Review Article

Early-Modern Japanese Confucianism: The Gyōza-Manjū Controversy

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Among Japanese scholars of early-modern (kinsei 近世) Japanese thought, there are two underlying assumptions about the nature of Confucian ideas introduced to Japan and their assimilation, as represented by what I call the Gyōza 餃子 and Manjū 馕頭 Schools. Adherents of the former school, such as Maruyama Masao 丸山真男, assume that Chinese ideographs representing Confucian ideas denoted more or less the same thing in both premodern China and Japan; after all, gyōza (fried dumplings) are virtually identical to chiao-tzu 饅子. In speech, a Japanese Confucian might pronounce key terms such as tao 道 (the Way), chung 忠 (loyalty), hsiao 孝 (filial piety), and i-li 義理 (principle of righteousness) differently from his Ming or Ch'ing Chinese counterparts, but the concepts and values signified did not differ radically. Gyōza School adherents assume that the universalist commonalities in Confucianism are of more historical importance than the minor particularist differences that might arise from its assimilation beyond China's borders.

By contrast, followers of the Manjū School, such as Tsuda Sōkichi 津田左右吉, hold that michi, chū, kō, and giri (the Japanese correlates of the four Chinese terms mentioned above), and the like are Japanese terms. These may have derived etymologically from Chinese, but the values and concepts they designated were peculiar to early-modern Japan, having been shaped by a socio-political environment drastically different from that of mid- to late-imperial China. No one biting into a Japan manjū (a bun with bean-jam filling) would ever mistake it for a Chinese man-t'ou (a kind of steamed bread), even though they are written with the same ideographs.

Built on one or the other of these underlying assumptions are two major scholarly theses about the ideological role played by Confucianism, especially the Chu Hsi 朱熹 variety, in Japan during the early-modern period. One thesis holds Confucianism to have been officially sponsored in the early seventeenth century as an "orthodoxy" supporting the existing order and Tokugawa bakufu supremacy. The other thesis sees Confucianism to have been an alien teaching and value system unsuited to, if not incompatible with, the realities of Japanese society. According to this
second thesis, Confucianism was at most a personal moral creed or an academic pursuit for private scholars, who rarely held government posts and so could not implement whatever Confucian ideals they might have held.

The key questions for this field as posed in Japanese scholarly circles, then, are: How compatible was Chinese Confucianism, an alien doctrine, to Japanese socio-political realities in the early-modern period? Could and did the Tokugawa bakufu employ Confucianism, and especially Chu Hsi Learning, as a ruling ideology? And, how far did that form of Confucianism produced in Japan diverge from its prototype in mid- to late-imperial China? Of course, these questions depend on how far one stretches the notion of compatibility, on one's definitions of "orthodoxy" and "ideology," and on the amount of Japanese variation or deviance from Chinese prototypes one will tolerate before Japanese Confucianism ceases to be "truly Confucian." But, disregarding such admittedly important considerations, I believe the basic typology just presented helps us sort out and clarify some key historical and historiographical issues addressed by a selected group of postwar Japanese intellectual historians. It is hoped that the following review, while not exhaustive, will serve to survey trends among Japanese scholars of early-modern thought.

Watanabe Hiroshi is a specialist in East Asian political thought, still in his early forties, on the Faculty of Law at Tokyo University. (Law faculties at Japanese universities include what we call political science). His distinguished academic career includes a research stint at Harvard University from 1980 to 1982, where he put his formidable linguistic skills to good use. Contact with intellectual historians of China who reside in the West, such as Benjamin Schwartz and Tu Wei-ming 杜維明, no doubt enriched his study of early-modern Japanese thought in a comparative East Asian context. Watanabe has given us a provocative book, indispensable for all working in Japanese or Sino-Japanese intellectual history. The work comprises two parts: his main treatise in three chapters entitled (in translation) "One Condition for the History of Confucianism in the First Half of the Tokugawa Period," and a Supplementary Essay on Itō Jinsai 伊藤仁斎 and Itō Tōgai 伊藤東涯 . Both parts were previously published as articles and appear here with very slight revision under the more sweeping title, Kinsei Nihon shakai to Sōgaku [Early-Modern Japanese Society and Sung Learning].

Watanabe succeeded to the law post at Tokyo University formerly held by Maruyama Masao and Matsumoto Sannosuke 松本三之助, and deference to them no doubt explains his gentle and indirect refutation of Maruyama's classic thesis, which dates from the early 1940s. The political scientist Maruyama held that: the Chu Hsi (or Sung) Learning of Fujiwara Seika 藤原惺窺
and Hayashi Razan was identical to Sung Learning in imperial China; it enjoyed a position of philosophical dominance at the very start of the Tokugawa period; it served the Tokugawa bakufu as a ruling ideology capable of inducing popular submission to the existing society as part of a "medieval natural order"; and its breakdown due to attacks by the more "modern" Ancient Learning School of Ogyu Sorai constitutes the main theme in early-modern Japanese intellectual history.

Watanabe also rejects the influential thesis produced by Tsuda Sōkichi, the premier Sino-Japanologist from Waseda University, whose distinguished career spanned both the prewar and postwar eras. Tsuda’s work in this area, published between 1916 and 1921, considered early-modern thought in Japan to be "the thought of commoners," which succeeded the earlier Nara-Heian "thought of aristocrats" and the Kamakura-Muromachi "thought of warriors." According to Tsuda, Confucianism and its Chinese cultural trappings were alien and irrelevant to "life as people actually lived it" in Japan. Concepts that best reveal true Japanese values and sentiments, such as giri or iji, cannot be properly conveyed through Chinese ideographs. Therefore, the only historically or culturally meaningful form of Japanese thought in any period was manifested in vernacular literature, not in the classical Chinese writings of Heian dairists, medieval Zen monks, or Tokugawa Confucian scholars, who were cut off from everyday life. Tsuda, then, was the most extreme Manjū School exponent, who virtually denied any place for Confucianism in the study of early-modern Japanese thought.

Watanabe is closer to, and should perhaps be seen as refining and expanding on, the work of two postwar historians: Bitō Masahide, formerly of Nagoya and Tokyo Universities, and Tahara Tsuguo of Hokkaido University. Bitō’s work was first published during the latter half of the 1950s, and Tahara’s dates from 1966-1967. It should be noted that Tsuda, Bitō, and Tahara belonged to faculties of arts and/or departments of Japanese history (kokushi), not faculties of law. Bitō and Tahara held that Chu Hsi’s Sung Learning was unsuited to socio-political realities in the first century of Tokugawa rule when it was imported, and so it could not be adapted to function as a political ideology early in that era. According to Bitō, trying to adhere to Sung Learning forced Hayashi Razan to confine himself to the realm of pure scholarship, and trying to remain faithful to the spirit of Confucianism drove Nakae Tōju and Kumazawa Banzan into hermitage or exile. On the other hand, remaining faithful to the Tokugawa socio-political order forced men like Yamazaki Ansai to do violence to Chu Hsi Learning. Bitō and Tahara were two of the earliest to raise the controversial issue of Confucianism’s "suitability" to or "compatibility" with (tekigōsei).
Japanese society—how this was lacking early in the Edo period, and how it had to be developed later on if Confucianism were to survive and prosper.

Bitō and Tahara, however, limited themselves to analyzing the writings of three or four "great thinkers" of the early Tokugawa period. Watanabe goes far beyond that. Though he rejects the labeling of his methodology as belonging to "social history," Watanabe's analysis undeniably centers on a comparative analysis of Japanese and Chinese society and of social roles and values in those two countries. He demonstrates vividly and in detail how early-modern, as opposed to a narrower Tokugawa, periodization is crucial. Watanabe forcefully argues that the Sengoku samurai ethos and the value system of early Tokugawa Japanese commoners were hostile to Confucian teachings and that this precluded any simple co-optation of Confucianism as a ruling orthodoxy or ideology. Thus, Watanabe treats roughly the first century of Tokugawa Confucianism as a historical continuation of Sengoku ideas and values, not as a historical starting point in itself, as Maruyama did; thus, Sung Learning was not a thesis for Sorai's antithesis to break down. Perhaps the most important part of Watanabe's argument (and the least well substantiated) is that, though Confucianism and Chu Hsi Learning began as alien doctrines, they became integral to Japan's early-modern culture and value system by the mid-eighteenth century, and so helped reshape Japanese society.

Through an exhaustively documented comparison of society in early-modern Japan and imperial China, Watanabe serves up his delectable manjū in Chapters 1 and 2 of Part I. For example, despite superficial similarities, the Japanese hōken system was not identical to the feng-chien order idealized in Chou times, and the Confucian shi-no-kō-shō status hierarchy had no basis in Japanese reality. Japan's early-modern daimyo and samurai, no matter what they might have fancied themselves, were not the shih of imperial China who dispensed "virtuous government." Tokugawa shoguns, unmistakably "kings" by Confucian criteria, never established the Confucian dynastic "rituals" essential to administration. "Loyalty and filial piety" differed in Japan, because the ruler-subject and parent-child relationships inhered in different political and family systems. Japanese samurai performed social roles that Chinese Confucians would have despised as fit for "bad iron" soldiers or eunuchs. The family members of Japanese Confucian scholars routinely violated Chinese Confucian taboos on marriage and adoption. And, above all, what self-respecting man of the sword would allow himself to be seen crying at funerals just because that was stipulated by the Book of Rites?

Having established that Chu Hsi Learning could not serve as an orthodoxy in seventeenth-century Japan, Watanabe outlines his
three-stage developmental scheme for Confucianism in general and describes the significance of that learning during the early-modern period. Stage I is the pre-Jinsai age of transmission, adaptation, and digestion of Chu Hsi Learning from 1600-1684. Stage II is the age of Jinsai, Sorai, and the Sekimon shingaku, from 1688 to 1747. For Watanabe, this represents the highpoint of Japanese Confucian thought. Stage III is the developmental age from 1748-1751 onward; it was characterized by eclecticism and schools influenced by Sorai but not necessarily Confucian, including thinkers as diverse as the Nativists (kokugakusha 国学者), bellettrists, and Rangaku (Dutch Learning) political economists.

Although there were far more Confucian thinkers in the second half of the early-modern period, Watanabe argues that most of those known to us today as "great" or "original" lived in the first half; and that era corresponds to Stages I and II of his periodization scheme. Watanabe explains this early burst of intellectual creativity as arising from the stress and tension experienced by Confucians struggling to overcome inconsistencies and contradictions in life. On a personal level, they had to cope with being both samurai and Confucian; and in politics and society, they had to compromise their foreign ideals to indigenous realities. This was especially true in Stage I, before Jinsai and Sorai, when Japanese intellectuals made Chu Hsi Confucianism palatable to their countrymen by consciously altering and adapting Sung Learning to fit the needs of their society.

That quest found culmination in Stage II, with the appearance of Japan’s Ancient Learning School led by Itō Jinsai and Ogyū Sorai, who systematically rejected Sung Learning as incorrect and created forms of Confucianism suitable to early-modern Japanese society. As outlined in the Supplementary Essay in this volume, for Watanabe, Itō Jinsai’s life history personifies how Confucianism was naturalized in Japan. Jinsai began as a Chu Hsi follower and became a recluse for eight years, trying to adhere to those alien teachings; but then he abandoned Chu Hsi, formulated his own thought, and returned to his family and society. For Jinsai, the Way of the Confucian sages was not something difficult and foreign; it was "plain and familiar" or accessible in everyday Japanese life. The Confucian "Principle of Heaven" accorded with jō 情, "human tenderness and compassion." As Watanabe holds, that was precisely the nasake 情 and ninjō 人情 that pervaded Kyoto-Ösaka merchant society; and, I would add, was depicted in Genroku 元禄 literature as Tsuda claimed. But, Jinsai’s manjū-style interpretation of jō contradicted Chu Hsi’s view of ch’ing 情 as emotion leading men to stray from the Way.

By the same token, Sorai naturalized Confucianism by politicizing it to fit what he saw as the needs of Edo bakufu rule. From about 1680 onward, Tokugawa shoguns such as Tsunayoshi 綱吉
became somewhat receptive to Confucian ideas. But, that receptivity was limited to listening to what scholar-advisors such as Arai Hakuseki 新井白石 preached, not putting it into political practice. According to Watanabe, Sorai reinterpreted the Chinese Confucian classics with the aim of convincing bakufu leaders that Confucianism really was essential to rulership. For example, his rigorous philological methods led him to argue that unless Japan's shogun-king created proper dynastic rituals—an act which defined the Way for Sorai—peace and prosperity could not be maintained in the realm. So, in sum, Sorai made Confucianism suitable for early-modern Japan in the realm of political theory, just as Jinsai had in that of personal morality.

Watanabe attempts to reinterpret early-modern Japanese Confucianism in a provocatively original way; and he succeeds admirably in many respects, for the book is extremely informative and valuable. Indeed, the insights that Watanabe provides on thought, politics, and society in imperial China alone make this book worth reading. The breadth and depth of Watanabe's erudition and his command of Japanese and Chinese sources astound even his most vituperative critics. But still, Kinsei Nihon shakai to Sogaku is not without problems. I will begin by noting specific points in Watanabe's argument that seem questionable. Then, I will deal with the book's larger issues in the context of postwar Japanese secondary scholarship on early-modern thought.

First, I would debate Watanabe's rejection of Confucianism in general, as opposed to Chu Hsi's Sung Learning in particular, as unsuited to serve as a doctrine supporting the bakuhanshō system. Granted, only a small number of late Sengoku and early Tokugawa Japanese could even read classical Chinese, much less master the intricacies of Chu Hsi thought. Daimyo and samurai met it with derision, and commoners could scarcely tell it apart from Christianity. Granted also that the status hierarchy in Japan was fluid, not fixed, in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries; hence, it did not correspond to some idealized version of the Chou era's shi-nō-kō-shō ranking system. To his credit, Watanabe has demonstrated all of this conclusively and graphically, using concrete examples culled from a plethora of rarely cited primary sources. But, as his critics have noted, to demand an accurate grasp of Chu Hsi thought among early Tokugawa thinkers is asking too much. I believe it is best to distinguish Confucianistic ideas and values, as these evolved in Japan, from Confucian ideas and values as practiced in the Chinese homeland. Clearly, some Confucianistic ideas and values did coincide, accidentally or not, with certain administrative aims of early bakufu rulers: to organize society on a strict hierarchy, to prize mental over physical labor as a moral basis for determining that hierarchy, and to rely on agriculture more
than commerce for government revenues. As Watanabe himself points out, there was in fact a discriminatory early-modern Japanese status hierarchy that placed outcasts, peasants, and townspeople (in ascending order) below the samurai, daimyo, and court nobility above. Furthermore, the more common trend of monetary and taxation systems in early-modern world history has been to advance from payment-in-kind to payment-in-cash. But, the early Edo bakufu intentionally ignored the kandaka system of money-use, quite widespread in central and western Japan, in favor of the seemingly more reactionary kokudaka system of rice-use.

Thus, the key point about early-modern Japan’s assimilation and political utilization of Confucian values, as Kinugasa Yasuki holds, is that thinkers like Kaibara Ekken had to fix the moral status hierarchy along hereditary lines and devise a version of Confucianism that conformed to the economic principles on which the bakuhans state based itself. And, as Miyake Masahiko holds, much in Chu Hsi Learning was logically compatible with the ideological aims of bakufu rule—though it was not necessarily "suitable," and I certainly reject his assertion that the bakufu’s adoption of Confucianism as a political orthodoxy was "inevitable." How far the bakufu sponsored Confucianism is debatable, but it certainly did not suppress Confucianism as it did Christianity or Fuju fuse Buddhism; and this can be interpreted as contra-factual evidence indicating a degree of official favor. Confucian thinkers eagerly joined Buddhists in other sects, who were sponsored through the temple-registration system, in attacking the wicked cult of Christianity as inimical to the early-modern Japanese state and society.

A second specific point I find questionable is Watanabe’s stress on Japan’s particular ie system as precluding the easy assimilation of Confucian family morality. Above all, Chinese filial piety (hsiao) called for preserving the extended-family bloodline through male offspring. But, in early-modern Japan, keeping the family bloodline intact was far less important than making the family’s inherited occupation prosper. This was the essence of kō (filial piety) in Japan. Heads of Japanese households adopted males having no blood ties as husbands for their daughters and named them heirs on condition that, if need be, they abandon their real parents for the good of the adoptive house. This observation on the manjū-style difference between hsiao and kō, though undeniably true at one level of generalization, is somewhat oversimplified and therefore misleading. For example, it overlooks the prevalent prewar Japanese sentiment that becoming an adopted son was undesirable, something a man would not normally do except at the prompting of his own parents and for reasons calculated ultimately to benefit the house into which he
had been born. Early-modern Japanese were not quite so ready, as Watanabe implies, to slight blood ties. Indeed, many adopted sons (yōshi 養子) were nephews adopted by uncles, not by the proverbial "total strangers" (aka no tanin 赤の他人). Indeed, it is not too exaggerated to say that, for a man to become an adopted son was something akin to a daughter being sold to a brothel. Again, the general Confucianistic ideal of filial piety, or "filial submission" as Frederick Mote translates the term, was the same in both China and Japan: lauding children who agreed to sacrifice their own happiness for the sake of parents and family, though the nature of "family" did differ in Japan. Also, Watanabe could have strengthened his argument by citing the particularistic Japanese form of filial piety often noted by Japanese folklore (minzokugaku 民俗学) specialists such as Yanagida Kunio 柳田國男: that filial piety in Japan meant observing Buddhist memorial services for the dead, a form of ancestor worship. Finally, Watanabe does not satisfactorily explain the fanatical emphasis that early-modern Japanese placed on the nation's imperial line, supposedly unbroken since Amaterasu 天照 (the Sun Goddess). Thinkers in virtually all schools gloated over this "fact" that putatively demonstrated Japan's uniqueness and superiority in the world.

Third, vexing ambiguities arise over Watanabe's use of the term "Sung Learning" itself. Does he intend it to mean "Chu Hsi Learning" exclusively, or more broadly as "all Confucian schools that emerged from the Sung period onward?" Even in China, Sung Learning in this latter sense appeared in radically different forms as dictated by changing socio-political conditions. Watanabe is correct to assert that the Chinese civil service examination system encouraged egalitarianism and moderated the general Confucian emphasis on social hierarchy and rule by mental laborers, as noted above. So, in that sense, early-modern Confucianistic ideas and values did differ significantly from Chu Hsi's brand of Sung Learning in imperial China. But, it is also true that in both the Sung and late Ch'ing eras, known for their strident Chinese culturalism, central governments relied more on commercial taxes than land taxes for revenue; and leaders rationalized this policy based on ideas found in the "Debates on Salt and Iron" of the Han dynasty or in writings from the Sung era. Did that make those Chinese dynasties somehow less "Confucian?"

This last point leads to an examination of larger issues encompassing the book as a whole. My first comment on this score concerns not only Watanabe, but all Japanese scholars of early-modern thought who work within the gyōza-manjū typology. How far did Confucianism have to be altered to become "suitable," and was the end product no longer really "Confucian?" As we have seen, the Gyōza School emphasizes universalist commonalities in
China and Japan. Maruyama’s classic work even attempted to place early-modern Japanese thought in a global historical framework: the transition from a "medieval" identification of the socio-political order with the natural order, to a "modern" view of state and society as man-made. His analysis also extends to the end of the Tokugawa period. These points hold as well for the more recent work of Kinugasa and Miyake, cited above, though perhaps to a lesser extent. By contrast, the Manjū School’s particularist "unsuitability" thesis—though its academic respectability is beyond doubt—seems to contain traces of a more vulgar Nihonjin ron日本人論; and it tends to limit itself to the first half of the Tokugawa period. The Manjū School is without a doubt something legitimate and highly valuable, which has grown out of the Nativist kokugaku, kokushi, and minzokugaku scholarly traditions in Japan. It rightly warns us against the danger of drawing abstract and over-generalized comparisons with China and the West that ignore the concrete realities of Japanese life; and it can be applied as a corrective to doctrines as diverse as Marxism, modernization theory, and the "same culture, same race" ideology of prewar Japanese expansionism.

However, those of us who live outside of Japanese academe or work in non-Japanese fields cannot help being puzzled by the tenacity and pervasiveness of this gyōza-manjū controversy in contemporary Japanese scholarship. Would, say, a British historian assert that the Anglican Church was not really "Christian" because it was overly compromised to English socio-political realities? Chinese medievalists do argue that Buddhism was alien to China and had to be sinified to gain acceptance, but that is not so dominant and recurring a theme in Chinese intellectual history. We Westerners would profit greatly by assiduously following issues and trends in Japanese secondary scholarship, and we have long been inexcusably delinquent about this. Yet, by the same token, our Japanese colleagues in the field today find their own research at a bottleneck that stems partly from an excessive (and parochial) concern with "suitability." A bit of "internationalization," as the current catchphrase goes, might help generate fresh new insights.

Watanabe has striven mightily to provide these insights through a comparative-contrastive approach, concluding both that Confucianism was alien to begin with and that it became integral to Japanese culture. But, the predominant thrust of his argument ends up emphasizing the first conclusion; roughly 180 pages (Chapters 1 and 2) in a 252-page book are devoted to it. Such an imbalance may cause the casual, or unkind, reader to overlook the second half of Watanabe's argument. Unfortunately, his use of the expression "Early-Modern Japanese Society" in the book's title does much to contribute to this misunderstanding. Japanese historical periodization conventionally lists "early-modern"
(kinsei) as from 1568 to either 1853 or 1867. That leads the reader to expect extensive coverage of the second half of the Edo period, as Kinugasa Yasuki’s Kinsei Jugaku shisō shi no kenkyū does in its three-stage periodization of Confucian thought. Watanabe’s unsuitability thesis is questionably valid when applied to the era 1568 to 1600, or even down to 1680 when contemporaries finally began to realize that theirs was an era of peace rather than war. But, we are told virtually nothing about Stage III, from 1748-1751 onward, except that it was characterized by eclecticism and schools of thought influenced by Sorai but not necessarily Confucian. In fairness to Watanabe, he does address these post-1750 issues in other published work. Nonetheless, when considered as an independent monograph, Kinsei Nihon shakai to Sōgaku does not deliver what its title promises. This characteristic appears to be common to all the postwar Manjū scholars reviewed here, except for Tsuda. Tahara Tsuguo, for example, claims to present "Studies in Tokugawa Intellectual History," but he never gets beyond Jinsai and Sorai; and the same general point can be made about Bito Masahide, who purports to cover Japan’s entire "feudal" period.

Specifically, then, what issues should Watanabe have raised and answered in Part III? The first concerns Ito Jinsai, who represents the highpoint in early-modern Japanese Confucianism for Watanabe. He argues that Jinsai succeeded in naturalizing Confucianism by making it "plain and familiar" or accessible to the merchant class, and by interpreting key Confucian terms in a manner consistent with ninjō or the kind of "human tenderness and compassion" that may or may not be unique to the Japanese. Yet, Watanabe also tells us that Ishida Baigan and Sekimon shingaku arrived at a similar naturalization of Confucian ideas and values and did so in colloquial Japanese. That presumably would have been even more "plain and familiar" to the Tokugawa merchant class, or at least to most sectors of it. A curious question then arises: Why should early-modern Japanese commoners or samurai want to spend years studying an archaic foreign language to get largely the same message available in native form? Would they not conclude, as Tsuda contends, that Confucianism was superfluous to their daily lives and needs, especially as the Edo period progressed? Quite to the contrary, Confucianism gained in popularity among all social classes during the second half of the period and became more and more identified with a burgeoning Japanese nationalism. Witness Yoshida Shōin, whose legendary Japanese spirit was best manifested in his 1855 prison commentaries on the Mencius. How is this seeming re-fusion of Confucianism with Nativism in the late Tokugawa period to be explained? As well, a detailed discussion of Yoshida Shōin’s thought would certainly have strengthened Watanabe’s argument that Sung Learning became integral to early-modern Japan’s cul-
ture and value system.

The second and related question I raise here has to do with the political implications of Ōgyū Sorai's emphasis on bakufu dynastic rule. According to Watanabe, Sorai made Confucianism politically suitable to Japan by reinterpreting the Chinese classics so as to convince bakufu leaders that Confucian ritual was absolutely needed to maintain domestic stability and well-being. Watanabe relates too that shoguns from Yoshimune onward never heeded this advice, and yet Japan was none the worse for it; the nation paradoxically remained at peace and became seemingly more prosperous. So again, why did Confucianism grow in strength and popularity when, as Sorai's students lamented, it and they had proven to be useless in government? Watanabe also tells us—and I find this suggestion fascinating—that the bakufu's rejection of Confucian ritual in its own administration later helped direct the people's minds to imperial court ritual and so encouraged reverence for the throne. Details are lacking, however.

Other controversial historical issues go unmentioned as well. For example, what political implications did the Kansei ban on Heterodox Learning have? We find no discussion of how, or whether, Western Learning and Confucian political economy helped strengthen the status quo and bakufu supremacy from the late eighteenth century onward. What implications did Confucianism have for facilitating, or impeding, the assimilation of advanced technology and socio-political forms of organization from the West between 1853 and 1868?

In sum, Kinsei Nihon shakai to Sōgaku does not deal with three important post-1750 problems: (1) the key role of Kokugaku and Shinto in bolstering the prestige and increasing the popularity of Confucianism among all social strata; (2) the ideological and political uses to which the Edo bakufu put all Stage III schools of thought, those influenced by Sorai even if not Confucian; and (3) the legacy that early-modern Japanese Confucianistic thought bequeathed to later eras. As mentioned earlier, Watanabe does deal with these issues in other published pieces; and therefore we can look forward eagerly to their revision and republication as monographs or volumes of collected essays.14

For the most part, Chinese, Japanese, and Western academics still live in separate worlds, even when they work in the same relatively narrow field or discipline. The intrinsic difficulty of classical Chinese and classical Japanese primary sources, the need to acquaint oneself with Western critical methods, and the burgeoning amount of secondary scholarship produced in Japanese, in Chinese, and in Western languages all make the effort to achieve scholarly communication across national lines more and more difficult today. So, it is truly heartening to see a young
scholar such as Watanabe equally at home and functioning in all
three academic worlds. His presence promises to raise the level
and increase the scope of research in Japanese and comparative
East Asian thought. Let us hope that his works will appear in
English and Chinese translations, so that non-Japanese readers
will have ready access to his seminal writings.

Notes

1. As will become apparent, the contours of the kinsei or
early-modern period (1568 to 1853 or 1868) are of decisive impor-
tance for this discussion. That is why I have tried to avoid
using the more familiar and convenient term "Tokugawa Confucianism."

2. Part One, "Tokugawa zenki Jugaku shi no ichi jōken" 徳川
前期儒学史の一条 [One condition for the history of
Confucianism in the first half of the Tokugawa period], was
published in Kokka gakkai zasshi 国家学会雑誌, 94:1-2
(February 1981) and 96:7-8 (August 1983); Part Two, "Itō Jinsai,
Tōgai" was published in Sagara Tōru 相良享, et al., ed., Edo
no shisōkatachi jō 江戸の思想家たち上 [Thinkers of the Edo
appreciation to Watanabe for personal correspondence on several
occasions, which has done much to clarify my understanding of his
ideas. He also has generously sent me copies of all his pub-
lished work, enlightened me about numerous primary sources, and
referred me to the relevant publications of other Japanese scholars.

3. Nihon seijī shisō shi kenkyū 日本政治思想史研究
[Studies in the History of Japanese Political Thought] (Tokyo:
Tōkyō daigaku shuppankai, 1952). However, the essays that com-
prise this book first appeared in the early 1940s. Mikiso Hane
has performed the valuable service of translating Maruyama’s
classic into English under the title Studies in the Intellectual
History of Tokugawa Japan (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press,
1974). Note that Maruyama, in the "Author’s Introduction" to
this translation, has modified many of his earlier views.

4. See Tsuda Sōkichi, Bungaku ni arawaretaru waga kokumin
shisō no kenkyū 文學に現はれた吾が國民思想の研究
[Studies in Japanese National Thought as Expressed in Literature]
5. Bitō Masahide, Nihon hōken shisō shi kenkyū 日本封建
思想史研究 [Studies in the History of Japanese Feudal
were published independently from 1956 to 1959. Tahara Tsuguo,
Tokugawa shisō shi kenkyū 徳川思想史研究 [Studies in the

6. See the review by Hongo Takamori 本郷隆盛, of Miyagi
Kyōiku University, in Shigaku zasshi 史学雑誌, 96:4 (April
1987), p. 78. One notes that the capacity for venom in our field
is not limited to this side of the Pacific.

7. Here the once-venerated distinction in ancient history
between "Hellenic" (real Greek) and "Hellenistic" ("Greekish" as
adapted by non-Greek) civilization is instructive.

8. Kinugawa Yasuki, Kinsei Jugaku shisōshi no kenkyū 近世
儒学思想史の研究 [Studies in the History of Early-Modern
Again, Kinugasa's book is composed of essays previously pub­
lished, in this case between 1959 and 1965. However, Kinugasa
has added new material and considerably revised portions of the
book that had come out before.

9. Miyake Masahiko, "Edo jidai no shisō" 江戸時代の思想
[Thought in the Edo Period], in Ishida Ishirō 石田一郎, ed.,
Taikei Nihon shi sōshi 23: Shisō shi II 大系日本史著書 23:
思想史 II [Compendium of Works on Japanese History, Vol. 23:

10. This sentiment remained prevalent until postwar legal
reforms and changing mores altered the traditional family system.

11. I say "Japanese scholars" because Tokugawa specialists in
the West generally ignore this typology in favor of analyzing
early Tokugawa Confucianism as "ideology," and they usually apply
theories from literary criticism, semiotics, or structural and
symbolic anthropology. See the prime example of Herman Ooms,
Also, it is interesting to note that, among Japanese scholars,
Gyōza School adherents tend to belong to law schools or political
science departments, whereas Manjū School followers tend to be in
Japanese history or literature departments. This is not a hard­
and-fast generalization, and Watanabe would seem to present an
exception.
12. See: (1) "Michi' to 'miyabi' ["The Way" and "Elegance"], a long treatise on Kokugaku, in four parts, published in *Kokka gakkai zasshi* 87:9-10 (September 1974), 87:11-12 (November 1974), 88:3-4 (March 1975), and 88:5-6 (May 1975); (2) *Kinsei Nihon seiji shisō shi* [A History of Early-Modern Japanese Political Thought] (Tokyo: Nihon hôsô shuppan kyôkai, 1985); (3) "'Go ikō' to shōchō" ["Authority" and Symbol], *Shisō* 740 (February 1986); and (4) "'Taihei' to 'Kôkoku'" ["Peace" and "Empire"], in *Kokka gakkai zasshi*, ed., *Kokka to shimin* [State and Citizens] (Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 1987), vol. 2. I wish to thank Watanabe for providing me with copies of all these publications.

13. This concern that a book's title correspond to its content may be peculiarly Western in nature, however. Note that Mikiso Hane translated Maruyama's *Nihon seiji shisō shi kenkyū* (literally, "Studies in the History of Japanese Political Thought") as *Studies in the Intellectual History of Tokugawa Japan*, limiting it to the period with which it actually deals.

14. A perfectionist, Watanabe refuses to publish anything in book form that does not meet his meticulously high standards. It should also be noted that in Japan the publishing of articles in specialized journals does not imply the same "finality" as in the North American scholarly world. A Japanese will publish an article partly to get feedback from colleagues in the field, somewhat as a Western scholar might circulate a word-processed draft copy of an article to solicit comments. Though this analogy is admittedly overdrawn, it helps explain why so many Japanese scholarly books are in fact collections of previously published essays--something quite rare in North America.