life in the unoccupied areas unsatisfactory or unbearable and returned to the university. One teacher reported that "quite a lot" of Yanda students did return, and not a few students justified this move with the conviction that they would be better prepared to serve China if they first completed their education. The number of returned students probably equaled those leaving for the hinterland.  

The movement of Chinese faculty members at Yanda, however, was decidedly one way--westward to the unoccupied regions.

About a dozen foreign students from Europe and America also attended classes at the university. Despite limited facilities for women students on campus, during the war years the institution admitted slightly more women than before, thus reducing the male-female ratio of incoming students to about 2.25 to 1. The overall ratio on campus was 2.5 to 1.

The university continued with its prewar academic programs, which were administered by nineteen departments distributed among three colleges, namely, natural sciences, arts and letters, and public affairs, in addition to a department of sociology and a school of religion and social work (the latter was not recognized by the prewar Nanjing government as a part of the university). Slightly over one hundred faculty members taught an average of 222 courses each year. The college of natural sciences offered instruction in biology, chemistry, geography, geology, home economics, mathematics, physics, and psychology. Chinese, English and other European languages, history, philosophy, education, journalism and music were the principal subjects taught in the college of arts and letters. The college of public affairs trained students in jurisprudence, political science, economics, and sociology. The university granted master's degrees in a dozen fields of concentration.

Like their counterparts in wartime Beijing University, entering freshmen gravitated toward the natural sciences (during the year 1939-1940, 50% of all entering freshmen, about 122 in total, chose to concentrate in a natural science field). In part because the limitations of facilities forced the administration to restrict the number of science concentrators, the school of public affairs did not lag far behind in popularity. In fact in 1939-1940, the department of had 135 concentrators, by far the largest number on campus, followed by the department of chemistry with 56 concentrators. Although readily available statistics do not provide enough information for detailed analysis, it would appear that by 1940 the college of public affairs was attracting more students than the other two colleges.
Relative Size of Undergraduate College

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1934</th>
<th>1935</th>
<th>1936</th>
<th>1937</th>
<th>1938</th>
<th>1939</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arts and Letters</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>34.7</td>
<td>29.7</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>31.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural Sciences</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>34.7</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>35.6</td>
<td>35.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Affairs</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>35.6</td>
<td>33.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: ACYU, annual report, 1939-1940)

Either individual choice or external pressure kept the enrollment of women in the college of public affairs low, about 20% of the total. Nonetheless, women did outnumber men slightly in one department in this college, namely, sociology. For the male students in this college, the department of economics was much more popular than the department of political science.

In the college of natural sciences, before the entering freshmen class in 1939 tipped the scale in favor of chemistry, biology had been the most popular field of study, followed by chemistry and physics. In the college of arts and letters, Western languages were the most popular fields of concentration, followed closely by education, journalism, and history. Psychology was the least popular field, claiming about one concentrator each class.

The university had offered Japanese-language courses in its college of arts and letters before the war and continued to do so after the Lugouqiao incident, but the subject never attracted many students and was not offered as a field of concentration. Unable to control Yanjing University’s purse strings, the political authorities in Beijing were deprived of a substantial degree of control over the institution, but they did attempt to exert pressure over its curriculum as well as other matters. In early November 1937, shortly after Stuart had a "friendly meeting" with the ranking Japanese military official in Beijing, General Kita Seiichi 嘉多誠一, the Japanese side suggested that Yanjing University hire one or more Japanese teachers.

Although university officials would not have countenanced the propagation of Xinmin 新民 ideology, a pastiche of antiquarian and modern ideas that passed for the official orthodoxy of the wartime North China government, in Yanda’s classrooms, not everyone was adamantly against increasing Japanese teachers, provided that the university alone took the initiative without any outside interference. Three months after the Lugouqiao incident, Yanda’s president told a visiting Japanese that "the special claims that Japan has for close relations with China—even to the disadvantage of Western countries—are cordially recognized and encouraged, provided these are to mutual benefit and free from coercive force." 20 In the winter of 1937, the president confided to university trustees in New York his plan of:

exploring possible ways in which an increasing Japanese influence can be introduced into the teaching personnel and
curriculum content which—devoid of any personnel and curriculum content which—devoid of any propagandistic intent and due in no sense to coercion—will enrich the scholarship, enlarge the international outlook, and contribute toward the healing and reconstruction processes which ought already to be at work.

A point that John Leighton Stuart, America’s postwar ambassador to China, did not reiterate after 1945 was his conviction held in the earlier days of the war that "whatever the outcome of the fighting, there was bound to be more Japanese influence" in north China. When he spoke of "reconstruction and reconciliation in north China," he had in mind a cooperative arrangement between the Chinese and the Japanese to be forged somehow without a complete denigration of Chinese sovereignty. Needless to say, this was, in the minds of many Chinese, an impossible feat to accomplish. Planning for such a future, the president of Yanda attempted to establish ties with leading Japanese universities. He viewed this move first as Yanda’s "best insurance against conflicts with the military or with their petty agents, both Chinese and Japanese." Moreover, he hoped this "gracious service," to be rendered by Yanda, would help mitigate "Japanese fury" directed at Britain and America’s "superior influence in China, [and] it would be a beautifully Christian attempt at helping toward peace and constructive good will."23

The president, among others, proudly dubbed the university an island of freedom surrounded by the occupied territory. However, no single aspect of the university was untouched by special wartime exigencies.

BALANCING PRINCIPLES AND REALITIES

Some Chinese, especially Yanda alumni, were not sanguine about the university’s continuation in north China. One alumnus, the noted sociologist Fei Xiaotong 费孝通, wrote to Stuart from London to urge the president to avoid "the possibility of being a stabilizing factor of the existing regime" and to refrain from making "public announcements of ‘all quiet and normal in Yenching’ and [from] public recruiting of new students."24 Other alumni tried to persuade the university from encouraging students who had fled north China to return to the Yanda campus.

Stuart countered these views with the promise that the institution would never compromise its two fundamental principles of allegiance to Chinese national loyalty and service in the Christian spirit. He seemed quite confident that the Japanese would not want to cause trouble for the university because they would not want an embarrassment to be made known in America and the rest of the world.

In John Leighton Stuart’s autobiography, the Hangzhou-born son of American missionaries admitted that when he accepted the
appointment to become president of Yanjing University in 1918, he was a "tyro in educational administration, ... unfamiliar with north China." 25 His record as Yan’s wartime president unmistakably shows how well he had honed his skills as a school administrator and fundraiser during the intervening years. In fact when hostilities broke out near the Marco Polo Bridge, Stuart had become a well-known figure in north China’s academic and political circles. Able to speak Chinese, Stuart made good use of his long-time association with several Chinese politicians who became top officials in Beijing’s wartime government. He seemed to take comfort in the fact that the daughter of an old friend Wang Kemin 王克敏, who happened to be the head of the North China Provisional Government, was a student at Yan. 26

Dealing with the Japanese, however, was a new challenge for the president. He shrewdly enlisted the aid of a handful of Chinese who had studied in Japan and were well equipped both linguistically and socially to negotiate with the Japanese. One individual, Xiao Chengyi, who was a native of Taiwan and had studied at Tokyo University as a graduate student, stood out among this small group of Stuart’s "capable young lieutenants" at Yan because of the variety of tasks he performed for his alma mater, ranging from teaching sections of Japanese language classes to serving as a personal interpreter and special assistant to the president. 27

Starting in the summer of 1937, Yanjing University’s association with America in part shielded the campus from any violence Japanese soldiers might have wanted to inflict. The Yan community certainly appreciated the meaning of relative safety in the fall of 1937 when they heard about how the Japanese appropriated the buildings and grounds of their neighbor Qinghua University, removed valuable scientific equipment, and turned one section of that campus into soldiers’ quarters and another into a military hospital. 30 The university’s location outside the city must have helped mitigate persistent official meddling. (Furen University, situated inside the city walls, seemed to have had more difficulty deflecting requests issued by the political authorities.) Armed Chinese, especially Muslim gangs of dubious allegiance roaming around the western suburb, posed a more real threat to the university. In response, Stuart approved the hiring of armed Chinese Muslim guards to surround the campus. 31 All in all, local rumor mills, working overtime, managed to furnish an abundance of apprehension for the Yan community well beyond the fall of 1937. 32
Dealing with the Political Authorities

John Leighton Stuart's correspondence with Yanjing University's trustees in New York, dispatched through a variety of channels—except the official Chinese postal system, constitutes the most detailed account of how the institution functioned during the war years. Perhaps with good reason, Stuart provided sparing and selective descriptions of the university's dealings with the political authorities in Beijing. Although he duly noted in his letters the conditions agreed upon concerning individual issues, how the university actually negotiated with the Beijing government over specific issues remains, for the most part, unclear.

For example, Stuart reported that in the fall of 1937 the political authorities agreed to stop frisking foreign passengers on Yanda's bus at the city gates if they showed the special identification cards, with photographs, issued by the university. But Japanese guards still accompanied the passengers on their trips to and from the city, and all Chinese passengers still had to submit to checks. He did not explain how this agreement was reached. In late 1937 and early 1938 the authorities requested Yanjing and other private institutions to supply information concerning the number of students and sources of funding, along with "the thinking of teachers and students," Stuart initially balked and began to coordinate with Furen University in issuing joint refusals. But records clearly indicated that Furen eventually complied with such official orders; Yanjing might also have capitulated. On the other hand, in the spring of 1938, claiming that the university had not yet recognized the Provisional Government in Beijing, Yanda joined the Beijing Union Medical College and Furen University in refusing to pay taxes that had been regularly levied by the Chinese government before the war.

In the summer the university ignored a government order to participate in an anti-communist, anti-Guomindang week.

This case-by-case approach illustrates the relationship John Leighton Stuart cultivated with the authorities in wartime Beijing. The president of Yanda maintained that, although his long-time Chinese friends at the top of the government could not deter the Japanese from pursuing whatever policy they may choose, they were not without influence. He was also comforted by the belief that the Chinese leaders "would lose face very badly if [Yanda] is injured and the reasons became public." In early January of 1941, perhaps in an attempt to quell veiled charges of collaboration, Stuart justified his continuing association with Chinese leaders in the Beijing government as an effort "partly to encourage them in their basic national loyalties and partly as a possible source of protection for the university." Some would find his second justification more credible than the first.

With the assistance of his interpreters, Stuart seemed to have been in regular contact with the top-ranking Japanese military officials and diplomats in Beijing. Not infrequently these meetings were
reported back to Tokyo and then broadcast to the public, often to Stuart’s dismay because of what he considered to be distortions of his views. Yanda’s president assured Japanese military leaders in Beijing that he did not object to spies observing activities at the university. He sometimes demonstrated his good will by arranging banquets for prominent Japanese military and civilian leaders.

While Stuart compromised and temporized in Beijing, he also directed offices in New York associated with Yanda’s operation to conduct a “counter-pressure” campaign aimed at Tokyo. The president supplied the New York offices with information about the university as well as wartime conditions in general, but resolutely admonished his colleagues in the U.S. against identifying him as the source of their information. Operating on the assumption that “the one thing the Japanese fear... is unfavorable opinion of action against them in the U.S.A.,” Stuart told those in New York “the more the publicity the better.”

Stuart’s relationship with the Japanese in Beijing transcended his role as head of Yanjing University. Although the details are still not clear, he also acted as a go-between for Tokyo and the Guomindang (GMD) regime in Chongqing in their various efforts to reach a settlement or a temporary cease fire well beyond the summer of 1937. Because Stuart was free to travel to the unoccupied areas until Japan attacked Pearl Harbor, he regularly attended meetings of the China Foundation and other organizations away from campus. His wartime meetings with Jiang Jieshi 蒋介石 and other GMD officials took place on these business trips. At least on one occasion Stuart dispatched one of his assistants who spoke Japanese to Japan to collect information which he then took to Chongqing.

Academic Freedom

If Japanese soldiers were kept away by Yanda’s show of harmonious intent and restraint, sweetened by banquets and the somewhat naive belief in Japan’s fear of bad press, all such measures could not immunize the university from subtler forms of encroachment. While the school initially resisted government requests to furnish information about its operation, it readily complied with the order to weed out proscribed books. Yanda librarians removed books on communism and other purportedly problematic topics from the shelves. But instead of turning them over to the authorities, they simply stored them away on campus. Furthermore, evidence clearly indicates that publications of the Xinminhui 新民会 were available in the university library.

As mentioned in passing above, the Japanese authorities pressed Yanjing University to expand its small program in Japanese studies. Evidently ranking Chinese members in the Beijing government shared their Japanese colleagues’ eagerness to implement the plan. For its part, some groups in the university community had hoped to establish ties with the Japanese scholarly community well before the Lugouqiao
incident. During the late 1920s when organizers were preparing for the opening of the Harvard-Yenching Institute (funded by the estate of a wealthy American industrialist and intended to cultivate and enhance Sinological research through scientific means at both Yanjing and Harvard universities), they recognized that "Japanese savants [would] be indispensable to [the institute], not only for its work in Japan but also in China."44

In the fall of 1937 when high-ranking Japanese officials broached the subject of Japanese faculty at Yanda, several university officials again, for different reasons perhaps, thought about these "Japanese savants." Fei Xiaotong and many other Chinese very likely were distressed to hear about Stuart’s willingness to invite Japanese scholars to Yanda, but the president had by no means become a pliant "puppet," despite considerable pressure from the political authorities in Beijing, intensified by internal Japanese rivalries.45

From the start, Stuart was not opposed to the idea of hiring Japanese nationals to teach a few Japanese history courses, in addition to conducting seminars and research at Yanda, but he predicted, probably accurately, that no student would take such courses. He further pointed out that Japanese scholars who would meet the approval of the university probably would have trouble lecturing in either Chinese or English. The president also was not certain whether such scholars would be accepted by the Yanda community.46 By the summer of 1938 Stuart announced that Yanda would invite one or more Japanese professors to its campus if hostilities were brought to an end, and in any event conditions were not appropriate to make such appointments for the 1938-1939 academic year. Although Japanese officials in Beijing had hoped for three or four faculty appointments, in early 1939 Stuart decided to invite just one Sinologist who would primarily conduct research on campus. In keeping with its official policy, implemented in 1925, of using its share of the Boxer Indemnity fund to finance cultural activities in China, the Japanese Foreign Ministry proposed to pay for Yanda’s Japanese faculty out of the Boxer account. Stuart declined the offer and obtained the necessary funds from the Harvard-Yenching Institute. The chancellor regarded the entire undertaking as "both politically expedient and worthwhile in more idealistic ways." But he also worried about charges that he and the university had yielded to pressure from the enemy.47

That the appointment was finally made in the spring of 1939, a year and one-half after the Japanese first expressed their wish, shows on the one hand both the persistence and restraint exercised by the Japanese, and on the other hand the degree of control Yanjing University was able to exert over its own affairs, especially since some Japanese officials in Beijing, who had lobbied for their own candidates, were not enthusiastic about Yanda’s choice.48 Interestingly and probably not coincidentally, Torii Ryūzō 鳥居龍藏, the Japanese invited to Yanda as visiting research professor in the fall of 1939, had been one of four Japanese scholars singled out by the
organizers of the Harvard-Yenching Institute in the late 1920s as "helpful people." Accompanying this septuagenarian specialist in anthropology and archaeology to the Yanda campus were his wife and two grown daughters who had been educated at Columbia University and in Paris respectively. His appointment was extended for one more year in the summer of 1940. By all accounts this Japanese family was cordially received on campus, and in fact one of Torii’s daughters married a Chinese student of her father’s. Torii’s presence at Yanda did not deter some Japanese officials in Beijing from pressuring the school to hire more Japanese teachers, but the university did not comply.

Personal Freedom

The ambivalence that accompanied the hiring of Torii Ryûzō also marked the university’s handling of regulations governing the personal behavior of both faculty and students. While boldly claiming that the Japanese fear of a negative reputation in the U.S. afforded the university a considerable degree of protection, university officials also desperately wanted to avoid trouble with the authorities in Beijing. To that end the president agreed with the government to make sure that his institution "indulged in no anti-Japanese or communistic activities."

How seriously John Leighton Stuart subscribed to these conditions was clearly shown in a letter he sent to Yanda’s faculty and their families in the fall of 1937. He reminded them that "it is of the utmost importance that all members of our community avoid public discussion of current political issues." The president was obviously vexed upon learning that two Yanda members ignored the precaution and talked on the university bus "in voices easily audible to other passengers with a Japanese sitting directly behind them." It is not clear in what language this problematic conversation was conducted or whether this unidentified Japanese could have been able to understand what was being said. But Stuart was not being irrational when he urged Yanda’s faculty to remember that "spies and informers are not limited to nationals of any one country." What he feared above all else was that seemingly insignificant indiscretion might "unwittingly do serious harm to the university or to individuals" on campus. He also urged faculty members and their families to exercise self-censorship when writing letters.

Understandably, the conduct of Yanda’s student body worried university officials more than whatever indiscretion their colleagues could commit. In the fall of 1937, these officials issued a set of special regulations for students. On the list of banned activities was the university-wide student association. The only concession school officials granted was the continuation of officially appointed student representation in the management of dormitories and dining halls. All student organizations were required to register with the administration and were not permitted to hold unauthorized meetings.
Only official notices from the administration could be posted on Yanda's bulletin boards. Students leaving campus had to declare their intended destination as well as the length of their absence from school. Manuscripts for publication on campus had to receive approval from the appropriate offices before going to press. Students were also urged to "refrain from potentially harmful journal subscriptions" and possession of books of similar nature. The regulations cited expulsion from school as a possible punishment for those failing to observe these rules. Subsequently in a bilingual notice enjoining all members of the university to refrain from participating in anti-Japanese activities on campus, Stuart noted that he would be "very grateful for assistance in tracing any indications of occurrences which would give credence to the reports [of continuing anti-Japanese activities on campus] which seem to be reaching Japanese headquarters."  

While taking part in curtailing, or at least in threatening to infringe upon, the civil liberties of Yanda members, Stuart at least on one occasion in the summer of 1938 assured a secretary at the Japanese embassy that the university had "no objection to the Xinminhui having direct contact with or making announcements" to the students, who were "free to respond either individually or in groups as they themselves desired." The president also assured this embassy official that the university would "spare no effort to prohibit its students from taking part in communistic or anti-Japanese or anti-Chinese Provisional Government movements." In part Stuart was confident that the Xinminhui would not attract a large following at Yanda, but in part he was probably trying to alleviate some of the pressure on the university to hire Japanese teachers. This double standard furnished fuel for Stuart's critics during as well as after the war.

Needless to say, neither stringent prohibitions nor overly pliant compromises could cow all Yanda students into docility and conformity. Students who left school to go to areas controlled either by the GMD or by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) apparently did not encounter interference from school officials. During the three and one-half years between the Lugouqiao incident and Pearl Harbor, one incident brought the institution perilously close to the kind of confrontation with the political authorities that Stuart and other university officials had taken pains to avoid. The incident was the assassination attempt on Zhou Zuoren 周作人, a part-time professor at Yanda since 1922. Eminent essayist and literature specialist, and brother of Lu Xun 鲁迅, Zhou was without question the premier Chinese intellectual figure in north China during the war years.

Zhou himself did not provide much information about this incident. Almost every published account of the event identifies the assassins as Chinese students from a Japanese school in Tianjin who were irked by Zhou's reluctance to work for the Beijing government.
Stuart offered a different version of the assassination attempt in a letter to Yanda’s trustees. With uncharacteristic agitation and dismay Stuart relayed the news that Zhou Zuoren’s would-be assassins were two freshmen from Yanjing University, members of a patriotic group consisting of 20 to 30 Yanda students. The activities of this group had aroused enough suspicion that the leader was questioned by both Stuart and the political authorities before the attempt on Zhou’s life. The leader evidently remained undaunted because he was one of the two suspected assassins. Stuart had to be somewhat comforted by the fact that the bullet intended for Zhou Zuoren bounced off a button, thus sparing his life. But the president, understandably, was gravely concerned about the potential repercussions of this incident. To the trustees he explained that the "obvious course" would be to dismiss the two students. But such an action, as he rightly feared, would not only endanger his "source" who had supplied him with the information but also, perhaps more important, would place the university in a potentially precarious position. Readily accessible Yanjing University records provide no clue as to whether the university took any action against the two students in question. Zhou Zuoren submitted his resignation to the university "on other grounds" shortly after the incident.  

A less sensational but persistently troublesome problem for the university during the war years was the arrests of Yanda students by the Beijing government on charges of subversion, either real or imagined. Yanjing University files afford a rare glimpse of an emotion-laden issue in discussions of wartime Beijing: harassment of and atrocities against Chinese students. Although a report claiming that two hundred Yanda students were shot by the Japanese was completely false, university officials began to deal with the delicate problem of the arrests of mostly but not exclusively male students almost immediately after the Lugouqiao incident in July 1937 when three Yanda students were detained in Tianjin.

The Japanese alone could not mastermind the arrests. As Stuart had warned the Yanda community, informants were sprinkled throughout the campus. The large fraternity of con artists and extortionists that fed voraciously on the peculiar conditions of wartime Beijing also seemed to have reaped considerable profits through the threat of false accusation as well as bribery and other illegal means to help secure the release of individual prisoners. It appeared that the campus did not witness any show of brute force, but the university administration could hardly be hailed as the uncompromising protector of students. For example, on May 31, 1938, a Japanese from the Xinminhui, accompanied by several Chinese civilians and 20 armed police arrived on campus to conduct a search of student dormitories. Yanda’s president insisted that they first obtain permission from the American embassy. In the meantime, certain that this move was directed at one particular student suspected to be a Communist, Stuart encouraged him to go with the authorities voluntarily and answer all
their questions. The student followed his suggestion, and the university agreed to the silence requested by the authorities. Recounting this episode one day later, Stuart confidently reported that the student was being well treated and "we shall keep quiet for a day or so longer. But if they do not then release him, we shall appeal to higher up. The fear of publicity in all such matters [would help gain his release] and the superiors seem as a rule to be much more reasonable."61

In many cases, the authorities not only compelled the arrested students to reveal the names of fellow students suspected of illegal activities but also demanded monetary payments from the families of those detained before granting them release. Moreover, often in exchange for freedom the students had to agree to become informants. For example, one arrested Yanda student had to promise that every Saturday afternoon he would report to a designated source the names of Communists or other anti-Japanese students at Yanda and to carry out other orders of espionage. He was told that should he disobey, he would suffer treatment worse than his first prison experience. His captors reminded him that they have "other spies [on campus] who can check on his statements" and make sure he is carrying out orders. Before releasing him, the authorities also obtained the guarantee of four family friends "with responsible positions."62

Extant university files note approximately two dozen arrests of Yanda students from July 1937 to December 1941. Arrests of students and general meddling in the affairs of the institution abated somewhat by the summer of 1939. Not coincidentally, by then the appointment of Torii Ryūzō for the following fall semester had become common knowledge. In fact one Japanese official publication in 1941 proclaimed that relations between the university and the political authorities had been shaky in the summer of 1937 but steadily improved thereafter.63 On the whole, Stuart was probably correct in believing that Yanda was shielded from the more painful traumas of student arrests in part because he, assisted by his interpreters and liaisons, was able to maintain a working relationship with the political authorities. The president's copious records seem to indicate that the university spared no effort in obtaining the release of those students, and occasionally even alumni, wrongly accused of subversion. At times Stuart himself vouched for their "good behavior" after leaving prison.64 However, extant records do not reveal what the institution did for students guilty of charges of anti-Japanese activities.

Reading accounts of these arrests in letters that Stuart and several American teachers sent home, one is struck by their seemingly matter-of-fact tone utterly devoid of emotional involvement. Even in correspondence that had not passed through the hands of censors and otherwise reveal undisguised ill feelings toward the Beijing government, no expressions of anger or abhorrence accompanied the descriptions of student arrests even when torture was mentioned. Most of
these letter writers were long-time residents of China who probably had come to accept violent treatment against allegedly subversive students as an unavoidable, albeit unpleasant, aspect of life in China. Nonetheless, this detachment is disturbing.

LIFE ON CAMPUS

Although the political authorities in Beijing impinged on Yanjing University more than any other Chinese government in the institution's entire history, wartime conditions did not erase the distinct features that had always separated the university from its Chinese counterparts in the city of Beijing. Before the war, the relative wealth of the institution as well as its student body had generated envy and even supposedly enhanced Yanda men's qualification as spouses. Before the war, observers in Beijing commented that more Yanda students sported leather shoes and suits than students from Beijing University (Beida) and Beijing Normal University (Shida), for example. During the war years although the majority of the students probably did not have to cope with many financial worries, contemporary observers noted seeing fewer leather shoes and more blue gowns, the latter being the unofficial uniform of students at institutions such as Beida and Shida. Voracious wartime inflation and increases in university fees made an expensive education even more expensive. A larger number of Yanda students received scholarships. Many helped to defray the cost of their Yanda education by accepting work on campus as a part of the work-study program. This move impressed more than one American teacher on campus. In a letter to a friend back home in the United States, the dean of the women's college noted with pleasure: "Anyone familiar with the Chinese student's former distaste for manual tasks would be astounded to see girls clipping hedges, answering the telephone, and weighing out vegetables and fish in the kitchen." All observers of Yanda during the war years noticed among the students a seriousness of purpose absent in the prewar era. Disciplinary problems among students, especially male students, were "much simpler than in previous years." Although enrollment in the school of religion showed no dramatic increase, the war years not only reversed the prewar decline in the membership of Yanda's Christian fellowship but also doubled its size. By the fall of 1939, 460 students (47% of the total enrollment) belonged to the organization; the following year the number increased to 576. This fellowship required no rigid adherence to a specific denomination; conversion to Christianity was not a requirement for membership. In fact, the number of Christians among the students probably did not increase dramatically during the war years, but the fellowship must have provided assurance and peace of mind to some at a time of not just national turmoil but no doubt also of personal distress.
Official reports and personal letters all note with pride that students and faculty alike accepted with equanimity the lowered standard of living on campus. But the institution’s wealth cushioned many in its community against the worst ravages of runaway inflation. While scholarships and work-study jobs, plus more money from their families, helped Yanda students to adjust to the wartime economy; after a temporary salary reduction, starting in the fall of 1939, the university granted its teachers and administrators successive raises to soften the impact of inflation. Although these increments, ranging from 25% to 40% of individual salaries, never equaled the rate of inflation, this kind of wartime compensation enjoyed by Yanda employees was simply beyond the realm of possibilities for their hard-pressed counterparts in Beijing’s other institutions of postsecondary education.

Externally imposed restrictions and self-imposed circumspection muted but did not silence the university. Although an unusual quiet seemed to have crept onto the campus, and even on the school bus shuttling between the university and the city, most claimed that the knowledge of spies present in their midst did not deter them from speaking freely, at least according to several American members of the Yanda community. Although university officials heeded the call of the political authorities to remove “harmful books” from the shelves of the library, Yanda subscribed to the Reuter service and regularly posted its news reports, apparently without editing, on the university bulletin board. Post office censors in Beijing saw fit to tear off pages advertising firearms from copies of a Montgomery Ward catalogue intended for the Yanda community, but they did not curtail delivery of the Sunday New York Times. Yanda students continued to participate in exchange programs with universities in America and Europe and went abroad to study.

If the war did not manage to close the gap between the lifestyle of Yanda students and that of students attending Beida or Shida, the war also did not level the obvious as well as the subtle differences between Yanda’s foreign and Chinese employees. Although salary differences between the two groups were more or less eliminated in the early 1930s, most of the Chinese employees had to support families much larger than their foreign colleagues, and during the war years felt the impact of inflation more keenly. While one of their foreign colleagues grumbled about the need to be “suave to Japanese officials, some of whom were very noisy, totally unlike the traditional Japanese of elegant manners,” Chinese teachers and students alike had to subject themselves to “rigid inspection of their persons and their baggage” at the city gates in Beijing by Chinese police under the supervision of Japanese military officials, not to mention the possibility of imprisonment or other types of harassment. The inspections at the city gates became “noticeably relaxed” by 1940, but they never ceased completely. While some Chinese teachers prepared for the dangerous trek to China’s interior,
a few of their Western colleagues traveled in another direction—to
the resort town of Beidaihe for rest and recreation. Ultimately,
some foreign members of the Yanda community regarded the conflict as
a nuisance, but not their war, at least not until the Japanese at-
tacked Pearl Harbor.

PEARL HARBOR AND INTERNMENT

In a moment of uncharacteristic doubt in 1938, Stuart wondered
whether "any higher education, as [it is] generally understood, would
be possible under the Japanese control," and admitted "what has come
to be proudly spoken of as the Yenching spirit could reproduce itself
far more effectively when freed from so repressive a despotism."76
Otherwise, Stuart, along with many of Yanda’s Chinese faculty, shared
the view of some of their foreign colleagues that "even freedom may
be badly impaired, truth may be sought and service be performed in
the utmost devotion...the Christian spirit is broader than service
for the nation."77

During the years between the Lugouqiao incident and the attack
on Pearl Harbor, Yanjing University no doubt benefitted from the
impressive skills of its president and his Japanese-speaking assist-
ants who negotiated among several interest groups not just for the
university but also for the warring nations. Yanda’s association
with America eventually forced it to close down after December 8,
1941. But during most of its wartime operation, its association with
America was an asset, not a liability, to the institution. As rela-
tions between Washington and Tokyo deteriorated in the fall of 1940,
some in the Beijing government warned college-age Chinese against
attending Yanda, and Yanda graduates had difficulty obtaining certain
types of employment in north China.78 But had Yanda received its
funding primarily from British sources, the school would have become
a prominent target in the increasingly virulent anti-British cam-
paigns, sponsored by the Beijing government that began with the
blockade of the British concession in Tianjin in 1938.

Recognizing the possibility of a war between the U.S. and
Japan—and the likelihood of closing Yanda if fighting were to erupt,
Stuart began to prepare for such an eventuality in 1940. He encour-
gaged foreign families living on campus with small children to leave
on steamers provided by the U.S. State Department. He also made
arrangements for employees to receive three months extra pay, to be
disbursed in the form of checks from a local Chinese bank, in the
event the university ceased operation.79

By the spring of 1941, Stuart began to consider the possibility
that he had been resisting since July 1937, namely, to close the
university before the onset of actual fighting. At this juncture,
the president claimed, to stay open "would expose the Chinese to
forms of pressure which it would be almost impossible for them to
resist."80 He was also worried about the fate of Yanda’s buildings
and grounds. The previous fall he had learned that in the event of a war between the U.S. and Japan, the Japanese plan to occupy and utilize the well-equipped campus. While expressing the concern that Chinese employees unable to escape with their families might be "coerced into working for the Japanese or be rudely ejected," Stuart also entertained the idea of encouraging these Chinese "to endure the humiliation in the hope that it would be only temporary and would tend to preserve the physical plant [of the university]."81

On the morning of December 8, 1941, Japanese military police and men from the special service of the Japanese North China Army appeared on the grounds of Yanjing University. They stationed guards at all the gates and ordered separate meetings for the students, Chinese faculty, and foreign faculty respectively to announce the commencement of the Pacific War and their takeover of the university.82 On that very day seven Chinese teachers, one administrator, and twenty students were arrested. Then, shortly afterwards, a second group of Chinese professors and administrators were taken into custody. Their prison experience varied from individual to individual: many professors were tortured, but at least one was shown respect by his Japanese interrogator.83 After being held for three to six weeks in the military police headquarters in the city, the two groups were individually brought to trial on the charge of being too friendly with the Americans. All except three (or possibly four), who were quickly released, were sentenced to prison for varying lengths of time. By May of the following year, most, if not all of the professors and administrators, along with the arrested students, were released. Yanda’s students were ordered to leave one day after Pearl Harbor. Some continued their studies at Furen or Beida where a few of their former teachers at Yanda also found part-time employment in the classroom. The university’s Chinese staff who were detained on campus were allowed greater freedom than their foreign colleagues, and were eventually permitted to leave.84

Until the summer of 1942 about 35 foreign faculty members plus their families were congregated in the southern compound on campus, but were free to go out and into the city with the appropriate pass. Before mid-March, they were given free access to the entire campus and permitted to keep their radios. Without salaries, they pulled their financial resources together and managed without much difficulty. On July 25, accompanied by 150 car loads of baggage and two trucks of pianos, Yanda’s foreign faculty were moved into a Ming temple in Beijing. They were allowed to move about freely within the city and required to carry identification cards, which were seldom requested. They were also permitted to keep their Chinese servants, go to church, and to consult with doctors from the Beiyang Union Medical College. Most tried to use the time to do some research. Books were circulated widely; several made available their private collections. Although in theory they were not allowed to see their Chinese friends, but the latter visited them frequently. In April
1942 the internees began to receive funds from the New York office of
the United Board for Christian Higher Education in Asia. The money
was given to the Swiss government whose diplomatic representatives in
Beijing then distributed the payments to the internees. Although
what each individual received was much less than his or her normal
salary and there was evidence that they were charged several times
over the already exorbitant retail prices, the internees survived
without much hardship or inconvenience because they only had to pay
for food and coal. One teacher lamented about the high cost of food
and assured friends back in the United States that she and her fellow
internees were "learning to eat cereal and drink coffee without
sugar, and to enjoy bread made of cornmeal and millet flour, etc. We
make postum out of bran and brown sugar, and I like it better than
the poor coffee that we get now." They were not unaware that outside
their compound in the city many Chinese were dying from hunger and
exposure, and some expressed feelings of guilt. In 1943 the in-
ternees were sent to a detention camp in Weixian, Shandong, where
conditions were much less comfortable, and then repatriated in
groups.

December 8, 1941 found John Leighton Stuart in Tianjin. He was
held in the American barracks along with Henry S. Houghton, director
of the Beiyang Union Medical College until early January the follow-
ing year. And then both were transported to the Beijing residence of
Houghton and subsequently to the headquarters of Japan's North China
Army, where they were placed under house arrest for the duration of
the war. Stuart was permitted to receive censored letters and pack-
ages, plus occasional visitors. He paid for his own food and inci-
dentals, and on two occasions was allowed to return to Yanda under
escort in order to gather some of his personal effects. He was also
questioned several times at the military police headquarters about
his connections with the unoccupied areas, especially about his ties
with the Guomindang government and the information he had supplied to
the American embassy prior to December 1941.

Shortly after the takeover, the university's nurseries and work-
shops were stripped of all equipment ranging from baskets and buckets
to shears and shovels. On Arbor Day in 1942 the authorities uprooted
"truckloads of young trees" from the campus for replanting in the
city and left Yanda's deforested grounds untended. The Japanese
completely dismantled and removed the gas plant on campus. After the
war efforts to locate it were unsuccessful. A considerable amount of
laboratory equipment from Yanda was transferred to Beijing University
and returned after the war. Those revisiting the campus after August
1945 did find at least one addition: a Japanese-style bath.

The war years brought Yanjing University unprecedented attention
and popularity. The institution's un-Chinese attributes, which had
been regarded as liabilities by many Chinese, became assets for the
first and only time in the history of Yanda. But, wartime and post-

61
war accounts exaggerate the autonomy of the school. International

ties and foreign funds permitted it to continue to function, but

noble rhetoric of defiance and purity notwithstanding, Yanda was

often either unable or unwilling to ignore the authorities in

Beijing.

It would be wrong, however, to reject completely the university’s claim that by continuing to operate it was performing an essential patriotic service in the Christian spirit for a nation in crisis. The campus afforded a refuge for a number of Chinese students and teachers. For those who ran afoul of the authorities, association with Yanda in most cases helped rather than hindered them.

A crucial question that might be answered satisfactorily in future research is how wartime Yanda students viewed their college experience. Did they actually regard themselves as the privileged beneficiaries of a rare, “untainted” educational opportunity? Did many feel obligated to serve the Nationalist or Communist side after graduation? Of course, patriotic students and teachers risked personal safety to participate in resistance activities, but many were preoccupied with personal welfare and comfort, concerns that were often more compatible with a pragmatic outlook than with patriotic ideals. Available evidence also suggests that increased admissions quotas, intended by school officials to help young, patriotic Chinese (and also to keep the school solvent, no doubt) actually benefited a significant number of youths in North China whose academic caliber would probably have been considered substandard by the school before the war. Notwithstanding an assortment of commendable services Yanjing University performed for China’s war efforts, its wartime records did not help erase, and perhaps even accentuated, its foreign, affluent image and suspicion about the quality of its education.

Notes


3. See Administrative Correspondence of Yenching University, United Board for Christian Higher Education in Asia (hereafter, ACYU): Howard S. Galt, "Yenching University: Its Sources and Its History."


5. ACYU: John Leighton Stuart (hereafter, JLS) to B.A. Garside, July 21, 1937.

6. While eager to protect the lives of Americans and their Chinese associates, the American embassy didn't altogether approve of this show of the flag because the university was registered with the Chinese government and its title deed was not properly recorded with the appropriate American agency. ACYU: JLS, July 31 and August 8, 1937.

7. ACYU: JLS, August 8, 1937; September 8, 1937, confidential to trustees.


11. ACYU: JLS to trustees, July 30, 1939.

12. ACYU: minutes of meeting, November 4, 1940, committee on Yenching College for Women.


14. For the 1938-1939 academic year, the grade average (10 being the highest point) according to classes were as follows: senior, 6.20; junior, 6.01; sophomore, 5.38, and freshman, 5.38. See ACYU: annual report, 1938-1939.

15. ACYU: annual report, 1939-1940.

16. For example, see ACYU: Zheng Dekun to JLS, April 6, 1938.
17. CYU: Alice Boring, July 13, 1938.

18. Information culled from copies of the *Yenching Bulletin* published in the 1930s, ACYU.

19. ACYU: JLS to trustees, July 4, 1940, and September 23, 1940. CYU: Margaret Speer, November 1939.

20. ACYU: JLS summary statement of meeting with Matsukata Saburō, October 1, 1937.

21. ACYU: JLS to trustees, December 17, 1937.

22. ACYU: JLS to trustees, November 22, 1937.

23. ACYU: JLS to trustees, confidential, November 1, 1937.

24. ACYU: Fei Xiaotong to JLS, April 28, 1938.


26. ACYU: JLS to trustees, February 16, 1938.

27. ACYU: JLS to trustees, confidential, November 1, 1937.


29. Since the mid-1920s, Yanjing University and the Beijing Medical Union College with its hospital, along with several other missionary-operated institutions in China had received considerable attention in the Japanese Diet while its members debated about the aims of Japan's official cultural policy in China. In the Diet debates, these Western institutions were often presented in a laudatory manner tinged with envy. See, for example, Dai Nihon teikoku gikai shi 大日本帝國議會史, 40th session (1918), pp. 565-567.

30. ACYU: JLS to trustees, October 8, 1937.

31. ACYU: JLS to trustees, September 16, 1937; to faculty on furlough, September 29, 1937.
32. See, for example, ACYU: JLS to trustees, February 17, 1938.

33. ACYU: JLS to trustees, confidential, November 1, 1937.

34. ACYU: JLS to trustees, November 22, 1937. Jiaoyu gongbao 1 (July 1938), pp. 30-31 attests to such an order being repeated within a period of two weeks.

35. CYU: Howard S. Galt, March 9, 1938.

36. ACYU: JLS to trustees, June 16, 1938.

37. ACYU: JLS to trustees, January 14, 1941.

38. For example, see ACYU: JLS memo to trustees, November 6, 1937.

39. ACYU: JLS to trustees, November 22, 1937.


41. ACYU: JLS to trustees, confidential, February 12, 1940.

42. CYU: Alice Boring, July 13, 1938.

43. Some of the Xinminhui materials I have used bore the stamp of Yanjing University Library.

44. ACYU: Harvard-Yenching Institute: A Proposed Institute of Oriental Education and Research.

45. Stuart felt that Kita Seiichi was pressured by his subordinates to bring Yanda to yield to Japanese demand. ACYU: JLS to trustees, June 4, 1938. In private, Stuart also worried that Yanda’s selection might not meet the approval of the Japanese authorities. JLS memo, June 1, 1938.

46. ACYU: JLS to trustees, February 16, 1938.

47. ACYU: JLS to Serge Elisseeff, February 24, 1938; to trustees, June 4, 1938; to trustees, February 2, 1939.

48. ACYU: JLS to trustees, February 2, 1939.


50. ACYU: JLS to trustees, July 3, 1939 and July 4, 1940.
Torii’s wife provided a brief account of their stay at Yanda in Torii Kimiko, "Enkin daigaku no omoide" 燕京大学の思い出 [Memories of Yanda], Fujiin no tomo 婦人の友 46.2 (February 1952), pp. 33-38

51. ACYU: JLS to trustees, confidential, November 1, 1937.

52. ACYU: JLS, September 20, 1937.

53. ACYU: JLS to trustees, confidential, September 3, 1937.

54. ACYU: JLS, memo, October 22, 1937.

55. ACYU: JLS to R. Yaguchi, June 15, 1938.


57. ACYU: JLS to trustees, very confidential, January 10, 1939.

58. In the war criminals’ trials held in Tokyo after the war, the two counts of atrocities in Beijing charged against the Japanese concerned the torture and murder of students in the aftermath of the assassination of two Japanese army officers in Beijing in July 1940. International Military Tribunal of the Far East, pp. 4645, 4647.

59. ACYU: JLS to Garside, November 1, 1937.

60. When an American teacher from Yanda tried to inquire about their fate, he was told to restrain his obvious concern "lest foreign interest might lead to additional ill treatment." By chance he also learned that sociology, the major of one of the arrested students was "not in favor with the Japanese army." CYU: Lucius Porter, October 1, 1937.

61. ACYU: JLS, memo, June 1, 1938.

62. ACYU: JLS to trustees, very confidential, January 10, 1939.

63. Kōain Kahoku renrakubu 興亞院華北連絡部 北支に於ける文教の現状 [Conditions in Education in North China] (Beijing, 1941).

64. See, for example, ACYU: JLS to trustees, December 8, 1938.
65. Beijing's college women reportedly ranked suitors in this favorite saying: "Beida lao, Shida qiong, weiyou Yanda ke tongrong," which can be roughly translated as those from Beida are old-fashioned, and those from Shida, poor; only those from Yanda can be considered.

66. For example, the university increased its board fee by 50% in 1940, but food had gone up 160% in a year's time. CYU: Margaret Speer, March 3, 1940.

67. CYU: Margaret Speer, November 1939.

68. ACYU: JLS to faculty on furlough, September 29, 1937.

69. For example, in the 1939-1940 academic year, the school accepted every single one of its applicants, totaling twelve.

70. ACYU: JLS to trustees, October 9, 1939. CYU: Mary Cookingham, September 25, 1940.

71. For example, in 1938-1939, approximately 25% (233) of the students considered themselves Christians; during the same period two students declared themselves followers of Buddha and Allah, respectively.

72. See, for example, ACYU: JLS to trustees, confidential, November 1, 1937. CYU: Margaret Speer, March 3, 1940.

73. ACYU: JLS to trustees, November 22, 1937.

74. CYU: Alice Boring, July 13, 1938.

75. ACYU: annual report, 1939-1940.

76. ACYU: JLS to trustees, June 4, 1938.

77. ACYU: Galt to trustees, June 1938.

78. ACYU: JLS to trustees, January 14, 1941.

79. ACYU: JLS to trustees, October 19, 1940 and February 28, 1941; JLS to Garside, October 24, 1940.

80. ACYU: JLS to trustees, February 28, 1941.

81. ACYU: JLS to trustees, October 19, 1940.
82. A branch campus was established in Chengdu in the spring of 1942. As of May 1943, 349 students and 83 teachers belonged to the institution. ACYU: letter from Serge Elisseeff to trustees, November 30, 1943.


84. CYU: Walter W. Davis, April 15, 1942, May 18, 1942; Y. P. Mei, June 4, 1942.

85. CYU: Alice Boring, November 15, 1942, January 1, 1943; Anne Cochran, August 9, 1942.


87. CYU: Walter W. Davis, April 15, 1942; Howard S. Galt, June 1, 1942.

88. CYU: Augusta Wagner, October 14, 1943; Walter W. Davis, April 15, 1942; Howard S. Galt, March 15, 1942.

89. CYU: Alice Boring, November 15, 1946; Samuel M. Dean, December 19, 1945.