Editor's note: One of the principal aims of the Sino-Japanese Studies Newsletter will be to present a lively section of reviews of important books and articles in the field of Sino-Japanese studies. We feel that the debates launched through reviews can be the cutting edge of scholarship. Unfortunately, most journals are forced, for one reason or another, to sacrifice the exchange of ideas that good reviewing can offer for the concerns of space or coverage. Journals such as the Journal of Asian Studies and the American Historical Review only extremely rarely publish a review that covers the many issues raised in important books; and neither reviews articles. They have a different conception of their mandates. The exceptions to this rule, such as the Journal of Japanese Studies and the American Asian Review, provide examples of how allocating more space, greater leeway, and more serious attention to reviews can liven up discourse in the field. Even these two do not, though, review articles. Prospective reviewers are encouraged to contact the editor about a book or article, in any language, (s)he would like to review. We also hope to allocate space for rebuttals. The only concern is that the work deals with Sino-Japanese studies in some important way. Bibliographic format should conform to the reviews in this issue of the Sino-Japanese Studies Newsletter.

Several years ago, the Centre for East Asian Cultural Studies of the Toyo bunko 東洋文庫 in Tokyo commissioned the writing and translation into English of a series of essays by renowned Japanese scholars of Asian culture on the developments in their respective fields over the decade 1973-1983. The series is titled Asian Studies in Japan, 1973-1983. Published as short pamphlets, each carries the warning label on its inside flap: "In each booklet the author describes research trends in Japan during 1973-1983 in a summarized fashion, and the text is appended with a select bibliography which lists representative research works appearing in book form or in scholarly journals in Japan during the period. The list does not intend to be comprehensive but aims to cover important works published by Japanese scholars both in and outside Japan and also research published by non-Japanese scholars in the Japanese language." Although altogether twenty-eight such essays are eventually expected to appear, as of 1987 only six have seen the light of day. Ordinarily the Sino-Japanese Studies Newsletter will not be reviewing each and every work of Japanese Sinology that appears in print in Japan. An entire journal could be devoted to this subject alone. However, review pieces of the sort published by the Toyo bunko will be reviewed because they offer insights into trends in Japanese understanding of China. (JAF)

Itō Michiharu of Kōbe University is one of the world’s leading scholars and interpreters of the Shang oracle bones and Zhou bronze inscriptions. Lest the reader of this pamphlet be unaware of this fact, Professor Itō reiterates it several times; for example (p. 3): "the syntactical interpretation of Itō [Michiharu is] to be regarded as [an] important new approach to the reading of oracle bone inscriptions." It is a straightforward account of the impressive research done in this field in Japan through the 1970s and early 1980s; he appends a bibliography containing 130 entries. Much of this work—particularly the difficulties involved in reading, dating, and proving the authenticity of inscriptional materials—is presented as detective work.

There is no mention at all of Chinese intellectual or cultural history in high antiquity. One would like to know something of trends in Japanese studies of the ancient philosophers, or how the discovery of new inscriptional materials may be changing a view derived primarily from written and textual traditions. All Itō is willing to venture is (p. 9): "Old philosophers, too [in additional to texts such as the Zhanguo ce and Shiji], cannot be depended on as authorities, for their works are compositions from diverse times and events recorded in them cannot be accepted as true without further verification. Such being the situation, speculative interpretation of history of this period has been usual in the face of difficulty in concretely establishing historical facts. It is urgently hoped that more historical material of similar kind will be unearthed in the future." It is safe to say that we all share Itō’s wish. It would seem that Itō has become such a positivist in his approach to the ancient period, such a stubborn skeptic with respect to received wisdom, that he has consciously jettisoned the entire classical tradition because the texts of the Hundred Schools are presumably unreliable. There is something frighteningly shallow about such an approach.

The bibliography is reasonably free of errors. There is one bothersome practice adopted here and in the other pamphlets in this series. In transcribing the names of Chinese in Japanese titles, two-character names are often rendered confusingly as one Japanese word. This practice violates the one consistent policy in these booklets of capitalizing the Japanese transcriptions of Chinese proper nouns. Thus, entry 11, by Itō himself, is rendered: "Eiu mei kō" 永盂銘 喜 [A study of the Yong Yu inscription]. It should read: "Ei U mei kō."

gives both. Macrons are uniformly left off "Tokyo" even where it is required by conventional practice (as in titles of journals). Furthermore, if a work was assigned an English title in its original form (on the back cover of journals or as back matter to books), that title is faithfully reproduced as translations for the titles in these bibliographies, even if they only approximate the Japanese (and the English language for that matter). Thus, entry III-8, by Shirakawa Shizuka 白川静 "Ryokei keitosho-hen nitsuite" 历代系統研究篇について [A genealogical treatise on some chapters of "Lüxing plan" in the Shujing]. It is better translated: "On the Chapters of the Shujing in the Lüxing filiation." The author of entry V-29 is listed as Saitō Saneo 梨藤実は郎; *Saneo should be Sanerō. (JAF)


Professor Ikeda of Chūō University in Tokyo offers a more balanced treatment of the different kinds of historical research in which Japanese scholars are engaged. He begins by highly lauding two recent multi-volume guides: Chūgoku shi kenkyū nyūmon 中国史研究入門 [Introduction to the Study of Chinese History], ed. Yamane Yukio 山根幸夫 (Yamakawa shuppansha, 1983, 2 vols.); and Ajia rekishi kenkyū nyūmon 歴史研究入門 [Introduction to the Study of Asian History], ed. Shimada Kenji 島田虔次 (Dōhōsha, 1983- , 5 vols. projected). According to Ikeda, the former "greatly ease[s] the researcher's task of locating the most suitable study materials"; the latter "is an invaluable reference tool for gaining an introduction to sources" concerning the periods covered (p. I).

These assessments are largely hype. Like so many other works of this kind, the essays in these two volumes are useful summaries of the points of view of a certain handful of authors. The Yamane set is by exclusively Tokyo University people (Goi Naohiro 五井直弘, Yanagida Setsuko 柳田節子, Hori Toshikazu 堀敏一, and others of a neo-Marxist bent). The Shimada set is largely the work of Kyoto University scholars (Tanigawa Michio 田川道雄, Tonami Mamoru 田沼真盛, Chikusa Masaaki 筒沙雅章, Takeuchi Minoru 竹内実, and others).

I am more inclined to agree with the evaluation of Motono Eiichi 本野英一, writing the survey of scholarship for the journal Shigaku zasshi 学術雑誌: "In fact, the chapters on modern China in two major introductions to research, one published in Tokyo and one in Kyoto several years ago, were appallingly uninteresting—merely a marshalling of secondary materials and the titles of document collections and reference works, following a
periodization which has not changed in the least since the publication of H. B. Morse’s *The International Relations of the Chinese Empire* [publ. 1910-1918]. Clearly the energy needed to confront the radical changes that have taken place in the last ten years has evaporated from works of this sort." See *Shigaku zasshi* 95.5 (May 1986), p. 221.

Thankfully, Ikeda has no particular grudge or partisan bone to pick in this survey. He presents the research findings of scholars of the Tokyo and Kyoto schools equally even-handedly. Particularly noteworthy are the fascinating and still developing debates on local society from Later Han through the Period of Disunion. There are so many scholars working in this area in Japan; one wishes their findings could be better integrated into Western and Chinese scholarship; one wishes there were more pre-modernists who published or vehicles for them to publish.

McDermott has chosen on at least three occasions (all on p. 7) not to use translations for technical terms from Charles Hucker’s recently published magnum opus. The term *xunyuan* is rendered "circuit offices," while Hucker gives "Touring Brokerage" (p. 257); *yushitai* is rendered "imperial censors," while Hucker gives "Censorate" (pp. 593-594); for the term *tuntian* he gives "military farm colonies" while Hucker offers "State Farms" (p. 550).

The bibliography appended to this booklet includes 194 items, several of them multi-volume sets. The transcriptions and translations are generally reliable. Item 40 has an incorrect character in its title. Item 70 has a misreading for the first character of the text embedded in the title: *Qindan liuzheng* should be *Zoudan liuzheng*. As in the pamphlet by Ito Michiharu, reviewed above, two-character Chinese names are rendered by a single Japanese word in transcription; for example, item 108 has "Soi" (Su Wei) which would be better rendered "So I" in Japanese. Similarly, item 192 renders Pei Yin *Hai In* in Japanese as "Hain"; "Hai In" is better. The surname of the author of item 166 should be *KANO*, not *KANO*.

Again, there are countless instances in which an accurate translation has been superceded by a translation undoubtedly attached to the Japanese book or article in its Japanese incarnation, a practice which makes no sense at all. This leads to an occasional non-translation of a sub-title and to bizarre or misleading translations: for example, item 153 in which title and translation have no identifiable relationship; or, item 190 in which the Chinese *suishiji* is rendered "records of the passage of the year," instead of almanacs, and in the subtitle *Simin yueling* (Japanese, *Shimin getsurei*) is translated redundantly as "the monthly instructions for the Simin yueling."

On the whole, though, these caveats aside, this little booklet is inordinately valuable for gaining a sense of what Japanese
views Keiji manage-
scholars of this period are working on and the reliance of their work on contacts with Chinese scholars and archeological sites. This is one of the most heavily researched areas in Japan. (JAF)


This thin pamphlet is, without a doubt, the most important contribution to this series so far published. Professor Okuzaki teaches at Aoyama Gakuin University in Tokyo and is one of Japan's foremost scholars of the Chinese gentry, having written a mammoth book on the subject, Chūgoku kyōshin jinushi no kenkyū 中国鄉紳地主の研究 [Studies of Gentry-Landlords in China] (Tokyo: Kyūko shoin, 1978). He begins on a contentious and altogether welcome note: "The current surge of scholarly interest in social history is about to engulf Japanese historical research on China. This new concern with social history has grown out of profound doubts about the conventional worship of modernism in recent scholarship and about the validity of the once unquestioned developmental view of history... Meanwhile, we have seen a waning of once fervent hopes of gaining a systematic grasp of Chinese history according to particular laws of history and a corresponding increase in piece-meal empirical studies leading to advances in academic learning. These two phenomena, I believe, are just part of the process underway towards a significant advance in Japanese historical research on China" (p. 1).

The same comments would apply to Japanese research on other eras in Chinese history, with the possible exception of 20th-century history. The term "modernism" should be understood in the sense of "modernization" theory. At long last, the virtually religious appeal of a belief in historical stages is losing its hold in the Japanese academy. Okuzaki's comment is largely directed at scholars of the Tokyo school, like himself, and others who, since the end of World War II, thought they were returning history to China by rigorously interpreting historical developments there in the same unilinear model of stages used by other Marxist scholars for Western history. The effort was such a colossal failure that, Okuzaki reports, it is being abandoned. This may also mean that the tired old clash between the Tokyo and Kyoto schools of Sinology will diminish. As one Japanese scholar from Kyushu put it to me recently: "The Tokyo-Kyoto controversy has been resolved—they're both wrong."

Okuzaki offers a number of cases in which contemporary Japanese scholars are working to undermine long uncontested views about Chinese history. These include, among others, Adachi Keiji 足立啓二, whose painstaking work on the organization and manage-
ment of Chinese agriculture of the Ming and Qing periods has led him to the postulation that pre-modern China was not a feudal society. Instead, he junks all the now moldy baggage of "feudalism-to-capitalism" and posits that capitalism in China developed out of an independent, small-scale agricultural management. As Okuzaki puts it, "his work has...had the important effect of undermining the once-unquestioned hegemony of the concept of a Chinese feudal system. It has thereby freed Japanese scholars from the powerful spell of such conventional wisdom and forced them to rethink their assumptions and analyses once again" (p. 2).

The centerpiece of Japanese Sino logy in the Song-to-Qing period throughout the 1970's was the debate over the nature of the Chinese gentry (or kyōshinron 郭紳論 in Japanese). It is summarized briefly here, and the reader is wisely referred to an essay by Mori Masao 森正夫 which provides a more detailed summary of all the various positions. In general, Okuzaki uses significant scholarly debates, rather than historical periods, as the means of organizing Japanese research. These include: local history and land utilization, water control, agriculture and land tenure, the roles of the lijia system, "local community," the unceasing debate between Fujii Hiroshi 藤井宏 and Kusano Yasushi 草野靖 (one cannot help but agree with Okuzaki when he exclaims: "I personally hope that these two views are resolved in the near future," p. 7), and political, economic, and religious rebellions.

His conclusion is worth quoting: "For a long time Japanese historians have relied on a developmental view of history based on a mere skeleton framework of analysis, thereby leaving the rich variety of social life to the research concerns of the social historian. Such divergent approaches clearly do not fit one another. Furthermore, the mere accumulation of evidence, however rich it may be, will not of itself suffice to create a new underlying theoretical framework. Only in the unending process of discovering and rediscovering the rich texture of social life will we be able to reconstruct a framework of thought which will support advances into the entire body of research on Chinese history. This change will lead neither to a resurrection of that 'progressivism' (the skeleton framework of the developmental view of history), which many Japanese scholars of China now recognize as invalid, nor to an extension of that conservatism which seems rampant everywhere today. This new movement, I believe, will be manifest by no later than a decade from now" (p. 11). With allowances for the untranslatability of some Japanese expressions, let us wish this new trend good luck and godspeed.

There are a few transcription and translation problems in the text and among the 90 items in the appended bibliography. The Luo sect is referred to three times (p. 11) incorrectly as *Lajiao. Parts of the Japanese titles are missing from the English translation in items 8, 19, 25, 76, and 79. In item 34, Zhang Lixiang
张履祥，the well-known author of an agricultural handbook, is referred to as Zhang Lüxiang. The character Lü is usually rendered Li in his name, as in Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period (p. 45) and Dictionary of Ming Biography (pp. 149, 1380). (JAF)


After such a fine piece as Okuzaki's, this essay by Kubota Bunji is frankly embarrassing. In this day and age, it as anachronistic as a human tail. Were it not for the fact that Kubota is a major figure in contemporary Japanese Sinology, one would be sorely tempted simply to forget it. Kubota begins with an equivocal statement about the developments in the People's Republic of China since the death of Mao Zedong: "These great changes in Socialist China are of course difficult to understand from the standpoint of people supporting the 'Proletarian Cultural Revolution,' and even from the viewpoint of Socialist parties in other countries that have criticized the Cultural Revolution and from the Chinese Communist line before the Cultural Revolution" (p. 1). What is he getting at here? Where does he stand on this issue?

His high estimation of the theories advanced by Tanaka Masatoshi 田中正俊, especially the idea of the Chinese peasantry as "slaves for the sake of capital" (put forward by Hazama Naoki and developed by Tanaka) for late imperial China, sounds utterly idiotic. If this and other ideas of Tanaka's are accurately presented by Kubota, then at least those of who have been trying to understand Tanaka's Japanese can now rest assured that it has not been worth the trouble.

One indication of just how far apart Japanese Marxist and Western scholars of 20th-century China are can be seen in a statement by Kubota about the united front: "It is true that many difficulties of understanding arise if we try to explain the basic conditions and the main force behind the formation of the anti-Japanese united front using [sic.] dogmatically a simple schemata which takes national capital as progressive, bureaucratic-compadore capital as reactionary, and the Guomindang regime as feudalistic" (p. 3). This sentence, dangling participle aside, strikes this reviewer as so obvious that articulation is unnecessary. Later in the same paragraph, Kubota claims: "It is difficult to deny that there were extreme left tendencies in the policies of the CCP and that there were nationalistic and national capitalistic elements in Guomindang policy." The CCP would be doing well if its candidates for membership knew their party history as well as Kubota; he certainly knows the line, although what may soon become an outdated version thereof.
One of the unstated aims of this pamphlet is to salvage the Comintern line that Chinese society was "semi-colonial" and "semi-feudal," in spite of all the changes that have transpired since Mao's passing from the scene. This barren slogan comes up three or four times in the essay and always in a positive light. Why would a serious scholar in the mid-1980's still labor to preserve a theory from Stalin's time which never had anything to recommend it? What is the agenda of men like Kubota and his ilk?

One debate of potentially enormous interest is given little mention; in fairness, it was just beginning in 1983. Mizoguchi Yūzō 池口雄三 launched an attack that year on postwar Japanese (and PRC) scholarship on modern China for being "distorted" into Mao Zedong's "monistic view of history based on popular revolution." In other words, he claimed that many Chinese and Japanese scholars relied on the teleology of the revolution culminating in 1949 and saw every incident and personage of the modern period prior to 1949 as contributing to or backsliding from the ultimate achievement of that glorious event. Kubota says less than this much about Mizoguchi's piece, but he devotes twice as much space to a certain rebuttal to Mizoguchi which defends the Japanese Marxist record for excessive allegiance to Mao; Kubota is the author of the rebuttal.

One cannot help but think that Mizoguchi hit on something, and not only for Japan and China. Having denied that Japanese scholarship deserves Mizoguchi's claims of myopia, blind loyalty to the late Chairman, and a severe teleology that sees the past with extraordinary revolutionary hindsight, Kubota goes on to conclude: "[T]he decade saw no new theories and methodology that were able to endure the great impact of the failure of the 'Great Proletarian [Cultural?] Revolution' and the progress of the 'four modernizations' and explain these phenomena in a convincing way" (p. 10). Why, one would like to know, should a theory concerning late imperial Chinese history have to be able to explain the Four Modernizations?

The appended bibliography contains 195 items, and it is unfortunately riddled with errors of translation, transcription, and omission. Portions of the titles of the following entries are either missing or incorrectly rendered in English: 4, 18, 25, 27, 46, 71, 75, 76, 86, 87, 91, 101, 105, 113, and 154. The publishing house, Nit-Chū shuppan 日中出版, is consistently transcribed *Nicchu Shuppan. The author of item 67 (also on p. 8) should be Kawata (not *Kawada) Teiichi 河田悌一. There are many other small errors of this sort. This pamphlet is best forgotten, save as a reminder of the sort of ignoramuses that still occupy university positions in Japan and elsewhere. (JAP)
This booklet by Kawai Shin'ichi of Chuo University should remind Western students of contemporary China that they ignore Japanese scholarship at their peril. In this area of research, one notes several strikingly similar developments in Japan and the West. Prior to the fall of the so-called "Gang of Four" and the rise of Deng Xiaoping's policies, Japanese scholars often followed uncritically the various policy lines and policy shifts in China as a reflection of reality. The questions now raised in China by the criticism directed at the pre-1978 period has served to shake up Japanese approaches to China as well. Namely, "the sentimental and idealistic research methods which were popular during the Cultural Revolution were criticized and the importance of understanding the reality of Chinese society and examining it from various points of view was recognized" (p. 1). Similar words, mutatis mutandis, might be said of Western scholarship of the period of the Cultural Revolution.

The reader of this essay still senses that Japanese scholars pay excessive attention to Party rhetoric in China, not in order to study Chinese Communist linguistic strategies, but because they are often afraid of being overly critical of the regime. Japanese scholars often still live with guilt for the war in China, and although attitudes may now be changing, most Japanese bend over backward so as not to appear as though they do not take the Chinese leadership seriously at their word.

One is generally struck by efforts in a variety of disciplines to come up with a new model for China's development, now that the Maoist model has been discredited. Kawai has high praise for the work of economist Nakagane Katsuji who did important work on the people's communes in the early and mid-1970s and is now attempting to derive a new methodology for the study of contemporary China. Together with Nakagane, others such as Ishikawa Shigeru and Nakajima Mineo are now trying to explain the evolution of the Maoist model (in economics and politics, respectively).

No attention is paid in this booklet to anything except politics, society, and economics in the PRC: no culture, no intellectual history, no literature, no Taiwan. While it is arguable (though I doubt sustainable) that the intellectual history of post-1949 China would not warrant even a sentence or two and literature is dealt with in a separate pamphlet, Taiwan has simply been jettisoned from Japanese consideration; it is not the "real China" for most Japanese.

In part Japanese scholars have become prisoners of their own (and Chinese Communist) jargon. An intelligent English-speaker reading a contemporary Chinese text who sees the expression jiefang
解放 (literally, 'liberation') translates this as "1949." Thus, where the Chinese speak of pre- and post-liberation, we speak of pre- and post-1949, an altogether healthy practice because we have been forced to confront this term, mediate it, evaluate it, and translate it into a linguistic medium that makes sense to us in our own lexicon. This is a troublesome tendency afoot to start using "pre-liberation" and "post-liberation" in English-language texts uncritically. Explaining this usage by its users is a desideratum. Japanese in the postwar period have consistently employed the Chinese terminology by simply reading it in Japanese; language has not compelled them, as it has us, to rethink the meaning and the impact of the terminology. This is not to say that they have failed to consider the problem, but that they have not developed a systematic way of doing it. The Western scholar trying to communicate in English with a Japanese scholar of China may be shocked to hear what we assume to be the language of Marxism used by people who may not be Marxists. No one has studied this problem, but it adds a layer of complexity to Japanese debates on China.

Kawai's appended bibliography contains 133 items, with many of the errant translation and transcription problems mentioned above. Also puzzling is the absence of a single reference to a book or article (other than translations) by Japan's leading Mao scholar, Takeuchi Minoru 竹内實. There has to be a reason for this; this lacuna is tantamount to a survey of Western scholarship on the PRC that ignored altogether the work of both Stuart Schram and Jerome Chen. (JAF)


This little pamphlet will be a great boon to those searching out Japanese works on Chinese literature of any period. Thankfully, Professor Satō of Ochanomizu University in Tokyo has kept politics to a minimum, not ignoring it but not allowing it to ride roughshod over everything else. The decade 1973-1983 witnessed an explosion of Japanese research on Chinese literature. As Satō himself notes: "An enormous number of publications on Chinese literature appeared during the period being surveyed, but one feature of the decade is how many of the works are fundamental tools of research: collections of materials, bibliographies, and concordances or indexes... [T]hey total nearly fifty for the period, the various kinds of indexes and concordances alone comprising about thirty" (p. 1).

Because the preparation of such works is often maligned in the West for being uncreative or too "Sinological," we will all probably be relying on these Japanese reference works for some time to come. For the Tang period alone, for example, these include con-
cordances to the poetic writings of Zhang Ji, Wen Tingyun, Wang Wei, Meng Haoran, and Li Shangyin. Similar painstaking work has been and is being done in the fields of Chinese drama and fiction, such as the vocabulary prepared for the Honglou meng.

As one might expect, the Lu Xun industry in Japan continues unabated to produce an unending flow of work on the great Chinese writer. Unlike anywhere else in the world outside China, in Japan, Lu Xun—actually Ro Jin—is a household name. There are several editions of his works in Japanese, including a "collected works" now being published. One wonders what is left to investigate in this man's life and work. Sato notes: "If one is to identify the outstanding feature of Lu Hsün studies in Japan during the decade, it would be the digging out of various materials that Lu Hsün left in Japan. The Society for Investigating Material on Lu Hsün in Sendai [Sendai ni okeru Ro Jin no kiroku o shiraberu kai] has done a signal service by combing widely for the most detailed of records; such work stands as a monument to modern Chinese literature studies in Japan" (p. 7). It should be added that this Society is a group of private citizens of Sendai, where Lu Xun studied medicine, who have taken on this research as a hobby; a comparable instance would be if a group of Hartford businessmen and their wives began devoting their spare time to collecting materials related to Yung Wing.

The appended bibliography lists 85 items. The one consistent transcription problem here is the aforementioned practice of Romanizing two-character Chinese names as one Japanese word: Rojin instead of the preferred Ro Jin; Genshin instead of Gen Shin (Yuan Zhen); Oi instead of 0 I (Wang Wei); Toho instead of To Ho (Du Fu); and many, many more. (JAF)


This "research note" provides a good introduction and survey of contemporary China studies in Japan, and, judging by the frightening lack of care that went into editing it, it is likely to fall on many deaf ears. The transcription errors are too numerous to enumerate; suffice it to say that every single macron is missing, including the one that should adorn the author's given name.

Kokubun should effectively put to sleep for all time the oft-heard and never-substantiated piece of wishful thinking that Japanese scholars have contributed nothing of worth to the study of contemporary China. This particular piece of Western self-congratulation is, obviously, the claim put forward by social scientists.
as rationalization for not having to invest the time needed to learn the Japanese language. Those of us interested in Sino-Japanese studies know the claim to be bogus; Kokubun has now proven it. He even hints at this when he notes that "an examination of the footnotes in this journal [namely, China Quarterly] in recent years and in the growing number of English-language monographs on China reveals few references to contemporary Japanese studies of China" (p. 506).

In addition to an exhaustive delineation of the principal publications, study groups, and government and press agencies that concern China, Kokubun also offers several highlights about current trends in Japanese studies of contemporary China. One of his more interesting points concerns changes in scholarly directions. Maoists in Japan--"who were often said to be more Maoist than Mao" (p. 514)--have occupied a sizable body in the Japanese academy; but since the collapse of the so-called "Gang of Four" and the reevaluations of Mao, Liu Shaoqi, and the Cultural Revolution in China, some of these Maoists "have reproached themselves for their past mistakes," some have turned their energies to historical studies to avoid having to evaluate contemporary China, while some continue to espouse Maoism and to favour the ideology of the Cultural Revolution. Some non-Marxist and pro-Maoist scholars defend the idealistic goals of the Cultural Revolution (anti-bureaucratism and egalitarianism), and avoid dealing with its negative aspects (violence and struggle for power); others take no stand at all" (pp. 514-515).

Kokubun is rather harsh concerning the recent boom in Japanese interest in prewar Manchuria. He sees it as a form of romanticism about the prewar Northeast, fueled largely by the accessibility of travel there for those Japanese who were born or raised in the region, and implicitly by the renascent conservatism in Japan which has supported this form of selective amnesia (only the good old days are remembered, not the horrors visited on the Chinese). He criticizes the treatment that recent scholars have offered of the Research Department of the South Manchurian Railway as a think-tank extraordinaire, but this (I would argue) is precisely what it was, for better or for worse. He also mentions the "war orphans" issue and the textbook case, but with little evaluation. (One should note, concerning the "war orphans," that these Chinese-born Japanese children in wartime China were usually not orphans in the dictionary sense of the term. Their parents abandoned them [to the care of Chinese families, it was hoped] because the parents were escaping to Japan at war's end).

Japan has also recently been plagued, as have we in the West, by the spread of books by journalists resident for a period of time in China. Like the works of Fox Butterfield and Orville Schell, some of these Japanese books are also "filled with gossip," "pessimistic about China's situation, stressing only China's problems."
Unlike the recent spate of Western accounts, though, most Japanese books of this genre remained optimistic about China's future. A comparison of the American and Japanese works in this genre would make an interesting study.

Kokubun notes that "Japanese have been struck by the fact that American scholars of contemporary China have tended to neglect the forces of historical and cultural continuity" (p. 517). No surprise; it is a national disease in the United States, compounded by a virtually proud ignorance of China's past in congruence with the efforts of the Chinese to overcome a past detested as "feudal" and "oppressive" and generally summed up with a set of caricatures. However, as China has begun to reassess its past and to find "good" things worthy of continued emulation from her own past, perhaps American social scientists will pay heed, even if for the wrong reasons.


In twenty-five pages, Chalmers Johnson summarizes Sino-Japanese relations for this 30-year period. As the title indicates, he examines more how Japan has acted and reacted in its relations with China, than how China sees their bilateral ties. While clearly a summary, a strength which makes this article essential reading for students, there is also a distinct line of argument pursued.

Johnson divides the period from the end of the American Occupation in 1952 through the textbook controversy of 1982 into three stages: "the period of Japanese dependency and contrition," 1949-1971; "the period of euphoria (panda-mania), from the Nixon Shocks to the Baoshan Shock," 1971-1981; and "the return of 'Banquo's ghost,' high-school history textbooks in hand, to haunt the celebration, 1982 and after" (p. 403). He notes, in general, that Japan's self-conception as a trading partner with China qualitatively differs from Japan's attitude in this regard with other nations in the world. "[T]he almost total lack of emotional involvement on the part of the Japanese people" with the disputes between various of its trading partners enable Japan to trade with, for example, Iran and Iraq. Only in the case of China, he argues, are "political, economic, and diplomatic ties...subtly skewed by the popular attitudes...of the Japanese people as they are mobilized by the Japanese press" (p. 402).

During the first period, according to Johnson, Japan essentially pursued a two-pronged policy. On the surface, contact with the PRC was extremely difficult because of the importance of Japan to the Cold War containment policies of the United States. At the same time Japanese were pounding their collective chests in contri-
tion for their actions in China during the war, and pro-Taiwan elements in the LDP were vocal in their support of U.S. policy. However genuinely guilty Japanese may have felt, the Chinese certainly demanded self-effacing apologies at every turn. By the same token, they did this to prevent the Chinese from closing down bilateral trade that was established in the 1950s through other channels, channels opened by leftist members of the LDP and other pro-PRC members of the Diet. To describe this mea culpa form of diplomacy, Johnson coins the marvelous expression, "fumie diplomacy." The term fumie 踏刑絵 comes from the early Tokugawa practice of compelling people to "step" on a "tablet" with a crucifix, indicating (through this blasphemy) that they were not Christians; it has come to be synonymous with a loyalty test.

Johnson is, not unexpectedly, extremely critical of "the high tide of Japanese intellectual flattery of China [in the 1960s], an attitude that turned into positive intoxication during the Cultural Revolution. Japanese scholars and critics filled the monthly magazines with paens to and justifications of everything the Chinese did" (p. 409). Surely the press, as well as scholarly and semi-scholarly monthlies, carried many pro-Cultural Revolution portraits, but, as Kokubun Ryösei has shown, these voices did not go unopposed in Japan (see my summary of Kokubun’s work in a forthcoming issue of Chinese Communist Studies Newsletter). One does have to agree with Johnson that the Japanese press, which had considerable access to China for the press of a non-Communist country, fully accepted dictates comparable to fumie diplomacy and refrained from saying anything negative about China.

The second period began as Sino-Japanese normalization was taking shape. Johnson argues that this event was not merely a result of visits by Nixon and Kissinger to China; Japanese planning predates even the visit to the PRC of the American ping-pong team. And, although normalization ultimately took place on terms laid down by Premier Zhou Enlai, Japan was not, Johnson claims, solely a loser. Japan managed to abide by the ideological demands of the Chinese while doing as it really wished. Prime Minister "Ohira’s air treaty [in which the PRC used Narita airport and Taiwan continued to use Haneda] is one of the best examples of Japan’s helping the Chinese to preserve their sacred principles while concretely violating them" (p. 414). During this period of international "China fever," every Western government, with the United States and Japan high on the list, wanted a slice of the China melon. In early 1981 China unilaterally cancelled roughly $300 billion worth of contracts which included a stage of the joint-venture Baoshan Iron and Steel Complex. The matter was resolved later that year only when Japan agreed to invest a like amount just for Baoshan. Sino-Japanese contacts have never been the same, Johnson argues, following the Baoshan Shock.

To the extent that he analyzes the causes for this strange
turn of events, Johnson essentially sees the Chinese acting entirely on their own, without the normal bilateral decision-making process that international business practices would expect. But, this could only have transpired if the Japanese had been willing to roll over and bark when the Chinese demanded another $300 billion. We need to know more of what happened behind the scenes in China; what role the Sino-Vietnamese War played in China's need for money; and why Japan ultimately acceded to China's demands.

The third period of Sino-Japanese relations actually covers only a year or two early in the present decade and concerns the highly publicized textbook case. Johnson's view of this incident and its impact in Japan will not please everyone, but it deserves its day in court. "Although farcical in its concrete details," he argues, "the textbook controversy hit the Japanese in an area of great emotional vulnerability, and brought home to some of them the risks of continuing to base their foreign policy solely on short-term economic advantages rather than on political principles to which they were committed and that they wanted to see prevail" (p. 420).

Johnson claims that "the initial reports were all untrue: no textbooks had been revised during 1982" (p. 421). He blames the leftist Japanese press for trying (and succeeding) to embarrass a conservative government. The Chinese exploded, claiming renascent militarism in Japan and refusing to meet with the Prime Minister. The Koreans were also outraged. Even more to the point, Johnson sees the long fight over the political bent of textbooks between the Japan Teachers' Union, a largely Communist organization, and the LDP as the "real background to this controversy" (p. 423). Nonetheless, the early 1980s did witness in Japan, as elsewhere in the world, a revival of conservatism and a reexamination of the war years, not always in the earlier spirit of contrition or even self-criticism. Ultimately, Japan apologized and promised to take another look at its history textbooks for the post-Meiji period.

"The most important follow-up investigations," Johnson concludes, "centered on the failings of the Japanese press: its obsequiousness toward China, its persistent leftist bias, its failure to report serious news events that do not square with its ideological tendencies, and its unchecked power to influence and occasionally even determine foreign policy" (p. 425).

As a whole, Johnson is clearly critical of the extent to which Japan has been willing to prostrate herself before China. He is particularly hard on the Japanese press, which obviously does not share his political views, for infantile leftism. One would like to hear more about this press-government relationship. Is such an adversarial relationship so bad? Might it not be an effective mechanism for keeping the government honest, although admittedly with the danger of raising phoney or altogether false issues? Johnson is especially critical of the press for its fawning admira-
tion and rosy pictures of the PRC. If this was once true, and I have no doubt that it was, things seem to be changing in the 1980s.

Nonetheless, one Sino-Japanese issue of the early 1980s which has continued to receive extraordinary press attention and which Johnson does not address is the bizarre and tragic drama of the "war orphans." This term, a concoction of the press, refers to the offspring of Japanese living in Manchuria and China proper at the end of the war when Japan's defeat forced them to flee without the excess baggage of their children. The youngsters were then raised by Chinese. In the early 1980s the Chinese began, in a well-orchestrated fashion, allowing these now grown adults a chance to find the parents who had abandoned them 35-40 years earlier. There were tearful and maudlin reunions when an occasional "child" met his/her now elderly parents. Few were able to do so, and fewer could speak Japanese. It turned into a grotesque manipulation of emotions by both sides and caused recriminations and a revival of bad feelings again. The term, "war orphan," itself was a conscious misnomer—they were not orphans at all but abandoned children. We await Professor Johnson's treatment of this issue.

There are several minor points that should be noted. The Japanese term for "Sino-Japanese" is consistently transcribed Nitchū; we think Nit-Chū is better because it capitalizes the element refering to "China." In theory, it would seem, Johnson agrees; see his transcription (p. 404, fn. 3) for "American, British, and Chinese" as Bei-Ei-Chū. By the same token, we would prefer Datsu-A ron (Fukuzawa Yukichi's phrase for his desire to see Japan "get out of Asia") to the Datsuaron used here (p. 425). Ikei *Yū (p. 404, fn. 2) should be Ikei Masaru (of Keiō University). The term dobun dōshu (p. 415), often used to stress the closeness of Chinese and Japanese, is translated here as "a common script and a common race"; bun can be interpreted here as "script," but "culture" (namely, "common culture") is preferable. Finally, the Chinese term for "aggression" (p. 420, fn. 31) is given as ginlue; it should be ginlue 侵侵略. (JAF)


In this long essay, Douglas Reynolds sets out to retrieve a decade--1898-1907--of amicable and mutually enriching Sino-Japanese relations from oblivion. This period roughly corresponds to the years between the Sino-Japanese and the Russo-Japanese Wars, although it is better thought of as the decade between the aftermath of one war and the aftermath of the other. Relying on numerous Chinese, Japanese, and English works from the period as well as subsequent scholarship, Reynolds examines numerous topics in the
intercultural Sino-Japanese mix during these years: Chinese students in Japan and Japanese teachers and advisers in China; the Japanese model for Chinese educational reforms; Chinese translations from the Japanese; the role of Japan in Chinese plans for constitutional, judicial, and modern linguistic reforms; and much more. The essay was just awarded the "Sino-Japanese Relations Prize" by the Mid-Atlantic Region of the Association for Asian Studies.

Reynolds begins with the antecedents to the 1898 Reform Movement in China and makes the important point that the Hunan reform movement modeled itself after the Meiji Restoration. One would like to see more detailed comparative studies of the specific areas in which the Meiji model served the Hunan reformers. How does a single province in an empire compare to an entire country? What role comparable to the Emperor Meiji was the Chinese emperor supposed to play? In English, Hao Chang's chapter in The Cambridge History of China (volume 11) and Noriko Kamachi's biography of Huang Zunxian (Reform in China) are only good as starting points.

In his section on Japan's dual military-civil engagement in China from the end of the 19th century, Reynolds effectively shows both that there were Japanese opposed to the partition of China and that their motives were self-preservationist. The partition of China would, in such people's eyes, lead to an increased Western presence in East Asia. This was the era in which few, in any, Japanese commentators were prepared to distinguish China's future development from Japanese prosperity. According to such reasoning, Japan could not consciously act against China's real interests, even if it may seem like that to us now.

Although the subject of Chinese students in Japan has become well known through the works of Sanetō Keishū, Marius Jansen, Abe Hiroshi, and Huang Fu-ch'ing (Huang Fuqing), the subject of Japanese teachers and advisers in late Qing China is considerably less well studied, except in China. Reynolds describes the contours of this program, its successes, and the reasons for its decline. Similarly, his section on the importance of Japanese assistance to Chinese military and police education is extremely interesting. Many future Chinese warlords were educated in Japanese military training institutes. Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) always remembered his years in Japan fondly. Less attention is paid to Japanese police training, although the Japanese were involved in both Beijing and Tianjin (and probably elsewhere as well) in organizing and training a modern police force. David Strand has shown the singular importance of the nefarious Kawashima Naniwa in the case of Beijing.

The influence exerted by Japanese translations in China has often been pointed out, and we have lengthy bibliographies of all the works rendered from Japanese, most recently in the work of
Professor Tam Yue-him (Tan Ruqian 譚汝謙) of the Chinese University of Hong Kong. We need more detailed studies beyond the titles of books. To whom were these translations directed and who read them? What role did the state play in this translation enterprise, and what was its intent? Can we separate the motives behind these efforts of men so politically different as Liang Qichao 梁啟超 and Luo Zhenyu 羅振玉? Also, all the people who are so frequently mentioned in the fin-de-siècle Chinese turn toward Japan--Cai Yuanpei 賽元培, Zhang Binglin 張炳麟, Liang Qichao, Kang Youwei 康有維, Lu Xun 魯迅, Wang Guowei 王國維, and countless others--read Japanese fluently. So, who read the hundreds of translated books?

By the same token, we need really detailed linguistic examinations of the Japanese influences on the Chinese language at this time. It is no longer sufficient to cite Liang Qichao's indebtedness to Japanese and list a few dozen character compounds that entered the Chinese language. What area was most affected by Japanese neologisms? Who, aside from Liang, created these new terms? Even more important, why was it that all of the many neologisms coined by Yan Fu 袁復 for Western concepts, a decade or more before Liang Qichao, failed to catch on? Or, did some of them through Liang?

One of Reynolds's most interesting observations comes in his section concerning the Japanese influence on late Qing constitutional reforms. The imperial institution in Japan--reigning but not ruling--beside a developing constitutional polity provided the late Qing reformers with an ideal model. In fact, Reynolds shows that the first two articles of the Principles of the Constitution, prepared by the Qing's constitutional planning office, were taken virtually in toto from the Meiji Constitution. These two points—that the emperor shall reign forever over the empire with his one unbroken line and that the emperor is "sacred and inviolable"—are fundamentally Japanese and wholly alien to Chinese ideas of the imperial institution, with its discrimination between heaven and the Son of Heaven and the latter's reliance upon a mandate bequeathed by the former.

As to why this "golden age" came to an end, Reynolds does not look to outside corrupting influences. He sees it, in part, as the ultimate result of the reasons China and Japan had initially sought each other out: self-interest. This article nicely lays out numerous topics that need much deeper analysis, and we understand that Reynolds is writing an entire book on the subject. This area of Sino-Japanese interchange is relatively better known than others, and yet it still leaves countless unanswered questions. Reynolds has begun the process.

There are a number of idiosyncratic usages that deserve mention. In a Japanese title, all words should be transcribed as they would be read in Japanese. Reynolds often transcribes Chinese
names in Japanese titles in Chinese pronunciation: for example, "Dongwen Xuetang" 東文堂 (p. 104, n. 35) in the essay by Hosono Kōji should by Dobun gakubō; and "Yang Du" 楊度 (p. 113, n. 63) in the essay by Nakamura Tadashi should be "Yo Do." The same is true for Chinese titles with Japanese proper nouns. On preferences for the capitalization of transcriptions from Chinese and Japanese, see the note (pp. 8-9 above) in this number of the Newsletter. Two minor transcription errors: Guandong (p. 124) should be Guangdong; and Sun Quanfang (p. 129) should be Sun Chuanfang. And, aside from obvious typographical errors, one should note that the Chinese character for wu in the expression (p. 138) given for "materialist philosophy" should be 物，not務．


Professor Hirano of the Department of International Relations, Tokyo University, is now the world’s leading authority on the subject of prewar Manchuria (Dongbei 東北). His extensive publications in both Japanese and English cover a wide range of political, economic, and sociological topics. He is also a leading authority on the history of Manchukuo 滿洲國，Japan’s puppet state in Northeast Asia. This essay, which follows a shorter, more theoretical one ("Ethnic Conflict and National Integration," pp. 5-16) by him in the same journal, is an effort to apply a model of top-down national integration in a multi-ethnic society, derived from the Japanese efforts in the mid-1930s through the organization known as the Concordia Association (Kyōwakai 協和會). One of the great advantages of this short essay is the fact that it provides a marvelous summary of Hirano’s (and others’) work.

Among the initial ideas for the establishment of a "state" in Manchuria, Hirano examines those of the well-known journalist and long-time China-hand, Tachibana Shiraki 橘樓. Although at first a supporter of Chinese nationalist aspirations, as articulated by the May Fourth generation of intellectuals, by the start of the 1930s Tachibana had made his celebrated "conversion" (tenkō 轉向) to advocacy of the Kwantung Army’s position on the future of the Northeast. His plan for a national assembly in Manchuria, which he submitted to the Army, called for ethnic apportionment on the basis of the contributions rendered by various nationalities toward the promotion of a state. Hirano’s keenly dissects Tachibana’s seemingly egalitarian argument to demonstrate how Japan would make use of this system of division to gain control over this new state. In fact, he argues, the essence of Tachibana’s plan lay in its effort to prevent the overwhelming Han population from
assuming political dominance of the region.

Tachibana drew from the Chinese Liji 礼記 (Book of Rites) to buttress his notion of ethnic separateness and decentralization. In the "Liyun" 礼運 (The evolution of rites) chapter of this classic, Tachibana found the convenient idea of a "kingly way" (wangdao 王道) which he posited would provide the spiritual basis for the new Manchurian state. It would be a predominantly agricultural community in which the various ethnic groups essentially were responsible for themselves. For all his efforts, Tachibana's plan was not adopted by the Kwantung Army, although some of his ideas did exert influence on the military's planning for the region. Hirano argues that the most important aspect of this influence was his demonstration to the Army that one could create the window-dressing for a state, a legislature, and an ideology, and yet run the whole show from behind the scenes.

In this and other writings of his, Hirano has shown that he is a relentless critic of prewar Japanese activities on the Asian mainland, always looking for the nefarious reason behind what appears to be obvious. Thus, in his next discussion of how the Japanese and the Manchus used each other in the creation of the Manchukuo regime, his following statement (p. 43) should have greater impact: "Of course there is no denying that the Japanese exploitation of the Manchu people was far more extensive in its nature; however, no matter how they denied it later on, at the time there is no doubt that the Manchus took full advantage of Japan's state-building activities in their territories. As a matter of fact, there is ample evidence for going so far as to say that both sides were actually co-conspirators in the affair." Bernardo Bertolucci should have read this article.

The prime example of Manchu "exploitation of the situation" was, of course, the former Qing emperor, Puyi. The Japanese military was prepared to use Puyi as symbol of legitimate rule in the region and as a focus for centralizing its own authority. Soon after Puyi was installed as Chief Executive of Manchukuo, he and his coterie began lobbying for his re-enthronement. Han Chinese in the region were less than thrilled by these developments, according to Hirano; and the Kwantung Army was forced to sponsor several groups led by ethnic Manchus to stem the tide of large-scale Han migration and growing land-cultivation there. These groups usually included the Manchu or Manchu and Mongol peoples in their titles, but Mongols played no significant role. The willingness of Manchus in the Northeast to rely on Japanese protection made it effectively impossible for them to engage in any form of joint anti-Japanese activities with their Han Chinese neighbors. They had signed their own dead certificates by being so thoroughly compromised.

Even before the Manchurian Incident of September 1931, Japanese settlers in the Northeast had begun to devise a means of defusing the rise of ethnic conflict. The idea they came up with,
minzoku kyōwa 民族協和 (ethnic harmony), was to become virtually coterminous with the name Manchukuo itself. Hirano traces the history of this concept through the responses of such men as the founders of the right-wing Manchurian Youth League to the rise of Chinese nationalism, especially that locally of Zhang Xueliang 張學良, in the late 1920s. Eventually advocates of "ethnic harmony" decided to distinguish Zhang's "lawless, egotistic, semi-feudal despotic regime" (cited on p. 49) from the ordinary Chinese masses, and in this way evade the dangerous thrust of rising Han Chinese ethnic consciousness. Thus, minzoku kyōwa was not devised as an excuse to justify Japan's conquest of Manchuria; it was developed locally by people willing, if necessary, to become independent of Japan.

Once the Kwantung Army moved in and gained effective control of the region, this concept provided a marvelous rationale for legitimizing a puppet regime. With the establishment of Manchukuo in early 1932, the military and the Manchurian Youth League formed a Concordia Party (Kyōwatō 協和党, which clearly played on the idea of ethnic "harmony" or "concord"). It was to be the single political party in the region, following the Nazi model of a one-party state. By mid-1932, though, the Kwantung Army decided to transform this party into a Concordia Association, so as to avoid conflict with other contenders for that single party and to appease the incessant opposition of Puyi. Eventually Puyi was named honorary president of the Association, but "all real power within the Association was held by a group of Japanese derived from" the Manchurian Youth League (p. 53).

Hirano concludes with several ideas about how his description of ethnic integration through the Concordia Association might provide us with insights into the efforts of other multi-ethnic states to attain centralized national integration, Lebanon being the most obvious example. More generally, Hirano's work should open our eyes to the great amount of research still to be done on this confusing chapter in East Asian history. The time has long passed when scholars could sum up the period 1931-1945 in Manchuria as Japanese aggression, collaborators, and Chinese resistance. Countless articles and books are waiting to be written, but the people, events, and ideas of the time have to be taken seriously. Hirano's work will continue to be pioneering for at least the next generation. (JAF)


This article appears in a collection of eleven essays on Lu Xun 魯迅 (1881-1936), that same one, brilliant Chinese writer of
this century who both here and abroad continues to receive the lion's share of critical attention in the field of modern Chinese literary history. In Japan, Lu Xun (actually "Ro Jin") is a household name known to virtually every literate person. Many editions of his works have been published in Japan, and many reminiscences about him have been written. Many a career in Japan has been made purely on the study of Lu Xun. Odd, indeed, that so few of the important conclusions reached by Japanese scholars have been incorporated by Western students of Lu's work. Even odder is the fact that, within this otherwise excellent collection, none of the works mentioned in Maruyama's summary of the history of Lu Xun studies in Japan has been used by any of the other ten authors. For example, John C. Y. Wang's essay, "Lu Xun as a Scholar of Traditional Chinese Literature" (pp. 90-103), makes no mention of a volume central to this theme which is cited by Maruyama, Hayashida Shinnosuke 林田慎之助, Ro Jin no naka no koten 響迅のなかの古典 [The Classics in Lu Xun] (Tokyo: Sō bunsha, 1981). We could repeat this example many times.

In any event, given the insularity from Japanese scholarship that Western Sinology seems to find so comforting, the recognition of the importance of Maruyama's theme and the inclusion of his article are to be applauded, although not uncritically. The great strength of this essay is both its description of the long history of Lu Xun's contacts in Japan and the centrality which Lu Xun has assumed in Japanese studies of modern Chinese literary history. Lu Xun had a smattering of Western friends and acquaintances (including Agnes Smedley), but he had numerous Japanese colleagues, wrote any number of pieces in Japanese (in which he interestingly used the then current Japanese expression of Shina支那 for China [see a note on the Japanese terms for "China" in a forthcoming issue of this Newsletter]), and made several extended trips to Japan. His diary is littered with the names of hundreds of Japanese whom he met.

Although the names of Lu Xun and his brother were mentioned in a Japanese journal as early as 1909, as recently discovered by Fujii Shōzō 藤井省三 (whose book on Lu Xun and Natsume Sōseki will be reviewed in a future issue of the Newsletter), the first Japanese critical look at his writing came in 1920. At that time, the famous scholar of Chinese literature from Kyoto University, Aoki Masaru 青木正兒, noted (in the most outstanding Sinological journal of the prewar era, Shinagaku支那學) that Lu Xun was a brilliant young writer with a "promising future." Lu Xun's first major translator and interpreter in Japan, with whom he became close friends, was Yamagami Masayoshi 山上正義. Maruyama has incidentally written an entire book on the relationship between these two men, Aru Chūgoku tokuhain, Yamagami Masayoshi to Ro Jin 或特使派遣員山上正義と魯迅 [A Special Correspondent in China, Yamagami Masayoshi and Lu Xun] (Tokyo: Chūō kōron sha, 1976).
The next round of Lu Xun interpreters in Japan moved his name to center stage in Japan. Satō Haruo, a formidable poet in his own right, translated several of Lu’s stories in the early 1930s and was particularly attracted to the traditional Chinese literature which he saw embedded in Lu’s writings, despite the latter’s ferocious attacks on it. Masuda Wataru, Sato’s assistant, was to become Lu Xun’s most famous Japanese friend. Their initial contact transpired at the famous bookstore in Shanghai of long-time China resident, Uchiyama Kanzō, another close friend of Lu Xun’s. Masuda would write several books on Lu in the years that followed, and he and Satō compiled the first significant edition of his "Selected Works," Ro Jin senshū (Tokyo: Iwanami, 1935). As Maruyama notes, the publication of this edition of Lu’s work greatly increased his popularity in Japan. It also led to the discovery that the teacher from his Sendai days, Dr. Fujino, immortalized in an early reminiscence by Lu, was still alive in Japan, although by this time Lu Xun had already passed away.

The most famous postwar Japanese scholar of Lu Xun and his work was the late Takeuchi Yoshimi. Maruyama’s essay is strongest in evaluating the decisive importance of Takeuchi’s work on Lu in Japan (and, ideally, outside Japan as well). Takeuchi was the first scholar to suggest that the story, presented by Lu Xun in the introduction to A Call to Arms, of his abandoning medical school for the literary arts after seeing a Chinese "spy" executed by the Japanese, might be apocryphal. This doubt has yet to make it into Western scholarship. The important point raised by Takeuchi is that one must be prepared to acknowledge a distinction between the first-person accounts in Lu’s writings and what Lu himself experienced. Takeuchi’s personal relationship with the literary and political content of Lu Xun’s work was complicated by the great pressures on Japanese scholars during the war years to support wholeheartedly the Japanese war effort. It has itself become a scholarly topic, as evidenced by the currency in Japan of the term "Takeuchi Ro Jin" (Takeuchi [Yoshimi’s major work of 1944] Lu Xun).

The immediate postwar popularity of the Chinese revolution in Japan insured enormous popularity for Lu Xun there, and until his death Takeuchi Yoshimi remained Japan’s foremost interpreter and translator of him. However, things began to change in the 1950s. As Japan’s social and economic development began to take off, Maruyama notes that fewer Japanese were able to feel that sense of solidarity with their oppressed Asian brethren. This factor, I would argue, is less important, because of the postwar Japanese academy’s decided left-wing inclination, than the second factor Maruyama points to. Having personalized the traumas described in Lu Xun’s work and experienced by Lu and his Chinese followers, many Japanese were troubled by the vicious treatment received by Xiao
Jun, Hu Feng, and Feng Xuefeng in the Anti-Rightist and earlier campaigns in China. When the CCP began to use Lu Xun in an effort to discredit his disciples, Japanese scholars were too knowledgeable about the events of the 1930s simply to mouth the Party line in bovine fashion. "From this time [namely, the Anti-Rightist campaign] forward, the Japanese became somewhat dissatisfied with and suspicious of the official Chinese interpretation of Lu Xun" (p. 236).

In the 1950s and 1960s, a new generation of Lu Xun scholars in Japan was coming of age. They founded a Ro Jin kenkū kai (Society for Lu Xun Studies) in 1952 and began to publish their own journal. In addition, a group of private citizens interested in Lu Xun got together to research materials from Lu Xun's days in the city of Sendai, where he had attended medical school, a marvelous example of just how popular he has become in Japan. Also, children's books about the life and work of Lu Xun have been prepared for elementary school children in Japan, and there are even several comic book treatments of his story. Indeed, "Lu Xun's enthusiastic Japanese readers regard him as a spiritual teacher who gives guidance to their lives and thoughts" (p. 240).

There are, unfortunately, a large number of errors and inconsistencies of transcription and translation in this article. Who edited it? Lu Xun's name in Japanese is best transcribed as two words, "Ro Jin," not "Rojin," as it is for some reason throughout this piece. Also, Japanese names that are transcribed in Chinese titles of books or articles should appear as a Chinese would read them. Hence, the piece by Yamagami Masayoshi cited in note 10 should be rendered: "Shanshang Zhengyi tan Lu Xun" [Yamagami Masayoshi on Lu Xun]. By the same token, Chinese proper nouns in a Japanese title should appear as a Japanese would ordinarily read them. Hence, the essay by Iizuka Akira (cited in note 40) should read: "Raku Binki to sono sakuhin" [Luo Binji and his works].

In note 37, the titles of two of Takeuchi Yoshimi's editions of Lu Xun's writings, Ro Jin sakuhin shū and Ro Jin hyōron shū, are translated respectively as "Collections of Lu Xun's works" and "The critical essays of Lu Xun." In notes 41 and 42, these same two titles are translated as "The collected works of Lu Xun" and "The collected essays of Lu Xun." The name of a postwar Japanese journal (see p. 236) that published many essays on Lu Xun, Hokuto, is translated as "Dipper"; to avoid the ambiguity of this rendering, it should have been translated as "Big Dipper."

Finally, there is reference (p. 241) to the influence of Lu Xun on a work by a Korean writer in Japan, Kim Tal-su. His work is given as: Bakutal no saiban [The trial of Bakutal]. This should read: Baku Tari no saiban [The Trial of Pak Tal]. *Bakutal can exist neither in Japanese nor in Korean; Japanese has no "I" phoneme and Korean has no morpheme initial "b."